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For thought is a bird of space, that in a cage of words may 
indeed unfold its wings but cannot fly.  
Kahlil Gibran, The Prophet (London: Penguin Classics, 2002 
reprint), at 68.    
 
 
 
 
A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the 
skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and 
content according to the circumstances and the time in which it 
is used.   
Justice Holmes, Towne v Eisner, 245 US 418 (1918), at 425. 
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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the rules of treaty interpretation as they are applied by foreign 
investment arbitral tribunals (“FIATs”).  Its primary aims are: 
a) to determine whether FIAT treaty interpretation practice is generally consistent 
with other international courts and tribunals;  
b) to assess whether the treaty interpretation rules contained in the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (“Vienna Convention”) are suitable for 
application in investor-State treaty disputes; and  
c) to evaluate the contribution of FIAT treaty interpretation jurisprudence to 
international law.  
The body of the thesis provides a background to treaty interpretation rules in 
international law and then examines in detail the application of the rules of 
interpretation contained in the Vienna Convention by both international courts and 
tribunals and FIATs.  It also explores modes of interpretation that have been deployed 
by these two groups which are not explicitly referenced in the Vienna Convention.  
Investigation is also made of some unique or notable aspects of FIAT jurisprudence 
that relates to treaty interpretation.  The research was carried out primarily through the 
analysis of international court and tribunal decisions and FIAT awards.  
The principal findings of the thesis are that:  
a) a general congruence exists between the interpretative practice of FIATs and 
that of other international courts and tribunals;  
b) the application of the Vienna Convention rules on treaty interpretation are 
suitable for investment treaty arbitration, with some exceptions, e.g., in 
situations where investors have vastly disproportionate access to the 
preparatory work of treaties as compared with respondent States; and  
c) FIATs have made a significant contribution to the international law of treaty 
interpretation. 
* * *
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PREFACE 
Gustave Flaubert is said to have kept a scrap-book entitled ‘The Dictionary of 
Received Ideas’.  Many parts of this thesis possess the same nature as Flaubert’s 
assemblage.  Much of my work is a collection and systemisation of ideas received 
through the reading of arbitral awards and publications.  They were not my ideas.  I 
simply cut them out and pasted them into the numerous scrap-book like drafts of this 
thesis.  The mechanics of my thesis writing process thus involved a good deal of 
plundering, reciting and recycling.  As such, I feel a pinch of unease that it should be 
catalogued as a work solely attributed to me.  But then again, I do take much pride in 
having tamed an unwieldy mass of received ideas and arranged them into a coherent, 
structured narrative, providing comments where I could make them and drawing on 
them to answer the primary questions posed in the thesis.  Sometimes this involved 
long hours of tedious work in cold, lonely libraries.  At other times, it seemed an 
indulgent pleasure.  Part of the feelings I experienced during those highs are 
delightfully reflected in what the Pulitzer Prize winning author, Bernard Malamud, 
described as ‘the enjoyment of finding new opportunities in old sentences, twisting, 
tying, looping structure tighter, finding pegs to tie onto what were apparently not there 
before, deepening meanings, strengthening logicality’.1 
The primary well-spring of inspiration for this thesis is the exemplary role provided 
by my father.  I will always be in awe at his inexhaustible passion for the rule of 
international law and his erudition in areas well beyond the law.  Words are not 
capable of encapsulating my infinite gratitude to him.  As a side note, I should 
mention that quite independent of him, I started upon my research and writing on 
treaty interpretation.  Not until I was some way into the research did I pleasantly 
discover that my father had also given serious thought to writing on the subject.  He 
subsequently discovered in his files a handwritten outline of the contents of a book on 
treaty interpretation.  It is a loss to all of us that he did not continue this endeavour, as 
he would have—in his inimitable style—produced a majestic work brimming with 
vision and inspiration.   
Two subsidiary sources of inspiration also need to be acknowledged.  First is the seed 
planted in my mind by Toby Landau’s address at the London ICCA conference.  He 
there spoke about public international law as a forgotten resource for commercial 
lawyers and suggested employing Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties to clarify the New York Convention.2  The second, took place later, 
as I was starting to realise the immense dimensions of the material required to be 
                                                 
1 Quoted in Joyce Carol Oates, ‘Today I Invented Sunshine’, Times Literary Supplement, 21 & 28 
December 2007, at p. 11. 
2  See Toby Landau, ‘The Requirement of a Written Form for an Arbitration Agreement: when 
“Written” Means “Oral”’, in A.J. van den Berg (ed.), International Commercial Arbitration: Important 
Contemporary Questions, ICCA Congress Series No. 11, ICCA Conference, London (The Hague: 
Kluwer 2002), p. 19, at pp. 75-80.  Originally my thesis topic focussed on the use of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties to interpret the New York Convention. 
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marshalled to formulate the thesis.  At that time, I had the good fortune of reading 
Aristotle’s The Politics.  His assiduous use of sources to compile his study of 
constitutions more than 2000 years ago struck me as nothing short of monumental.  If 
this could be done with the rudimentary materials and research tools available to 
Aristotle, I – as a beneficiary of the technological advances bestowed by the likes of 
Gutenberg, Gates and Google – had no excuse for submitting a thesis that lacked a 
high degree of research.     
Nonetheless, despite the tremendous advantages of modern technology, the deluge of 
arbitration awards that have flooded the plains of international investment law since I 
commenced my research has prevented me from reviewing every award.  I did, 
however, attempt to cover the most prominent decisions, particularly those reported in 
the ICSID Reports.  Out of practical necessity, March 2009 was arbitrarily imposed as 
a cut-off point.  Prominent awards published after this date have not been considered 
as thoroughly as awards issued prior to this date.  If relevant case law is omitted, I 
alone am answerable for this deficiency.   
As a result of my common law training, I am also answerable for any distortions 
created by a disproportionate use of common law references or analogies.  It is hoped 
that the inevitable shortcomings produced by this narrowness of perspective may be 
rectified by scholars who have familiarity with the world’s other legal systems and 
traditions. 
All the investment arbitration awards and decisions cited in this thesis, unless 
otherwise indicated, are available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca or 
www.investmentclaims.com.  To be economical with words and to avoid repetition, I 
have refrained from mentioning these websites when citing awards.  In relation to 
ICSID awards, http://icsid.worldbank.org helpfully cites other reports or journals 
where these awards have been published.  Where the cited awards have paragraph 
numbers, usually those only have been cited in footnotes.  Where no paragraph 
numbers are present, a citation has been made to the page number in the ICSID 
Reports, or other relevant report.  In the footnotes, quotations are provided in 
parentheses where they are short and to the point.  They are not so provided when 
relevant sections are too lengthy too quote or are otherwise not suitable for quotation.  
Writing this thesis has, at times, felt like partaking in a voyage scripted by Homer, full 
of delays, distractions and danger.  The energy and the desire needed to sustain me on 
this epic journey would not have been sufficient without the extraordinary and 
unconditional support from all my family (including nieces, nephews, aunts and 
uncles) and the finest of friends.  There also several academics and practitioners who 
have generously shared their time and views with me.  To the best of my abilities, I set 
out here a list of those who have assisted in this odyssey of mine.  There is a risk that I 
have made some omissions and of course this has not been intentional.  Profound 
thanks must be given to my mother and father for their love, concern, kindness and 
financial support; Professors Julian Lew QC and Loukas Mistelis for their expert 
guidance on the thesis content and their unfaltering encouragement despite the many 
completion schedules that slipped their leash; Ravi, Shala, Nil, Rosh, their beautiful 
families, Uncle Trevor, Aunty Yvonne, Danthi and all at Littleton Street for their 
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constant interest, care and support; Manu for her wonderful relief packages sent to me 
in all corners of the world; Andy and Rach for keeping up my spirits by taking me on 
their incredible adventures; Shane and Ios for the homely London accommodation; 
Jules for the friendship and the coffee; Mizuno for their running shoes (runs often 
maintained my sanity); and Claire Wilson for her swift and thorough editing.  Special 
appreciation must also be recorded for the help and wise advice received at various 
stages from (in alphabetical order) Professor Georges Abi-Saab, Dr Femi Elias, 
Professor Judd Epstein, Professor Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Professor Tom Franck, 
Professor Alejandro Garro, Craig Harrison SC, Dr Veijo Heiskanen, Dr Sarah Hilmer, 
Professor Michael Reisman, Silja Schaffstein, Tim Sowden and Professor Wang 
Guiguo. 
I must also thank the staff and acknowledge the first-class facilities of the following 
libraries at which I had the privilege to study and conduct research for the thesis: City 
University of Hong Kong; Columbia Law School, New York; L’Institut de hautes 
études internationales et du développement (HEI), Geneva; Institute of Advanced 
Legal Studies, University of London; London School of Economics; Monash 
University Faculty of Law, Melbourne; New York University School of Law; the 
Peace Palace Library, The Hague; and the United Nations Library, Palais des Nations, 
Geneva. 
Finally, for the motivation to wrap up my work with still so many sources and avenues 
unexplored and to desist from including everything possibly relevant in the thesis, I 
am indebted to the observation of Barry Humphries in his autobiography My Life as 
Me: ‘Voltaire was right when he defined a bore as a man who leaves nothing out’.   
* * *  
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Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan, (Indonesia v. Malaysia) 
Judgment, ICJ Reports 2002 p. 625 
Temple of Preah Vihear, (Cambodia v. Thailand)  (Preliminary Objections), ICJ 
Reports 1961 p. 17  
Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear, (Cambodia v. Thailand) Merits, 
Judgment, 15 June 1962, ICJ Reports 1962 p. 6 
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Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1994 
p. 6  
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1980 
p. 3 
Western Sahara case, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1975) p. 12  
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FIAT AWARDS 
 
AAP Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Democratic Socialist 
Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Award (27 
June 1990) 4 ICSID Rep 245. 
AAP (Dissenting 
Opinion) 
Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Democratic Socialist 
Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Dissenting 
Opinion (27 June 1990) 4 ICSID Rep 245. 
ADC  ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited 
v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, Award (2 
October 2006). 
ADF (Order No. 
2) 
ADF Group Inc. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. 
ARB (AF)/00/1, Procedural Order No 2, Concerning Place of 
Arbitration, (11 July 2001). 
ADF (Order No. 
3) 
ADF Group Inc. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. 
ARB (AF)/00/1, Procedural Order No. 3 (4 October 2001). 
ADF (Award) ADF Group Inc. v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. 
ARB (AF)/00/1, Final Award (9 January 2003) 6 ICSID Rep 449. 
AES  AES Corporation v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/17, Decision on Jurisdiction (26 April 2005). 
Aguas del Tunari Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/3, Decision on Jurisdiction (21 October 2005) 20 ICSID 
Rev-FILJ 450. 
Aguas 
Provinciales 
Aguas Provinciales de Santa Fe S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de 
Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and InterAguas Servicios Integrales del 
Agua S.A.  v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, 
Order in Repsonse to a Petition for Participation as amicus curiae 
(17 March 2006). 
Amco 
(Jurisdiction) 
Amco Asia Corporation v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/81/1, Decision on Jurisdiction (25 September 1983) 1 
ICSID Rep 376. 
Amco (Award) Amco Asia Corporation v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/81/1, Award (20 November 1984) 1 ICSID Rep 413. 
Amco 
(Annulment) 
Amco Asia Corporation v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/81/1, Annulment (16 May 1986) 1 ICSID Rep 509. 
J O S E P H  R O M E S H  W E E R A M A N T R Y                                          18  P H D  T H E S I S  |  U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  L O N D O N  
Amco 
(Resubmitted  
Jurisdiction) 
Amco Asia Corporation v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/81/1, Resubmitted Case: Decision on Jurisdiction (10 
May 1988) 1 ICSID Rep 543. 
Amco 
(Resubmitted  
Award) 
Amco Asia Corporation v. Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, 
Resubmitted Case: Award on the Merits (5 June 1990) 1 ICSID 
Rep 569. 
Amco 
(Resubmitted 
Rectification) 
Amco Asia Corporation v. Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, 
Resubmitted Case: Decision on Rectification (10 October 1990) 1 
ICSID Rep 569. 
American 
Manufacturing 
(Award) 
American Manufacturing & Trading v. Republic of Zaire, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/93/1, Award (21 February 1997) 5 ICSID Rep 11. 
American 
Manufacturing 
(Opinions) 
American Manufacturing & Trading v. Republic of Zaire, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/93/1, Individual Opinions (21 February 1997). 
Archer Daniels 
(Order) 
Archer Daniels Midland Company and Tate & Lyle Ingredients 
Americas, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB 
(AF)/04/5, Order of the Consolidation Tribunal (20 May 2005). 
Archer Daniels 
(Award) 
Archer Daniels Midland Company and Tate & Lyle Ingredients 
Americas, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB 
(AF)/04/5, Award (Redacted Version) (21 November 2007). 
Aucoven 
(Jurisdiction) 
Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela v. Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/5, Decision on Jurisdiction 
(27 September 2001) 6 ICSID Rep 417. 
Aucoven (Award) Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela v. Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/5, Award (23 September 
2003). 
Azinian (Award) Robert Azinian and others v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case 
No. ARB (AF)/97/2, Award (1 November 1999) 5 ICSID Rep 
269. 
Azurix 
(Jurisdiction) 
Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, 
Decision on Jurisdiction (8 December 2003) 43 ILM 262. 
Azurix (Award) Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, 
Final Award (14 July 2006). 
Banro Banro American Resources, Inc. and Société Aurifère du Kivu et 
du Maniema S.A.R.L v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
ICSID case No. ARB/98/7, Award (1 September 2000) 17 ICSID 
Rev-FILJ 382. 
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Bayindir  Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.Ş. v. Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29, Decision on 
Jurisdiction (14 November 2005). 
Benvenuti & 
Bonfant (Award) 
Benvenuti & Bonfant v. People’s Republic of the Congo, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/77/2, Award (8 August 1989) 1 ICSID Rep 330. 
Cable Television 
(Award) 
Cable Television of Nevis Ltd. And Cable Television of Nevis 
Holdings, Ltd., v. The Federation of St. Christopher (St. Kitts) 
and Nevis, ICSID Case No. ARB/95/2, Award (13 January 1997) 
5 ICSID Rep 108. 
Camuzzi 
(Jurisdiction) 
Camuzzi International S.A.  v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/02, Decision on Jurisdiction (11 May 2005).  
Camuzzi 
(Objections) 
Camuzzi International S.A.  v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/02, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction (10 June 
2005). 
Canadian 
Cattlemen 
Canadian Cattlemen for Fair Trade v. United States, NAFTA 
Arbitration (UNCITRAL Rules), Award on Jurisdiction (28 
January 2008).  
Canfor (Notice) Canfor Corp. v. United States of America, UNICITRAL, Notice 
of Arbitration (9 July 2002). 
Canfor 
(Consolidation – 
Order) 
Canfor Corp. v. United States of America, Terminal Forest 
Products Ltd v. United States of America (Consolidated NAFTA 
Arbitration, UNCITRAL Rules) Order of the Consolidation 
Tribunal, (7 September 2005). 
Canfor 
(Consolidation – 
Preliminary 
Question) 
Canfor Corp. v. United States of America, Terminal Forest 
Products Ltd v. United States of America (Consolidated NAFTA 
Arbitration, UNCITRAL Rules), Decision on Preliminary 
Question (6 June 2006). 
Casado 
(Provisional 
Measures) 
Victor Pey Casado and President Allende Foundation v. Republic 
of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/2, Decision on Provisional 
Measures (25 September 2001) 6 ICSID Rep 375. 
Casado (Award) Victor Pey Casado and President Allende Foundation v. Republic 
of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/2, Award (8 May 2008). 
CDC 
(Annulment) 
CDC Group plc v. Republic of Seychelles, ICSID Case No 
ARB/02/14, Decision on Application for Annulment (29 June 
2005). 
Champion 
Trading 
(Jurisdiction) 
Champion Trading Co and Ameritrade International Inc. v. Arab 
Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/9, Decision on 
Jurisdiction (21 October 2003) 19 ICSID Rev-FILJ 275. 
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Champion 
Trading (Award) 
Champion Trading Co and Ameritrade International Inc. v. Arab 
Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/9, Award (27 
October 2006). 
CME (Partial 
Award) 
CME Czech Republic B.V. (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, 
UNCITRAL, Partial Award (13 September 2001) 9 ICSID Rep 
121. 
CME (Final 
Award) 
CME Czech Republic B.V. (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, 
UNCITRAL, Final Award (14 March 2003) 9 ICSID Rep 264. 
CME (Separate 
Opinion) 
CME Czech Republic B.V. (The Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, 
UNCITRAL, Separate Opinion on Final Award (14 March 2003). 
CMS 
(Jurisdiction) 
CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision on Jurisdiction (17 July 2003) 7 
ICSID Rep 492. 
CMS (Award) CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/01/8, Award (12 May 2005) 44 ILM 1205. 
Continental 
Casualty 
(Jurisdiction) 
Continental Casualty Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/9, Decision on Jurisdiction (22 February 
2006). 
Continental 
Casualty 
(Award) 
Continental Casualty Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/9, Award (5 September 2008). 
Corn Products 
(Order) 
Corn Products International, Inc. v. United Mexican States, 
ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/04/1, Order of the Consolidation 
Tribunal (20 May 2005). 
CSOB 
(Jurisdiction) 
Československá Obchodní Banka, A.S. (CSOB) v. The Slovak 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, Decision on Objection to 
Jurisdiction (24 May 1999) 5 ICSID Rep 330. 
CSOB (Further 
Decision on 
Jurisdiction) 
Československá Obchodní Banka, A.S. (CSOB) v. The Slovak 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, Decision on Further and 
Partial Objections to Jurisdiction (1 December 2000) 
CSOB v Slovak 
Republic 
(Award) 
Československá Obchodní Banka, A.S. (CSOB) v. The Slovak 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, Award (29 December 
2004). 
Duke v Ecuador  Duke Energy Electroquil Partners and Electroquil S.A. v. 
Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/19, Award (18 
August 2008). 
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Duke v Peru  Duke Energy International Peru Investments No. 1 Ltd. v. 
Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/28, Decision on 
Jurisdiction (1 February 2006). 
El Paso  El Paso Energy International Company v.  Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Decision on Jurisdiction (27 April 
2006). 
Enron 
(Jurisdiction) 
Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P.  v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision on Jurisdiction 
(14 January 2004). 
Enron (Ancillary 
Claim) 
Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P.  v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision on Jurisdiction 
(Ancillary Claim) (2 August 2004). 
Enron 
(Supplemental 
Claim) 
Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P.  v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Supplemental Claim (25 
October 2007). 
Ethyl 
(Jurisdiction) 
Ethyl Corporation v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL 
(NAFTA). Award on Jurisdiction (24 June 1998) 38 ILM 708. 
Eureko Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Poland, Ad-hoc arbitration procedure, 
Partial Award, Dissenting Opinion (19 August 2005). 
FEDAX 
(Jurisdiction) 
FEDAX N.V. v. Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/96/3(1), Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction (11 July 
1997) 5 ICSID Rep 183. 
FEDAX (Award) FEDAX N.V. v. Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/96/3(1), Final Award (9 March 1998). 
Feldman 
(Jurisdiction) 
Feldman v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB 
(AF)/99/1, Award on Jurisdiction (6 December 2000). 
Feldman 
(Award) 
Feldman v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB 
(AF)/99/1, Award on the Merits (16 December 2002) 7 ICSID 
Rep 341. 
Fireman’s Fund Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company v. United Mexican States, 
ICSID Case No ARB (AF)/02/01, Decision on the Preliminary 
Question (17 July 2003).  
Fraport Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Philippines, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Award (16 August 2007). 
GAMI (Award) GAMI Investments Inc. v. United Mexican States, UNCITRAL, 
Final Award (15 November 2004) 44 ILM 545. 
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Gas Natural  Gas Natural SDG, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/10, Jurisdiction (17 June 2005). 
Generation 
Ukraine (Award) 
Generation Ukraine, Inc. v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/9, 
Award (16 September 2003) 44 ILM 404. 
Genin  Alex Genin, Eastern Credit Limited v. Republic of Estonia, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/99/2, Award (25 June 2001) 6 ICSID Rep 236. 
Glamis Gold Glamis Gold, Ltd v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, 
Award (8 June 2009).  
Goetz (Award) Antoine Goetz and Others v. Republic of Burundi, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/95/3, Award (10 February 1999) 6 ICSID Rep 3. 
Goetz (Decision 
on Liability) 
Antoine Goetz and Others v. Republic of Burundi, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/95/3, Part 1. Decision on Liability (2 September 1998). 
Goetz 
(Agreement) 
Antoine Goetz and Others v. Republic of Burundi, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/95/3, Part 2. The Parties’ Agreement (23 December 
1998). 
Gruslin  Gruslin v. Malaysia, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/3 
(Belgo/Luxembourg/Malaysia BIT) Final Award (27 November 
2000) 5 ICSID 483. 
Grand River 
(Jurisdiction) 
Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., v. United States, 
UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction 
(20 July 2006). 
Grand River 
(Challenge) 
Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., v. United States, 
UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Decision on the Challenge to Arbitrator 
(28 November 2007). 
Guinea/Atlantic 
Triton (Award) 
Atlantic Triton Company Limited v. People’s Revolutionary 
Republic of Guinea, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/1, Award (21 April 
1986). 
Holiday Inns  Holiday Inns S.A. and others v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/72/1, Decision on Jurisdiction (12 May 1974). 
Impregilo  Impregilo S.p.A v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/2, Decision on Jurisdiction (22 April 2005). 
Joy Mining  Joy Mining Machinery Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/11, Decision on Jurisdiction (6 August 2004) 
19 ICSID Rev-FILJ 486. 
Kaiser Bauxite  Kaiser Bauxite v. Government of Jamaica, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/74/3, Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence (6 July 
1975)1 ICSID Rep 296. 
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Klöckner 
(Award) 
Klöckner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH and others v. United Republic 
of Cameroon and Société Camerounaise des Engrais, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/81/2, Award (21 October 1983) 2 ICSID Rep 9. 
Klöckner 
(Dissenting 
Opinion) 
Klöckner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH and others v. United Republic 
of Cameroon and Société Camerounaise des Engrais, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/81/2, Dissenting Opinion (21 October 1983) 2 
ICSID Rep 77. 
Klöckner 
(Annulment) 
Klöckner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH and others v. United Republic 
of Cameroon and Société Camerounaise des Engrais, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/81/2, Decision on Annulment (3 May 1985) 2 
ICSID Rep 95. 
Lanco Lanco International Inc. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/97/6, Decision on Jurisdiction (8 December 1998) 5 ICSID 
367. 
Lauder Ronald S. Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award 
(3 September 2001) 9 ICSID Rep 62. 
Lemire  Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/98/1, Award 
embodying the Parties’ Settlement Agreement (18 September 
2000) 6 ICSID Rep 60. 
LESI  Consortium Groupement L.E.S.I-DIPENTA v. People’s 
Democratic Republic of Algeria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/8, 
Award (10 January 2005). 
LETCO 
(Jurisdiction) 
Liberian Eastern Timber Corporation (LETCO) v. Government of 
the Republic of Liberia, ICSID Case No. ARB/83/2, Decision on 
Jurisdiction (24 October 1984). 
LETCO (Award) Liberian Eastern Timber Corporation (LETCO) v. Government of 
the Republic of Liberia, ICSID Case No. ARB/83/2, Award (31 
March 1986) 2 ICSID Rep 346. 
LETCO 
(Rectification) 
Liberian Eastern Timber Corporation (LETCO) v. Government of 
the Republic of Liberia, ICSID Case No. ARB/83/2, Rectification 
(10 June 1986) 2 ICSID Rep 346. 
LG&E 
(Jurisdiction) 
LG&E Energy Corporation and Others v. Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Jurisdiction (30 April 
2004). 
LG&E (Liability) LG&E Energy Corporation and Others v. Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability (3 October 
2006). 
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Loewen 
(Jurisdiction) 
Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of 
America, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/98/3, Award on Jurisdiction 
(5 January 2001). 
Loewen (Award) Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of 
America, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/98/3, Award on Merits (26 
June 2003) 7 ICSID Rep 421. 
Loewen 
(Supplementary 
Decision) 
Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of 
America, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/98/3, Decision on 
Respondent’s Request for a Supplementary Decision (13 
September 2004) 44 ILM 836. 
Lucchetti 
(Award) 
Industria Nacional de Alimentos, S.A. and Indalsa Perú, S.A. 
(formerly Empresas Lucchetti, S.A. and Lucchetti Perú, S.A.) v. 
Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/4, Award (7 February 
2005) 20 ICSID Rev-FILJ 359. 
Empresas 
Lucchetti 
(Annulment) 
Industria Nacional de Alimentos, S.A. and Indalsa Perú, S.A. 
(formerly Empresas Lucchetti, S.A. and Lucchetti Perú, S.A.) v. 
Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/4, Decision on 
Annulment (5 September 2007). 
Empresas 
Lucchetti 
(Rectification) 
Industria Nacional de Alimentos, S.A. and Indalsa Perú, S.A. 
(formerly Empresas Lucchetti, S.A. and Lucchetti Perú, S.A.) v. 
Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/4, Decision on the 
Rectification of the Decision of the Ad Hoc Committee (30 
November 2007). 
Maffezini 
(Jurisdiction) 
Emilio Agustin Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/97/7, Decision on Jurisdiction (25 January 2000) 5 
ICSID Rep 387. 
Maffezini 
(Award) 
Emilio Agustin Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/97/7, Award (13 November 2000) 5 ICSID Rep 419. 
Maffezini 
(Rectification) 
Emilio Agustin Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/97/7, Rectification of Award (31 January 2001) 5 
ICSID Rep 440. 
Malaysian 
Historical 
Salvors (Award) 
Malaysian Historical Salvors, SDN, BHD v. Malaysia, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/05/10, Decision on Jurisdiction (17 May 2007). 
Malaysian 
Historical 
Salvors 
(Annulment) 
Malaysian Historical Salvors, SDN, BHD v. Malaysia, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/05/10, Decision on the Application for Annulment 
(16 April 2009). 
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Metalclad 
(Award) 
Metalclad Corporation v. the United Mexican States, ICSID Case 
No. ARB (AF)/97/1, Award (30 August 2000) 5 ICSID Rep 209. 
Metaclad 
(Review) 
Metalclad Corporation v. the United Mexican States, ICSID Case 
No. ARB (AF)/97/1, Review by the British Columbia Supreme 
Court (2001 BCSC 664) (2 May 2001) 5 ICSID Rep 236. 
Metaclad 
(Supplementary 
Reasons) 
Metalclad Corporation v. the United Mexican States, ICSID Case 
No. ARB (AF)/97/1, Supplementary Reasons for BCSC Decision 
(31 October 2001). 
Metalpar 
(Jurisdiction) 
Metalpar S.A. and Buen Aire S.A.  v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/5, Decision on Jurisdiction, (27 April 2006). 
Metalpar 
(Award) 
Metalpar S.A. and Buen Aire S.A.  v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/5, Award (6 June 2008). 
Methanex 
(Amicus 
Decision) 
Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, UNCITRAL 
(NAFTA), Decision on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene 
as “Amici Curiae” (15 January 2001) 7 ICSID Rep 208. 
Methanex 
(Partial Award) 
Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, UNCITRAL 
(NAFTA), Preliminary Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility 
(First Partial Award) (7 August 2002). 
Methanex (Final 
Award) 
Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, UNCITRAL 
(NAFTA), Final Award (3 August 2005) 44 ILM 1345. 
Middle East 
Cement 
Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co. S. A. v. Arab 
Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/6, Award (12 April 
2002) 7 ICSID Rep 173. 
Mihaly  Mihaly International Corporation v. Democratic Socialist 
Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/2, Award (15 
March 2002) 6 ICSID Rep 308. 
MINE (Award) Maritime International Nominees Establishment v. Republic of 
Guinea, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/4, Award (6 January 1988) 4 
ICSID Rep 61. 
MINE (Interim 
Order) 
Maritime International Nominees Establishment v. Republic of 
Guinea, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/4, Interim Order No. 1 on 
Guinea’s Application for Stay of Enforcement of Award (12 
August 1988).  
MINE 
(Annulment) 
Maritime International Nominees Establishment v. Republic of 
Guinea, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/4, Decision on Annulment (22 
December 1989) 4 ICSID Rep 79. 
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Mitchell (Award) Mitchell, Patrick v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/99/7, Award (9 February 2004). 
Mitchell (Stay of 
Enforcement) 
Mitchell, Patrick v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/99/7, Decision on the Stay of Enforcement (30 
November 2004) 20 ICSID Rev-FILJ 587. 
Mitchell 
(Annulment) 
Mitchell, Patrick v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/99/7, Decision on the Application for Annulment 
of the Award (1 November 2006). 
Mobil Oil  Mobil Oil Corporation v. New Zealand, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/97/2, Findings on Liability (4 May 1989) 4 ICSID Rep 140. 
Mondev Mondev International Ltd. v. United States of America, ICSID 
Case No. ARB (AF)/99/2, Award (11 October 2002) 6 ICSID 
Rep 181. 
MTD (Award) MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. & MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award (25 May 2004) 44 ILM 91. 
MTD (Stay of 
Execution) 
MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. & MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Decision on Respondent’s Request 
for a Continued Stay of Execution (1 June 2005) 20 ICSID Rev-
FILJ 615. 
MTD 
(Annulment) 
MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. & MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Decision on Annulment (21 March 
2007). 
Nagel (Award) William Nagel v. Czech Republic (Ministry of Transportation and 
Telecommunications), Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) 
Case No. 049/2002, Final Award (9 September 2003). 
Noble Ventures 
(Award) 
Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, 
Award (12 October 2005). 
Noble Ventures 
(Rectification) 
Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, 
Award of 11 October 2005, Rectification of Award (19 May 
2006). 
Nykomb (Award) Nykomb Synergetics Technology Holding AB v The Republic of 
Latvia, Arbitral Tribunal – Stockholm Rules (Energy Charter 
Treaty), Award (16 December 2003). 
Occidental 
(Award) 
Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. Republic of 
Ecuador, London Court of International Arbitration, Case No. 
UN 346, Award (1 July 2004). 
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Olguin 
(Jurisdiction) 
Olguín v. Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/5, 
Decision on Jurisdiction (8 August 2000) 6 ICSID Rep 156.   
Olguin (Award) Olguín v. Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/5, 
Final Award (26 July 2001) 6 ICSID Rep 164. 
Pan American 
(Preliminary 
Objections) 
Pan American Energy LLC and BP Argentina Exploration 
Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/13, 
Decision on Preliminary Objections (27 July 2006). 
Pan American 
(Order) 
Pan American Energy LLC and BP Argentina Exploration 
Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/13, 
Order taking note of discontinuance issued by Tribunal (20 
August 2008). 
Petrobart 
(Award) 
Petrobart Ltd v Kyrgyz Republic, Arb. No 126/2003 (SCC) 
Energy Charter Treaty, Award (29 March 2005). 
Phoenix Phoenix Action, Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/06/5 Award (15 April 2009).  
Plama 
(Jurisdiction) 
Plama Consortium Limited v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction (8 February 2005) 20 ICSID 
Rev-FILJ 262.  
Plama (Order) Plama Consortium Limited v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/24, Order on Provisional Measures (6 September 2005). 
Plama (Award) Plama Consortium Limited v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/24, Award (27 August 2008). 
Pope & Talbot 
(Interim Award) 
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. the Government of Canada, UNCITRAL 
(NAFTA), Interim Award on Merits (26 June 2000). 
Pope & Talbot 
(Merits, Phase 2) 
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. the Government of Canada, UNCITRAL 
(NAFTA), Award on the Merits of Phase 2 (10 April 2001) 7 
ICSID Rep 43. 
Pope & Talbot 
(Damages) 
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. the Government of Canada, UNCITRAL 
(NAFTA), Award on Damages (31 May 2002) 7 ICSID Rep 43. 
Pope & Talbot 
(Costs) 
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. the Government of Canada, UNCITRAL 
(NAFTA), Award on Costs (26 November 2002). 
PSEG 
(Jurisdiction) 
PSEG Global, Inc., The North American Coal Corporation, and 
KonyaIngin Electrik Uretim ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi v. Turkey, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Decision on Jurisdiction (4 June 
2004). 
Renta 4 Renta 4 S.V.S.A et al. v. Russian Federation, SCC No. 24/2007, 
Award on Preliminary Objections (20 March 2009). 
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Saipem 
(Jurisdiction) 
Saipem S.p.A v. People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/05/7, Decision on Jurisdiction (21 March 2007). 
Saipem (Award) Saipem S.p.A v. People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/05/7, Award (30 June 2009). 
Salini v Jordan 
(Jurisdiction) 
Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Hachemite 
Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, Decision on 
Jurisdiction (9 November 2004) 44 ILM 573. 
Salini v Jordan 
(Award) 
Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v.Hachemite 
Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, Award (31 
January 2006). 
Salini v Morocco 
(Jurisdiction) 
Salini Construtorri S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom of 
Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction 
(23 July 2001) 6 ICSID Rep 398. 
Saluka (Award) Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, 
Decision on Jurisdiction over the Czech Republic’s 
Counterclaim, 7 May 2004, Partial Award (17 March 2006). 
Saluka (Swiss 
Decision) 
Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, 
Decision on Jurisdiction over the Czech Republic’s 
Counterclaim, 7 May 2004, Swiss Federal Tribunal Decision (7 
September 2006). 
Santa Elena 
(Award) 
Compañía de Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Republic of 
Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, Award on the Merits (17 
February 2000) 5 ICSID Rep 153. 
Santa Elena 
(Rectification) 
Compañía de Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Republic of 
Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, Rectification of Award 
(8 June 2000) 5 ICSID Rep 157. 
SD Myers 
(Award) 
S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL 
(NAFTA), First Partial Award (13 November 2000) 8 ICSID Rep 
3. 
SD Myers 
(Liability) 
S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL 
(NAFTA), Award on Liability (13 November 2000). 
SD Myers 
(Opinion) 
S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL 
(NAFTA), Separate concurring Opinion (13 November 2000). 
SD Myers 
(Second Award) 
S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL 
(NAFTA), Second Partial Award (21 October 2002). 
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SD Myers 
(Damages) 
S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL 
(NAFTA), Award on Damages (21 October 2002) 8 ICSID Rep 
3. 
Sempra Energy 
(Jurisdiction) 
Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/02/16, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction (11 May 
2005). 
Sempra Energy 
(Award) 
Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/02/16, Award (28 September 2007). 
Sempra Energy 
(Opinion) 
Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/02/16, Partial Dissenting Opinion (28 September 2007).
SGS v Pakistan 
(or Pakistan) 
(Order) 
SGS Société Générale de Surveillance SA v. Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Procedural Order No. 2 
(16 October 2002) 8 ICSID Rep 388. 
SGS v Pakistan 
(or Pakistan) 
(Jurisdiction) 
SGS Société Générale de Surveillance SA v. Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision on Jurisdiction 
(6 August 2003) 8 ICSID Rep 383. 
SGS v 
Philippines 
(or Philippines) 
(Jurisdiction) 
SGS Société Générale de Surveillance SA v. Republic of the 
Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision on Objection to 
Jurisdiction (29 January 2004) 8 ICSID Rep 518.  
SGS v 
Philippines 
(or Philippines) 
(Supplementary) 
SGS Société Générale de Surveillance SA v. Republic of the 
Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Supplementary 
Declaration (29 January 2004) 8 ICSID Rep 568. 
SGS v 
Philippines 
(or Philippines) 
(Order) 
SGS Société Générale de Surveillance SA v. Republic of the 
Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Order on Further 
Proceedings (17 December 2007). 
Siemens 
(Jurisdiction) 
Siemens v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, 
Decision on Jurisdiction (3 August 2004). 
Siemens (Award) Siemens v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, 
Award (6 February 2007). 
SOABI 
(Jurisdiction) 
Société Ouest Africaine des Bétons Industriels (SOABI) v. State of 
Senegal, ICSID Case No. ARB/82/1, Decision on Jurisdiction (1 
August 1984). 
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SOABI (Award) Société Ouest Africaine des Bétons Industriels (SOABI) v. Tate of 
Senegal, ICSID Case No. ARB/82/1, Award (25 February 1988) 
2 ICSID Rep 164.  
SOABI (Opinion) Société Ouest Africaine des Bétons Industriels (SOABI) v. State of 
Senegal, ICSID Case No. ARB/82/1, Dissenting Opinion (25 
February 1988 ). 
SOABI 
(Declaration) Société Ouest Africaine des Bétons Industriels (SOABI) v. State of Senegal, ICSID Case No. ARB/82/1, Declaration of President of 
the Tribunal (25 February 1988). 
Soufraki 
(Jurisdiction) 
Soufraki v. United Arab Emirates, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/7, 
Award on Jurisdiction (7 July 2004). 
SPP 
(Jurisdiction) 
Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v. Arab 
Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3, ICC Award No. 
YD/AS No. 3493, Decision on Jurisdiction (27 November 1985) 
3 ICSID Rep 112. 
SPP 
(Jurisdiction No. 
2) 
Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v. Arab 
Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3, ICC Award No. 
YD/AS No. 3493, Jurisdiction (No.2) (14 April 1988) 3 ICSID 
Rep 131. 
SPP (Opinion) Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v. Arab 
Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3, ICC Award No. 
YD/AS No. 3493, Dissenting Opinion (14 April 1988) 3 ICSID 
Rep 131. 
SPP (Award) Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v. Arab 
Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3, ICC Award No. 
YD/AS No. 3493, Award (20 May 1992) 3 ICSID Rep 189. 
SPP (Dissenting 
Opinion) 
Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v. Arab 
Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3, ICC Award No. 
YD/AS No. 3493, Dissenting Opinion (20 May 1992) 3 ICSID 
Rep 189. 
Swembalt Swembalt AB, Sweden v. Latvia, UNCITRAL Award (23 October 
2000). 
Tanzania 
Electric (Award) 
Tanzania Electric Supply Company Ltd v Independent Power 
Tanzania Ltd, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/8, Award (12 July 2001) 
8 ICSID Rep 226. 
Tanzania 
Electric 
(Provisional 
Measures) 
Tanzania Electric Supply Company Ltd v Independent Power 
Tanzania Ltd, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/8, Decision on 
Provisional Measures (20 December 1999). 
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Tanzania 
Electric 
(Remaining 
Issues) 
Tanzania Electric Supply Company Ltd v Independent Power 
Tanzania Ltd, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/8, Decision on All 
Further Remaining Issues (24 May 2001). 
Tecmed Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican 
States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Final Award (29 May 
2003) 43 ILM 133. 
Tembec (Notice) Tembec Inc. v. United States of America, UNICITRAL, Notice of 
Arbitration (December 2003). 
Terminal Forest 
(Notice) 
Terminal Forest Products Ltd. v. United States of America, 
UNICITRAL Notice of Arbitration (March 2004). 
Thunderbird  International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. United 
Mexican States, UNCITRAL Arbitration, Award (26 January 
2006). 
Tokios 
(Jurisdiction) 
Tokois Tokelės v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Decision 
on Jurisdiction (29 April 2004) 20 ICSID Rev-FILJ 205. 
Tokios (Opinion) Tokois Tokelės v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, 
Dissenting Opinion (29 April 2004) 20 ICSID Rev-FILJ 234. 
Tokios (Award) Tokois Tokelės v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Award 
and Separate Opinion (26 July 2007). 
Tradex 
(Jurisdiction) 
Tradex Hellas S.A. v. Republic of Albania, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/94/2, Decision on Jurisdiction (24 December 1996) 5 ICSID 
Rep 43.  
Tradex (Award) Tradex Hellas S.A. v. Republic of Albania, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/94/2, Award (29 April 1999). 
TSA Spectrum 
(Award) 
TSA Spectrum de Argentina, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/05/5, Award (19 December 2008).  
TSA Spectrum 
(Opinion) 
TSA Spectrum de Argentina, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/05/5, Concurring Opinion (19 December 2008). 
TSA Spectrum 
(Dissenting 
Opinion) 
TSA Spectrum de Argentina, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/05/5, Dissenting Opinion (19 December 2008). 
Tza Yap Shum Tza Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6 
Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence (19 June 2009). 
UPS 
(Jurisdiction) 
United Parcel Service of America Ltd. v. the Government of 
Canada, UNICITRAL (NAFTA), Award on Jurisdiction (22 
November) 2002285 7 ICSID Rep 3. 
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UPS (Award) United Parcel Service of America Ltd. v. the Government of 
Canada, UNICITRAL (NAFTA), Award on the Merits and 
Separate Statement (24 May 2007). 
Vacuum Salt  Vacuum Salt Products Limited v. Government of Republic of 
Ghana, ICSID Case No. ARB/92/1, Award (16 February 1994) 4 
ICSID Rep 329. 
Vivendi (Award) Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija & Vivendi Universal 
(formerly Compagnie Générale des Eaux) v. Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award (21 November 2000) 16 
ICSID Rev-FILJ 641. 
Vivendi 
(Annulment) 
Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija & Vivendi Universal 
(formerly Compagnie Générale des Eaux) v. Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment (3 July 
2002) 6 ICSID Rep 340. 
Vivendi 
(Rectification) 
Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija & Vivendi Universal 
(formerly Compagnie Générale des Eaux) v. Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Supplementation and Rectification of 
Decision regarding Annulment of award issued on 28 May 2003. 
Waste 
Management 
(Award) 
Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case 
No. ARB (AF)/98/2, Award (2 June 2000) 5 ICSID Rep 443. 
Waste 
Management 
(Opinion) 
Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case 
No. ARB (AF)/98/2, Dissenting Opinion (2 June 2000). 
Waste 
Management II 
(Objection) 
Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States ICSID Case 
No. ARB (AF)/00/3, Decision on Preliminary Objection (26 June 
2002) 6 ICSID Rep 538.  
Waste 
Management II 
(Award) 
Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States ICSID Case 
No. ARB (AF)/00/3, Award (30 April 2004) 43 ILM 967. 
Wena Hotel 
(Jurisdiction) 
Wena Hotel Ltd v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/98/4, Decision on Jurisdiction (29 June 1999) 6 ICSID Rep 
74.  
Wena Hotel 
(Award) 
Wena Hotel Ltd v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/98/4, Award on Merits (8 December 2000) 6 ICSID Rep 89.
Wena Hotel 
(Annulment) 
Wena Hotel Ltd v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/98/4, Decision on Annulment (5 February 2002) 6 ICSID 
Rep 129. 
J O S E P H  R O M E S H  W E E R A M A N T R Y                                          33  P H D  T H E S I S  |  U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  L O N D O N  
World Duty Free 
Company 
World Duty Free Company Limited v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/00/7, Award (4 October 2006). 
Yaung Chi Oo 
Trading (Award) 
Yaung Chi Oo Trading Pte Ltd. v. Government of the Union of 
Myanmar, Award (31 March 2003) 8 ICSID Rep 452. 
Yaung Chi Oo 
Trading (Award 
2) 
Yaung Chi Oo Trading Pte Ltd. v. Government of the Union of 
Myanmar, Award (1 August 2004). 
Yukos (Interim 
Award) 
Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v. The Russian Federation, 
PCA Case No. AA 227, UNCITRAL (Energy Charter Treaty), 
Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (30 November 
2009). 
Zhinvali Zhinvali Development Limited v. Georgia, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/00/1, unpublished. 
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OTHER INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS OR AWARDS 
 
Access to Information under Article 9 of the OSPAR Convention, (Ireland v. United 
Kingdom) Permanent Court of Arbitration, 2 July 2003, paras. 93-105; 42 ILM 1118 
(2003). 
Air Transport Services Agreement Arbitration, (United States of America v. France) 
38 ILR 182 (1963). 
Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights, 123 ILR 24 (2001). 
Alaska Boundary case, (Great Britain v. United States of America) 15 RIAA 485 
(1903). 
Beagle Channel Arbitration, (Argentina v. Chile) 52 ILR 93 (1977). 
Kingdom of Belgium v. Federal Republic of Germany (Young Loan Arbitration), 59 
ILR 495 (1980) 
Boundaries in the Island of Timor, (Netherlands v. Portugal) 1 Hague Court Reports, 
354 (1914). 
Chamizal Arbitration, (United States of America v. Mexico) 5 AJIL 782 (1911). 
Re Competence of Conciliation Commission, Anglo-Italian Conciliation Commission, 
22 ILR 867 (1955). 
Costa Rica Journalists Association case, Advisory Opinion, Inter-Am. Court of 
Human Rights, 75 ILR 31 (1985). 
Decision regarding Delimitation of the Border, 13 April 2002 (Eritrea v. Ethiopia) 
Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, 41 ILM 1057 (2002). 
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf (United Kingdom v. France), Award of 30 June 
1977, 54 ILR 6 (1977). 
Elton case, Mexico-US General Claims Commission of 1929, Repertory of 
International Arbitral Jurisprudence, Vol. II, p.35.  
Georges Pinson case, Franco Mexican Claims Commission, 1924-1932 Annual 
Digest of Public International Law Cases, Case No. 292 (1927-1928); 5 RIAA 327 
(1928). 
The Golder case, (Golder v. United Kingdom) European Court of Human Rights, 57 
ILR 201 (1975). 
Kingdom of Greece (on behalf of Apostolidis) v. Federal Republic of Germany, 
Arbitral Commission on Property, Rights and Interests in Germany, 34 ILR 219 
(1960). 
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Howland case, Moore’s History and Digest of International Arbitrations, Vol. IV, at 
3616-64 
In the Matter of Cross-Border Trucking Services, Final Report of NAFTA Chapter 20 
Panel (6 February 2001). 
In the Matter of Tariffs Applied by Canada to Certain US-Origin Agricultural 
Products, Final Report of NAFTA Chapter 20 Panel (2 December 1996). 
Iran v. United States, (‘Decision A18’) Iran-US Claims Tribunal, Decision 32-A18-
FT (6 April 1984), 5 Iran-US CTR 251 (1984). 
Iron Rhine (‘Ijzeren Rijn’) Railway Arbitration, (Belgium v. Netherlands) (24 May 
2005) available at www.pca-cpa.org. 
Island of Palmas case, (United States of America v. Netherlands) 2 RIAA 829 
(1949). 
Italy v. Federal Republic of Germany, Arbitral Commission on Property, Rights and 
Interests in Germany, 29 ILR 442 (1959). 
Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II, AB-1996-2, WTO Appellate Body, AB-
1996-2, WT/DS8,10&11/AB/R (4 October 1996). 
‘Juno Trader’ Case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v Guinea-Bissau) (Judgment) 
ITLOS Case No 13 (2004). 
Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products, 
WT/396/R; WT/DS98/AB/R. 
Laguna de Desierto case, (Dispute Concerning the Course of the Frontier between 
B.P. 62 and Mount Fitz Roy – Argentina/Chile) 113 ILR 1. 
Martini case, Italy-Venezuela Claims Commission, 10 RIAA 644 (1903). 
McCollough & Co., Inc. v. Iranian Ministry of Post, 11 Iran-US CTR 3 (1986-II). 
MOX Plant case, (Ireland v. United Kingdom) Provisional Measures, Order of 3 
December 2001, ITLOS Reports 95 (2001), at 106, para. 51, 41 ILM 405 (2002). 
United States (LF and PE Neer) v. Mexico, United States-Mexico General Claims 
Commission, 15 October 1926, 21 American Journal of International Law 555 (1927) 
(Supplement) 
North Atlantic Coast Fisheries case, (Great Britain v. United States of America), 
Award of 7 Sept. 1910, Scott’s Hague Reports 141 (1916). 
North Atlantic Fisheries case, United Nations, Reports of International Arbitral 
Awards, Vol. XI. 
Pertulosa Claim, Franco-Italian Conciliation Comm., 18 ILR 414 (1951). 
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Phillips Petroleum Company Iran v. Iran, 21 Iran-US CTR 79 (1989). 
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić (aka ‘Dule’), ICTY Decision on the Prosecution motion to 
withdraw protective measures for victims and witnesses, Case No. IT-94-1 (10 
August 1995). 
Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic, Advravko Mucic (aka ‘Pavo’), Hazim Delic and Esad 
Landžo (aka ‘Zenga’), Trial Judgment, ICTY, IT-96-21-T (16 November 1998), 
available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/41482bde4.html [accessed 8 
September 2009]. 
Re Competence of Conciliation Commission, Anglo-Italian Conciliation Commission, 
22 ILR 867 (1955). 
Restrictions to the Death Penalty, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 70 ILR 
449 (1983). 
Saudi Arabia v. Aramco, 27 ILR 117 (1963). 
Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Report of the WTO 
Appellate Body (29 April 1996). 
The ‘Volga’ Case, (Russian Federation v. Australia) (Applicant – Respondent), 
ITLOS Case No. 11 (23 December 2002). 
UNESCO-France Arbitration, (Award of 14 January 2003) reprinted in 107 Revue 
Général de Droit International Public 221 (2003), at 236, para. 41; noted in 98 AJIL 
163 (2004). 
United States (LF and PE Neer) v. Mexico, United States-Mexico General Claims 
Commission, 15 October 1926, 21 AJIL 555 (1927). 
United States Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO 
Appellate Body Report, WT/DS58/AB/R (12 October 1998). 
Van Bokkelen case (1888); Moore’s History and Digest of International Arbitration, 
1807 Vol. II, at 1849 (1898). 
Woodward-Clyde Consultants v. Iran, 3 Iran-US CTR 239 (1983). 
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DOMESTIC COURT DECISIONS 
 
Adams v. Naylor, (1946) 2 All ER 241 (Eng.). 
Applicant A v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, (1997) 190 CLR 225 
(Aust.). 
Chubb & Son, Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301 (2nd Cir. 2000) (US). 
Czech Republic v. CME Czech Republic BV, Svea Court of Appeal, T 8735–01, IIC 63 
(2003), 15 May 2003 (Sweden). 
Czech Republic v. European Media Ventures SA, [2007] EWHC 2851 (Comm) (Eng.). 
Dole Food Co v. Patrickson, 123 S. Ct. 1655 (2003) (US). 
Ecuador v. Occidental Exploration & Production Co, [2006] EWHC 345 (Comm) 
(Eng.) 
Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines Ltd, [1981] AC 251 (Eng.). 
Her Majesty The Queen v. Tom Dudley and Edwin Stephens, [1884] 14 QBD 273 
(Eng.). 
Kodros Shipping Corp v. Empressa Cubana de Fletes, (The Evia) [1983] 1 AC 736 
(HL); [1982] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 307 (Eng.). 
Mexico v. Metalclad, Supreme Court of British Columbia, 2 May 2001 (Canada). 
Nielson v. Johnson, (1929) 279 US 47, 5 Annual Digest (1929-30) (US). 
Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), Sup. Crt., (1998) 
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TREATIES 
 
MULTILATERAL TREATIES  
 
ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments; 27 ILM 612 
(1988), Manila, 15 December 1996, as amended by the Protocol to Amend the 
Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Jakarta, 12 September 
1996. 
 
ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, Cha-am, Thailand, signed 26 
February 2009. 
 
Charter of the United Nations, signed 26 June 1945, entered into force Oct. 24, 1945, 
1 UNTS XVI. 
 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States (the ICSID Convention) 18 March, 1965; entered into force 14 October, 
1966: 575 UNTS 159; 4 ILM 532 (1965); 60 AJIL 892 (1966); 22 Annuaire Suisse de 
Droit International 221 (1965); 93 Journal du Droit International 50 (1966); and 1966 
Naciones Unidas Anuario Juridico 211. 
 
Energy Charter Treaty, (annex I of the Final Act of the European Energy Charter 
Conference) Lisbon, 17 December 1994; 34 ILM 373. 
 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) signed 12 December 1992; entered 
into force 1 January 1994, 32 ILM 296 and 605. 
 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 22 May, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331; 8 ILM 
679 (1969); and 63 AJIL 875 (1969); entered into force 27 January, 1980. 
 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International 
Organizations or between International Organizations, 21 March 1986; 25 ILM 543 
(1986). 
 
 
BILATERAL TREATIES  
 
Citations in this section commencing with “IC” refer to the treaty database in 
Investment Claims, published by Oxford University Press 
(www.investmentclaims.com). 
 
Argentina-
Belgo/Luxembourg 
BIT 
Treaty between the Argentine Republic and the Belgo-
Luxembourg Economic Unit on the Promotion and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments (1990)  
Argentina-Egypt 
BIT 
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of 
Argentina and the Arab Republic of Egypt for the Promotion 
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and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, IC-BT 1025 (1992) 
Argentina-Germany 
BIT 
Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
Argentine Republic on the promotion and reciprocal protection 
of investments, IC-BT 029 (1991) 
Argentina-
Netherlands BIT 
Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the 
Argentine Republic, IC-BT 1040 (1992)  
Argentina-Panama 
BIT 
Agreement between the Argentine Republic and the Republic 
of Panama for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments, 2033 UNTS 205; IC-BT 1043 (1996) 
Argentina-Spain 
BIT 
Agreement between the Government of the Argentine 
Republic and the Kingdom of Spain for the Promotion and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments, IC-BT 1051 (1992) 
Argentina-US BIT Treaty between the United States of America and the 
Argentine Republic Concerning the Reciprocal 
Encouragement and Protection of Investment, IC-BT 384 
(1991) 
Bulgaria-Cyprus 
BIT 
Agreement on Mutual Encouragement and Protection of 
Investments between the Government of the Republic of 
Cyprus and the Government of the People’s Republic of 
Bulgaria (1987) 
Chile-Peru BIT Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Peru 
and the Government of the Republic of Chile for the 
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments (2000) 
Italy-Jordan BIT Agreement between the Government of the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan and the Government of the Italian 
Republic on the Promotion and Protection of Investments 
(1996) 
Malaysia-
Belgo/Luxembourg 
Agreement 
Agreement between the Belgo-Luxemburg Economic Union 
and the Government of Malaysia on Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 1284 UNTS 121; IC-BT 
1143 (1979) 
Netherlands-
Bolivia BIT 
Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the 
Republic of Bolivia, 2239 UNTS 505; IC-BT 917 (1992) 
Netherlands-
Czech/Slovak BIT 
Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the 
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, IC-BT 584 (1991) 
Netherlands-Poland 
BIT 
Agreement between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the 
Republic of Poland on Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments (1992) 
Netherlands-
Venzeuela BIT 
Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments between the Republic of Venezuela and the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands, 1788 UNTS 45; IC-BT 1000 
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(1991)  
Pakistan-Germany 
BIT 
Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and Pakistan 
for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, IC-BT 117 
(1959) 
Spain-USSR BIT Agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
and Spain concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection 
of Investments, IC-BT 211 (1990) 
Switzerland-
Pakistan BIT 
Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments, IC-BT 730 (1995) 
Switzerland-
Philippines BIT 
Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the Republic 
of the Philippines concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments, IC-BT 731 (1997) 
Ukraine-Lithuania 
BIT 
Agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the 
Government of the Republic of Lithuania for the Promotion 
and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (1994) 
US-Albania BIT Treaty between the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of the Republic of Albania 
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investment, IC-BT 383 (1995) 
US-Australia FTA Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement (2005) 
US-Ecuador BIT Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic 
of Ecuador Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investment, IC-BT 398 (1993) 
US-Egypt BIT Treaty between the United States of America and the Arab 
Republic of Egypt Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement 
and Protection of Investments, IC-BT 399 (1982) 
US-Iran Treaty of 
Amity 
Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights of 
1955 between United States of America and Iran; signed in 
Tehran on 15 August 1955 and entered into force on 16 June 
1957 
US-Zaire BIT Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic 
of Zaire Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and 
Protection of Investment, IC-BT 394 (1984) 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
In this thesis, the following abbreviations, unless otherwise indicated, have the 
meanings assigned to them below: 
   
AJIL American Journal of International Law 
AIDI Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International 
Annual Digest Annual Digest and Reports of Public International Cases 
Article 31 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention  
Article 32 Article 32 of the Vienna Convention  
ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations 
ASIL Proceedings Proceedings of the American Society of International 
Law 
BIT Bilateral Investment Treaty 
BYBIL 
CISG 
British Year Book of International Law 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (1980) 
ECHR European Court of Human Rights 
ECJ European Court of Justice 
ECT Energy Charter Treaty 
EECC Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission 
EHRC European Convention on Human Rights 
EU European Union 
Executive Directors’ 
Report 
Report of the Executive Directors on the ICSID 
Convention  
Fauchald empirical 
analysis 
The study conducted by Ole Kristian Fauchald and 
reported in ‘The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals – 
An Empirical Analysis’, 19(2) European Journal of 
International Law 301 (2008) 
FCN treaties Friendship, commerce and navigation treaties 
FIAT Foreign Investment Arbitral Tribunal.  For the purposes 
of the thesis, this designation is wide-ranging and covers 
any arbitral tribunal established specifically to resolve a 
claim of an investor against a State.  These include any 
ICSID or NAFTA tribunal or ICSID ad hoc Committee.  
It does not, however, cover the International Court of 
Justice, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, the UN 
Compensation Commission or Holocaust-related claims 
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resolution tribunals. 
FTC NAFTA Free Trade Commission 
FTC Interpretation ‘Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter XI 
Provisions’ issued by the FTC on 31 July 2001 
GA United Nations General Assembly 
Harvard Draft Convention Harvard Research in International Law, Draft 
Convention on the Law of Treaties 1935 
IACHR Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
ICJ International Court of Justice 
ICLQ International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
ICSID International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes 
ICSID (Additional 
Facility) Rules  
Rules Governing the Additional Facility for the 
Administration of Proceedings by the Secretariat of 
ICSID 
ICSID Convention 
(alternatively Washington 
Convention) 
1965 Convention for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States. 
ICSID Rules 
 
 
IIA 
Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (the 
Arbitration Rules) of ICSID, adopted by the 
Administrative Council of the Centre pursuant to Article 
6(1)(c) of the ICSID Convention 
International Investment Agreements 
ILC International Law Commission 
ILC Commentary 1966 commentary of the ILC on its draft articles on the 
Law of Treaties, in Report of the ILC to the General 
Assembly on the work of its eighteenth session, UN Doc. 
A/6309/Rev.1, YILC (1966-II), at 217-226. 
ILM International Legal Materials 
ILR International Law Reports 
Institute Institute of International Law 
Iran-US CTR IUSCT Reports 
ISDS Investor-state dispute settlement 
ITLOS International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea 
IUSCT Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 
jurisprudence Unless otherwise indicated, this term refers to both case 
law and scholarly literature/opinion 
MFN clause Most favoured nations clause 
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement 
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OPIC Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
PCIJ Permanent Court of International Justice 
RGDIP Revue générale de droit international public 
RIAA United Nations Reports of International Arbitral Awards 
SC United Nations Security Council 
UN United Nations 
UN Charter Charter of the United Nations 
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
UNTS United Nations Treaty Series 
US United States of America 
VCOR Official Records of the Vienna Conference 
Vienna Conference 1968 UN Conference on the Law of Treaties, First Session, 
Vienna, 26 March – 24 May 1968. 
Vienna Conference 1969 UN Conference on the Law of Treaties, Second Session, 
Vienna, 9 April – 22 May 1969. 
Vienna Conference 1968 Vienna Conference and 1968 Vienna Conference  
Vienna Convention 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties  
Vienna Convention Rules Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention 
Waldock III Sir Humphrey Waldock’s Third Report as ILC Special 
Rapporteur on the law of treaties,  YILC (1964-II), UN 
Doc. A/CN.4/167 and Add. 1-3 (1964) 
Washington Convention 
(alternatively ICSID 
Convention) 
Washington Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States 
1965 
YILC Yearbook of the International Law Commission 
* * * 
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Chapter I 
 
 
OVERVIEW 
 
 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
1. Objectives 
1. This thesis concerns the application of treaty interpretation rules by foreign 
investment arbitral tribunals (‘FIATs’).  It endeavours  
a) to determine whether FIAT treaty interpretation practice is generally consistent 
with other international courts and tribunals;  
b) to assess whether the treaty interpretation rules contained in the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties3 (‘Vienna Convention’) are suitable for 
application in investor-State treaty disputes; and  
c) to evaluate the contribution of FIAT treaty interpretation jurisprudence to 
international law.  
                                                 
3 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), UN Doc. A/Conf.39/27; 1155 UNTS 331; 8 ILM 
679; and 63 AJIL 875 (1969), adopted on 22 May 1969 and entered into force on 27 January 1980.  
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2. The work is divided into seven Chapters.  This first Chapter introduces the 
thesis and states, inter alia, its objectives, nature and scope.  It also provides a brief 
description of treaty law and investment treaties.  Chapter II describes the historical 
background and current status of the international law rules pertaining to treaty 
interpretation.  Chapters III and IV contain a detailed analysis of the treaty 
interpretation rules expressed in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention 
(‘Vienna Convention Rules’).  Chapter V explores other supplementary means of 
interpretation not explicitly specified in the Vienna Convention.  Chapter VI discusses 
some salient features of FIAT practice relating to the interpretation of treaties.  
Chapter VII completes the thesis by addressing the three core issues set out in the 
introductory paragraph above. 
2. Nature of Subject Matter 
3. Most international adjudications involving States feature disputes as to the 
meaning of treaty provisions.4  This phenomenon is in large measure attributable to 
the imperfections of language and the ineffable complexity of human interaction.  
Practical necessity has thus dictated that principles or rules5 of treaty interpretation 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., Jennings and Watts (eds.), Oppenheim’s International Law (1992), at 26 (commenting that 
the jurisdiction of the ICJ ‘has been most frequently invoked for the purpose of interpreting treaties’); 
and Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2000), at 184 (‘there is no treaty which cannot raise some 
question of interpretation’).  See also the ILC Commentary, YILC (1966-II), at 218, para. 3 and Sohn, 
‘Settlement of Disputes Relating to the Interpretation and Application of Treaties’, 150 Recueil des 
cours 195 (1976-II).  
5 Unless otherwise specified in this thesis, the terms ‘rules’ and ‘principles’ of treaty interpretation will 
be used synonymously.  The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disptues between States and 
National of Other States appears to juggle these two terms.  In the English version of that Convention, 
Article 42(1) contains three references to ‘rules’ of international law whereas the French version of that 
same provision speaks twice of ‘règles’ and—with no apparent reason—once of ‘principes’.  For 
further commentary on this inconsistency in terminology, see Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A 
Commentary (2001), at 608-9.  In Schreuer’s view, principles would indicate ‘a higher level of 
generality and abstraction.’  Ibid., at 608.  The ICSID Convention may be contrasted with Article 26(6) 
of the Energy Charter Treaty, which provides that ‘[a] tribunal established under paragraph (4) shall 
decide the issues in dispute in accordance with this Treaty and applicable rules and principles of 
international law’ (emphasis added).  See also Klöckner (Annulment), at para. 68.  
Some useful theoretical distinctions have been made between the two terms by Cheng, General 
Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals (1953), at 367 (taking the view that 
principles ‘form the theoretical bases of positive rules of law.  The latter are the practical formulation of 
the principles and, for reasons of expediency, may vary and depart, to a greater or lesser extent, from 
the principle from which they spring’); Bennion, Statutory Interpretation: A Code (2002), at 467 and 
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assume an important role in the resolution of differences between States and, 
increasingly, between States and private investors.  Notwithstanding their practical 
importance, treaty interpretation rules have not developed—and are unlikely ever to 
develop—into straightforward formulae that mechanically extract incisive meanings 
from treaty texts swollen with ambiguity.  As the International Law Commission 
observed in its commentary to the provisions that were eventually to become Articles 
31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention, interpretation is ‘an art, not an exact science.’6 
4. Treaty interpretation rules are often applied without uniformity, if applied at 
all.  They find expression in concise language, yet are deceptively complex.  They 
have helped resolve disputes, but have also created them.  They have been credited 
with upholding the intentions of the parties, but equally have been criticised for 
ignoring them.  While they have helped to clarify treaty provisions, the rules 
themselves have been accused of lacking clarity.   
5. Not surprisingly, scholarly literature often recalls with approval the 
observation of Lord McNair that ‘[t]here is no part of the law of treaties which the 
                                                                                                                                            
 
657 (commenting (in relation to English statutory interpretation) that ‘[a] rule of construction must be 
followed … A criterion is not deserving of the name rule unless it is compelling’ and that a ‘principle 
of statutory interpretation can … be described as a principle of legal policy formulated as a guide to 
legislative intention’); and Klob, ‘General Principles of Law’, in Zimmermann, et al., (eds.), The 
Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary 677 (2006), at 794-5.  But see Mendelson, 
‘The International Court of Justice and Sources of International Law’, in Lowe and Fitzmaurice (eds.), 
Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice: Essays in Honour of Sir Robert Jennings (1996), at 63, 
80 (‘although there is quite a debate among legal theorists as to the difference and hierarchical relation 
between rules and principles, none of this finds any reflection in the utterances of the ICJ, which tends 
to treat the two terms as synonymous’).  
6 International Law Commission, Commentary to Draft Articles 27 & 28, para. 4, YILC (1966-II), at 
218,  reprinted in United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records, Documents of 
the Conference (1971), at 38.  Similarly, see Amerasinghe, ‘The Jurisdiction of the International Centre 
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes’, 19 Indian J. Int’l Law 166 (1979), at 167 (treaty 
interpretation is ‘a delicate art rather than a strict science’); Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties (1984), at 153 (‘Interpretation is a process involving the deployment of analytical and other 
skills: it cannot be reduced to a few propositions capable of purely automatic application in all 
circumstances.’); and Harvard Law School, Research on International Law, Part III Draft Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, with Comment, 29 AJIL (Supplement) 657 (1935), at 939 (the process of 
interpretation ‘calls for investigation, weighing of evidence, judgment, foresight, and a nice 
appreciation of a number of factors varying from case to case.  No canons of interpretation can be of 
absolutely and universal utility in performing such a task, and it seems desirable that any idea that they 
can be should be dispelled.’).  See also Oppenheim, supra note 4, at 1271; and Generation Ukraine, at 
para. 20.29. 
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text-writer approaches with more trepidation than the question of interpretation’.7  It is 
against this background that we embark upon the present examination of treaty 
interpretation. 
3. Pre-research Hypotheses 
6. Prior to the commencement of the research, two FIAT practices were 
contemplated as possible findings: (i) FIATs pay a high degree of lip service to public 
international law rules of treaty interpretation or misapply them; 8  and (ii) in 
comparison with other international courts and tribunals, FIATs are more open to 
drawing guidance from domestic law approaches to interpretation, such as the 
‘mischief rule’ in statutory interpretation or the contractual interpretation principles 
famously enunciated by Lord Hoffmann in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v 
West Bromwich Building Society.9   The reason for this outcome prediction was due in 
large measure to (i) the commercial nature of foreign investment and (ii) the 
commercial backgrounds of many FIAT arbitrators.10  As a consequence of the above 
                                                 
7 McNair, The Law of Treaties (1961), at 364.  More recently, one scholar has maintained that ‘[t]he 
issue of treaty interpretation remains a deeply obscure and subjective process’.  French, ‘Treaty 
Interpretation and the Incorporation of Extraneous Legal Rules’, 55 ICLQ 281 (2006), at 281.  The ILC 
commented that ‘[a]ny attempt to codify the conditions of the application of those principles of 
interpretation whose appropriateness in any given case depends on the particular context and on a 
subjective appreciation of varying circumstances would clearly be inadvisable.  Accordingly the 
Commission confined itself to trying to isolate and codify the comparatively few general principles 
which appear to constitute general rules for the interpretation of treaties.’  YILC (1966-II), at 218-19, 
para. 5.  In relation to the interpretation of domestic statutes, Justice Frankfurter of the United States 
Supreme Court once noted with illuminating candour that cannons of construction cannot ‘save us from 
the anguish of judgment.  Such cannons give an air of abstract intellectual compulsion to what is in fact 
a delicate judgment, concluding a complicated process of balancing subtle and elusive elements.’  
Justice Felix Frankfurter, ‘Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes’, 2 The Record of the 
Association of the Bar of the City of New York 213 (1947), at 235.  See also Chang, The Interpretation 
of Treaties by Judicial Tribunals (1933), at 19 (‘The interpretation of treaties is, perhaps, one of the 
most confused subjects in international law to-day’). 
8 See, e.g., United States v Canada, LCIA Case No. 81010, Expert Opinion by Professor W. Michael 
Riesman, ‘Opinion with respect to Selected International Legal Problems in LCIA Case No. 7941’, 1 
May 2009, at para. 7 (commenting that the Vienna Convention Rules ‘have become something of a 
clause de style in international arbitral awards, where they are often briefly referred to or … solemnly 
reproduced verbatim, and then largely ignored.’). 
9  [1997] UKHL 28; [1998] 1 All ER 98. 
10 A few commentators have expressly questioned whether the appointment of arbitrators in investment 
treaty arbitrations is suitable if they lack public international law expertise.  See, e.g., Sornarajah, ‘A 
Coming Crisis: Expansionary Trends in Investment Treaty Arbitration’, in Sauvant (ed.), Appeals 
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two possibilities, it was considered possible that the thesis could reveal a specific 
regime of interpretation or lex specialis (for example, a hybrid of international and 
domestic law) that evolved from the interpretation of investment treaties by FIATs.  It 
will be seen from the ensuing pages that the research has found this not to be the case. 
4. Method of Research 
7. The research required for the thesis was carried out in two discrete phases: (i) 
research on public international law generally and (ii) research specifically on FIAT 
awards and practice.  The first phase surveyed treaty interpretation as generally 
accepted in international law, relying mainily on international law cases, particularly 
those of the ICJ, PCIJ and other prominent arbitral awards (excluding FIATs), the ILC 
commentaries on its draft articles on the law of treaties and related ILC reports by 
special rapporteurs.  Relevant academic literature was also examined.  The materials 
collected during this phase have been distilled in the sub-sections headed 
‘International Law Practice’.  Space permitted only a fraction of the collected 
materials to be included.  As such, these sub-sections do not purport to provide a 
comprehensive survey of the law on the subject but contain sufficient material to 
enable a fruitful comparison to be made with FIAT practice in the area.     
8. In contrast, the material gathered in the second phase—on FIAT practice in 
relation to treaty interpretation—finds far greater exploration and analysis in the 
thesis.  This material is presented the sub-sections entitled ‘FIAT Practice’.  The 
                                                                                                                                            
 
Mechanism in International Investment Disputes 39 (2008), at 42 (“The pronouncements of commercial 
arbitrators on substantial issues of international law involved in treaty-based investment arbitration can 
be open to question.  Tribunals can consist of judges or arbitrators inexpert in matters of international 
law or without a long period of experience in the field, which makes it difficult to speak authoritatively 
as representative tribunals of the international community.”); and Mendelson, ‘The Runaway Train: the 
“Continuous Nationality Rule” From the Panevezys-saldutiskis Railway case to Loewen’, in Weiler 
(ed.), International Investment Law and Arbitration: Leading Cases from the ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral 
Treaties and Customary International Law 97 (2005), at 136 (commenting that none of the members of 
the Loewen v United States tribunal was ‘a specialist public international lawyer, although they will 
have encountered international law issues from time to time in their work.  This is perhaps unfortunate, 
given that the key issues turned out to concern that discipline’).  Article 35(2) of the ASEAN 
Comprehensive Investment Agreement 2009 takes this concern into account, providing that ‘[a]ny 
person appointed as an arbitrator shall have expertise or experience in public international law’.  See 
also Chang, The Interpretation of Treaties by Judicial Tribunals (1933), at 19 (‘Jurists and judges, 
trained in various systems of private law, are not infrequently prejudiced by rules of their own judicial 
systems’). 
J O S E P H  R O M E S H  W E E R A M A N T R Y                                          50  P H D  T H E S I S  |  U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  L O N D O N  
primary source for research in this second phase was the burgeoning mass of publicly 
available FIAT awards.  Materials extrinsic to these awards, such as academic 
commentary and the texts of the hundreds of bilateral investment treaties, while 
important, played a subordinate role in the research and were not consulted in an 
exhaustive or systematic basis.  In reviewing the awards, no attempt was made to 
conduct an empirical or quantitative analysis so as to establish the precise number of 
cases that have applied one interpretative principle or another.  This examination has 
been undertaken elsewhere.11  The research adopted a qualitative approach, which 
assessed the treaty interpretation methods applied and did not focus on the frequency 
of application of those methods.        
9. One of the problems encountered in examining the awards was that several did 
not refer to or otherwise indicate that they have applied the Vienna Convention 
Rules.12  In these instances, the tribunals appeared to be using notions of common 
sense or logic rather than any structured or established rule.13  At other times, FIATs 
did not delve into those Rules in any great detail.  But this also is not an uncommon 
occurrence in the practice of other international law courts and tribunals.14     
5. Scope of Thesis 
10. The focus of the thesis is the examination of treaty interpretation techniques.  
By and large, it does not intend to assess the correctness of the substantive 
determinations produced by the interpretations subject to scrutiny in this thesis.  Any 
evaluation of substantive issues will be incidental to the primary objectives of the 
thesis.   
                                                 
11 See Fauchald, ‘The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals – An Empirical Analysis’, 19(2) European 
Journal of International Law 301 (2008), at 313-314. 
12 See also Fauchald, ibid., at 308. 
13 On this issue, see also Chapter VI, Section B. 
14 See, e.g., Gardiner, International Law (2003), at 79 (noting that “international courts and tribunals do 
not indicate at every step when interpreting a treaty which principle of the Vienna Convention they are 
applying.  General references may make explicit that the court or tribunal intends to apply the rules, but 
particular references are more likely to be made only when some uncertainty arises whether a particular 
element of interpretation is admissible.”).   
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11. For the purpose of this thesis, the term FIAT refers to arbitral tribunals 
constituted to determine disputes under investor-State agreements, BITs, the ECT, 
other investment treaties or FTAs, particularly NAFTA.  It does not include the Iran-
US Claims Tribunal or a Chamber thereof, and it covers only awards rendered after 
the 1990 AAP award.15    
12. Topics that lie outside the scope of the present work include (1) the 
interpretation of treaties by domestic courts,16 (2) the interpretation of international 
commercial agreements,17 investor-State agreements, awards, commercial documents, 
or domestic legislation, (3) OPIC decisions, (4) the use of different language versions 
to interpret treaties, including application of Article 33 of the Vienna Convention 
(concerning the interpretation of plurilingual treaties), and (5) the rules of treaty 
interpretation applicable in disputes between states and international organisations.  
The major part of the findings is based on FIAT awards issued before March 2009.  
However, where awards of high relevance have been issued subsequent to that date, 
an attempt has been made to incorporate them in the text to the extent that this was 
possible.  
                                                 
15 The temporal significance of this award is that it was the first award issued under the auspices of 
ICSID. 
16 With specific regard to domestic court interpretations of investment treaties, see, e.g., Guinea v 
Maritime International Nominees Establishment, Court of First Instance, Antwerp, 27 September 1985, 
4 ICSID Reports 32; Guinea v Maritime International Nominees Establishment, Swiss Federal 
Tribunal, 4 December 1985, at 4 ICSID Reports 35; Czech Republic v CME Czech Republic BV, Svea 
Court of Appeal (Sweden), at pp. 6-7; Mexico v Metalclad, Supreme Court of British Columbia, 2 May 
2001, Tysoe J., at paras. 63, 70-72; Ecuador v Occidental Exploration & Production Co, English High 
Court, [2006] EWHC 345 (Comm), para. 90; and Czech Republic v European Media Ventures SA, 
English High Court, [2007] EWHC 2851 (Comm), para. 14 et seq.   
17 For FIAT practice in this regard, see Mobil Oil, 4 ICSID Reports, at 187-9, paras. 6.6-6.9; and 
Tanzania Electric (Award), Appendix B, para. 40; and Amco (Jurisdiction), at para. 14(i). 
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B.  TREATY LAW 
1. Vienna Convention of 1969 on the Law of Treaties 
13. Prior to the formulation of the Vienna Convention, a number of codifications 
of treaty law had been attempted.  None of them attained any degree of universal 
acceptance.18  Given this background, an early priority of the ILC was to codify the 
law of treaties.19  Between 1950 and 1966, sixteen reports were prepared by ILC 
special rapporteurs on the topic.20  From these reports emerged a set of final draft 
articles, which were submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1966 
with a recommendation that it should convene a conference to study those articles and 
to conclude a convention on the subject. 21   In response, the General Assembly 
convened a conference on the law of treaties in Vienna (‘Vienna Conference’) to 
consider those draft articles.22  The Vienna Conference was held in two sessions in 
                                                 
18 See, e.g., the Appendices to the First Report on the law of treaties by ILC Special Rapporteur Brierly, 
YILC 222 (1950-II), at 243-248, which reproduce relevant sections of the Convention on Treaties 
adopted in Havana (1928) and other treaty law codifications by the International Commission of 
American Jurists (Rio de Janeiro, 1927), Field (1876), Bluntschli (1881), and Fiore (1919).  See 
generally, Wetzel and Rauschning, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: Travaux 
Préparatoires (1978), at 20.  See also the Harvard Draft Convention of 1935 on the Law of Treaties, 
prepared by the Harvard Research on International Law, reprinted in 29 AJIL (Supplement) 657 (1935).   
19 General Assembly Resolution 174(II) of November 1947 established the ILC.  The task of the ILC 
was to promote the progressive development of international law and its codification.   
20 A helpful list of these reports is contained in Watts, The International Law Commission 1949-1998, 
Volume Two: The Treaties (1999), at 617.  The Special Rapporteurs were as follows: Brierly (three 
reports, 1950-52); Lauterpacht (two reports, 1953-54); Fitzmaurice (five reports, 1956-60); and 
Waldock (six reports, 1962-66).  Fitzmaurice’s reports differed from the others in that, somewhat 
controversially, they proceeded to restate the law in the form of an expository code.  He considered the 
topic unsuitable for codification in the form of a convention.  See YILC (1966-II), at 176, para. 23.  As 
regards the activities of the ILC concerning the law of treaties, see generally Rosenne, The Law of 
Treaties: A Guide to the Legislative History of the Vienna Convention (1970), at 32-41; and Sinclair, 
The International Law Commission (1987), at 56-8. 
21 The final draft articles are contained in ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the work of 
its eighteenth session’, 4 May – 19 July 1966, UN Doc. A/6309/Rev.1, YILC (1966-II), at 177; 
reprinted in 61 AJIL 263 (1967).  As for the recommendation to convene a conference, see YILC (1966-
I), at 322, paras. 17-8 (892nd meeting); and YILC (1966-II), at 177, para. 36. 
22 See GA Resolution 2166 (XXI) of 5 December 1966, reprinted in 61 AJIL 656 (1967); and GA 
Resolution 2287 (XXII) of 6 December 1967. 
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1968 and 1969. 23  On 22 May 1969, the Vienna Conference adopted the Vienna 
Convention, the text of which in large measure mirrored the ILC’s final draft 
articles.24  The Convention was opened for signature on the following day.  It entered 
into force on 27 January 1980 in accordance with Article 84 following Togo’s deposit 
of the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification.  By the end of 2009, 144 State parties had 
ratified the Convention. 
14. The Vienna Convention has codified the greater part of treaty law.  Its scope 
covers, inter alia, the rules relating to the formation, entry into force, interpretation, 
invalidity and termination of treaties. 25   Save for a few exceptions, the Vienna 
Convention applies to both bilateral and multilateral treaties.26  It does not apply to 
agreements between States and private entities, even if such agreements provide that 
they shall be interpreted by reference to rules of international law.27  Aside from the 
requirement that the treaties it covers are to be in writing, the Convention does not 
specify other requirements of form.  This leaves open the possibility that documents 
                                                 
23 The sessions were held at the Neue Hofburg in Vienna.  The first session was held from 26 March to 
24 May 1968 (at which 103 States were represented) and the second session from 9 April to 22 May 
1969 (at which 110 States were represented).  See Final Act of the United Nations Conference on the 
Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, UN Doc. A/CONF.39/26, at paras. 2 and 3, reprinted in VCOR 
(Documents), at 283.  As regards the procedure and work of the conference, see Rosenne, supra note 
20, at 63-91. 
24 See Watts, supra note 20, at 611.  The Vienna Convention was adopted by 79 votes to 1 with 19 
abstentions.  France was the lone State to vote against the Convention.  VCOR (Second Session), 206-
7, paras. 51-3 (36th plenary meeting).  
25  Areas not covered by the Convention’s scope include treaties between States and international 
organizations, agreements and effects on treaties in circumstances of State succession or on the 
outbreak of hostilities between States.  See Articles 3 and 73 of the Vienna Convention.  See also, 
Rosenne, supra note 20, at 41-6; Watts, supra note 20, at 612; and The International Law Commission 
Fifty Years After: An Evaluation, Proceedings of the Seminar held to commemorate the fiftieth 
anniversary of the International Law Commission, 21-22 April 1998 (New York: United Nations 2000), 
Ch. IV “‘Law of Treaties’: Questions Remain Open”, at 73-110; Rosenne, Developments in the Law of 
Treaties 1945–1986 (1989), at 1–84 (concerning unaddressed issues).  As regards the writing 
requirement, see Article 2(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention.  Nonetheless, international law permits oral 
agreements but these are rarely concluded.  See Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, PCIJ, Ser. A/B, No. 
53 (1933), p. 36; and Salini v Jordan (Award), at para. 77 et seq.  Treaties to which international 
organisations are parties are addressed in the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between 
States and International Organisations or between International Organisations, ILM 543 (1986). 
26 Article 60 (1) is limited to bilateral treaties and Articles 40, 41, 58 and 60(2) expressly relate to 
multilateral treaties.  See Aust, supra note 4, at 9. 
27 See Greenwood, ‘State Contracts in International Law – The Libyan Oil Arbitrations’, (1982) 53 
BYBIL 27. 
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such as a joint communiqué may constitute a treaty within the meaning of the Vienna 
Convention.28 
2. Treaty Law as Customary International Law 
15. The two essential elements of customary international law are (1) a general 
convergence in the practice of States from which a settled practice can be extracted, 
and (2) a subjective element or opinio juris.  They were described by the ICJ in the 
North Sea Continental Shelf cases as follows:  
Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, 
or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered 
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.  The need for such a belief, i.e., 
the existence of a subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris sive 
necessitates.  The States concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to what 
amounts to a legal obligation.  The frequency, or even habitual character of the acts is not 
in itself enough.  There are many international acts, e.g., in the field of ceremonial and 
protocol, which are performed almost invariably, but which are motivated only by 
considerations of courtesy, convenience or tradition, and not by any sense of legal duty.29  
16. Once these two criteria are satisfied, the generally accepted consequence is 
that the relevant rule becomes customary international law.  An important aspect of a 
customary rule expressed in a treaty is that it ordinarily binds all States, including 
those not party to that treaty.  As Malcolm Shaw has succinctly explained: ‘where 
                                                 
28 See Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case, (Greece v Turkey), ICJ Reports 39 (1978), at para. 96, and 
Qatar v Bahrain ICJ Reports 112 (1978), at para. 25; and Salini v Jordan (Award), at para. 76.  See 
generally Shabtai Rosenne, Developments in the Law of Treaties 1945–1986 (1989), at 85–134. 
29 (Germany v Denmark/Germany v Netherlands) ICJ Reports 3 (1969), at para. 77.  See also Pellet, 
‘Article 38’, in Zimmermann, et al., (eds.), The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A 
Commentary 677 (2006), at 748-764; and Oppenheim, supra note 4, at 25-31.   
In Pope & Talbot (Damages), at para. 59, the tribunal observed that ‘[i]t is a facet of international law 
that customary international law evolves through state practice.  International agreements constitute 
practice of states and contribute to the grounds of customary international law.’  See also Mondev, at 
para. 111 (as to opinio juris) and para. 117 (as to the influence of the considerable number of BITs).  
Annex A of the 2004 United States Model BIT defines customary international law in the following 
terms: ‘[t]he Parties confirm their shared understanding that “customary international law” … results 
from a general and consistent practice of States that they follow from a sense of legal obligation’. 
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treaties reflect customary law then non-parties are bound, not because it is a treaty 
provision but because it reaffirms a rule or rules of customary international law’.30   
17. In connection with the Vienna Convention, the majority view prevailing today 
considers that it is, as a whole, reflective of customary international law. 31  The 
authoritative nature of the Vienna Convention is demonstrated by the following 
remark by Aust: 
When questions of treaty law arise during negotiations, whether for a new treaty or about 
one concluded before the entry into force of the [Vienna Convention], the rules set forth 
in the [Vienna Convention] are invariably relied upon even when the states are not parties 
to it.  The writer can recall at least three bilateral treaty negotiations when he had to 
respond to arguments of the other side which relied heavily on specific articles of the 
[Vienna Convention], even though the other side had not ratified it.32 
18. Aust takes the point further by observing that while the ICJ in the Gabčíkovo-
Nagymaros Project case33 applied Articles 60 to 62 of the Vienna Convention as 
customary law,  
it is reasonable to assume that the Court, will take the same approach in respect of 
virtually all of the substantive provisions of the Vienna Convention.  There has been yet 
                                                 
30 Malcolm Shaw, International Law (2003), at 90. 
31 As to Vienna Convention provisions the ICJ has specifically indicated as expressive of customary 
international law, see the Namibia case, ICJ Reports (1971), at 47, para. 94 (concerning Article 60(3)); 
Fisheries Jurisdiction case, Judgment, (U.K. v. Iceland) ICJ Reports 3 (1973), at 14 and 18, paras. 24 
and 36, (concerning Articles 52 and 62); Fisheries Jurisdiction case, Judgment, (F.R.G. v. Iceland) ICJ 
Reports 49 (1973), at 63, para. 36, (concerning Article 62); Aegean Sea case, ICJ Reports (1978), at 39, 
para. 95 (concerning Articles 2, 3 and 11); Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between 
the WHO and Egypt, ICJ Reports (1980), at 94-5, para. 47 (concerning Article 56(2)); Frontier Dispute, 
ICJ Reports (1986), at 563, para. 17 (concerning Article 62); Border and Transborder Armed Actions, 
ICJ Reports (1988), at 85, para. 35 (concerning reservations); and Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case, 
Judgment, ICJ Reports 7 (1997), at 38 and 62, paras. 46 and 99 (concerning Articles 60-62).  For 
pronouncements by the ICJ on the customary nature of Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention, see 
infra note 116.   
Concerning FIAT jurisprudence on the status of the Vienna Convention, the Eureko tribunal had 
occasion to observe that the Vienna Convention represented ‘[t]he authoritative codification of the law 
of treaties … a treaty in force among the very great majority of the States of the world community’.  
Eureko, at para. 247.    
32 Aust, supra note 4, at 10-11.  It has been suggested that the Convention’s influence on the practice of 
foreign ministries throughout the globe is to some extent attributable to the participation of most of 
their international law experts at the Vienna Conference.  Wetzel and Rauschning, supra note 18, at 12. 
33 ICJ Reports 7 (1997). 
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no case where the Court has found that the Vienna Convention does not reflect customary 
law. 
... 
[t]o attempt to determine whether a particular provision on the Vienna Convention 
represents customary international law is now usually a rather futile task.  As Sir Arthur 
Watts has said in the foreword to this book, the modern law of treaties is now 
authoritatively set out in the Convention.34 
19. Although the Vienna Convention has gained wide acceptance, many nations 
are still not signatories to it. 35   In this regard, the requirement of consent in 
international law mandates that States not party to a treaty are not bound by its 
terms. 36   However, as discussed above, this principle of treaty law is generally 
inapplicable to those parts of treaties that express rules of customary international law.  
Consequently, because most, if not all, of the Vienna Convention provisions reaffirm 
customary international law, the content of those provisions bind States that are not 
parties to the Vienna Convention. 
C.  RELEVANT TREATIES 
1. ICSID Convention 
20. The prodigious rise of foreign investment arbitration (also known as 
investment treaty arbitration or investor-State arbitration) owes a great deal to the 
                                                 
34 Aust, supra note 4, at 11.  Notwithstanding this, reference must be made to Sinclair, supra note 6, at 
12-18, in which attention is drawn to a number of the Vienna Convention’s provisions that appeared to 
him—at the time he wrote—to involve a progressive development of international law rather than a 
codification of customary law.  To examine whether the provisions pointed out by Sinclair have in the 
intervening period become accepted into the fold of customary international law rules is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, save to note that more recent publications, such as Aust’s, indicate that those 
provisions have been accepted as such. 
35 McDade has suggested that the major reason for a State not to have ratified the Vienna Convention is 
‘the requirement for the acceptance of compulsory procedures for the settlement of disputes, rather than 
any fundamental disagreement with the Convention’s provisions.’  McDade, ‘The Effect of Article 4 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, 35 ICLQ 499 (1986), at 503. 
36 See Articles 26 and 34 of the Vienna Convention.  See also the obligation set out in Article 18 of the 
Vienna Convention not to defeat the purpose of a treaty signed but not yet entered into force. 
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ICSID Convention37 and the promotion of its dispute resolution mechanism by the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (‘ICSID’).38   
21. The World Bank was responsible for the negotiation and formulation the 
ICSID Convention.  Aron Broches, then the World Bank’s General Counsel (later to 
become ICSID’s first Secretary-General), has been considered as the ICSID 
Convention’s principal architect.39  He set out the basic idea of the Convention in a 
note to the World Bank’s Executive Directors in August 1961.  The drafting of the 
Convention took place during the years 1961 to 1965.40  On 18 March 1965, the final 
text of the Convention was approved by the World Bank Executive Directors and 
transmitted to all member governments of the World Bank.  It entered into force on 14 
October 1966.41   
22. It is well accepted that ‘[t]he purpose of the Convention is to promote private 
foreign investment by improving the investment climate for investors and host States 
                                                 
37 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, 
adopted 18 March 1965, entered into force 14 October 1966; 575 UNTS 159; 4 ILM 532 (1965); 60 
AJIL 892 (1966); 22 Annuaire Suisse de Droit International 221 (1965); 93 Journal du Droit 
International 50 (1966); and 1966 Naciones Unidas Anuario Juridico 211. 
38 The first ever registration of an ICSID case was made in 1972.  From that year up to 1986, only 21 
arbitrations were registered with ICSID.  In contrast to those initial 14 years, almost 190 registered 
cases were registered in the following 19 years (1987 to June 2006).  These figures are derived from the 
list of cases posted on ICSID’s website <www.worldbank.int/icsid/cases/cases.htm> and do not take 
into account foreign investment arbitrations conducted outside ICSID’s auspices.  See generally, 
Alexandrov, ‘The “Baby Boom” of Treaty-Based Arbitrations and the Jurisdiction of ICSID Tribunals: 
Shareholders as “Investors” and Jurisdiction ratione temporis’, 4 Law and Practice of International 
Courts and Tribunals 19 (2005).  With respect to earlier concerns as to the under-utilization of ICSID, 
see, e.g., Toope, Mixed International Arbitration: Studies in Arbitration between States and Private 
Persons (1990), at 253. 
39 See Schreuer, supra note 5, at 2. 
40 A considerable portion of the preparatory work has been documented by ICSID in the following four 
volumes: History of the ICSID Convention (Washington, D.C.: International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes 1968-1970) Vol. I: Analysis of Documents Concerning the Origin and the 
Formulation of the Convention (1970); Vol. II (in two parts): Documents Concerning the Origin and 
the Formulation of the Convention (in English) (1968); Vol. III: Documents Relatifs à l’Origine et à 
l’Elaoboration de la Convention (in French) (1968); Vol. IV: Documentos Relativos al Origen y a la 
Formulación del Convenio (in Spanish) (1969). 
41 See generally, Schreuer, supra note 5, at 2-4, and for the role of the World Bank, see Sutherland, 
‘The World Bank Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes’, 28 ICLQ 367 (1979), at 373-
78. 
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alike’.42  In pursuit of this goal, ICSID was established to provide facilities that would 
assist in the process of settling investment disputes between an ICSID State and 
nationals of other ICSID States.43  The Convention offers a procedural framework 
pursuant to which these disputes can be resolved but does little to determine 
substantive legal issues involved in such disputes.  
23. The Convention alone does not enable an investor to bring a claim against the 
host State.  By virtue of Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, both the investor and the 
host State must have consented to the jurisdiction of the Centre.  In practical terms, 
this often means that there must be—in addition to the Convention—consent provided 
either under an investor-State arbitral agreement or through a treaty that makes a 
standing offer to investors wishing to pursue a claim against a host State under 
ICSID’s dispute settlement mechanism.  Where such a standing offer is made, an 
investor usually accepts this offer by lodging a claim with ICSID, which creates the 
requisite consensual bond between the investor and host State. 
24. The law applicable to ICSID Convention disputes is dealt with in Article 42(1) 
of the Convention: 
The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be 
agreed by the parties.  In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law 
of the Contracting State party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) 
and such rules of international law as may be applicable. 
25. Under this provision, a foreign investor and a State are left with wide latitude 
to choose the law that shall govern their dispute.44  However, limitations such as 
                                                 
42 Broches, ‘The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States’, 136 Recueil des Cours 331 (1972-II), at 348.  See also the Executive Directors’ Report, 
para. 12 (‘adherence to the Convention by a country would provide additional inducement and 
stimulate a larger flow of private international investment into its territories, which is the primary 
purpose of the Convention’). 
43 See, e.g., Article 1 of the ICSID Convention. 
44 For a case where the parties failed to agree either domestic or international law as the applicable law, 
see, Aucoven (Award), at para. 100.  As to the scope of the reference in Article 42(1) to ‘rules’ of 
international law rather than simply ‘international law’, see Blase, ‘Proposing a New Road Map for an 
Old Minefield: The Determination of the Rules Governing the Substance of the Dispute in International 
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mandatory domestic rules 45  and the supplemental and corrective functions of 
international law46 may limit this choice or the extent of the law chosen.  In a case 
where a claim is based not on an agreement negotiated between an investor and a host 
State but on a BIT, that treaty is generally considered the primary source of the 
applicable legal rules47 and to the extent that there may be any inconsistency between 
the domestic law and public international law, the latter prevails.48   
26. With respect to the law applicable to the interpretation of a treaty—and this is 
true not just for the ICSID Convention but for all other investment treaties—it is well 
settled that international law and not contractual or statutory interpretation rules 
apply.49      
                                                                                                                                            
 
Commercial Arbitration’, 20 Journal of International Arbitration 267 (2003), at 269 (contending that 
this reference extends to ‘general principles of law’ and ‘rules of national justice’). 
45 It is not uncommon for States to prohibit the contractual waiver of aspects of its administrative, 
labour, monetary, regulatory or penal law.  See Feuerle, ‘International Arbitration and the Choice of 
Law under Article 42 of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes’, 4 Yale Studies in 
World Public Order 89 (1977), at 108. 
46 See Klöckner (Annulment), where the ad hoc Committee considered that the requirement in Article 
42(1) that ‘the Tribunal shall apply the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute … and such 
principles of international law as may be applicable’ gave those international principles: 
a dual role, that is complementary (in the sense of a ‘lacuna’ in the law of the State), or 
corrective, should the State’s law not conform on all points to the principles of international 
law’. 2 ICSID Reports 122 (original emphasis). 
See also Aucoven (Award), at para. 100; Amco (Resubmitted Award), (1990) 1 ICSID Reports 569, at 
580, para. 40; and Amco (Annulment), (1986) 1 ICSID Reports 509, at 515, para. 18. 
47 See, AAP, at 4 ICSID Reports at 256.    
48 See, e.g., Santa Elena (Award), at para. 64.  See generally, Schreuer, supra note 5, at 622-631; 
Chukwumerije, ‘International Law and Article 42 of the ICSID Convention’, 14 Journal of 
International Arbitration 79 (1997); and Weiler, ‘Good Faith and Regulatory Transparency: The Story 
of Metalclad v. Mexico’, in Weiler (ed.), International Investment Law and Arbitration: Leading Cases 
from the ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties and Customary International Law 701 (2005), at 720-722.  
49 See, e.g., Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, PCIJ, Ser. B, No. 10 (1925), at 17 (‘the 
difference of opinion which has arisen regarding the meaning and scope of the word ‘established’, is a 
dispute regarding the interpretation of a treaty and as such involves a question of international law.  It is 
not a question of domestic concern …’); and the Van Bokkelen case (1888) (‘for the interpretation of 
treaty language and intention, whenever controversy arises, reference must be made to the law of 
nations and to international jurisprudence’).  See also AAP, at para. 39; and Amco (Annulment), at para. 
18.   
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2. Bilateral Investment Treaties 
27. Bilateral treaties that touch upon commerce and foreign investments are not, in 
general, a recent development.  The United States, for example, entered into a Treaty 
of Amity and Commerce with France in 1778.50  During the last century, friendship, 
commerce and navigation (‘FCN’) treaties were a common form of bilateral 
agreement between States.  However, in the 1960s and 1970s, they seemed to lose 
favour as developing States appeared to become sceptical as to the benefits to be 
derived from them.51   
28. FCN treaties tended to deal with a variety of different matters, including 
consular rights, the freedom of navigation of vessels, and the protection of nationals of 
one contracting State in the territory of the other.  BITs, in contrast, focus specifically 
on foreign investment.  On the whole, BITs aim to create a stable legal environment 
for the protection of foreign investment and seek to increase the amount of foreign 
capital flowing into host States by utilizing international legal rules and effective 
enforcement mechanisms provided under the legal framework established by the 
ICSID Convention.52 
                                                 
50 See Walker, ‘Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation’, 42 Minnesota Law Review 
805 (1958), at 805. 
51 Salacuse, ‘BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and their Impact on Foreign 
Investment in Developing Countries’, 24 International Lawyer 655 (1990), at 657.  In relation to British 
post-Second World War treaty practice, Professor Schwarzenberger has identified seven types of treaty 
that covered to some degree foreign investment protection.  These included peace settlements, general 
economic and commerce treaties, and nationalisation agreements.  Georg Schwarzenberger, Foreign 
Investments and International Law (1969), at 30, et seq. 
52 Salacuse, ibid., at 661. 
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29. Germany and Pakistan share the distinction of signing the first BIT in 1959.53  
After a relatively slow start, the conclusion of BITs began to accelerate in the 1970s.  
Several European States and some non-Western capital-exporting States started to 
conclude BITs in that decade.54  The United States signed its first BIT—the US-Egypt 
BIT—in 1982.55  In the 1990s, another wave of BIT negotiations occurred as a result 
of the collapse of the Soviet Union.56  The dramatic rise in the popularity of BITs 
becomes apparent when the average of approximately 7 BITs signed per year between 
1959 through 1968 is contrasted with the average signature of 146 BITs per year in 
the 1990s.57  By the end of 2008, the total number of BITs amounted to 2,676.58    
30. The proliferation of BITs in the past two decades is a remarkable phenomenon.  
Not only are the treaties by sheer weight of numbers beginning to influence 
                                                 
53 Pakistan and Federal Republic of Germany: Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments 
(with Protocol and exchange of notes), 457 UNTS 23 (1963).  This was signed at Bonn on 25 November 
1959 and entered into force on 28 November 1962.  See Vandevelde, ‘The Political Economy of a 
Bilateral Investment Treaty’, 92 AJIL 621 (1998), at 627.  The first BIT to enter into force was between 
Germany and the Dominican Republic, signed on 19 December 1959 and entered into force on 3 June 
1960.  Ibid.  The lead that Germany took in developing this new type of investment treaty may be 
attributed to the loss of all its foreign investments in the wake of the Second World War and the need to 
generate a new investment program.  Salacuse, supra note 51, at 657.  See also Kenneth J. Vandevelde, 
‛A Brief History of International Investment Agreements’, 12 U. C. Davis Journal of International Law 
and Policy (2005), at 157 
54 See Vandevelde, supra note 53, at 628; and Salacuse, supra note 51, at 658.  
55 Various explanations are offered for the delay of the United States to commence its BIT program.  
Vandevelde, at 627-8, explains that the United States launched its program in ‘direct response’ to the 
United Nations General Assembly debates on the measure of compensation for expropriation (full 
compensation being asserted by developed nations, less than full by developing nations and some 
Marxist nations even claiming no compensation should be due).  In contrast, Salacuse, supra note 51, at 
657, indicates that the US program was commenced because it was encouraged by the experience of 
European States.  
56 Vandevelde, supra note 53, at 628.  That commentator suggests BITs were a relatively easy means to 
for Central and Eastern European economies to renounce Marxist economics and to introduce liberal 
economic practices.  See also Plama (Jurisdiction), at para 195 (‘[i]n the 1990s, after Bulgaria’s 
communist regime changed, it began concluding BITs with much more liberal dispute resolution 
provisions, including resort to ICSID arbitration’). 
57  See UNCTAD, ‘International Investment Rule-Making: Stocktaking, Challenges and the Way 
Forward’, UN Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2007/3 (2008), at 23; and Vandevelde, supra note 53, at 627-
628. 
58 See UNCTAD, ‘Recent Developments in International Investment Agreements’, IAA Monitor No. 3 
(2009), at 2, UN Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2009/8 and UNCTAD, ‘Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement and Impact on Investment and Rulemaking’, UN Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2007/3 (2007), at 
3,.  See also Eureko, at para. 258. 
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international law,59 they have been the instruments out of which dozens of investment 
arbitrations have spawned.  In turn, the jurisprudence emerging from these arbitrations 
are making (as this thesis will show) a significant contribution to international law.  
3. Multilateral Treaties60 
31. The 1992 North American Free Trade Agreement61 (NAFTA) is multilateral 
treaty that deals with a broad range of subjects, including intellectual property and 
trade in services, much of which has no direct relevance to foreign investment 
disputes.  Investment arbitration is addressed in Chapter 11 of the NAFTA, which 
deals with measures relating to foreign investment and establishes a regime for the 
settlement of investor-State disputes within the scope of its provisions.62 
32. Article 1131 of NAFTA identifies the applicable law for investment arbitration 
disputes under Chapter 11.  It states that 
                                                 
59 See, e.g., Eureko, at para. 258 (indicating that contemporary customary international law ‘has been 
reshaped by the conclusion of more than 2000 essentially concordant bilateral investment treaties’); 
Lowenfeld, ‘Investment Agreements and International Law’, 42 Columbia Journal of Transnational 
Law 123 (2003-2004), at 128 (‘the mass of almost identical bilateral investment treaties constitutes 
international legislation, though it does not quite fit the traditional classification of international law 
into two categories—customary law and treaty law.’) and at 130 (‘the undertaking of legal obligations 
by a large group of states, even from a mixture of motives, has resulted in something like customary 
international law’); and Rubins and Kinsella, International Investment, Political Risk, and Dispute 
Resolution: A Practitioner’s Guide (2005), at 190 (‘the contours of customary international law have 
evolved through the enactment and application of investment treaties’).  See also Schwebel, ‘The 
Reshaping of the International Law of Foreign Investment by Concordant Bilateral Investment 
Treaties’, in Charnovitz, Steger, and van den Bossche, (eds.), Law in the Service of Human Dignity – 
Essays in Honour of Florentino Feliciano 241 (2005).   
60 For a general summary of this topic see Vicuña, International Dispute Settlement in an Evolving 
Global Society: Constitutionalization, Accessibility, Privatization (2004), at 63-70. 
61 Signed 12 December 1992, entered into force 1 January 1994, 32 ILM 296 and 605. 
62 See generally Alvarez, ‘Arbitration under the North American Free Trade Agreement’, 16 Arbitration 
International 393 (2000); and Trakman, ‘Arbitrating Investment Disputes under the NAFTA’, 18 
Journal of International Arbitration 385 (2001).  It should be noted that some of the NAFTA claims 
that fall within the Chapter 11 investment provisions could also be seen as falling within the ambit of 
the trade-in-goods provisions.  See Wälde and Weiler, ‘Investment Arbitration under the Energy 
Charter Treaty in the Light of the New NAFTA Precedents: Towards a Global Code of Conduct for 
Economic Regulation’, in Kaufmann-Kohler and Stucki (eds.), Investment Treaties and Arbitration, 
Swiss Arbitration Association Conference, 25 January 2002 (ASA Special Series No. 19), p. 159, at 
184. 
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A Tribunal established under this Section shall decide the issues in dispute in accordance 
with this Agreement and applicable rules of international law.63 
33. Of special relevance to this thesis is the comment on this provision by the 
tribunal in Waste Management: 
The thrust of this Article permits this Arbitral Tribunal to be guided, in matters of 
interpretation, by the rules laid down by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
signed on 23 May 1969, which establishes the general rule of interpretation of treaties at 
Article 31 …64 
34. The NAFTA, like BITs, has generated a number of investment arbitrations.  A 
growing number of investment arbitrations are also being instituted under the 1994 
Energy Charter Treaty.65  The ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection 
of Investments66 also requires mention as a relevant multilateral treaty because one 
investment arbitration has been instituted under it.67        
 
 
                                                 
63 Related to this provision is Article 102(2) which specifies that the parties shall interpret and apply its 
provisions ‘in the light of [NAFTA’s] objectives set out in [Article 201(1)] and in accordance with 
applicable rules of international law’. 
64 Waste Management (Award), at para. 9.  See also Methanex (Partial Award), at para. 100.   
65  As at 22 November 2009, the Energy Charter Secretariat listed 23 ECT investor-State dispute 
settlement cases.  See www.encharter.org.  See generally, Wälde, ‘Investment Arbitration under the 
Energy Charter Treaty – From Dispute Settlement to Treaty Implementation’, 12 Arbitration 
International 429 (1996); and Wälde and Weiler, supra note 62, at 183.  Article 26(6) of the Energy 
Charter Treaty provides: 
A tribunal established under paragraph (4) shall decide the issues in dispute in accordance with 
this Treaty and applicable rules and principles of international law. 
66 15 December 1987, 27 ILM 612 (1988) and amended by the Protocol to Amend the Agreement for 
the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Jakarta, 12 September 1996.   
67 Yaung Chi Oo Trading v Government of the Union of Myanmar, ASEAN I.D. Case No. ARB/01/1. 
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Chapter II 
 
 
TREATY INTERPRETATION 
 
 
 
Chapter outline: The purpose of Chapter II is to survey the history of treaty 
interpretation, to discuss the development of the Vienna Convention Rules and describe 
how they are currently accepted as rules of international law.  This background 
information will facilitate a deeper understanding of the Chapter III and IV examination 
of the Vienna Convention Rules.   
 
Section A of this Chapter provides a history of treaty interpretation rules prior to the 
Vienna Convention Rules.  Section B describes how those Convention Rules developed.  
Section C examines the criticisms that have been levelled against those Rules.  Section D 
demonstrates that the Vienna Convention Rules are now considered to express customary 
international law.  Sections E, F and G address, respectively, the distinction between 
interpretation and application of treaties, who may interpret treaties and what types of 
instruments may be interpreted by treaty interpretation rules. 
A.  PRE-VIENNA CONVENTION TREATY INTERPRETATION 
RULES 
35. Rules of treaty interpretation have been used by States for hundreds, if not 
thousands, of years.  David Bederman suggests that the Greeks were the first of the 
ancient civilizations to develop rules of treaty interpretation.68  Up to around 700 BC, 
little is known about treaty interpretation practices.  Historical records indicate that 
                                                 
68 Bederman, Classical Canons: Rhetoric, Classicism and Treaty Interpretation (2001), at 50.  
J O S E P H  R O M E S H  W E E R A M A N T R Y                                          65  P H D  T H E S I S  |  U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  L O N D O N  
from this time until about 300 BC the ancient Greeks practised an extremely literal 
construction technique known as sophistic interpretation.69   
36. Over the centuries, a diverse but unsystematic range of rules and approaches 
developed.  Many distinguished international lawyers expended a good deal of energy 
to give coherence to this body of interpretative rules.70  Municipal law rules on the 
interpretation contracts and statutes significantly influenced the content of these early 
rules.71  
37. At the turn of the 20th century, Oppenheim went so far as to observe in the first 
edition of his classic treatise that ‘[n]either customary nor conventional rules of 
International Law exist concerning interpretation of treaties’.72  One publicist in the 
1930s described the situation at that time as follows: 
The interpretation of treaties is, perhaps, one of the most confused subjects in 
international law to-day.  Many a publicist, influenced by the great classics of Grotius 
and Vattel, seems inclined to over-emphasize the classical cannons of construction 
without carefully examining their practical usefulness.  Jurists and judges, trained in 
various systems of private law, are not infrequently prejudiced by rules of their own 
judicial systems.  Even careful students of international law, who have spent years in 
analysing judicial decisions of international and national tribunals, are sometimes misled 
by a mere dictum.  Consequently, conflicting and even contradictory views are expressed 
on the subject; and this state of confusion needs immediate clarification.73 
                                                 
69 Wheeler, ‘Sophistic Interpretations and Greek Treaties’, 25 Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies 253 
(1984), at 255; and Bederman, International Law in Antiquity (2001), at 176-7. 
70 See, e.g., Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1646), Ch. XVI ‘On Interpretation’; and Vattel, The Law of 
Nations or the Principles of Natural Law Applied to the Conduct and to the Affairs of Nations and of 
Sovereigns, (1758), Bk. II, Ch. XVII, ‘The Interpretation of Treaties’. 
71 See, e.g., Boundaries in the Island of Timor (1914), 1 Hague Court Reports, 354, at 365 (‘[p]rinciples 
of interpretation are, by and large, and mutatis mutandis, those of the interpretation of agreements 
between individuals, principles of common sense and experience, already formulated by the Prudents of 
Rome’).  See also, YILC (1966-II), at 218, para. 3; and Oppenheim, supra note 4, at 1269. 
72 Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise (1905), Vol. I. ‘Peace’, at 559-60.  See also, Westlake’s 
opinion: 
The interpretation of treaties has been considered at much length by many writers on 
international law, and rules on it have been suggested which in our opinion are not likely to be 
of much practical use.   
Westlake, International Law (1904), at 282. 
73 Chang, The Interpretation of Treaties by Judicial Tribunals (1933), at 19.   
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38. The diversity of treaty interpretation rules and approaches led to great 
uncertainty; it was not clear when any one or a combination would be used by a 
tribunal to interpret a treaty; no established order of importance of application guided 
the interpreter; and they were easily susceptible to misapplication.  In the 1960s, Lord 
McNair expressed the view that in the domain of treaty interpretation there had 
emerged ‘a wilderness of conflicting decisions of tribunals and opinions of writers’.74  
A general criticism levelled at this jurisprudential ‘wilderness’ was that if one rule of 
interpretation were invoked by a party, the opposing party could just as equally rely 
on another to contradict or counter it.75  Certain rules also became associated with 
exceptions or variations so detailed that, in the opinion of some, the original rule was 
left unrecognisable. 76   Further, some commentators questioned the rules of 
interpretation, considering their application an illusory construct employed to justify 
the conclusion that the tribunal desired to reach for altogether independent reasons.77  
Others held the view that an international tribunal must not be bound by hard and fast 
rules of interpretation as ‘none of them can be of rigid and universal application’.78  
                                                 
74 McNair, supra note 7, at 366.  See also Sir Eric Beckett, ‘Comments [on the report by Hersch 
Lauterpacht]’, 43 AIDI 435 (1950-I), at 435; and Hudson, The Permanent Court of International 
Justice, 1920-1942 (1943), at 643. 
75 See, e.g., Professor Verzijl’s lecture at the Royal Netherlands Academy of Science (Mededeelingen 
der Afdeeling Letterkunde, Nievwe Reeks D1, No. 2), at 144 (‘[i]n principle [the rules of interpretation 
employed by the PCIJ] are all correct, but on concrete application they often abrogate each other and 
frequently appear worthless …’), quoted in Andreae, An Important Chapter from the History of Legal 
Interpretation (1948), at 75.  The existence of these matching opposites in interpretative rules have 
been seen as a system of checks and balances that offers protection against extremes.  See 
Weeramantry, The Law in Crisis: Bridges of Understanding (1975), at 151. 
76 Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Treaty Interpretation and 
Certain Other Treaty Points’, 28 BYBIL 1 (1951), at 2.   
77  See, e.g., Lauterpacht, ‘Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in the 
Interpretation of Treaties’, 26 BYBIL 48 (1949), at 53 (rules of interpretation ‘are not the determining 
cause of judicial decision, but the form in which the judge cloaks a result arrived at by other means’ and 
‘[t]he very choice of any single rule or of a combination or cumulation of them is the result of a 
judgment arrived at, independently of any rules of construction, by reference to considerations of good 
faith, of justice, and of public policy within the orbit of the express or implied intention of the parties or 
of the legislature’).  See also Yü, The Interpretation of Treaties (1927), at 27-39; Stone, ‘Fictional 
Elements in Treaty Interpretation – a Study in the International Judicial Process’, 1 Sydney Law Review 
344 (1953-1955), at 355-7; Fairman, ‘The Interpretation of Treaties’, 20 Transactions of the Grotius 
Society 123 (1935), at 134; and Salvioli, Comment on Report of Lauterpacht, 43(1) AILI 453 (1950), at 
454.  
78 Hudson, The Permanent Court of International Justice, 1920-1942 (1943), at 642.   
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Some also did not consider that rules of interpretation were ‘a secure safeguard 
against arbitrariness or partiality’.79 
39. In reaction to these problems, calls were made for a simpler and more coherent 
body of rules.  It was suggested by some that the rules be reduced to two or three basic 
general principles, leaving the ultimate choice to the good faith and common sense of 
the interpreter.80  Others favoured a fixed set of rules that had a definitive order or 
hierarchy.81  Debate was also taking place as to the usefulness of treaty interpretation 
rules.       
40.   Given this unsettled legal environment, when the ILC had started to examine 
the subject of treaty interpretation in the 1960s, the time was fully ripe for a 
formulation of an authoritative set of generally applicable treaty interpretation rules.82 
B.  DEVELOPMENT OF VIENNA CONVENTION TREATY 
INTERPRETATION RULES 
41. Of the eighty-five articles that constitute the text of the Vienna Convention, 
just three—Articles 31 to 33—are devoted solely to treaty interpretation.  These are 
set out in Chapter III, Section 3 of the Vienna Convention and are of signal 
importance to this thesis. 
                                                 
79 Lauterpacht, ‘Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of 
Treaties’, 26 BYBIL (1949), at 53.  See also Stone, ‘Fictional Elements in Treaty Interpretation – a 
Study in the International Judicial Process’, 1 Sydney Law Review 344 (1953-1955), at 360.  But see, 
e.g., Beckett, ‘Comments [on the report by Lauterpacht]’, 43(I) AIDI 435 (1950), at 436 (‘[t]he 
fundamental reason for the existence of rules of interpretation … is to defend the court from the charges 
of reaching its conclusions on arbitrary or subjective grounds … an international court, above all others, 
has to be free from the suspicions of deciding cases on [those] grounds.’). 
80 In this regard, see Pollux, ‘The Interpretation of the Charter’, 23 BYBIL 54 (1946), at 70-70.  See also 
Brierly, The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the International Law of Peace (1942), at 199.  
81 See, e.g., the rules of interpretation formulated by Professor Verzijl in the Georges Pinson case, 
France-Mexico Claims Commission, (1927-1928) Annual Digest 426, Case No. 292, at 426-7; 5 RIAA 
327 (1928), at 422; and Fitzmaurice’s ‘Chief Principles of Interpretation Applied by the [ICJ]’, in 
Fitzmaurice, supra note 76, at 9. 
82 Coincidentally, it was also at about this time that Karl Llewellyn produced his critique on cannons of 
statutory interpretation showing that for each cannon, there usually existed an equal and contradictory 
cannon.  See Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (1960), at 521-535. 
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42. The genesis of those treaty interpretation provisions may be traced back to the 
Institute of International Law’s work on the interpretation of treaties from 1950 to 
1956.83  In 1956, the Institute adopted a resolution that distilled the rules of treaty 
interpretation into two articles. 84   Although those rules did not gain general 
acceptance, the Institute’s study of the topic was a precursor to the ILC’s work on 
codifying the rules of treaty interpretation, which commenced in 1964.85   
43. The major components of the ILC’s work on treaty interpretation are found in 
(i) Waldock’s Third Report as Special Rapporteur to the ILC, (ii) the ILC’s 1964 draft 
articles on the law of treaties, and (iii) the ILC 1966 draft articles on the law of 
treaties. 86   The latter contained the final version of the ILC’s rules on treaty 
interpretation (numbered there as Articles 27 to 29), which were adopted by the 
Vienna Conference virtually unchanged as Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna 
Convention.87  As the Ethyl tribunal has noted, the Vienna Conference adopted the 
Vienna Convention Rules without a dissenting vote.88 
                                                 
83 The work of the Institute on this topic is reported in Lauterpacht, ‘De l’interprétation des traités: 
Rapport et project de Résolutions’, 43(I) AIDI (1950), at 366-460; Lauterpacht, ‘De l’interprétation des 
traités: Observations complémentaires et project définitif de Résolutions’, 44(I) AIDI (1952), at 197-
223 and 44(II) AIDI (1952), at 359-406; Lauterpacht, ‘De l’interprétation des traités: Nouveau project 
définitif de Résolutions’, 45(I) AIDI (1954), at 225-230; and Fitzmaurice, ‘De l’interprétation des 
traités’, 46 AIDI 317 (1956). 
84 The resolution on treaty interpretation is set out in 46 AILI (1956), at 358-9, 364-5 and reproduced in 
Annex II hereto. 
85 Rosenne, supra note 20, at 40.  It should be noted here that two of the authors of the Institute’s report 
on the subject became ILC Special Rapporteurs in relation to its work on the law of treaties.  See supra 
note 20. 
86 Sir Humphrey Waldock’s Third Report as ILC Special Rapporteur on the law of treaties, UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/167 and Add. 1-3 (1964) (specifically Articles 70-75), which was significantly redrafted in the 
ILC’s 1964 draft articles on the law of treaties (there numbered as Articles 69-73).  See Annex II. 
87 See Annex I for a comparison between the rules of interpretation as found in the 1966 ILC draft 
articles on the law of treaties and the those found in the Vienna Convention.  See also Rosenne, supra 
note 20, at 40.  
88 Ethyl (Jurisdiction), at para. 52.  However, in the vote for the adoption of the whole treaty, one 
dissenting vote (by France) was recorded.  See supra note 24.   
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44. The ILC’s work did not draft any fundamentally new rules of interpretation.  It 
drew on rules and practice that prevailed at the time it was considering the topic.  In 
its own words: 
the Commission confined itself to trying to isolate and codify the comparatively few 
general principles which appear to constitute general rules for the interpretation of 
treaties.89  
45. Its main contribution to treaty interpretation law was to synthesise the 
unwieldy body of diverse treaty interpretation rules (as discussed above) into one set 
of coherent and systematic rules acceptable to all States and applicable in a wide range 
of circumstances.90  As Thirlway has explained, the work of the ILC went beyond the 
jurisprudence of the ICJ because the Court did not have the opportunity to organise 
cannons of interpretation  
into an articulated system, and it was of course this that the ILC Rapporteurs were able to 
contribute.  In its decisions, the Court frequently refers to a specific principle of 
interpretation, but does not set out any sort of structural system for the hierarchy or 
interaction of those principles.91  
46. The long-term consequence of the establishment of the rules was significant—
they did away with each international tribunal called upon to interpret a treaty having 
to conduct a re-examination of the old conflicting rules of the pre-Vienna Convention 
days, as was the approach adopted by the AAP tribunal.92   
 
                                                 
89 YILC (1966-II), at 218-9, para. 5. 
90 Although there had been codifications of interpretational rules prior to the work of the ILC, see supra 
notes 70 and 81, these codifications failed to gain wide acceptance by international courts and tribunals 
as definitive expressions of the rules of interpretation. 
91 Hugh Thirlway, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1960-1989: Part 
Three’, 62 BYBIL 1 (1991), at 17.  While the ICJ did not lay down a hierarchy or interaction of the 
principles, some Judges in their individual opinions came closer to doing so.  See, e.g., Judge de Castro 
in the Namibia case, ICJ Reports (1971), pp. 182 ff.; and Sir Percy Spender, in the Certain Expenses 
case, ICJ Reports (1962), pp. 184 ff. 
92 See Chapter VI, Section A. 
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C.  CRITICISM OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION RULES 
a) International Law 
47. The Vienna Convention Rules have not been free from criticism.  One of its 
principal critics during the Vienna Conference was Professor McDougal, a member of 
the United States delegation to that Conference.  He criticised the subordination of the 
principles contained in Article 32 to those contained in Article 31.93  To him, Articles 
31 and 32 were too restrictive in the sense that they excluded recourse to many other 
potentially helpful means of interpretation and unduly predetermined the rules to be 
applied.94  His preferred approach comprised an open-ended itemization of the various 
principles of interpretation, without fixed, hierarchical weightings as to the application 
of those principles.  As a part of that approach, a wide spectrum of disciplines and 
methods, including ‘linguistics, logic … mathematical and … empirical research on 
the role of communicative activities in social process’, were suggested as available 
tools.95 
48. McDougal’s far-reaching concepts regarding the materials upon which reliance 
could be had to elicit the agreement of the parties was glaringly at odds with the 
narrower textual approach to interpretation adopted by the ILC.  Of the ILC’s 
approach, McDougal wrote: 
It can scarcely be doubted, further, that the ‘basic approach’ of the Commission in 
generally arrogating to one particular set of signs—the text of the document—the rôle of 
serving as the exclusive index of the shared expectations of the parties to an agreement is 
an exercise in primitive and potentially destructive formalism.  The parties to any 
particular agreement may have thought to communicate their shared expectations of 
commitment by many other signs and acts of collaboration; and it is hubris of the highest 
order to assume that the presence or absence of shared subjectivities at the outcome phase 
of any sequence of communications, much less that of an international agreement, can be 
                                                 
93 The hierarchy is established by the requirement that Article 31 ‘shall’ be used to interpret a treaty, 
whereas recourse ‘may’ be had to Article 32.  
94 See his statement of 19 April 1968 to the Committee of the Whole, reprinted at 62 AJIL 1021 (1968).  
That statement refers to Articles 27 and 28, which provisions eventually became Articles 31 and 32. 
95  McDougal, Lasswell, and Miller, The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order: 
Principles of Content and Procedure (1967), at xii. 
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read off in simple fashion from a manifest content or ‘ordinary meaning’ of words 
imprinted or embossed in a document.96 
49. Professor McDougal’s views were subject to strong criticism.97   
50. Professor O’Connell, also far from convinced that the Vienna Convention 
properly encapsulated the rules of treaty interpretation, made the following criticism: 
Articles 31-33 of the [Vienna Convention] are concerned with treaty interpretation, and 
they have the effect of transforming logical positions into rules of law.  However, the 
priorities inherent in the application of these rules are not clearly indicated, and the rules 
themselves are in part so general that it is necessary to review traditional methods 
whenever interpreting a treaty.  The danger in these rules is that States will argue that 
they are comprehensive of the canons of interpretation, whereas they are selective and 
themselves ambiguous.  More controversy is likely to be aroused by them than allayed.98 
51. These criticisms, however, have by and large fallen into abeyance as the 
Vienna Convention Rules have gained increased use and have become accepted as 
expressing rules of customary international law. 
b) FIAT Jurisprudence 
52. The Vienna Convention Rules have also faced criticism in the domain of 
international investment law.  Matthew Weiniger, for example, has observed that ‘[i]n 
practice the principles contained in the Vienna Convention are not wholly useful in 
resolving difficult questions of BIT interpretation as the guidance they provide is 
insufficiently concrete’.99  He concluded from his analysis of the jurisdiction awards 
                                                 
96 McDougal, ‘The ILC’s Draft Articles upon Interpretation: Textuality Redivivus’, 61 AJIL 992 (1967), 
at 997.   
97 See, e.g., Fitzmaurice, ‘Vae victis or woe to the negotiators: Your treaty or our ‘interpretation’ of it?’, 
65 AJIL 358 (1971), at 373; Briggs, ‘The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order’ (Book 
Review), 53 Cornell Law Review 543 (1968), at 545; and ASIL Proceedings 1969, at 136. 
98 O’Connell, International Law, (1970), at 253 (footnote omitted).     
99 Weiniger, ‘Jurisdiction Challenges in BIT Arbitrations – Do You Read a BIT by Reading a BIT or by 
Reading into a BIT?’, in Mistelis and Lew, Pervasive Problems in International Arbitration 235 
(2006), at 254.  This makes one recall the observation of Professor Hart in his classic work on legal 
philosophy: ‘cannons [of interpretation] are themselves general rules for the use of language, and make 
use of general terms which themselves require interpretation’.  Hart, The Concept of Law (1994), at 
126.  See also Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law (2005), at 50 (‘[domestic] statutes setting laws of 
interpretation have little impact on the way judges actually interpret legal texts, in most cases because 
the guidelines are too general to be practically useful.’).   
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in CMS, SGS v Pakistan, SGS v Philippines and Tokios that tribunals were able to use 
interpretative principles to mould BIT provisions as they wished. 100   McLachlan, 
Shore and Weinger take a similar view when they assert  that the Vienna Convention 
is only of limited use in giving guidance to a tribunal in its interpretive task.  Problems 
arise because the [Vienna Convention’s] rules of construction are capable of supporting a 
wide range of potential interpretations.  The fact that both parties to a dispute usually rely 
on its provisions is a good indication of its inherent flexibility ... The guidance they 
provide is not sufficiently concrete.101  
53. There are incontrovertible elements of truth in the above arguments.102  To 
illustrate the highlighted weakness in the Vienna Convention Rules, the examination 
of arbitral pleadings in which the Vienna Convention Rules are invoked by the 
claimant and respondent is instructive.  In the Plama case, for example, despite the 
application of those Rules to the same facts, the claimant and respondent reached 
diametrically opposite conclusions.103  However, this is the problem associated with 
any rule of interpretation so far devised—total predictability of outcome will never be 
guaranteed.  
54. Additionally, the oft-discussed FIAT awards that have made interpretations 
that lack consistency with other FIAT awards concerning similar BIT provisions do 
                                                 
100 Weiniger, ibid., at 254.  See also van den Berg, The New York Convention of 1958: Towards a 
Uniform Interpretation (1981), at 4 (noting in relation to the interpretation of the 1948 New York 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards that the Vienna 
Convention Rules were helpful but adding at the same time that ‘it is no secret that how they are used 
(some may say “manipulated”) may depend on the desired result’). 
101 McLachlan, Shore and Weiniger, International Investment Law: Substantive Principles (2007), at 
67-68, para. 3.71-3.72.  Nonetheless, in another chapter of that work those authors describe in some 
detail the Vienna Convention Rules and even comment that Article 32(2) ‘may have significant bearing 
on the interpretation of the treaty’, and Article 31(3)(c) ‘is likely to be of particular significance in the 
case of investment treaties.’  Ibid., at 221-224, paras. 7.64-7.72. 
102 Adopting the words of the ICJ (in relation to general terms in treaties relating to the continental 
shelf), it could be said that the Vienna Convention Rules are ‘terms of a somewhat imprecise character 
which, although they convey a reasonably clear general idea, are capable of a considerable fluidity of 
meaning’.  North Sea Continental Shelf case, ICJ Reports 3 (1969), at 30, para. 41. 
103 See, e.g., Plama (Jurisdiction), at para. 188.  See also the Dissenting Opinion of Alberro-Semerena 
in Aguas del Tunari, at para. 22.  In Tokios, the object and purpose criteria was used in the majority 
opinon and the dissent to arrive at completely different interpretations.  See Tokios (Award), at para. 31 
and Tokios (Opinion), at para. 8. 
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not appear to be reflective of FIAT jurisprudence as a whole.  As a recent UNCTAD 
study has noted: 
there is evidence of almost identical disputes leading to conflicting results.  Nonetheless, 
when ISDS experience is put into perspective, and bearing in mind that the jurisprudence 
is evolving on the basis of the interpretation of more than 2,500 different IIAs negotiated 
by different countries and containing provisions whose wording is also different, the 
degree of consistency in the evolving investment jurisprudence is quite remarkable. 
  
By contrast, conflicting decisions such as those in Lauder and CME and the two SGS 
cases against 
Pakistan and Philippines have been relatively rare.104 
55. While to some extent it may be fair to criticise the generality of the Vienna 
Convention Rules, that—paradoxically—is the very characteristic that endows the 
Rules with one of its most valuable features: flexibility.  It may be validly observed 
that flexibility is a vital attribute of the Rules if they are to be general rules suitable for 
the infinite variety of situations in which they are required to be applied.  In this 
connection, it is noteworthy that Shabtai Rosenne considered that rules possessing a 
great deal of specificity would not be appropriate for the law of treaties.  He noted that 
the Vienna Convention was drafted in a fashion that 
throws the day-to-day application over to practice, including of course judicial practice, 
and opens the way to flexibility by endowing the statement of the law with considerable 
resilience and self-adaptability to constantly changing circumstances.  Too detailed and 
too precise a codification of the law of treaties could have exactly the opposite result 
from that which is desired.  The danger of over-specificity is that it might lead to greater 
international controversy and that it would therefore not reinforce international 
stability.105       
56. Criticism of the Vienna Convention Rules must also be weighed against 
numerous other factors.  For example, due to the imperfections of language it is 
                                                 
104 UNCTAD, ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement and Impact on Investment and Rulemaking’, Paper by 
UNCTAD Secretariat (2007), UN Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2007/3, at p. 91 (footnotes omitted).  This 
paper notes that in relation to the investment arbitrations involving Argentina, it has been commented 
that ‘l’exemple des onze décisions sur la compétence rendues dans les affaires argentines illustre 
parfaitement le mouvement de création d´une jurisprudence arbitrale beaucoup plus cohérente que son 
mode d´élaboration aurait pu le faire craindre’, quoting E. Gaillard, ‘Chroniques des sentences 
arbitrales’, Centre international pour le règlement des différends relatifs aux investissements (CIRDI), 
Revue trimestrielle, LexisNexis, Juris Classeur, January–February–March 2006.  
105 Rosenne, The Law of Treaties: A Guide to the Legislative History of the Vienna Convention (1970), 
at 52. 
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unlikely that words adopted in a treaty will (i) perfectly mirror the ideas, concepts or 
aspirations intended by the drafters or negotiators and (ii) have only one valid 
meaning.106  It also needs to be recognised that many treaty provisions have emerged 
out of compromise, which may result in ‘recording disagreement in acceptable 
ambiguity’.107  Sometimes negotiators may even consider ambiguity in a text as the 
only means by which to persuade an opposing State to agree.108  The outcome of an 
interpretation may also pivot on the manner in which the legal argument is 
presented109 and, of course, the specific factual circumstances of the case.110  And no 
matter how tightly drafted or objective a rule of interpretation might be, it would be 
illusory to expect a perfectly objective outcome every time that rule is applied.111  
Further, value-laden considerations may exert some influence on arbitrators where the 
competing arguments as to a rule’s application are finely balanced.112 
 
                                                 
106 This is well reflected in the title of Lord Hoffmann’s article ‘The Intolerable Wrestle with Words 
and Meanings’, (1997) 114 SALJ 656.  See, also, Weeramantry, The Law in Crisis: Bridges of 
Understanding (1975), at 132 (‘Words are not passive agents meaning the same thing and carrying the 
same value at all times and in all contexts. … Through its own particular personality each word has a 
penumbra of meaning which no draftsman can entirely cut away.’).   
107 Gardiner, International Law (2003), at 84. 
108 See, e.g., the memoirs of Dennis Ross, the United States Envoy to the Middle East (1998-2000), in 
his book The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace (2004), at p. 395.  
Ambiguity in a treaty text may provide some precious room for each negotiator to persuade their 
domestic lawmakers, press, interest groups and general public that the treaty is in their State’s interest.  
109 See, e.g., Generation Ukraine, at para. 20.29. 
110 One is reminded here also of the words of the Occidental tribunal: ‘what ultimately matters is that 
every solution must respond to the specific circumstances of the dispute submitted and the nature of 
such dispute’.  Occidental Exploration (Award), at para. 57.  See also Starke, Introduction to 
International Law (1989), at 478 (‘These rules, canons, and principles [of interpretation], although 
sometimes invested with the sanctity of dogmas, are not absolute formulae, but are in every sense 
relative—relative to the particular text, and to the particular problem that is in question.’). 
111 Jeremy Waldron has pertinently observed that ‘[c]itizens cannot plausibly insist that judges turn 
themselves into machines, that they reason in exactly the same way, or that they avoid any intellectual 
exertions that might show up the differences in values between them.’  Waldron, ‘How Judges Should 
Judge’, New York Review of Books, 10 August 2006, p. 54, at p. 59. 
112 See, e.g., Dworkin, Justice in Robes (2006), at 32. 
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D.  VIENNA CONVENTION RULES AS CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
a) International Law Practice 
57. References to the Vienna Convention Rules as generally applicable 
interpretation rules were emerging even before the Vienna Convention entered into 
force in 1980.  In the European Court of Human Rights 1975 judgment in the Golder 
case, for example, it was observed that ‘Articles 31 to 33 [of the Vienna Convention] 
enunciate in essence generally accepted principles of international law’.113   
58. One of the first authoritative signs that the Vienna Convention Rules had 
transformed into rules of customary law is found in Ian Sinclair’s 1984 publication on 
the Vienna Convention, in which he wrote that ‘[t]here is no doubt that Articles 31 to 
33 of the [Vienna Convention] constitute a general expression of the principles of 
customary international law relating to treaty interpretation’.114 
59. The first suggestion by the ICJ that Articles 31 to 33 encapsulated customary 
international law appeared in its 1991 judgment in the Case concerning the Arbitral 
Award of 31 July 1989.  There, the Court held—in a relatively guarded statement—
that Articles 31 and 32 ‘may in many respects be considered as a codification of 
existing international law on the point’.115  There have since been several bolder ICJ 
                                                 
113 57 ILR 201 at 214, para. 29.  
114 Sinclair, supra note 6, at 153. 
115 ICJ Reports 53 (1991), at 69-70, para. 48.  In the Iron Rhine (‘Ijzeren Rijn’) Railway Arbitration 
(Belgium v Netherlands), 24 May 2005, available at <www.pca-cpa.org>, at para. 45, the Tribunal 
observed—after citing several instances in which the ICJ applied the rules of customary international 
law as formulated in Articles 31 and 32—that ‘[t]here is no case after the adoption of the Vienna 
Convention in 1969 in which the International Court of Justice or any other leading tribunal has failed 
so to act’.  For some early references to Article 31 in ICJ separate or dissenting opinions, see Judge 
Ammoun, Separate Opinion in the Barcelona Traction case, ICJ Reports (1970), at 304; Judge Dillard, 
Separate Opinion in the Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council, ICJ Reports (1972), at 
107; Judge de Castro, Separate Opinion in the Fisheries Jurisdiction (Fed. Rep. Germ. v Iceland) case, 
ICJ Reports (1974), at 226; Judge de Castro, Dissenting Opinion in the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf 
case, ICJ Reports (1978), at 68, 69; and Judge Mosler, Separate Opinion, Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ICJ Reports 392 (1984), at 463.  
See generally Torres Bernárdez, ‘Interpretation of Treaties by the International Court of Justice 
following the Adoption of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’, in Hafner et al. (eds.), 
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pronouncements confirming the customary status of those Articles.116  In addition to 
the ICJ judgments, an enormous body of other international law jurisprudence,117 as 
well as domestic court pronouncements from across the globe, 118  now provide 
                                                                                                                                            
 
Liber Amicorum for Professor Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern in Honour of His 80th Birthday (1998), at 721-
748. 
116 See Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v. Honduras: Nicaragua intervening), 
Judgment, ICJ Reports (1992), at 582-583, para. 373, and 586, para. 380; Territorial Dispute (Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad), Judgment, ICJ Reports (1994), at 21-22, para. 41; Maritime Delimitation 
and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, Judgment, ICJ Reports (1995), at 18, para. 33; Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear 
Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 66 (1996), 75, para. 19; Oil Platforms case 
(Iran v. US), Preliminary Objection, ICJ Reports 803 (1996), at 812, para. 23; Kasikili/Sedudu Island 
(Botswana v. Namibia), ICJ Reports 1045 (1999), at 1059, para. 18; Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan 
and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia v. Malaysia), ICJ Reports (2002), at para. 37; LaGrand (Germany v. 
US), ICJ Reports 466 (2001), at 501, para. 99; Oil Platforms case (Iran v. US), Judgment, ICJ Reports 
161 (2003), at 182, para. 41; Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States), ICJ 
Reports 12 (2004), at 48, para. 83; and Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 136 (2004), at 174, para. 94. No 
statement as to the customary status of Article 33 has yet been made by the ICJ.  As to the customary 
international law status of Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between 
States and International Organizations or between International Organizations (these are identical to 
Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention), see the UNESCO-France Arbitration (Award of 14 
January 2003), reprinted in 107 Revue Général de Droit International Public 221 (2003), at 236, para. 
41; noted in 98 AJIL 163 (2004). 
117 See, e.g., the Golder case, ECHR, 21 February 1975, 57 ILR 201 at 213-214, para. 29; Beagle 
Channel Arbitration, (Argentina v. Chile) (1977) 52 ILR 93, at 127, para. 15; Kingdom of Belgium v 
Federal Republic of Germany (Young Loan Arbitration), (1980) 59 ILR 495 at p. 529, para. 16; 
Restrictions to the Death Penalty, IACHR, (1983) 70 ILR 449, at 465, paras. 47ff.; Standards for 
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Report of the WTO Appellate Body, 29 April 1996; the 
Volga case, ITLOS (2002), at para. 77; the Juno case, ITLOS (2004), at para. 51; and Iron Rhine 
(‘Ijzeren Rijn’) Railway Arbitration (Belgium v Netherlands), 24 May 2005, available at <www.pca-
cpa.org>, at para. 45; Prosecutor v Tadić, ICTY Decision (1995) on the Prosecutor’s motion to 
withdraw protective measures for victims and witnesses, at para. 18; Prosecutor v Delalic, ICTY 
Judgment (1998), at para. 1161; Decision regarding Delimitation of the Border (Eritrea v Ethiopia), 
Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, 41 ILM 1057 (2002), at para. 3.4.  It is also noteworthy that 
during the ratification process of the Vienna Convention in the United Kingdom, the Attorney-General 
stated that Articles 31(1) and (3) of the Vienna Convention were ‘a statement of the relevant rules 
under customary international law’, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), vol. 812, col. 1768 (3 March 
1971).  See also, Elias, Modern Law of Treaties (1974), at 13; Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, “The Scope 
and Content of the Principle of non-refoulement: Opinion”, in Feller, Türk and Volker, (eds.), Refugee 
Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection (2003), at 
103; Fitzmaurice and Elias, Contemporary Issues in the Law of Treaties (2005), at 221; and Dixon, 
Khan and Fulford (eds.), Archbold International Criminal Courts: Practice Procedure and Evidence 
(2005), at 155, et seq. 
118  See, e.g., Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd [1981] AC 251 at 282; Ecuador v Occidental 
Exploration & Production Co, [2006] EWHC 345 (Comm), at para. 90; Czech Republic v. European 
Media Ventures SA, [2007] EWHC 2851 (Comm), at para. 14; the Svea Court of Appeal (Sweden) in 
Czech Republic v CME Czech Republic BV, at p. 93 of English translation (‘General principles 
regarding interpretation of treaties under international law are found in the 1969 Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties’); The Commonwealth v Tasmania (the Tasmanian Dams Case) (1983) 158 CLR 1 
at 222; Thiel v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1990) 171 CLR 338, at 349, 356; Victrawl Pty Ltd v 
Telstra Corporation Ltd, (1995) 183 CLR 595 (H. Crt. of Aust.) at 622; and Applicant A v Minister for 
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incontrovertible support for the proposition that Articles 31 to 33 reflect customary 
rules of international law. 
60. Because the Vienna Convention Rules reflect customary international law, 
they also bind States that are not parties to that Convention.  This aspect of customary 
law was illustrated in Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan, in which 
Indonesia, although not a party to the Vienna Convention, did not dispute before the 
ICJ that the Vienna Convention Rules constituted the applicable rules.119  
b) FIAT Practice 
61. As far back as 1979, scholarly literature relating to international investment 
law recognized the significance of the Vienna Convention Rules.  In that year, C.F. 
Amerasinghe, in commenting on the principles of interpretation applicable to the 
ICSID Convention’s jurisdictional clauses, wrote:  
[i]t is arguable that there are several choices open in the task of interpreting a convention.  
But generally it is admitted, and seems to have been the consensus underlying the Vienna 
Convention, that the most frequent approach as reflected in Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention requires that the terms of a treaty be given their ordinary meaning in context 
and in the light of the object and purpose of the treaty.120 
62. In comparison, FIAT awards were relatively slow to refer explicitly to the 
Vienna Convention Rules.  An early exception was the AAP award’s reference to the 
Rules.  Rendered in 1990, that was the first FIAT award issued under the auspices of 
ICSID.  In it, the tribunal referred to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention but at the 
                                                                                                                                            
 
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225 (H. Crt. of Aust.), at 277; Pushpanathan v 
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), Sup. Crt. of Canada, (1998) 160 DLR (4th) 193, at 
221; Thomson v Thomson, Sup. Crt. of Canada, (1995) 119 DLR (4th) 253, at 272; R v Parisien, Sup. 
Crt. of Canada, [1988] 1 SCR 950, at 958.  As regards domestic case law of the United States, see, e.g., 
Chubb & Son, Inc. v Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301 (2nd Cir. 2000), at 308-12, and generally, 
Frankowska, ‘The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties before United States Courts’, 28 Virginia 
Journal of International Law 281 (1987/1988).  The American Law Institute’s Restatement of the 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Third Restatement at §325(1) replicates Articles 31(1) and 
(3), at §325(2), with some inconsequential differences.  The codification found in the Restatement 
omits other provisions of Articles 31 to 33.  Nonetheless, most of those omitted provisions are still 
covered in the Restatement by way of inclusion in the American Law Institute’s Commentary to §325.  
119 (Indonesia v. Malaysia), ICJ Reports (2002), at para. 37. 
120  Amerasinghe, ‘The Jurisdiction of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes’, 19 Indian J. Int’l Law 166 (1979), at 167. 
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same time formulated its own rules, which largely reflected the pre-Vienna 
Convention Rules position on treaty interpretation.121 
63. In more recent cases, numerous FIAT awards have considered the Vienna 
Convention Rules sufficiently important to quote122 or paraphrase.123  Many others 
cite merely the relevant Article or paragraph, without quote or description of their 
content.124  
                                                 
121 APP (Award), at paras. 38-42.  A detailed discussion of this award is found in Chapter VI, Section 
A. 
122 See, e.g., Yukos (Interim Award), at para. 261 (Articles 31 and 32); Hrvatska, at paras. 158 and 160 
(Articles 31 and 32); Canadian Cattlemen, at para. 33 (Articles 31 and 32); Tza Yap Shum, at para. 38 
(Articles 31 and 32); Malaysian Historical Salvors (Annulment),  at para. 53 (Articles 31 and 32); MTD 
(Award), at para. 112 (Article 31(1)); Petrobart (Award), p. 23 (Article 31(1)); Canfor (Jurisdiction), at 
para. 177, n. 185 (Articles 31 and 32); Banro, at para. 19 (Article 31); Camuzzi, at para. 133 (Article 
31); Sempra Energy (Jurisdiction), at para. 141 (Article 31(1)); Plama (Jurisdiction), at paras. 26 
(Articles 31 and 32); Aguas del Tunari, at paras. 90 and 92 (Articles 31 and 32); Enron (Ancillary 
Claim), at para. 32 (Articles 31(1) and 32); Methanex (Partial Award), at para. 97 (Article 31(1)); 
Methanex (Final Award), at Part II, Chpt. B, paras. 15 and 18 (Article 31, subparagraphs (1) and (3), 
and Article 32); Pope & Talbot (Interim Award), para. 67 (quoting all subparagraphs of Article 31 and 
paraphrasing Article 32); Pope & Talbot (Merits, Phase 2), para. 75, n. 68 (quoting Article 31(1) and 
referring to paras. 31(3) and 32, at para. 115, n. 114 and 117); Pope & Talbot (Damages), para. 26, n. 
10 (Article 32); SD Myers (Partial Award), para. 201 (Articles 31(1) and (2)), Siemens (Jurisdiction), 
para. 80 (Article 31(1)); Eureko, at para. 247 (Article 31(1)); Waste Management, 5 ICSID Reports, 
451, para. 9 (Article 31(1)) and that Award’s Dissenting Opinion by Keith Highet at para. 5, n. 2 
(Article 31(1)) and para. 64, n. 54 (Article 31(2)(b)), Tokios (Jurisdiction), at para. 27 (Article 31(1)), 
and Weil’s Dissenting Opinion, at para. 19 (Article 31(1)); Ethyl (Jurisdiction), at para. 51 (Articles 31 
and 32); CME v Czech Republic (Final Award), Professor Brownlie’s Separate Opinion, at para. 15 
(Articles 31 and 32).  It may be observed from this list that there is a general tendency for NAFTA 
tribunals to quote the rules more than other FIATs. 
123 See, e.g., CDC (Annulment), at para. 33 (Article 31); Lucchetti (Annulment), at para. 79; Noble 
Ventures (Award), at para. 50 (Articles 31 and 32); Metalclad (Award), at 225, para. 70 (Article 31(1), 
31(2)(a) and 31(3)); Champion Trading (Jurisdiction), 19 ICSID Review, at p. 288 (Article 31); 
Loewen (Jurisdiction), at para. 51 (Articles 31(1) and (2)); SGS v Pakistan, at para. 164 (paraphrasing 
Article 31(1) without making express reference to the Vienna Convention).  In Amco (Resubmitted 
Jurisdiction), at 550, the tribunal endorsed an interpretation of Article 52 contained in a legal opinion of 
Professor Reisman submitted by Indonesia in which he stated that his conclusions were ‘mandated by 
the ordinary meaning, objects, and purposes of the text and the context of ICSID Article 52’, which was 
a clear reference to Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention. 
124 See, e.g., CSOB (Jurisdiction), at para. 57 (Article 31(1)); Tecmed, at paras. 121 and 155 (Article 
31(1)); SGS v Philippines, at para. 99, n. 32; Salini v Jordan (Jurisdiction), at para. 75 (Articles 31 to 
33); Salini v Jordan (Award), para. 75; CME (Final Award), para. 496 (Article 31); CAA-Vivendi 
(Challenge), para. 12 (Article 31(3)); El Paso, at para. 68 (quoting Methanex (Partial Award), para. 68, 
which referred to Article 31(1)); ADF (Award), at para. 148, n. 153 (Articles 31 and 32); Lauder, para. 
292 (Articles 31 and 32); ADC, para. 290; Maffezini, Jurisdiction at 400-403, paras. 27 (Article 31); 
AAP, at para. 38 (Article 31); Fedax v Venzuela, at para. 20 (concurring with Venezuela ‘about the need 
to apply rules of interpretation laid down in the Vienna Convention’); Mondev, at para. 43 (Articles 31 
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64. In a recent empirical study of 98 decisions made by ICSID tribunals during 1 
January 1998 and 31 December 2006 (the ‘Fauchald empirical analysis’), 125 
references to Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention were found in 35 decisions.  
This number represented only in 36 percent of the ICSID decisions reviewed in that 
study.  However, no indication is contained in the study as to whether it took into 
account decisions in which the Vienna Convention Rules were paraphrased, applied 
without explicit reference to them or even whether the decision required a treaty to be 
interpreted.  Nonetheless, the figures are indicative of a significant number of cases 
that do not refer to the Vienna Convention Rules.126  Moreover, that analysis found 
further that 
[i]f we look beyond the mere references to the [Vienna Convention] … and assess 
whether the tribunals actually made active use of the instruments in their reasoning, we 
can find elements of such application of Articles 31-33 of the [Vienna Convention] in 20 
[out of 98] decisions.  The application of the [Vienna Convention Rules and Article 38 of 
the ICJ Statute] was in general very brief and they were used only as general arguments 
in support of the tribunals’ approaches in almost all decisions.  Only in exceptional 
decisions did tribunals integrate the [Vienna Convention] into their reasoning beyond 
general references or make any link between the [Vienna Convention] and case law of the 
ICJ.127 
                                                                                                                                            
 
to 33); Occidental Exploration (Award), at para. 68 (referring to the Vienna Convention Rules in a 
general manner). 
125 Fauchald, supra note 11. 
126 In the research undertaken for the present thesis, the FIAT awards found not to refer explicitly to the 
Vienna Convention Rules in their decisions concerning the interpretation of treaties included Amco 
(Annulment), at para. 18; Vivendi (Award); Vivendi (Annulment); LESI; Feldman (Award); Wena Hotels 
(Annulment); Azurix (Jurisdiction); CME (Partial Award) (despite the Respondent’s submission that 
the relevant treaty was to be interpreted ‘according to the ordinary rules of treaty interpretation as 
established by State practice and as codified in Article 31 of the [Vienna Convention]’, at para. 284); in 
addition, in the challenge to this award before the Svea Court of Appeal (Sweden) in Czech Republic v 
CME Czech Republic BV, at p. 93 of English translation, found need to refer to Article 31(1) and 
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention); Gruslin v Malaysia; Feldman (Jurisdiction); Joy Mining; LG&E; 
Impregilo; Genin v Estonia; Methanex (Amicus Decision); Middle East Cement (although this was quite 
a straightforward application of the BIT at issue); Mihaly; Lanco (no mention of the rules in 
interpreting Article 26 of the ICSID Convention at 381-3, paras. 35 to 40; this was despite its reference 
to Article 24(1) of the Vienna Convention, at 378, para. 27); and Cable Television, at 121, para. 2.28 et 
seq. (interpreting Article 25 of the ICSID Convention).  
127 Fauchald, supra note 11, at 314 (footnotes omitted). 
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65. The above figures do not appear to be consistent with Professor Schreuer’s 
position that ‘[t]ribunals almost invariably start by invoking Article 31 of the [Vienna 
Convention] when interpreting treaties.’128   
66. As mentioned in the previous paragraphs, the present thesis research found 
more recent decisions tended to make more reference to the Vienna Convention Rules.  
The Fauchald empirical analysis reveals an interesting trend in this respect: the 
frequency of the references increased toward the latter part of the period examined.  
For the years 1999-2002, references to those provisions were made in 21 percent of 
the decisions whereas in the period 2003-2006, references were made in 47 percent of 
the decisions.129  In other words, an increase of over 120 percent took place respect of 
references to the Vienna Convention Rules in the second period. 
67. Moreover, a considerable weight of FIAT authority confirms that the Vienna 
Convention Rules reflect customary international law.  Many cases have explicitly 
held that the Vienna Convention Rules on interpretation reflect, express, comprise or 
codify customary international law.130  Other FIATs, while not explicitly stating that 
the Vienna Convention Rules embody customary international law rules, have 
variously described those Rules, or at least Article 31(1), as  
a) ‘normal principles of treaty interpretation’;131  
b) the ‘principal international law rules on the interpretation of treaties’;132  
                                                 
128 Schreuer, ‘Diversity and Harmonization of Treaty Interpretation in Investment Arbitration’, 3(2) 
Transnational Dispute Management (2006), at 1. 
129 Fauchald, supra note 11, at 314. 
130 See, e.g., Phoenix, at para. 76; Canadian Cattlemen, at para. 46 (Articles 31 and 32); Aguas del 
Tunari, at para. 88; Noble Ventures (Award), at paras. 50 and 55 (Articles ‘31 et seq.’); Canfor 
(Jurisdiction), at para. 177; Mondev, at 203, para. 43 (Articles 31 to 33); Salini v Jordan (Jurisdiction), 
at para. 75 (Articles 31 to 33); Banro, at para. 19 (Article 31); Methanex (Partial Award), at para. 97, 
(Article 31(1)); Methanex (Final Award) Part IV, Chpt. B, at para. 29 (Articles 31 and 32); Camuzzi, at 
para. 133.  See also Eureko, at para. 247.  See also Tokios (Jurisdiction), at para. 27 which refers to 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention and at the same time says that ‘much’ of the Vienna Convention 
reflects customary international law, not specifying whether Article 31 is reflective of such custom.   
131 SGS v Philippines, at para. 99 (Articles 31 to 33). 
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c) the ‘principal means of interpretation’;133  
d) ‘general principles of treaty interpretation’;134 
 
a) the ‘legal principles applicable to treaty interpretation’;135 
b) the ‘primary guide’ to the interpretation of the NAFTA;136  
c) ‘the sound universally accepted rules of treaty interpretation’;137  
d) the ‘rules governing the interpretation of treaties’;138  
e) rules ‘now universally accepted as general international law’;139  
f) the ‘first port of call’ for treaty interpretation;140  
g) the ‘norms of interpretation’;141 and  
h) rules ‘declaratory of existing law’.142 
68. The customary international law expressed in the Vienna Convention Rules 
also has been applied in FIAT cases in which the respondent State was not a party to 
the Vienna Convention.  This aspect of FIAT practice is well illustrated in Aguas del 
Tunari.  In that case, the Netherlands-Bolivia BIT was the treaty under which the 
investment claim was made.  The Netherlands was a party to the Vienna Convention 
                                                                                                                                            
 
132 Pope & Talbot (Interim Award), at para. 65 (no specific identification of a Vienna Convention 
Article). 
133 Sempra Energy (Jurisdiction), at para. 142. 
134 Petrobart (Award), p. 23. 
135 Continental Casualty (Award), at para. 187. 
136 Loewen (Jurisdiction), at para. 51. 
137 AAP, at para. 38. 
138 Enron (Jurisdiction), at para. 47. 
139 Dissenting Opinion of Keith Highet in Waste Management, at 463, para. 5, n. 2. 
140 SD Myers (Partial Award), at para. 201. 
141 MTD (Award), at para. 112. 
142 Ethyl (Jurisdiction), at para. 52, citing De Aréchaga, ‘International Law in the Past Third of a 
Century’, 159 Recueil des cours 42 (1978-I) (‘Legal rules concerning the interpretation of treaties 
constitute one of the Sections of the Vienna Convention which were adopted without a dissenting vote 
at the Conference and consequently may be considered as declaratory of existing law’). 
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whereas Bolivia, the respondent State, was not.  As a consequence, the Vienna 
Convention was held not to be applicable in the case but the tribunal held that because 
the Convention’s rules relating to treaty interpretation reflect customary international 
law, it constituted the applicable law for the interpretation of the BIT between those 
two States.143   
69. In relation to this issue, it is noteworthy that the United States has not signed 
the Vienna Convention and was in fact one of the principal critics of the Vienna 
Convention Rules at the Vienna Conference.144  Despite this initial opposition, the 
United States attitude has undergone a sea change over the years.  In Methanex, for 
instance, the United States agreed that Article 31(1) reflected customary international 
law.145 
70. Notwithstanding the vast body of FIAT jurisprudence applying the Vienna 
Convention Rules as detailed above, a number of FIAT awards have failed to make 
any direct reference to those Rules when called upon to interpret a treaty.  For 
example, in Amco (Annulment) case, reference to the rules of treaty interpretation 
were made in the following general form, without any reference to the Vienna 
Convention Rules: ‘Problems of interpretation or lacunae which emerge have to be 
                                                 
143 Aguas del Tunari, at para. 88.  Similarly, see Canfor (Jurisdiction), at para. 177 (indicating the at the 
Vienna Convention rules of interpretation apply to the United States even though it has failed to ratify 
that treaty). 
144  In his Dissenting Opinion in Qatar v Bahrain, Judge Schwebel observed that ‘[t]he Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties is accepted by this Court as an authoritative codification of 
international law.  Its provisions on interpretation of treaties however were particularly contested, to 
some extent in the International Law Commission which composed them, and much more acutely in the 
United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties itself.  Nevertheless they were adopted by large 
majorities.’  Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. 
Bahrain), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1995 p. 6, at p. 28. 
145 Methanex (Partial Award), at para. 97.  See also Ethyl (Jurisdiction), at para. 52 in which it was 
observed that the United States accepted the Vienna Convention as a correct statement of customary 
international law, citing Iran v United States (‘Decision A18’) Iran-US Claims Tribunal, Decision 32-
A18-FT (6 April 1984), 5 Iran-US CTR 251 (1984), at 259, and also citing a number of United States 
domestic court decisions that have looked to the Vienna Convention when interpreting treaties.  See 
also the almost verbatim formulations of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention in Article 
21.9(2) of the United States – Australia Free Trade Agreement, 18 May 2004, text at 
www.ustr.gov/new/fta/Australia/final/final.pdf.  
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solved or filled in accordance with the principles and rules of treaty interpretation 
generally recognized in international law’.146 
71. It should also be noted here that while the Vienna Convention Rules contain or 
allow application of most of the generally accepted rules of treaty interpretation, they 
do not explicitly refer to all of the prominent rules, particularly the principle of 
effectiveness.  This is perhaps why the ad hoc Committee in Lucchetti stated that the 
general principles of international law on treaty interpretation were ‘set out primarily 
in the [Vienna Convention].’147  But such a qualification is rarely found in FIAT 
awards.  
72. By way of mutual agreement an investor and a host State may agree to 
dispense with the Vienna Convention Rules and use other interpretative techniques, 
for example, requiring that the meaning of treaty provisions be determined and 
applied ex aequo et bono.  While there is specific mention to this method of dispute 
resolution in Article 42(3) of the ICSID Convention, no award reviewed for this thesis 
has adopted this approach.148   
                                                 
146 Amco (Annulment), at para. 18.  See also Tecmed, at para. 55, where the tribunal referred to the 
‘rules governing the interpretation of treaties’ without referring to the Vienna Convention but later at 
para. 155 it makes express reference to Article 31(1) (albeit without applying each one of its criteria). 
147 Lucchetti (Annulment), at para. 79 (emphasis added). 
148 See also Fauchald, supra note 11, at 305. 
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E.  INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION DISTINGUISHED 
73. The subject matter of the present thesis calls for a brief exposition on the 
distinction between two closely connected treaty processes: interpretation and 
application.  The former concerns ascertaining a treaty provision’s precise meaning.  
The latter involves applying a treaty term to a concrete set of factual circumstances.149   
74. Theoretically, interpretation constitutes the step before application—one 
cannot apply a law unless its precise meaning is known.  In practice, however, the line 
demarcating the interpretation of treaty terms and their application may sometimes be 
far from clear.  In many cases, an interpretation may depend on an examination of 
how a given interpretation will apply to the facts.  In other cases, simple logic or 
common sense will dictate that the treaty provisions automatically apply to the facts 
without real need for a separate ‘application’ of the treaty once a meaning of a 
provision is determined (through a process of interpretation).  Given this close relation 
between the two concepts, it has been asserted that ‘[a]ny time an issue involving the 
application [of a treaty] arises, the interpretation of its provisions becomes 
indispensable’.150   
75. As a consequence of this interplay, the thesis may examine areas considered 
by some to be an application of a treaty.  It should be added here that FIATs more 
punctilious in the presentation of their reasons attempt—rather helpfully—to deal with 
these two procedures in separate sections of the award.151  
                                                 
149 See generally, Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (2008), at 26-29.  See also Sir Franklin Berman’s 
Dissenting Opinion in Lucchetti (Annulment), at para. 15, which emphasises the twofold need to 
interpret a treaty and then apply it.  
150 Frankowska, ‘The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties before United States Courts’, 28 
Virginia Journal of International Law 281 (1987/1988), at 327.  Professor Hart took the view that ‘the 
range of application of a law is always a question of its interpretation’.  Hart, supra note 99, at 42. 
151 See, e.g., Mondev, at para. 93 et seq.; Methanex (Partial Award), Chapters J and K; and Professor 
Brownlie’s Separate Opinion in CME (Final Award), at paras. 17 et seq. and 34 et seq. (classifying 
sections of his opinion into ‘Treaty Criteria’ and ‘Application of the Treaty Criteria’).  
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F.  WHO MAY INTERPRET TREATIES?   
76. Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention remain silent as to the persons or 
bodies that are permitted to interpret treaties.  The Harvard Research identified a wide 
spectrum of potential interpreters when it stated that 
in so far as treaties in their international aspect are concerned, they may be authoritatively 
interpreted by the parties themselves through mutual agreement, either directly and 
through the ordinary channels of international relations, or indirectly as the result of 
recourse to good offices, mediation, or conciliation.  Or they may be interpreted by an 
international organ or agency, permanent or ad hoc, to whose decision and interpretation 
the parties to the dispute agree to submit.152 
77. Also indicated in the Harvard Research was that State parties to a treaty have 
the right to issue an authoritative interpretation of their treaty if unanimous agreement 
among them is obtained.  This is reflected in Articles 31(2) and (3) of the Vienna 
Convention.153  
78. However, a State cannot make a binding interpretation of a treaty to which it is 
a signatory unilaterally.  As the tribunal held in the Plama case, a State having power 
to interpret a treaty unilaterally in the context of an investor-State dispute would be 
akin to a State being a ‘judge in its own cause’.154  Based on similar reasoning, it was 
held in Impregilo that the scope of a BIT cannot be altered solely by the domestic law 
of one of the State parties to that BIT.155   
79. In Camuzzi, Argentina contended that the interpretation of a treaty  
                                                 
152 Harvard Research on International Law, reprinted in 29 AJIL (Supplement) 657 (1935), at 975-76. 
153 See also, e.g., Article 30(3) of the 2004 US Model BIT (‘[a] joint decision of the Parties … declaring 
their interpretation of a provision of this Treaty shall be binding on a tribunal, and any decision or 
award issued by a tribunal must be consistent with that joint declaration’). 
154 Plama (Jurisdiction), at para. 149. 
155 Impregilo, at para. 150. 
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must be based on the intention of the parties and that States signatories to the treaty are 
the best qualified to do so.  In that view, interpretation is not the task of arbitral tribunals 
and the case law to this effect should be ignored.156   
80. The tribunal did not agree: 
Notwithstanding the Argentine Republic’s opinion to the contrary, interpretation is not 
the exclusive task of States.  It is also the duty of tribunals called to settle a dispute, 
particularly when the question is to interpret the meaning of the terms used in a treaty.  
This is precisely the role of judicial decisions as a source of international law in Article 
38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, to which the Respondent 
refers.157 
81. The implicit concern of the Camuzzi tribunal appears to be that that once an 
investor-State treaty dispute has arisen, it would be unfair thereafter to allow the State 
parties to that treaty to interpret its terms in order to evade jurisdiction or liability in 
relation to a claim by an investor.158  However, a balance needs to be struck with the 
legitimate entitlement of the signatories to clarify BITs by subsequent agreement as is 
provided for in Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention.159 
                                                 
156 Camuzzi, at para. 124.  The quote is the tribunal’s description of Argentina’s argument. 
157 Camuzzi, at para. 135.  See also the Camuzzi companion award, Sempra Energy (Jurisdiction), at 
para. 147; and Aguas del Tunari, at para. 263 (‘it is the Tribunal, and not the contracting parties, that is 
the arbiter of its jurisdiction’).  Concerning the Camuzzi statement that judicial decisions constitute 
sources of law, see infra note 568. In Methanex, the three NAFTA States made concurring submissions 
regarding the meaning of Article 1101(1) of that treaty.  It was contended by those States that this 
common consensus amounted to a subsequent agreement under Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention, 
which constituted an authoritative interpretation that the tribunal should follow.  See Methanex (Partial 
Award), at para. 130 (United States position); para. 133 (Canadian position); and para. 134 (Mexican 
position).  Because the tribunal decided in favour of the interpretation asserted by the States (based on 
the criteria set out in Article 31(1)) it considered it unnecessary to explore the Article 31(3) argument.  
Methanex (Partial Award), at para. 147. 
158 Similar concerns appear to have surfaced in NAFTA cases relating to the interpretation of Article 
1105 of the NAFTA by the FTC.  E.g., the Pope & Talbot tribunal took the view that it would not 
simply accept whatever the FTC stated to be an interpretation.  Pope & Talbot (Damages), at para. 23.  
Compare ADF (Award), at paras. 176-7. 
159 The CME and Lauder arbitrations, for example, appear to have led to the conclusion of ‘Agreed 
Minutes’ between the Netherlands and the Czech Republic as to a common position in respect of the 
applicable interpretation of Article 8.6 of the Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal of 
Investments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic of 29 
April 1991.  See the Svea Court of Appeal Judgment (Sweden), Czech Republic v CME Czech Republic 
BV, at pp. 6-7; and CME (Final Award), paras. 89 et seq.  However, even though this common position 
was established there appeared to be argument as to what that position actually meant.  See CME (Final 
Award), paras. 398 et seq.   
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82. Treaties may allocate the task of interpretation to bodies or persons other than 
courts or arbitral tribunals.  The NAFTA, for instance, established (in addition to the 
NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitration process) the FTC, which was empowered to resolve on 
its own initiative disputes that may arise regarding the interpretation or application of 
that treaty.  Such an interpretation is deemed to be binding on a NAFTA tribunal.160  
Additionally, pursuant to Article 1131(1), a NAFTA tribunal may be obliged to 
request certain interpretations from the FTC.161  More recently, pursuant to Article 
155 of the New Zealand-China FTA, an arbitral tribunal formed under that treaty 
must, upon the request of a State party, request a joint interpretation from the State 
parties in respect of issue in dispute.  This interpretation will be binding on the 
tribunal.  
83. Domestic courts may have jurisdiction to interpret BITs but, as it was 
indicated in Maffezini, BIT dispute resolution provisions may allow such domestic 
interpretations to be ultimately determined by a FIAT.162  In respect of private parties, 
it has been held that between themselves (and without the consent of a State) they 
cannot by their own interpretation of an investment treaty expand the rights created by 
that treaty.163   
                                                 
160 See, NAFTA Articles 1131(2) and 2001(2). 
161 NAFTA Article 1132(1) prescribes: 
Where a disputing Party asserts as a defense that the measure alleged to be a breach is within 
the scope of a reservation or exception set out in Annex I, Annex II, Annex III or Annex IV, 
on request of the disputing Party, the Tribunal shall request the interpretation of the [FTC] on 
the issue. … 
Similar wording is used in Article 31 of the 2004 US Model BIT.  By virtue of this provision, the 
tribunal is obliged, upon request by the respondent State, to seek an interpretation from the parties to 
the BIT as to the meaning of certain annexes.  Paragraph 2 of Article 31 states that the interpretation is 
binding on the tribunal. 
162 Maffezini, at para. 31 (rejecting the respondent’s argument that the applicable BIT referred the 
dispute to international arbitration only if there occurred a denial of justice by a domestic court and 
observing that dispute resolution clauses ‘are designed to give foreign investors the right to have their 
disputes under a BIT decided either exclusively or ultimately by international arbitration’). 
163 Impregilo, at para. 136. 
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84. Attention should also be drawn to the Report of the Executive Directors, which 
discuss the meaning of certain provisions of the ICSID Convention.164  Although the 
Executive Directors could be seen as representatives of the sponsor of the treaty, i.e., 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (now known as the World 
Bank),165 their elaborations are more likely to be viewed as guides to the interpretation 
of the ICSID Convention rather than any binding determination as to its meaning. 
85. Finally, Article 64 of the ICSID Convention should be noted for its grant of 
jurisdiction to the ICJ to interpret that Convention in the event that State parties 
disagree on the meaning of its provisions.  That Article provides:  
Any dispute arising between Contracting States concerning the interpretation or 
application of this Convention which is not settled by negotiation shall be referred to the 
International Court of Justice by the application of any party to such dispute, unless the 
States concerned agree to another method of settlement. 
86. No case has yet been filed with the ICJ pursuant to this provision. 
G. WHAT MAY BE INTERPRETED? 
87. It is almost pointless to state that the Vienna Convention Rules apply to 
treaties.166  But complexity may surface in the application of those Rules when there is 
uncertainty as to what constitutes a treaty.  Treaties are defined in Article 2(1)(a) of 
the Vienna Convention as follows: 
“treaty” means an international agreement concluded between States in written form and 
governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or 
more related instruments and whatever its particular designation … 
                                                 
164 See, e.g., Report of the Executive Directors, at para. 22. 
165 See History of the ICSID Convention, Vol. II, Part 2, p. 1087. 
166 Interestingly, the Chairman’s Statement at the Adoption Session of the Energy Charter Treaty, 17 
December 1994, explicitly stated that that Treaty ‘shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with 
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.’  See Energy Charter Secretariat, The Energy Charter Treaty and Related Documents: A Legal 
Framework for International Energy Cooperation (Brussels 2005), at p. 157. 
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88. In other words, agreements between States and investors, such as concession 
contracts or contracts for the supply of goods are not covered by the Vienna 
Convention Rules.167  
89. In some instances, however, rules of treaty interpretation have been applied to 
a range of instruments not strictly within the confines of the Vienna Convention 
definition, for example, to interpret the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules168 or domestic 
laws that provide a State’s consent to investment treaty arbitration.169 
                                                 
167 See, e.g., Peter, Arbitration and Renegotiation of International Arbitration Agreements (1986), at 
100. 
168  See Methanex (Partial Award), at para. 100.  Aust, supra note 4, at 39, suggests that treaty 
interpretation rules may be ‘convenient and reasonable’ to apply to memoranda of understanding ‘in so 
far as they are not at variance with the non-legally binding nature of MOUs’.  
169 See Chapter VI, Section C.  In relation to the interpretation of investor-State agreements on consent 
to ICSID arbitration, see generally Schreuer, ‘The Interpretation of ICSID Arbitration Agreements’, in 
Wellens (ed.), International Law: Theory and Practice; Essays in Honour of Eric Suy (1998), at 719.  
See also Waelde and Ndi, ‘Stabilizing International Investment Commitments: International Law 
Versus Contract Interpretation’, 31 Texas International Law Journal 215 (1996), at 250 et seq. 
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Chapter III 
 
 
THE GENERAL RULE OF TREATY 
INTERPRETATION 
 
 
 
Chapter outline: This Chapter studies in detail each provision of the ‘general rule’ of 
interpretation contained in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention.  Following a general 
introduction in Section A, Section B proceeds to examine treaty interpretation practice 
relating to good faith, ordinary meaning, context and object and purpose—the four main 
criteria contained in the all important first paragraph of Article 31.  Section C deals with 
Article 31(2), which provides an elaboration of ‘context’ in treaty interpretation.  Section 
D is concerned with the role of a subsequent agreement or practice and relevant rules of 
international law in interpreting a treaty pursuant to Article 31(3).  Finally, Section E 
discusses the reference in Article 31(4) to special meanings given by parties to a treaty 
term.  Also relevant to this Chapter are Annexes I and II of the thesis, which provide a 
guide to the drafting history of Article 31. 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
90. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention contains four paragraphs.  The ILC 
intended them to be read together as one ‘general rule’.  Accordingly, all the 
paragraphs of Article 31 are positioned under one heading entitled ‘General rule of 
interpretation’. 170  This title was expressed in the singular, not in the plural (i.e., 
                                                 
170 Article 31 was numbered as Article 27 in the ILC’s final 1966 draft. 
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‘General rules’) because the ILC sought to emphasize that all four paragraphs of the 
article formed a single, closely integrated rule.171   
91. A strict application of this general rule, i.e., all paragraphs of Article 31, would 
therefore require (A) a good faith interpretation according to (i) the ordinary meaning 
of the treaty terms (ii) in their context and (iii) in the light of the treaty’s object and 
purpose; (B) giving consideration, where applicable, to (i) the preamble, (ii) annexes, 
and (iii) agreements or instruments connected with the treaty’s conclusion; (C) taking 
into account (i) certain post-treaty agreements or practice relating to the treaty’s 
interpretation or application, and (ii) any relevant rules of international law; and (D) 
any special meaning intended by the parties.   
92. As is manifest from this list of Article 31 interpretative criteria, the application 
of the ‘general rule’, if stringently applied, will be a multi-faceted exercise requiring a 
good deal of inquiry by the interpreter.  Rarely do international courts and tribunals, 
including FIATs, indicate in their decisions that they have checked each one of these 
mandated requirements when called upon to interpret treaties.  Many international 
courts and tribunals, including FIATs, find sufficiency in applying selected elements 
of Article 31.  This practice falls short of a faithful application of Article 31 as an 
integrated whole.  Richard Gardiner arrived at the following conclusion after his 
detailed analysis of the interpretative techniques deployed in the CSOB case: 
In this case one sees how many matters for interpretation were approached using 
appropriate elements of the [Vienna Convention Rules].  There was not, however, a 
systematic application of each part of the general rule, followed by assessment of whether 
to refer to supplementary means of interpretation (circumstances of conclusion of 
preparatory work).  The tribunal applied such of the rules as were appropriate, including 
reference to accounts of the preparatory work at an early stage of its interpretation on one 
                                                 
171 YILC (1966-II), at 220, para. 8.  This position is also confirmed by Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation 
(2008), at 33-38; Sinclair, supra note 6, at 119 et seq. and Oppenheim, supra note 4, at 1272, § 632.  
But see Aust, supra note 4, at 186-87 (‘[t]he singular noun [i.e., ‘rule’] emphasises that the article 
contains only one rule, that set out in paragraph 1’); and also Decision regarding Delimitation of the 
Border, 13 April 2002 (Eritrea v Ethiopia), Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, 41 ILM 1057 
(2002), at para. 3.4, which recited the content of Article 31(1)—without making an explicit reference to 
that provision—and described it simply as the ‘general rule’.  
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point.  This is consistent with the practice adopted in many courts and tribunals, even if 
not with a narrow reading of the Vienna Convention.172    
93. Evidence that FIATs often do not apply all the Article 31 criteria is contained 
in the findings of the Fauchald empirical analysis.  That study of FIAT decisions 
reveals that out of the 98 ICSID decisions reviewed, 35 referred to the Vienna 
Convention interpretation rules but only 16 of these decisions extended their 
examination beyond the Article 31(1) criteria.173  These figures may also suggest that 
FIATs consider the first paragraph in Article 31 more important than the other 
paragraphs of that Article.  
94. But the above practice does not mean that Articles 31(2) to (4) are generally 
considered by international tribunals to be meaningless.  Their lack of use must be 
viewed in light of the practicalities of the decision making process.  From perspective 
of the efficiencies at play, it would be unduly burdensome to require this process to be 
carried out for each and every interpretation, particularly where (as is often the case) a 
more economical means of determining the meaning is available to the tribunal.        
95. With regard to the sequence of the paragraphs as they appear in Article 31, this 
position in which one paragraph is found does not ascribe any level of importance to 
be given to its provisions.  The ILC commented that Article 31  
when read as a whole, cannot properly be regarded as laying down a legal hierarchy of 
norms for the interpretation of treaties.  The elements of interpretation in the article have 
in the nature of things to be arranged in some order.  But it was considerations of logic, 
not any obligatory legal hierarchy, which guided the Commission in arriving at the 
arrangement proposed in the article.174  
                                                 
172 Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (2008), at 45.  Two notable exceptions to this general practice are 
the application of the Vienna Convention Rules in Aguas del Tunari and Plama.   
173 Fauchald, supra note 11, at 314. 
174 YILC (1966-II), at 220, para. 9.  See also Aust, supra note 4, at 187.  McLachlan has observed that 
‘[a]lthough the Convention does not require the interpreter to apply its process in the order listed in 
Articles 31-2, in fact that order is intuitively likely to represent an effective sequence in which to 
approach the task.’ McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3) (c) of the 
Vienna Convention’, 54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 279 (2005), at 291.  
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The intention of the ILC thus was that the four paragraphs of Article 31 should not be 
ranked so as to give one paragraph more weight than another.175 
96. This Chapter will proceed to examine the general international law position 
and FIAT practice relating to each of the four paragraphs of Article 31.  Each 
paragraph will be considered separately. 
B.  ARTICLE 31(1) 
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning 
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.176 
1. Generally 
a) International Law Practice 
97. The interpretative process articulated in Article 31(1) — sometimes referred to 
as the ‘golden rule’ of treaty interpretation 177  — may be dissected into four 
elementary criteria: (1) good faith; (2) ordinary meaning; (3) context; and (4) object 
and purpose.178     
                                                 
175 Contrast Reuter, Introduction to the Law of Treaties (1989), at 97 (Article 31 interpretations ‘must 
be based simultaneously on the “context” (paragraph 2) and on other elements (paragraph 3) which 
appear to carry less weight.’). 
176 This provision evolved from the following ILC draft articles:  Article 70(1), Waldock III, YILC 
(1964-II), at 52; Article 69(1), ILC Draft Articles 1964, YILC (1964-II), at 199; and Article 27(1), ILC 
Draft Articles 1966, YILC (1966-II), at 217.  See Annex II. 
177 See, e.g., Aréchega, Hague Lectures, at 43. 
178  Contrast the ILC’s position that Article 31 was comprised of ‘three separate principles’: (1) 
‘interpretation in good faith’; (2) ‘parties are to be presumed to have that intention which appears from 
the ordinary meaning of the terms used by them’; (3) ‘the ordinary meaning of a term must not be 
determined in the abstract but in the context of the treaty and in the light of its object and purpose’.  
YILC (1966-II), at 221, para. 12.  This section of the ILC’s commentary is quoted with approval in 
Methanex (Partial Award), at para. 98.  
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98. On its face, Article 31(1) offers no explicit order of importance in relation to 
its four criteria. 179   However, an analysis of the ILC Commentary indicates a 
preference for the ordinary meaning, for example, ‘by the fact that … “le texte signé 
est, sauf de rares exceptions, la seule et la plus récente expression de la volonté 
commune des parties”.’180  A  endorsement of the ILC’s approach is contained in the 
ICJ’s unequivocal statement in the Libya v Chad case: ‘interpretation must be based 
above all upon the text of the treaty.’181  The ILC added that:  
the text must be presumed to be the authentic expression of the intentions of the parties; 
and that in consequence, the starting point of interpretation is the elucidation of the 
meaning of the text [of a treaty], not an investigation ab initio into the intentions of the 
parties.182 
99. In other words, the interpretation should give due respect to the intentions of 
the parties as recorded in the text without conducting wide-ranging searches for 
intentions from extraneous sources. 183  Although the ascertainment of the parties’ 
                                                 
179 See, e.g., YILC (1966-II), at 219-20, para. 8 (‘[a]ll the various elements [of Article 31], as they were 
present in any given case, would be thrown into the crucible, and their interaction would give the 
legally relevant interpretation’); and Aust, Handbook of International Law (2005), at 89 (Article 31(1) 
‘gives no greater weight to one particular factor, such as the text (‘textual’ or ‘literal’ approach), or the 
supposed intentions of the parties, or the object and purpose of the treaty (‘effective’ or ‘teleological’ 
approach)’).   
180 YILC (1966-II), at 220, para. 11, quoting the Institute of International Law, 44 AIDI (1944-I), at 199 
(‘the signed text is, aside from rare exceptions, the sole and most recent expression of the common 
consent of the parties’ (author’s translation)).   
181 ICJ Reports 6 (1994), at 22, para. 42.  See also Aust, supra note 4, at 188 (‘[i]t is important to give a 
term its ordinary meaning since it is reasonable to assume, at least until the contrary is established, that 
the ordinary meaning is most likely to reflect what the parties intended.’); Reuter, Introduction to the 
Law of Treaties (1989), at 96-7 (‘The purpose of interpretation is to ascertain the intention of the parties 
from a text …The primacy of the text, especially in international law, is the cardinal rule for any 
interpretation.’); Oppenheim, supra note 4, at 1267 (‘The purpose of interpreting a treaty is to establish 
the meaning of the text which the parties must be taken to have intended it to bear in relation to the 
circumstances with reference to which the question of interpretation has arisen.’); and Lauterpacht and 
Bethlehem, ‘The Scope and Content of the Principle of non-refoulement: Opinion’, in Feller, Türk and 
Volker (eds.), Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on 
International Protection 87 (2003), at 104 (observing that in interpreting the terms of a treaty ‘the text 
of a treaty will be the starting point’).  See also Judge ad hoc Chagala’s opinion in the Case concerning 
Right of Passage Over Indian Territory, (Portugal v. India) (Preliminary Objections) Judgment, ICJ 
Reports (1957), p. 167 (‘No cannon of construction is more firmly established than the one which lays 
down that the intention of a party to an instrument must be gathered from the instrument itself and not 
from what the party says its intention was’). 
182 YILC (1966-II), at 220, para. 11.  See also Sinclair, supra note 6, at 115.  
183 Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (2008), at 8. 
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intentions is not far removed from the goal of treaty interpretation, an explicit 
reference to the intentions of the parties is notably absent in Article 31(1).184  A reason 
that disfavours the intentions approach was well put by Judge Keith: 
Removing intention from the process avoids what will often in fact be a fiction ... The 
matter may be one that could not have conceivably been within the contemplation of 
those preparing the text or, if it was, they may have disagreed expressly or silently on it.  
Emphasising the text along with the purpose and context facilitates, as is often 
appropriate, the application of the text to changing facts and contexts.  Next, that 
approach emphasises the objective rather than the subjective.  Further, if the interpreter 
does address the purpose of the text, also referring to intention may add nothing to the 
inquiry and may simply cause confusion.185     
100. A strong advocate of the intentions of the parties approach was Hersch 
Lauterpacht, who took the view that   
[i]t is the intention of the authors of the legal rule in question—whether it be contract, a 
treaty, or a statute—which is the starting-point and goal of all interpretation.  It is the 
duty of the judge to resort to all available means … to discover the intentions of the 
parties … But to assert … that intention is irrelevant and that what matters are the ‘plain 
words’ of the text, is, in the long run, to divest the task of interpretation of its scientific 
character and its true purpose.  Words have no absolute meaning in themselves.’186 
101. Professor Lauterpacht was involved in drafting an Institut de Droit 
International resolution on treaty interpretation rules and sought to include the search 
                                                 
184 The only express reference in the Vienna Convention Rules to the intentions approach is found in 
Article 31(4). 
185 Keith, Interpreting Treaties, Statutes and Contracts, Occasional Paper No. 19, New Zealand Centre 
for Public Law, Victoria University of Wellington, May 2009, at 5.  In Judge Torres Bernárdez’s 
Separate Opinion in Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v. Honduras: Nicaragua 
intervening), Judgment, ICJ Reports (1992), 629, at 718, para. 189, the view was taken that ‘rules of 
treaty interpretation disregard any intentions of the parties to the treaty as a subjective element distinct 
from the text of the treaty.  Subjective intentions alien to the text of the treaty, particularly a posteriori 
subjective intentions, should play no role in the interpretation.’  See also Gardiner, Treaty 
Interpretation (2008), at 6 (ascertainment of the intention is ‘the sense of the true meaning of the treaty 
rather than the intention of the parties distinct from it’); Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law and Procedure of the 
International Court of Justice 1951-54: Treaty Interpretation and Other Treaty Points’, 33 BYBIL 203 
(1957), at 205-6 and Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951-
54: General Principles and Sources of Law’, 30 BYBIL 1 (1953), at 4.   
186 Lauterpacht, ‘Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of 
Treaties’, 26 British Yearbook of International Law 48 (1949), at 83.  The intentions approach can be 
traced back as far as Aristotle, who said that when general laws operate unjustly in unusual situations, 
they should be interpreted according to ‘what the legislator himself would have said had he been 
present and would have put in his law had he known’.  Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, V. 10 (1137b 
22-4).  
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for the intention of the parties as a primary goal of interpretation in those rules.187  But 
ultimately, the Institut did not adopt the intentions approach in its resolution on the 
basis that ‘the intention of the parties is often difficult to establish’ and in some cases 
‘the parties have no common intention.’ 188  The approach finally adopted by the 
Institut in relation to intentions was also followed by the ILC when it drafted the 
Vienna Convention Rules. 
b) FIAT Practice 
102. Consistent with the international law position described above, the absence of 
hierarchy among the ordinary meaning, context, and object and purpose criteria was 
recognised by the Aguas del Tunari tribunal when it said: 
the Vienna Convention does not privilege any one of these three aspects of the 
interpretation method [i.e., the ordinary meaning, context and object and purpose].  The 
meaning of a word or phrase is not solely a matter of dictionaries and linguistics.  As 
Schwarzenberger observed, the word ‘meaning’ itself has at least sixteen dictionary 
meanings.  Rather, the interpretation of a word involves a complex task of considering 
the ordinary meaning of a word or a phrase in the context in which that word or phrase is 
found and in light of the object and purpose of the document.189 
103. Notwithstanding the above passage, FIAT awards reviewed demonstrate that 
when applying Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention, FIATs place considerable 
importance on the text of the treaty.  This practice is similar to the general approach 
under international law described above,  In relation to the role played by the 
intentions of the parties, the Methanex tribunal approved the statement of  the ILC 
quoted in the International Law section above when it observed:  
                                                 
187 Lauterpacht, ‘De l’interprétation des traités: Observations complémentaires et project définitif de 
Résolutions’, 44 Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International (1952), Vol. 1, at 222. 
188 Lauterpacht, 46 Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International 319-20 (1956). 
189 Aguas del Tunari, at para. 91, citing Schwarzenberger, ‘Myths and Realities of Treaty Interpretation: 
Articles 27-29 of the Vienna Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties’, 22 Current Legal Problems 205 
(1969), at 219.  See also Canadian Cattlemen, at para. 116, n. 1.  
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the text of the treaty is deemed to be the authentic expression of the intentions of the 
parties; and its elucidation, rather than wide-ranging searches for the supposed intentions 
of the parties, is the proper object of interpretation.190 
104. This issue of the predominance of the text in treaty interpretation is discussed 
in Section B(3) below.   
2. Good Faith 
a) International Law Practice 
105. The first criterion mentioned in Article 31(1) is that a treaty be interpreted in 
good faith.  A precise and authoritative definition of this seemingly rudimentary term 
has proved allusive.191  The essence of the doctrine has been broadly described by Bin 
Cheng as requiring ‘obedience to a standard of honesty, loyalty, and fair dealing, in 
short of morality, in international conduct’. 192  In international law, good faith is 
connected to the broad principle of pacta sunt servanda, a fundamental cornerstone of 
treaty law.193  The ILC indicated in this regard that ‘the interpretation of treaties in 
                                                 
190 Methanex (Final Award), at Part II, Chpt. B, para. 22, citing Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, 1966, Vol. II, p. 223, para. 18.  This issue of the predominance of the text in treaty 
interpretation is discussed in Chapter III, Section B(3) below.  See also Tza Yap Shum, at para. 72; and 
Methanex (Final Award), Part IV, Chpt. B, para. 37 (‘[i]nternational law directs this Tribunal, first and 
foremost, to the text; here, the text and the drafters’ intentions, which it manifests, show that trade 
provisions were not to be transported to investment provisions’), Part II, Chpt. B, para. 5 and Part IV, 
Chapt. B, para. 35.  See also Salini v Jordan (Jurisdiction), at para. 79 (‘[t]he common intention of the 
Parties is reflected in this clear text that the Tribunal has to apply’) and para. 110.  The text may be 
viewed as encompassing the treaty’s preamble as well.  See Siemens (Jurisdiction), at para. 81.  
191 Lord Hobhouse perceptively remarked that that a concept such as good faith ‘can be illustrated but 
not defined’.  Russell v Russell [1897] AC 395, at 436 (HL). 
192 Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals (1953), at 
389.  He thereafter referred to these striking words of Lord Coleridge: 
Though law and morality are not the same, and many things may be immoral which are not 
necessarily illegal, yet the absolute divorce of law from morality would be of fatal 
consequence. 
The Queen v Tom Dudley and Edwin Stephens (1884) 19 QBD 273, at 287. See also Fitzmaurice, ‘The 
Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951-1954: General Principles and Sources of 
Law’, 30 BYBIL 1 (1953), at 12-13 (commenting that good faith requires a State to act in such a way 
that it does not act arbitrarily or capriciously, or abuse its rights).  
193 This principle prescribes that every treaty is binding upon its parties and must be performed in good 
faith.  For relevant international jurisprudence, see, e.g., Article 2(2) of the Charter of the United 
Nations (1945); Article 26 of the Vienna Convention; Land and Maritime Boundary between 
Cameroon and Nigeria case, (Preliminary Objections) ICJ Reports 275 (1998), at 296, para. 38; Bin 
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good faith and according to law is essential if the pacta sunt servanda rule is to have 
any meaning’.194   
106. Relatively little jurisprudence by international tribunals has been found that 
elaborates on the role played by good faith in treaty interpretation.  This is confirmed 
by Gardiner’s observation that the ‘ICJ has little to say about good faith as such in 
treaty interpretation beyond referring to it as part of its frequent reiteration of article 
31(1) of the Vienna rules as customary law applicable to treaty interpretation.’195  
Perhaps most useful is Lord McNair’s observation that it would be a breach of the 
good faith obligation ‘for a party to make use of an ambiguity in order to put forward 
an interpretation which it was known to the negotiators of the treaty not to be the 
intention of the parties.’196  
107. On the ability of the good faith criterion to dislodge the application of the 
ordinary meaning criterion, Waldock has stated:  
only when interpretation in good faith leaves a real doubt as to the meaning is it 
permissible to set aside the natural and ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty in 
favour of some other meaning.197  
108. Very rarely would an issue arise as to whether an arbitral tribunal failed to 
exercise good faith in its interpretation because it is constituted, in principle, by 
independent and impartial persons.  More likely is the accusation that a party to the 
dispute failed to exercise good faith in interpreting a treaty.  Thus, in the context of a 
                                                                                                                                            
 
Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals (1953), at 105 et 
seq.; Goodwin-Gill, ‘State Responsibility and the ‘Good Faith’ Obligation in International Law’, in 
Fitzmaurice and Sarooshi (eds.), Issues of State Responsibility before International Judicial Institutions 
(2004), at 85 ff.; Kolb, La bonne foi en droit international public 179-207 (2000); and Rosenne, 
Developments in the Law of Treaties 1945–1986 (1989), at 135–179.  
194 See YILC (1966-II), at 219, para. 5.  See also Yasseen, ‘L’interprétation des traités d’après la 
convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités’, 151 Recueil des cours 1 (1976-III), at 20 and 22. 
195 Gardiner, International Law (2003), at 152. 
196 McNair, The Law of Treaties (1961), at 465.  In relation to the use of good faith in the interpretation 
of arbitration agreements, see Gaillard and Savage (eds.), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on 
International Commercial Arbitration (1999), at para. 477 (‘a party’s true intentions should always 
prevail over its declared intention’).  Also see the reference to good faith in the interpretation provision 
of the CISG (Article 7).  
197 YILC (1964-II), at 57, para. 16 (emphasis added). 
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tribunal interpreting a treaty, Sinclair helpfully indicates that the good faith that the 
tribunal must maintain is that of the parties if they (the parties) were themselves called 
upon to interpret the disputed text.198 
109. Although found in Article 31(1), the good faith obligation is considered not to 
be limited to that provision—it covers all other stages of the interpretative process and 
applies equally to an examination of subsequent practice, recourse to preparatory work 
or reconciling the meaning of multilingual texts. 199   In particular regard to the 
preparatory work, Aust has written: 
It has been suggested that, even when the ordinary meaning appears to be clear, if it is 
evident from the travaux that the ordinary meaning does not represent the intention of the 
parties, the primary duty in Article 31(1) to interpret a treaty in good faith requires a 
court to ‘correct’ the ordinary meaning.  This is no doubt how things work in practice; for 
example, the parties to a dispute will always refer the tribunal to the travaux, and the 
tribunal will inevitably consider them along with all the other material put before it.  The 
suggestion is therefore a useful addition to the endless debate on the principles of 
interpretation.200 
This statement does not fully conform with the framework of the Vienna Convention 
Rules (as will be seen in the discussion on Article 32) but it is somewhat indicative of 
the ways courts and tribunals justify departure from the rules. 
b) FIAT Practice  
110. FIAT references to the good faith criterion in interpretation are scarce.  This 
tendency mirrors the slender amount of discussion by international tribunals on the 
subject.201  The good faith criterion was rather boldly described by the majority in 
                                                 
198 See, Sinclair, supra note 6, at 120. 
199 Ibid. 
200 Aust, supra note 4, at 197 (footnotes omitted), citing Schwebel, ‘May Preparatory Work Be Used to 
Correct Rather than Confirm the ‘Clear’ Meaning of a Treaty Provision?’, in Makarczyk (ed.), Theory 
of International Law at the Threshold of the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Krzystof Skubiszewski 
(1996), 541-547. 
201 For a detailed discussion on the role of good faith in the minimum standard of protection afforded by 
NAFTA Article 1105, see Weiler, ‘Good Faith and Regulatory Transparency: The Story of Metalclad v. 
Mexico’, in Weiler (ed.), International Investment Law and Arbitration: Leading Cases from the 
ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties and Customary International Law 701 (2005), at 719 et seq. 
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Hrvatska as ‘the core principle about which all else revolves’.202  However, this does 
not reflect the understanding or treatment of this criterion in other FIAT awards.  
Indeed, Jan Paulsson in his Individual Opinion in Hrvatska firmly rejected the 
majority’s view.  He considered that the majority incorrectly used its statement above 
first to apply the good faith criterion in order to arrive at a certain result and only 
thereafter embark upon an interpretation to justify the desired result.203 
111. The following passage in the Aguas del Tunari award, that deals with Article 
31 in detail but fails to mention good faith, is illustrative of the treatment (by silence 
or omission) of the good faith criterion in FIAT awards: 
Interpretation under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention is a process of progressive 
encirclement where the interpreter starts under the general rule with (1) the ordinary 
meaning of the terms of the treaty, (2) in their context and (3) in light of the treaty’s 
object and purpose, and by cycling through this three step inquiry iteratively closes in 
upon the proper interpretation.204 
112. Despite the rare application of the good faith criterion, there have been a 
number of peripheral discussions by FIATs that help provide a better understanding as 
to how this criterion operates in the interpretative process. 
113. The decision in Plama appears to indicate that the tribunal considered an 
interpretation contrary to good faith as one that results in a ‘gross manipulation’ of the 
language of the treaty;205 or one that would deprive the investor of any certainty as to 
its rights and the host country’s obligations. 206  According to the Tecmed award, 
                                                 
202 Hrvatska, at para. 191. 
203 Hrvatska, Jan Paulsson Individual Opinion, at para. 51.  See also paras. 7 and 47. 
204 Aguas del Tunari, at para. 91.  This description mirrors an idea by Max Huber.  He is said to have 
considered the process of interpretation as one of ‘encerclement progressif’ of a text.  The relevant 
observations of Huber are referred to (without citation of the source) in Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, 
‘International Law in the Past Third of a Century’, 159 Recueil des cours 1 (1978), at 44.  A similar 
omission of an application of the good faith criterion was made in the detailed application of the Vienna 
Convention Rules in Canadian Cattlemen. 
205 Plama (Jurisdiction), at para. 147. 
206 Plama (Jurisdiction), at para. 163-64. 
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conduct that transgresses the principle of good faith need not be intentional, 
manifestly damaging or fraudulent.207 
114. In relation to investor-State agreements to arbitrate, some FIATs have 
observed that a good faith interpretation must take into account the consequences 
which the parties must ‘reasonably and legitimately be considered to have envisaged 
as flowing from their undertakings’.208 
115. The Methanex case is illustrative as to the statement made by Sinclair in the 
International Law section above as to the perspective from which good faith is to be 
evaluated.  In that case the tribunal quoted with approval the ILC’s statement that 
interpretation in good faith flows directly from the rule pacta sunt servanda209 and 
explicitly acknowledged that all parties had submitted their interpretations in good 
faith.210 
3. Ordinary Meaning 
a) International Law Practice 
116. The second Article 31(1) criterion requires a treaty to be interpreted ‘in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty.’  A wide 
array of terminology has been deployed by international courts and tribunals to refer 
to it.  The most frequently used term has been ‘natural and ordinary meaning.’211  
Other terms that have been adopted include the 
                                                 
207 Tecmed, at para. 71. 
208 SOABI (Award), at para. 4.10.  See also Amco (Jurisdiction), at para. 14(i); CSOB (Jurisdiction), at 
para. 34; and CSOB (Further Decision on Jurisdiction), at para. 24.    
209 Methanex (Partial Award), at para. 98, citing YILC (1966-II), commentary to draft article 27, at 
para. 12.  See also Amco (Jurisdiction), at para. 14(i).   
210 Methanex (Partial Award), at para. 135 
211  See, e.g., Competence of the General Assembly regarding Admission to the United Nations, 
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 4 (1950), at 8 (‘the first duty of a tribunal which is called upon to 
interpret and apply the provisions of a treaty, is to endeavour to give effect to them in their natural and 
ordinary meaning in the context in which they occur.’); Interpretation of Peace Treaties (Second 
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d) ‘natural meaning’;212  
e) ‘natural sense’;213  
f) ‘meaning and scope’;214  
g) ‘reasonable meaning’;215  
h) ‘usual or common meaning’;216  
i) ‘real meaning’;217  
j) ‘true meaning’;218  
k) ‘ordinary sense’;219 
l) ‘tenor’;220  
                                                                                                                                            
 
Phase), ICJ Reports 221 (1950), at 226-30 (the ‘natural and ordinary meaning of the terms’ of a treaty 
took precedence over the principle of effectiveness); the Asylum case, ICJ Reports 266 (1950), at 279; 
Case concerning the Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco, ICJ Reports 176 
(1952), at 195; Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime 
Consultative Organization, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 150 (1960), at 159-60; Temple of Preah 
Vihear, ICJ Reports 17 (1961), at 32; South-West Africa cases (Preliminary Objections), ICJ Reports 
319 (1962), at 343; and Article 1(1) of the Institute of International Law’s 1956 Resolution, 46 AIDI 
364-5 (1956).   
212 Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, Advisory Opinion, PCIJ, Ser. B, No. 10 (1925), at 21; 
Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 57 (1948), 
at 62-3; Italy v Federal Republic of Germany, Arbitral Commission on Property, Rights and Interests in 
Germany, 29 ILR 442 (1959), at 449; and Air Transport Services Agreement Arbitration, (US v. 
France) 38 ILR 182 (1963), at 229-30. 
213 Employment of Women at Night, PCIJ, Ser. A/B, No. 50, at 373; and Re Competence of Conciliation 
Commission, Anglo-Italian Conciliation Commission, 22 ILR 867 (1955), at 871. 
214 Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, Advisory Opinion, PCIJ, Ser. B, No. 10 (1925), at 17.   
215 Pertulosa Claim, Franco-Italian Conciliation Comm., 18 ILR 414 (1951), at 417.   
216 Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative 
Organization, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 150 (1960), at 158. 
217 Anglo-Iranian Oil case, Jurisdiction, ICJ Reports 93 (1952), at 105. 
218 Competence of the ILO in Regard to International Regulation of the Conditions of Labour of 
Persons Employed in Agriculture, Advisory Opinion, PCIJ, Ser. B, No. 2 (1922), at 39. 
219 Polish Postal Service in Danzig, PCIJ, Series B, No. 11 (1925), at p. 37; and Case concerning Right 
of Passage Over Indian Territory, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports (1957), at 142.  
220 Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube, Advisory Opinion, PCIJ, Ser. B, No. 14 
(1927), at 52. 
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m) ‘plain language’;221  
n) ‘sense’ the words ‘would normally have’;222 and  
o) ‘grammatical and logical meaning’.223   
117. In each case, no indication has been provided that these variations signify a 
departure from the sense denoted by the phrase ‘natural and ordinary meaning.’224  
Without a contrary indication, it is assumed that these different terms essentially 
possess the same meaning. 
118. As discussed previously, the ILC described the Article 31(1) ordinary meaning 
criterion as ‘the very essence of the textual approach’.225  But what does the ‘ordinary 
meaning’ or textual approach actually signify? 
119. Dictionaries have been used as aids in the quest for the ordinary meaning of 
treaty texts.226  The WTO Appellate Body has taken the view that while dictionaries 
may be useful, they also have limitations.  In one case it stated that ‘dictionaries are 
important guides to, not dispositive statements of, definitions of words appearing in 
agreements and legal documents.’227  In another it warned ‘dictionary definitions have 
their limitations in revealing the ordinary meaning of a term.  This is especially true 
where the meanings of terms used in the different authentic texts of the WTO 
                                                 
221 Martini case, (1903) 10 RIAA 644, 663-4; Ambatielos case, Jurisdiction, Judgment, ICJ Reports 28 
(1952), at 41.  See also the reference to ‘plain terms’ in The SS ‘Wimbledon’ case, Judgment on 
Intervention by Poland, PCIJ, Ser. A, No. 1, at 25.    
222 Polish Postal Service in Danzig, PCIJ, Series B, No. 11 (1925), at 39. 
223 Factory at Chorzów, Judgment, PCIJ, Ser. A, No. 9 (1927), at 24. 
224 Noteworthy here is the following critical comment by McNair: ‘A mon avis, il faut éviter des 
expressions comme « sens clair », « sens évident », et leur préférer les formules « sens naturel », « sens 
ordinarire », parce que les mots « clair », « évident », sont plus subjectifs que les mots « naturel », 
« ordinaire ». Clair, évident ? A qui ?.’  McNair, 43 AIDI 448 (1950-I), at 449. 
225 YILC (1966-II), at 221, para. 12. 
226 See generally, Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (2008), at 166-169. 
227 United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, Report of WTO Appellate 
Body, 16 January 2003, WT/DS217/AB/R and WT/DS234/AB/R, at para. 248. 
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Agreement are susceptible to differences in scope.’228  Similarly, in Avena and other 
Mexican Nationals, the ICJ considered that the diverse dictionary meanings of the 
term ‘without delay’ made it necessary to look elsewhere to understand this term.229  
120.   The ICJ in the Temple case held that ‘the principle of the ordinary meaning 
does not entail that words and phrases are always to be interpreted in a purely literal 
way.’ 230   This observation articulates a relatively straightforward aspect of the 
ordinary meaning criterion.  In contrast, the question as to what may precisely be 
considered ‘ordinary’ raises many questions.  Such a task is far more difficult than 
what such a simple term first suggests.  For example, Judge Spender drew attention to 
the problems of finding an ‘ordinary’ meaning in treaty language when he made the 
following observation in the Expenses case:  
[t]he ordinary and natural sense of words may at times be a matter of considerable 
difficulty to determine.  What is their ordinary and natural sense to one may not be so to 
another.  The interpreter not uncommonly has, what has been described as, a personal 
feeling towards certain words and phrases.  What makes sense to one may not make sense 
to another.  Ambiguity may lie hidden in the plainest and most simple words even in their 
natural and ordinary meaning.231 
                                                 
228 United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with respect to Certain Softwood Lumber 
from Canada, Report of WTO Appellate Body, 19 January 2004, WT/DS257/AB/R, at para. 59. 
229 ICJ Reports 12 (2004), at 48, para. 84.  
230 ICJ Reports 17 (1961), at 32.  See also Sinclair, supra note 6, at 121 (the ordinary meaning ‘does not 
necessarily result from a pure grammatical analysis’) and Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as 
Applied by International Courts and Tribunals (1953), at 114.   
231 ICJ Reports 151 (1962), at 184.  As to other difficulties faced by the ICJ as to the ordinary meaning 
of terms, see Thirlway, supra note 91, at 24 et seq.  Professor Hartley has pertinently observed that ‘it is 
a well known fact that what is clear to one set of lawyers can be extremely doubtful to another set of 
lawyers.  This is especially true where the two groups belong to different legal traditions or look at the 
law from different points of view.’  T.C. Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law 
(Oxford: Clarendon 1988), at 271.  While Professor Hartley was commenting on European law, his 
remarks apply with equal force to the present topic.  In this regard, see the observation by Lord Goff on 
the Kodros Shipping Corp v Empressa Cubana de Fletes (The Evia) [1983] 1 AC 736 (HL); [1982] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep 307.  That case turned on the term ‘employed’ in a contractual document.  The word was 
used in the phrase ‘the vessel to be employed between good and safe ports’.  Six commercial judges 
considered the term as a reference to the vessel’s actual employment under contract.  The House of 
Lords, in contrast, felt that it referred to the orders given by the ship’s charterers.  Lord Goff’s 
conclusion was that ‘the case illustrates vividly how a few apparently simple words can give rise to a 
profound difference of opinion among very experienced judges; and how all the principles of 
construction in the world cannot avoid the fact that different people may form different views, and that 
interpretation of commercial documents will remain until the end of time a topic which can give rise to 
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121. A search for the ordinary meaning lies at the start of the interpretative process, 
as was indicated by the ICJ: 
the first duty of a tribunal which is called upon to interpret and apply the provisions of a 
treaty, is to endeavour to give effect to them in their natural and ordinary meaning in the 
context in which they occur.  If the relevant words in their natural and ordinary meaning 
make sense in their context, that is an end of the matter.232 
122. This may indicate the ordinary meaning of words in their context may play a 
determinative role in interpretation.  However, in a later decision, the ICJ drew 
attention to the need also to consider the object and purpose, holding that the ordinary 
meaning of words 
is not an absolute one.  Where such a method of interpretation results in a meaning 
incompatible with the spirit, purpose and context of the clause or instrument in which the 
words are contained, no reliance can be validly be placed on it.233 
123. Note should be made that in this pre-Vienna Convention case, the ICJ seemed 
to be making reference to the purpose and context of a clause or the treaty.  This lacks 
congruence with Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, which speaks more precisely of 
the context of the terms and the purpose of the treaty.   
124. As is indicative in Chapter III, Section B(1), there is a significant body of 
international jurisprudence that gives prominence to the text (and thus the ordinary 
meaning) when interpreting treaties.  A direct affirmation of this practice in respect of 
the WTO Appellate Body’s practice is provided by Claus-Dieter Ehlermann: 
[o]f the three criteria mentioned in Article [31(1)] of the Vienna Convention (ordinary 
meaning of the terms of the treaty; context; object and purpose), the Appellate Body has 
                                                                                                                                            
 
differences of opinion of this kind.  We can only do our best.’  Lord Goff, ‘Commercial Contracts and 
the Commercial Court’, [1984] Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 382, at 391. 
232  Competence of the General Assembly regarding Admission to the United Nations, Advisory 
Opinion, ICJ Reports 1950, p. 4, at p. 8. 
233  South-West Africa cases, (Ethiopia v. South Africa, Liberia v. South Africa) (Preliminary 
Objections), Judgment of 21 December 1962, ICJ Reports 1962, p. 319, at p. 336. 
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clearly attached the greatest weight to the first, the ordinary meaning of the terms of the 
treaty.234   
125. Similarly, some commentators also take the view that the ordinary meaning 
criterion is primus inter pares.  Aust, for example, in commenting on Article 31(1) 
considers that ‘although paragraph 1 contains both the textual (or literal) and the 
effectiveness (or teleological) approaches, it gives precedence to the textual.’  The 
view expressed by Sinclair is that  
reference to the object and purpose of the treaty is, as it were, a secondary or ancillary 
process in the application of the general rule on interpretation.  The initial search is for 
the ‘ordinary meaning’ to be given to the terms of the treaty in their ‘context’; it is in the 
light of the object and purpose of the treaty that the initial and preliminary conclusion 
must be tested and either confirmed or modified.235 
126. A more expansive approach to the object and purpose has been adopted by the 
European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice, which approach 
is discussed in Section B(5) below.  
127. It may be concluded from the above that the position of international courts 
and tribunals in relation to the importance to be given to the ordinary meaning is not 
altogether consistent but viewed as a whole there is generally an emphasis on the text.     
b) FIAT Practice 
128. The ordinary meaning criterion in the treaty interpretation practice of FIAT 
jurisprudence, much like international law in general, finds expression in various 
forms.  Although many references have been made specifically to the ‘ordinary 
                                                 
234 Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, ‘Reflections on the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO)’, in American Society of International Law, Proceedings of the 97th Annual Meeting 77 (2003), 
at 80.  See also Frederico Ortino, ‘Treaty Interpretation and the WTO Appellate Body Report in US – 
Gambling: A Critique’, 9 Journal of International Economic Law 117 (2006). 
235 Sinclair, supra note 6, at 130. 
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meaning’, 236  other terminology that has been employed and that appears to have 
equivalence include the: 
a) ‘natural and fair meaning’;237  
b) ‘natural and ordinary meaning’;238  
c) ‘natural and obvious sense’;239  
d) ‘ordinary or grammatical meaning’;240  
e) ‘language’;241  
f) ‘plain language’;242  
g) ‘plain meaning’;243  
h) ‘plain wording’;244  
i) ‘plain and natural language’;245  
                                                 
236  See, e.g., Tokios (Jurisdiction), para. 85; Champion Trading Company v Egypt, 19 ICSID Review, 
at p. 288; Pope & Talbot (Interim Award), at para 69; Siemens (Jurisdiction), at para. 93; Methanex 
(Final Award), Part II, Chpt. H, para. 20. 
237 AAP, at paras. 51 and 61. 
238 Dissenting Opinion of Keith Highet in Waste Management, at 469, para. 24.  Interestingly, this 
phrase was used in Waldock III, YILC (1964-II), at 52 but the word ‘natural’ was subsequently dropped 
without explanation in the ILC’s 1964 draft articles on the law of treaties.  See YILC (1964-II), at 199.   
239 AAP, at 268, para. 47. 
240 SPP (Jurisdiction), 147, at para. 74. 
241 Maffezini (Jurisdiction), at 402, para. 31. 
242 AAP, at para. 66; Dissenting Opinion of Dr. El Mahdi in Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) 
Limited v Arab Republic of Egypt, Award of 20 May 1992, 3 ICSID Rep. 189, at 322.   
243 Eureko, at para. 246. Note should be made here that the eighth edition of Black’s Law Dictionary 
considers the phrase ‘ordinary meaning’ as synonymous with ‘plain meaning’.  This latter is a common 
term used in interpreting United States statutes.  See, e.g., Qi-Zhou v  Meissner, 70 F.3d 136, 140 
(D.C.Cir.1995) (‘[w]here … the plain language of the statute is clear, the court generally will not 
inquire further into its meaning, at least in the absence of a clearly expressed legislative intent to the 
contrary’) (internal quotation and citations omitted). 
244 Lauder, at para. 219. 
245 Methanex (Final Award), Part IV, Chapt. B, para. 29 and Part IV, Chapt. C, para. 14. 
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j) ‘fair meaning’;246  
k) ‘common use’;247 and 
l) ‘usus loquendi’.248  
129. Displaying consistency with international law jurisprudence, FIATs have held 
that the ordinary meaning does not constitute the literal meaning,249 and, generally, the 
starting point of any FIAT interpretation is the text of the treaty at issue.  The 
Methanex tribunal emphasised this latter position when it held that ‘[i]nternational law 
directs this Tribunal, first and foremost, to the text’. 250  Many other FIATs have 
expressed similar views.251  FIATs tend to favour the textual approach because it 
gives primacy to the documentary record of the agreement reached by the State 
parties.252  The text of a treaty may also evidence other Article 31 criteria.  This dual 
role of the text was indicated by the ADF tribunal when it observed:  
We understand the rules of interpretation found in customary international law to enjoin 
us to focus first on the actual language of the provision being construed.  The object and 
purpose of the parties to a treaty in agreeing upon any particular paragraph of that treaty 
                                                 
246 AAP, at 268, para. 47. 
247 AAP, at para. 40 (Rule (B)) and para. 47. 
248 AAP, at para. 40 (Rule (B)) and para 47. 
249 See, e.g., Methanex (Partial Award), at para. 136 (‘there is a difference between a literal meaning 
and the ordinary meaning of a legal phrase’); Siemens (Jurisdiction), at para. 92; and Methanex (Final 
Award), at Part II, Chpt. B, para. 16 (stating in regard to the interpretation in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning of a term that ‘several scholars have noted that this is not merely a semantic exercise 
in uncovering the mere literal meaning of a term’).   
250 Methanex (Final Award), at Part IV, Chpt. B, para. 37.   
251 See, e.g., Yukos (Interim Award), at para. 411 (‘according to Article 31 of the [Vienna Convention], 
a treaty must be interpreted first on the basis of its plain language’); SGS v Philippines, at paras. 114 
and 116 (‘[o]ne must begin with the actual text’ and the text ‘means what it says’); Hrvatska, Jan 
Paulsson Individual Opinion, at paras. 47 and 48; and Pope & Talbot (Interim Award), at para 69 
(quoting with approval the WTO Appellate Body’s view in Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (4 
October 1996) that ‘[i]nterpretation must be based above all on the text of the treaty’); SPP 
(Jurisdiction), 147, at para. 74; Tecmed, at para. 121; and Gruslin, at paras. 21.4 and 21.6.  As to the 
application of the textual approach in interpreting a domestic law that provides a State’s consent to 
ICSID jurisdiction, see Tradex (Jurisdiction), at 59.  See also the English High Court decision in Czech 
Republic v European Media Ventures SA, [2007] EWHC 2851 (Comm), at para. 16 
252 See, e.g., Tokios (Jurisdiction), at para. 82; Methanex (Final Award), at Part II, Chpt. B, para. 22; 
and Siemens (Jurisdiction), at para. 106. 
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are to be found, in the first instance, in the words in fact used by the parties in that 
paragraph.253 
130. A few FIATs have taken the view that some terms they have been called upon 
to interpret have been clear and that their ordinary meaning has been beyond doubt.  
Consequently, they have seen no need for further interpretation, i.e., examination of 
the context or the treaty’s object and purpose.254  A rationale for this approach was 
provided by the AAP tribunal as follows:  
The first general maxim of interpretation is that it is not allowed to interpret what has no 
need of interpretation.  When a deed is worded in a clear and precise terms [sic.], when 
its meaning is evident and leads to no absurd conclusion, there can be no reason for 
refusing to admit the meaning which such deed naturally presents …255 
131. The text’s dominant position vis-à-vis the context was highlighted by the 
Salini v Jordan tribunal when it held that ‘the context cannot prevail over the general 
wording of the text’.256  A preference for the textual approach also manifests itself in 
the strong reluctance of many FIATs to read or imply terms into a treaty.257   
                                                 
253 ADF (Award), at para. 147. 
254 See, e.g., Maffezini (Jurisdiction), at paras. 27, 32 and 35-36; and Duke v Ecuador, at paras. 318 and 
324. 
255 AAP, at 268, para. 47, quoting Vattel’s The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law Applied 
to the Conduct and to the Affairs of Nations and of Sovereigns (1758), Vol. III, Chapt. XVII, at para. 
263.  See also SGS v Philippines, at para. 99; Middle East Cement, at paras 100-102; and Gruslin, at 
501, para. 21.6.  For an example of the application of this principle to an investor-State agreement, see 
Aucoven (Jurisdiction), at para. 87 (‘the Tribunal does not see any reason nor justification for departing 
from the clear meaning’).               
256 Salini v Jordan (Jurisdiction), at para. 77.  See also ADF (Award), at para. 147. 
257 See, e.g., Plama (Jurisdiction), at paras. 203-4; SGS v Pakistan, at para. 177 (‘[i]n the absence of 
such treaty language, we are not free to read into the Swiss-Pakistan BIT a requirement that would 
preclude a would-be claimant from resorting to other remedies in respect of contract claims prior to the 
exercise of its BIT rights’); Dissenting Opinion of Alberro-Semerena in Aguas del Tunari, at para. 27; 
Tokios (Jurisdiction), at para. 52 (‘we do not believe that arbitrators should read in to BITs limitations 
not found in the text nor evident from negotiating history sources’) and at para. 77 (rejecting an 
interpretation suggested by the respondent because it was ‘plainly absent from the text’); Methanex 
(Final Award), at Part IV, Chapt. C, para. 16 (‘[w]hen the NAFTA Parties did not incorporate a non-
discrimination requirement in a provision in which they might have done so, it would be wrong for a 
tribunal to pretend that they had’); Methanex (Final Award), Part IV, Chapt. B, para. 35 (‘the drafters 
did not insert the [words ‘with respect to any like, directly competitive or substitutable goods’] in 
Article 1102 [of the NAFTA]; and it would be unwarranted for a tribunal interpreting the provision to 
act as if they had, unless there were clear indications elsewhere in the text that, at best, the drafters 
wished to do so or, at least, that they were not opposed to doing so’); Sempra Energy (Jurisdiction), at 
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132. Notwithstanding the importance placed on the ordinary meaning or the text, 
even if such a meaning is considered to have been clear, it still may not be decisive.  
In Aguas del Tunari, for example, the tribunal took the view that the ordinary meaning 
of a certain phrase in dispute, ‘although clearly an essential element of the task of 
interpretation, is not determinative in this instance.’258    
133. Even if an ordinary meaning of a term is clear, FIATs have been unwilling to 
be semantic.  For example, in Pope & Talbot, Canada argued that the use of the plural 
form in Article 1102(2) of NAFTA (‘investments’ and ‘investors’) required more than 
one investor to be aggrieved for that provision to come into play.  As part of its 
decision, the tribunal stated: 
As a general principle of interpretation, use of the plural form does not, without more, prevent 
application of statutory or treaty language to an individual case.  Laws outlawing 
discrimination against ‘women’ or setting labour standards for ‘children’ could not reasonably 
be interpreted to prevent their application to a woman or a child.259 
134. Similarly, in Siemens, although the relevant treaty text referred only to the 
grant of fair and equitable treatment to ‘investments’ it was held that to reserve such 
treatment only for investments and not investors was not in accord with the treaty’s 
                                                                                                                                            
 
para. 146 (‘[t]he Tribunal cannot presume that intention if it is not expressly stated’); Amco 
(Jurisdiction), at para. 12(iii); Loewen (Award), at para. 230 (‘[t]here is no such language in the 
NAFTA document and there are substantial reasons why the Tribunal should not stretch the existing 
language to affect such a change”); CME (Final Award), at para. 412 (holding that if it implemented the 
view of the respondent’s expert, Professor Schreuer, it would inject into the disputed choice-of-law 
treaty provision a requirement not contained in it); SGS v Philippines, at para. 118 (‘[i]f the States 
Parties to the BIT had wanted to limit investor-State arbitration to claims concerning breaches of 
substantive standards contained in the BIT, they would have said so expressly’), and 132(a), and 
132(e); Tokios (Jurisdiction), at para. 36 (‘[i]n our view, it is not for tribunals to impose limits on the 
scope of BITs not found in the text, much less limits nowhere evident from the negotiating history’) and 
at para. 52 (‘we do not believe that arbitrators should read into BITs limitations not found in the text 
nor evident from negotiating sources’); and Methanex (Partial Award), at paras. 138 (‘it would require 
clear and explicit language to achieve this result’).  See also CME (Final Award), para. 412; and 
Methanex (Partial Award), at para. 123; and Tza Yap Shum, at para. 111.   
258 Aguas del Tunari, at para. 226.  Other instances in which the ordinary meaning of words has not 
been considered decisive is where they are manifestly absurd or unreasonable (see particularly 
Champion Trading Company v Egypt, 19 ICSID Review, at p. 288), where a special meaning is clear 
from the treaty (discussed in Chapter III, Section E), or where the interpretation concerns procedural 
provisions (particularly concerning negotiation period provisions) (discussed below in Chapter VI, 
Section I).   
259 Pope & Talbot (Merits, Phase 2), at para. 37. 
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purpose, despite the absence of an explicit reference to investors.260  This reluctance to 
be semantic may also be connected with the duty to carry out the interpretation in 
good faith. 
135. FIATs have frequently shown a willingness to refer to dictionary definitions of 
words to cast light on the ordinary meaning of terms.261  Usually, these definitions 
offer some degree of guidance but care needs to be exercised, as was indicated by the 
tribunal in Methanex (Partial Award).  In that case, the tribunal referred to a number 
of dictionaries to interpret the phrase ‘relating to’ but found that 
none of these dictionary definitions decide the issue.  To a limited extent, they support 
the USA’s reliance on the requirement of a “connection”.  These definitions imply a 
connection beyond a mere impact, which is all that the term “affecting” involves on 
Methanex’s interpretation.  Nevertheless, we do not consider that this issue can be 
decided on a purely semantic basis; and there is a difference between a literal meaning 
and the ordinary meaning of a legal phrase.  It is also necessary to consider the ordinary 
meaning of the term in its context and in the light of the object and purpose of NAFTA 
and, in particular, Chapter 11 (as required by Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention).262  
136. McLachlan, Shore and Weiniger consider that an ordinary meaning analysis 
fails to take the interpretative process far and that ‘[i]t may simply result in an 
                                                 
260 Siemens (Jurisdiction), at para. 92.  See also Plama (Jurisdiction), at paras. 147 and 190; and 
Eureko, at para. 186.   
261 Saluka (Award), at para. 462 (Black’s Law Dictionary); MTD (Award), at para. 113 (Concise Oxford 
Dictionary of Current English); Tokios (Jurisdiction), at paras. 29 and 75 (The New Shorter Oxford 
English Dictionary); ADF (Award), at para. 161 (Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary of the 
English Language); ADF (Order No. 2), at para. 20 (Black’s Law Dictionary); Pope & Talbot (Merits, 
Phase 2), at para. 75, n. 67 (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary); Feldman (Award), para. 96 
(Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary); Lauder, at para. 221 (Black’s Law Dictionary); American 
Manufacturing, Arbitrator Golsong’s Separate Opinion, at 40, para. 12 (Webster’s Third International 
Dictionary); Methanex (Partial Award), at paras. 135-6 (American Heritage Dictionary, The Oxford 
English Dictionary and Funk & Wagnalls New Comprehensive International Dictionary of the English 
Language); SD Myers (Partial Award), at para. 285 (The Oxford English Dictionary); Aguas del 
Tunari, at paras. 227, 229, 231 and 232 (The Encarta World English Dictionary, The Oxford English 
Dictionary, Webster’s On-Line Dictionary, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, Meriam 
Webster’s International Dictionary, and Black’s Law Dictionary).  See also the reference to dictionaries 
to ascertain the ordinary meaning of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ in Vasciannie, ‘The Fair and 
Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law and Practice’, 70 BYBIL 99 (1999), at 
102-3. 
262  Methanex (Partial Award), at para. 135.  See also Aguas del Tunari, at para. 227, in which 
dictionary meanings supported the arguments of both the claimant and the respondent. 
J O S E P H  R O M E S H  W E E R A M A N T R Y                                          112  P H D  T H E S I S  |  U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  L O N D O N  
exchange of synonyms.’ 263  This statement is particularly relevant for substantive 
provisions such as ‘fair and equitable treatment’ which (particularly given the 
jurisprudence that has developed around the term) do not produce an abundance of 
meaning if dictionary meanings are applied to those individual terms.  The problem 
relates not to an issue of textual ambiguity but ascertaining the substantive content of 
the standard of protection that those terms afford to investors.  Put differently, the 
substantive content is far greater than what is indicated by the ordinary meaning of the 
words utilised to identify the substantive provision.  Zachary Douglas has perceptively 
observed that  
Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires interpretation in 
accordance with the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the terms of the treaty.  In relation to the 
substantive investment protection standards, there is rarely any linguistic ambiguity latent 
in their formulation, so this first principle of interpretation will rarely take the tribunal 
very far in its quest to interpret a concept like the ‘fair and equitable standard of 
treatment’.  In other words, nothing is gained by resorting to dictionary definitions of 
‘fair’ and ‘equitable’.264 
137. Stephen Vasciannie has drawn attention to the interpretation of substantive 
provisions from another angle.  He has written:  
difficulties of interpretation may also arise from the fact that the words ‘fair and equitable 
treatment’, in their plain meaning, do not refer to an established body of law or to 
existing legal precedents; instead, the plain meaning approach presumes that, in each 
case, the question will be whether the foreign investor has been treated fairly and 
equitably, without reference to any technical understanding of the meaning of fair and 
equitable treatment.265 
138. But more often than not (as Chapter V, Section B shows) tribunals will look to 
relevant past decisions to shine light on the meaning of substantive provisions.  It is 
                                                 
263 McLachlan, Shore and Weiniger, International Investment Law: Substantive Principles (2007), at 
221, para. 7.66. 
264 See Douglas, The International Law of Investment Claims (2009), at 82, para. 143 (and see also 
para. 145). 
265  Vasciannie, ‘The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law and 
Practice’, 70 BYBIL 99 (1999), at 103-4 (footnotes omitted).  See, e.g., Genin, at para. 367; Lucchetti 
(Award), at para. 48; Loewen (Award), at para. 128; and Wena Hotels (Award), at para. 84.  It could be 
said that substantive provisions identify certain areas of law, the content of which is elaborated by 
sources of law external to the treaty. 
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not the practice of treaty drafters to mention cases or bodies of case law in explicit 
terms in a treaty.  
139. Relevant studies that have focused on the legal meaning of terms used in 
investment treaties may also provide a source of guidance in determining the ordinary 
meaning.  In Bayindir, for example, the Tribunal made reference to a comparative 
study of BIT definitions of ‘investments’ contained in other BITs to confirm its 
interpretation of ‘investment’ in the BIT in dispute.266   
140. Where more than one equally applicable ordinary meaning of a term exists, the 
ordinary meaning may be heavily dependent on the facts of a case.  A helpful case on 
point is Pope & Talbot (Merits, Phase 2).  There, the tribunal interpreted the NAFTA 
Article 1102(1) and (2) words ‘like circumstances’ as follows: 
It goes without saying that the meaning of the term will vary according to the facts of a 
given case.  By their very nature, ‘circumstances’ are context dependent and have no 
unalterable meaning across the spectrum of fact situations.  And the concept of ‘like’ can 
have a range of meanings, from ‘similar’ all the way to ‘identical’.  In other words, the 
application of the like circumstances will require evaluation of the entire fact setting 
surrounding, in this case, the genesis and application of the Regime.267 
141. Not only may the ordinary meaning be dependent on the facts; it may vary 
depending on the subjective opinion and cultural background of the interpreter.268  But 
use of these subjective notions in determining the ordinary meaning must be avoided 
                                                 
266 Bayindir, at para. 113, citing Rubins, ‘The Notion of “Investment” in International Investment 
Arbitration’, in Horn (ed.), Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes (2004), p. 292.  
267 Pope & Talbot (Merits, Phase 2), at para. 75 (footnotes omitted).  See also Aguas del Tunari, at 
para. 91 (referring to Schwarzenberger, ‘Myths and Realities of Treaty Interpretation: Articles 27-29 of 
the Vienna Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties’, 22 Current Legal Problems 205 (1969), at 219, 
in which that commentator observed that the word ‘meaning’ itself has at least sixteen different 
meanings).   
In this regard, Sir Robert Jennings has noted that ‘[a] problem of interpretation arises when the meaning 
of a treaty is doubtful or controverted.  Where the meaning is clear, the treaty should be applied 
according to its clear meaning’.  This position was qualified with the following addition ‘[i]n practice, 
however, the process of interpretation is not easily thus confined.  The classical theory that a text has 
only one correct meaning is unrealistic’.  Jennings, ‘Treaties’, in Bedjaoui, International Law: 
Achievements and Prospects 135 (1991), at 144. 
268 See, e.g., Waldock III in YILC (1964-II), at 57, para. 16 (‘subjective elements may enter into the 
determination of the natural and ordinary meaning of a text and lead to different opinions as to its 
clarity’.).   
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to maintain the objectivity of the Vienna Convention Rules interpretation process.  In 
other words, what is ordinary should not be what the interpreter thinks is ordinary.  On 
the contrary, it should be assessed according to more generally accepted standards, 
and this perhaps explains why the use of dictionaries is so prevalent.  The ordinary 
meaning may also be influenced by the professional backgrounds of the treaty 
drafters.  In this regard, FIATs have taken into account that investment treaties have 
been drafted by professionals knowledgeable in diplomacy, law and commerce and it 
is from the perspectives of such persons that the ‘ordinary meaning’ of treaty terms 
should be derived.  In Aguas del Tunari, for example, the tribunal remarked  
the negotiators of the Netherlands-Bolivia BIT likely possessed a sophisticated 
knowledge of business and law.  For such persons, the ordinary meaning of a word or 
phrase also includes the legal meanings given to such words or phrases.269   
142. This accords with the general position in international law in which the context 
and the object and purpose of the treaty play a role to suggest that the line of inquiry is 
not to determine the ordinary meaning to an ordinary person.  Rather it would be to 
ascertain the ordinary meaning to a person reasonably informed of the treaty’s subject 
area.270 
143. Another question concerning the ordinary meaning is whether it should be 
assessed with regard to the meaning prevalent at the time of the dispute or the time the 
text was drafted.  The issue is discussed in Chapter V, Section E.  
                                                 
269 Aguas del Tunari, at para. 231.  A similar concern for the expertise of the drafters is also found in 
Methanex, in which the tribunal observed ‘[t]he drafting parties of NAFTA were fluent in GATT law 
and incorporated, in very precise ways, the term “like goods” and the GATT provisions relating to it 
when they wished to do so’.  Methanex (Final Award), at Part IV, Chapt. B, para. 30.  In the same vein, 
the Pope & Talbot (Damages) tribunal observed in assessing the negotiation history of the NAFTA that 
the negotiators were sophisticated representatives of their governments who should have known the 
implications of failing to insert ‘customary’ before the term ‘international law’.  Pope & Talbot 
(Damages), at para. 46.  In this regard, the words of Justice Frankfurter (albeit relating to the 
interpretation of domestic statutes) are expositive: ‘If a statute is written for ordinary folk, it would be 
arbitrary not to assume that Congress intended its words to be read with the minds of ordinary men.  If 
they are addressed to specialists, they must be read by judges with the minds of the specialists’.  
Frankfurter, ‘Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes’, 47 Columbia Law Review 527 (1947), at 
536. 
270 See, e.g., Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (2008), at 173-174. 
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4. Context 
a) International Law Practice 
144. The third criterion of Article 31(1) requires an interpretation to take into 
account the context of the terms subject to interpretation.  The terms of a treaty should 
not be interpreted as if they were contained in a vacuum.  They draw meaning from 
other provisions in the treaty and other sources or materials outside the treaty.  Judge 
Jessup’s observation that ‘[w]ords are like those insects that take color from their 
surroundings’ captures with elegance the influence that the context exerts over the 
text.271   
145. The scope of the ‘context’ referred to in Article 31(1) appears to be wide.  It 
finds specific elaboration in Article 31(2) but this latter provision still does not purport 
to be exhaustive.  Well before the Vienna Convention was drafted, the diverse range 
of elements that may constitute the context were helpfully itemized by Hudson into 
four general categories:  
[the context] is not simply the particular sentence, or the particular paragraph in which 
the term to be construed occurs.  It may be (1) a particular part of the instrument, or (2) 
the instrument as a whole, or (3) the versions of the text in different languages, or (4) the 
texts of several interrelated and interdependent instruments …272 
                                                 
271 This quote is taken from a letter by Philip Jessup to Myres McDougal, 1 November 1967, quoted in 
McDougal, Lasswell, and Miller, The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order: Principles 
of Content and Procedure (1967), at xxviii.  Sinclair encapsulated the essence of the criterion when he 
wrote: ‘there is no such thing as an abstract ordinary meaning of a phrase, divorced from the place 
which that phrase occupies in the text to be interpreted’.  Sinclair, supra note 6, at 121, referring to both 
Yasseen, supra note 194, at 26 and de Visscher, Problèmes de l’interprétation judiciaire en droit 
international public (1963), at 30. 
272 Hudson, The Permanent Court of International Justice, 1920-1942 (1943), at 646-7.  Similarly, see 
Air Transport Services Agreement Arbitration, (US v. France) 38 ILR 182 (1963), at 229.  A more 
restricted view is taken by Oppenheim, supra note 4, at 1273, n. 12 (‘[t]he context is the treaty as a 
whole, not merely the sub-paragraph, Article, or section of the treaty in which the unclear term appears, 
unless the part of the treaty under consideration is self-contained’).  See also Article 1(1) of the Institute 
of International Law 1956 Resolution on interpretation, 46 AIDI 364-5 (1956), which, among other 
criteria, required the terms of a treaty to ‘be interpreted in their context as a whole’ (emphasis added).  
Fitzmaurice also subscribed to the restrictive school of thought.  He viewed the requirement to take into 
account the context not as ‘a narrow and quasi literal interpretation of words, phrases or articles, taken 
in isolation, that is envisaged, but one related to the treaty as a whole.’  Fitzmaurice, supra note 76, at 
11.  An analysis of the various ILC draft articles on this point shows a gradual shift from referring to 
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146. A more detailed exploration of international practice and case law identifies 
many other types of context.  Under international law, the meaning of a treaty term 
has been influenced by a context that relates to: 
a) the order of words or sentences found proximate to that term;273  
b) other paragraphs of an article in which the disputed term is found;274  
c) the position of the article in the treaty;275  
d) the ‘letter and spirit’ of the article;276  
e) other articles of the treaty in which the disputed term is found;277  
f) the ‘role’ assigned to an article by a treaty;278   
                                                                                                                                            
 
the ‘context of the treaty as a whole’ to wording that permits an even wider contextual scope: Waldock 
III, Article 70(1) a natural and ordinary meaning is to be ‘given to each term … in its context in the 
treaty and in the context of the as a whole’, YILC (1964-II), at 55; the 1964 ILC Draft Article 69(1) the 
ordinary meaning is to be ‘given to each term … [i]n the context of the treaty’, YILC (1964-II), at 199; 
and the 1966 ILC Draft Article 27(1) an ordinary meaning is to be ‘given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context’, YILC (1966-II), at 219.  Compare YILC (1966-II), at 222, para. 12.   
273 See, e.g., in the Asylum case, ICJ Reports 266 (1950), at p. 279 and Minority Schools in Albania, 
PCIJ Ser. A/B, No. 64 (1935), at 18.  However, the sequence of paragraphs has also been considered as 
inconsequential.  See Peter Pázmány University case, PCIJ, Ser. A/B, No. 61, p. 208 (1933), at 247 
(‘[i]t appears difficult to attach such momentous consequences to the system of numbering employed—
especially as that system may, according to the information given by the Parties, have been merely 
accidental’). 
274 See, e.g., Free Zones case, PCIJ, Ser. A/B, No. 46 (1932), at 140 (‘it must not be overlooked that 
Article 435, both by reason of its position in the Treaty of Versailles and of its origin, forms a complete 
whole: it would therefore be impossible to interpret the second paragraph without regard to the first 
paragraph’); Interpretation of Article 3, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne (Frontier between 
Turkey and Iraq), Advisory Opinion, PCIJ, Ser. B, No. 12 (1925), at 21 (‘[e]ven if there were any 
possible doubt in regard to the meaning of the first two sub-paragraphs … this would be dissipated by 
the terms of the third sub-paragraph’); Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4), 
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 57 (1948), at 64 (‘paragraph 2 is concerned only with the procedure for 
admission, while the preceding paragraph lays down the substantive law’). 
275 See, e.g., Free Zones case, PCIJ, Ser. A/B, No. 46 (1932), at 140. 
276 The SS ‘Wimbledon’, PCIJ, Ser. A, No. 1 (1923), at 23.  Admission of a State to the United Nations 
(Charter, Art. 4), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 57 (1948), at 64.  It may well be argued that this 
relates more to the object and purpose criterion. 
277 See, e.g., Minority Schools in Albania, PCIJ, Ser. A/B, No. 64 (1935), at 18; and Certain Expenses 
of the United Nations, ICJ Reports 151 (1962) at 161 as to other provisions of the UN Charter throwing 
light on the provision subject to interpretation.   
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g) a consideration of the relevant treaty as a whole;279  
h) the title of the treaty;280 
i) other relevant treaties or instruments;281  
j) diplomatic correspondence surrounding an agreement;282  
k) an entire legal system or framework of agreements;283 and  
                                                                                                                                            
 
278 Interpretation of Article 3, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne (Frontier between Turkey and 
Iraq), Advisory Opinion, PCIJ, Ser. B, No. 12 (1925), at 23.    
279 See, e.g., Competence of the ILO in Regard to International Regulation of the Conditions of Labour 
of Persons Employed in Agriculture, Advisory Opinion, PCIJ, Ser. B, Nos. 2 and 3 (1922), at 23; 
Certain Expenses of the United Nations case, ICJ Reports 151 (1962), at 162; Competence of ILO to 
Regulate Incidentally the Personal Work of the Employer, Advisory Opinion, PCIJ, Ser. B, No. 13 
(1926), at 18. 
280 See, e.g., Beagle Channel Arbitration, (Argentina v. Chile) (1977) 52 ILR 93, at 131, para. 18.  In 
contrast, the ICJ has held the fact that States have entered into an agreement entitled ‘Treaty of 
Friendship’ does not oblige the parties to abstain from acts that could be classified as unfriendly acts, 
except when such a limitation is explicit or necessarily implicit.  See Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua, ICJ Reports 14 (1986), at 136-37.  As to  headings within a treaty, 
it may be argued that these may be used to interpret the treaty.  The UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration (as amended in 2006), although not a treaty, serves as a good 
illustration of the point.  Footnote 1 of that instrument notes that ‘[a]rticle headings are for reference 
purposes only and are not to be used for purposes of interpretation’.  The note suggests that had it not 
been included, it would have been arguable that the headings could potentially have been used to 
interpret that document.  Similar reasoning could be applied to treaties.    
281 See, e.g., Fisheries case, (UK v Iceland), Jurisdiction, ICJ Reports (1973), at 8, para. 13; Treatment 
of Polish Nationals in Danzig, Advisory Opinion, PCIJ, Ser. A/B, No. 44 (1932), at 40; Case 
concerning the Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco, ICJ Reports (1952), at 
195; Costa Rica Journalists Association case, 1985, Advisory Opinion, Inter-Am. Court of Human 
Rights, 75 ILR 31, at 47-48; Air Transport Services Agreement Arbitration (US v France), 38 ILR 182 
(1963), at 229.  As to the interpretation of ‘a treaty by reference to other treaties, the parties to which 
are partly or totally non-identical’, Schwarzenberger, International Law (1957), Vol. 1, at 528 has 
commented: 
[p]rima facie, any such interpretation runs counter to the rule on exclusiveness of treaty 
relations.  By itself, the fact that any number of other States, or either of two contracting States 
in its relations with third States, have accepted limitations of their sovereignty which it would 
have been desirable to incorporate into the treaty to be interpreted, is irrelevant … Ultimately, 
the justification of any such interpretation depends always on some evidence either of actual 
intention of parties to this effect or of necessary intendment of the treaty’ (footnote omitted). 
282 See, e.g., Western Sahara case, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 12 (1975), at 54, para. 120.   See 
Thirlway, supra note 91, at 32, questioning the approach of the Court on the ground that diplomatic 
correspondence was referred to by the Court without any stated reason such as ambiguity in the treaty 
text or absurdity.  
283 This view was taken by the ICJ in the South West Africa cases, where the majority of the Court 
appears to have considered the context to have included the full text of the Mandate for German South 
West Africa, coupled with the League of Nations Covenant, as well as the ‘Mandates System’.  ICJ 
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l) relevant factual, historical, political, economic and social backgrounds.284   
147. Despite the frequent reference to the context in international case law, it is 
typically not a criterion that is alone decisive in the interpretation of a treaty.  Often, 
the criteria of ordinary meaning and context are fused and applied as one rule.  In the 
(Second) Admissions case, for example, the ICJ observed that ‘the first duty of a 
tribunal which is called upon to interpret and apply the provisions of a treaty, is to 
endeavour to give effect to them in their natural and ordinary meaning in the context 
in which they occur’.285   
148. Notwithstanding the wide understandings of context referred to above, the text 
of Article 31(1) requires that an ordinary meaning ‘be given to the terms of the treaty 
in their context’ (emphasis added), which suggests that consideration be given to the 
context of the terms subject to interpretation, not the treaty as a whole.286  Thus, it is 
arguable that the wide range of contexts indicated in the above list shows that 
                                                                                                                                            
 
Reports (1962), at 336.  The ruling has been considered as corresponding with Article 31(3)(c) of the 
Vienna Convention.  See Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, ‘International Law in the Past Third of a 
Century’, 159 Recueil des cours 1 (1978), at 49.  The decision has been subject to criticism.  See 
Thirlway, supra note 91, at 40-41.  
284 See, e.g.,  Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins in the Oil Platforms case, ICJ Reports 161 (2003), at 
237, para. 48; North Atlantic Coast Fisheries case, (GB v US), Award of 7 Sept. 1910, Scott’s Hague 
Reports 141 (1916) at 162-63; Customs Régime between Germany and Austria, Advisory Opinion, 
PCIJ, Ser. A/B, No. 41, p. 37, at 42 (1931) and joint Dissenting Opinion, at 75-6.  See also the several 
examples provided by Hudson, The Permanent Court of International Justice, 1920-1942 (1943), at 
656-57, §574 (the PCIJ ‘must take account of the circumstances in which the parties acted if it would 
understand their purposes, and its construction of an instrument may very properly be influenced by 
factors of a political or social significance’); and the Harvard Research on International Law, reprinted 
in 29 AJIL (Supplement) 657 (1935), at 953 ( ‘[t]he treaty, in short, stands, therefore, as a related part of 
the general setting in which the parties acted, and that setting must be taken into account if the purpose 
which the treaty was intended to serve is to be fully comprehended and effectuated’).     
285  Competence of the General Assembly regarding Admission to the United Nations, Advisory 
Opinion, ICJ Reports (1950), at 8. 
286 This position is fully consistent with the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the Competence of the General 
Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, ICJ Reports (1952), at 196 and 199 (‘the 
first duty of a tribunal which is called upon to interpret and apply the provisions of a treaty, is to 
endeavour to give effect to them in their natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which they 
occur’ (emphasis added)).  
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international court and tribunal practice is not strictly in conformity with the Vienna 
Convention Rules.287    
b) FIAT Practice 
149. FIAT awards and commentary, much like the corresponding international law 
practice, show that a diverse range of contexts have been used to interpret treaties.  
Interpretations of treaty terms by FIATs have been influenced by a context provided 
by  
1) words or sentences found in close proximity to those terms;288   
2) other sub-paragraphs within an article in which that term is found;289  
3) other articles in the treaty;290  
4) the use of an identical or similar term in other articles of the treaty;291 
                                                 
287 Notwithstanding the words used in its own draft articles, the ILC commented that the ‘ordinary 
meaning of a term is not to be determined in the abstract but in the context of the treaty …’.  YILC 
(1966-II), at 221, para. 12 (emphasis added). 
288 See, e.g., Lucchetti (Annulment), at para. 80 (holding that the second sentence of Article 2 of the 
Peru-Chile BIT ‘must be read in its context, i.e., together with the first sentence of the same article’); 
MINE (Annulment), at para. 4.06; Fedax, at para. 24; Amco (Annulment), at para. 34; SD Myers (Partial 
Award), at 262 (‘[t]he phrases … fair and equitable treatment … and … full protection and security … 
cannot be read in isolation.  They must be read in conjunction with the introductory phrase … treatment 
in accordance with international law’).  In interpreting Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention, 
Schreuer has commented that ‘[i]t is possible but not likely that the word “nationality” used earlier on 
in the same sentence in a more general context has a different meaning.  … Unless there are convincing 
reasons to the contrary, it must be assumed that a word appearing twice in the same sentence has the 
same meaning in both instances’.  Schreuer, supra note 5, at 278. 
289 Plama (Jurisdiction), at para. 191; Tokios (Jurisdiction), at para. 30; Siemens (Jurisdiction), at para. 
85; Methanex (Final Award), at Part IV, Chap. C, para. 14; and Pope & Talbot (Merits, Phase 2), at 
para. 37. 
290  Klöckner (Annulment), 2 ICSID Reports 95, at 118, para. 58 and 120, at para. 62; MINE 
(Annulement), 4 ICSID Reports 79, at 89, para. 5.13; Lanco, at para. 40; Banro American Resources v 
Congo at para. 19; ADF (Award), at paras. 133 and 147; El Paso, at para. 81; Methanex (Final Award), 
at Part IV, Chpt. B, paras. 30 et seq. and Part IV, Chap. C, para. 15; Pope & Talbot (Merits, Phase 2), 
at paras. 37 and 117; Fedax (Jurisdiction), at para. 33; SD Myers (Partial Award), at para. 244; and 
Continental Casualty (Jurisdiction), at paras. 78-79. 
291 Loewen (Jurisdiction) case, at para. 40 et seq.  See also ADF (Award), at paras. 164-165.  In Dr. El 
Mahdi’s Dissenting Opinion in SPP, at 253, he took the view that the reference to ‘investment’ 
anywhere in the ICSID Convention should be accorded the same ‘significance’. 
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5) the tense used in various articles of the treaty;292 
6) the definition of a term as providing the context for other terms in the same 
treaty;293  
7) the location of the article in the treaty;294  
8) a consideration of the treaty as a whole;295 
9) usage of a term in the context of investor/state dispute resolution (as opposed 
to the ordinary meaning of that term);296  
10) an overall evaluation of the system/structure of the treaty;297  
                                                 
292 Tecmed, at para. 64. 
293 See, e.g., Aguas del Tunari, at para. 242; SGS v Philippines, at para. 99, n. 31 and Feldman 
(Jurisdiction), at para. 34. 
294 SGS v Pakistan, at paras. 169-170 (holding that a clearly grouped section of articles related to 
substantive obligations and an article by reason of its placement outside that group, particularly after 
the dispute settlement provisions, was not considered a substantive obligation) and at 170, n. 176 
(observing that ‘[w]e do not, of course, here suggest that the particular location by itself of a provision 
within the Treaty affords anything like conclusive indication of the specific intent of the Contracting 
Parties.  We are saying that the interpretation urged by the Claimant raises questions as to the coherence 
of the structuring of the BIT’); SGS v Philippines, at para. 124 (holding that although location is a 
factor entitled to some weight, it was not decisive); Plama (Jurisdiction), para. 192 (finding that the 
positioning of the MFN clause in the provisions relating to substantive investment protection may 
influence the interpretation of the MFN provision but ‘the context alone, in the light of the other 
elements of interpretation considered [in the award], does not persuade the Tribunal that the parties 
intended such an interpretation.  And the Tribunal has no evidence before it of the negotiating history of 
the BIT to convince it otherwise’); and Eureko, at para. 259.  See also Salini v Jordan (Jurisdiction), at 
para. 77; and Lanco, at para. 27.  
An interesting counterpoint in this regard is one of the suggested means to interpret Justinian’s Corpus 
Juris.  As an example, the eminent Roman law scholar H. F. Jolowicz has written:  
[the text’s] position in the compilation may be decisive.  If for instance two passages are 
contradictory, we should prefer one that comes from the title devoted to the subject in question 
(the sedes materiae) to one that occurs elsewhere (a lex fugitiva), for we must imagine that 
when he accepted the former, the legislator’s mind was more specifically directed to the point 
at issue. 
Jolowicz, Roman Foundations of Modern Law (1957), at 2 (footnotes omitted). 
295  See, e.g., Loewen (Award), at para. 233; ADF (Award), at 149 (‘the specific provisions of a 
particular Chapter need to be read, not just in relation to each  other, but also in the context of the entire 
structure of NAFTA if a treaty interpreter is to ascertain and understand the real shape and content of 
the bargain actually struck by the three sovereign Parties’); Methanex (Partial Award), at para. 98; and 
Tokios (Jurisdiction), at para. 85 (indicating that under the Vienna Convention, ‘the ordinary meaning 
of these terms “must emerge in the context of the treaty as a whole and in the light of its objects and 
purposes.”’), citing Ian Brownlie, Principles of International Law 634 (5th ed. 1998).   
296 Tokios (Award), at para. 117. 
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11) the title of the treaty;298  
12) the sub-heading under which the disputed provision is located;299  
13) other relevant treaties or instruments;300  
14) the length of the treaty;301 
15) the ‘legal context’ of the treaty;302 
16) a treaty’s ‘circumstances’ or ‘background’;303 
                                                                                                                                            
 
297 Amco (Annulment), at para. 21; and ADF (Award), at para. 149.  See also Klöckner (Annulment), at 
para. 119.   
298 Plama (Jurisdiction), at para. 193 (referring to the title of the BIT in dispute in ascertaining the 
object and purpose of that treaty); and Professor Brownlie’s Separate Opinion in CME (Final Award), 
para. 17. In Siemens (Jurisdiction), at para. 81, the tribunal noted that it ‘shall be guided by the purpose 
of the Treaty as expressed in its title and preamble’.  However, at para. 92, that tribunal held that while 
the title included ‘investments’ and not ‘investors’, to exclude ‘investors’ from the treaty’s protections 
would not accord with its purpose.  
299 Plama (Jurisdiction), at para. 147; and Salini v Jordan (Jurisdiction), at para. 76 
300 See Chapter V, Section C. 
301 In Occidental Exploration (Award), at para. 68, the tribunal hinted that provisions in treaties that 
were short in length may have a certain degree of additional weight or importance (as compared to 
lengthy treaties consisting of numerous articles) in assessing the intentions of the parties.  Contrast this 
approach with the interpretation of a large and complex treaty such as the NAFTA, which comprises 
several different chapters dealing with a diverse range of subjects and in which certain provisions may 
only apply to a limited number of other provisions.  See, e.g., SD Myers (Partial Award), at para. 76. 
302 In SD Myers, for example, the tribunal stated that the legal context of Article 1102 of the NAFTA 
provision included other provisions of the NAFTA, its companion agreement—the North American 
Agreement on Environmental Co-operation—and principles that are affirmed in that environmental 
treaty, including those of the Rio Declaration.  SD Myers (Partial Award), at para. 247.  The SD Myers 
tribunal further added that the interpretation of the phrase ‘like circumstances’ in Article 1102  
must take into account the general principles that emerge from the legal context of the 
NAFTA, including both its concern with the environment and the need to avoid trade 
distortions that are not justified by environmental concerns.  The assessment of “like 
circumstances” must also take into account circumstances that would justify governmental 
regulations that treat them differently in order to protect the public interest.  SD Myers (Partial 
Award), at para. 250 
Jan Paulsson suggests that to understand fully the provisions of the Energy Charter Treaty, they must be 
read in light of related laws such as trade law, competition law, regional common market treaties and 
the framework for regulation of the energy industry.  Paulsson, ‘Arbitration without Privity’, 10 ICSID 
Review Foreign Investment Law Journal 232 (1995), at 251.   
303 Aguas del Tunari, at 241; and Sempra Energy (Jurisdiction), at para. 145.  In Tradex (Jurisdiction), 
at 67, although the issue concerned the interpretation of an Albanian law that provided foreign investors 
recourse to ICSID arbitration, it is of interest to note the tribunal’s approach.  The tribunal’s view there 
was that the interpretation of the dispute settlement mechanism under this law was required to take into 
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17) the entire background of a host State’s disputes with the investor’s State in the 
trade sector at issue;304   
18) State treaty practice in relation to the specific issue in dispute;305   
19) ‘the whole body of state practice, treaties and judicial interpretations of that 
term in international law cases’;306 and 
20) information emanating from a State party to the treaty in dispute but not a 
party to the arbitration.307 
150. The above list is broad in scope—and some of its items may be too broad to 
fall within the meaning of the term ‘context’ in Article 31(1).  As Jan Paulsson crisply 
put it, ‘[t]he permissible context is the context of the terms of the treaty and not the 
context of the treaty generally’.308  Thus, like other international courts and tribunals, 
the use of ‘context’ by FIATs may not be in full conformity with that provision of the 
Vienna Convention.   
                                                                                                                                            
 
account ‘a context of progressive evolution’ of Albanian investment laws.  See also SPP (Jurisdiction 
No. 2), at para. 107. 
304 Pope & Talbot (Merits, Phase 2), para. 77.  See also SD Myers (Partial Award), at para. 245. 
305 Mihaly (Award), at para. 58. In that award, in relation to the issue whether development costs 
constituted an investment within the meaning of the ICSID Convention David Suratgar took the view in 
his Individual Concurring Opinion, at para. 6, that  
the Tribunal should have called for evidence of international legal and utility precedents and 
practice [and] evidence from the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation as 
well as from insurance agencies such as the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA) and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). 
He added  
[i]t does appear for example that investment insurance can be obtained for development costs.  
As for the World Bank practice attention should be paid to the guidelines set out in the World 
Bank’s Discussion Paper of September 1999, Submission and Evaluation of Proposals for 
Private Power Generation Projects in Developing Countries where (at p.14) a full discussion 
is provided with respect to the correct make-up of proper Capacity Payments.   
Ibid.  
306 SD Myers (Partial Award), at para. 280. 
307 In Aguas del Tunari, the tribunal, acting under Rule 34 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules requested 
information from the Government of the Netherlands as to the interpretation of the Netherlands-Bolivia 
BIT in dispute. 
308 Hrvatska, Separate Opinion, at para. 44 (emphasis original). 
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151. Nonetheless, not every circumstance has been considered part of a context for 
the purposes of interpretation.  For example, national legislation has been considered 
not to provide a context for the interpretation of a treaty.309  More particularly, the 
tribunal in Aguas del Tunari expressed caution in using a State’s regulation of 
domestic corporate activity as a context by which similar terms occurring in foreign 
investment protection treaties could be interpreted.  The tribunal took the view that it 
was ‘perilous to transfer meaning from one regulatory framework to another where the 
motivations underlying the choice of terminology often will be determinative’.310  
152. The conflation of the ordinary meaning and context into one step of the 
interpretative process, as was noted in the international law section above, is also a 
practice common to FIATs.  This practice is readily apparent in Plama, in which the 
tribunal searched for the ‘ordinary contextual meaning’ of the words subject to 
interpretation.311 
153. Additionally, the context is a nebulous concept that may conceivably overlap 
with other criteria in the Vienna Convention Rules.  For example, in Eureko, the 
tribunal considered that ‘[t]he context of Article 3.5 [of the Netherlands-Poland BIT] 
is a Treaty whose object and purpose is the “encouragement and reciprocal protection 
of investment”’.312 
                                                 
309 See, e.g., LESI (Award), at Pt. II, para. 24(iii) (‘the Bilateral Agreement is an international treaty, its 
meaning should be the one given it by both parties, as opposed to a meaning based on one party’s 
domestic legislation’).  But compare these approaches to that taken in AAP, at para. 21 (taking the view 
that the BIT in dispute needs ‘to be envisaged within a wider juridical context in which rules from other 
sources are integrated through implied incorporation methods, or by direct reference to certain 
supplementary rules, whether of international law character or of domestic law nature’). 
310 Aguas del Tunari, at para. 235, n. 214.  See also Tokios (Jurisdiction), Prosper Weil Dissenting 
Opinion, at para. 24 (‘[w]hen it comes to mechanisms and procedures involving States and implying, 
therefore, issues of public international law, economic and political reality is to prevail over legal 
structure, so much so that the application of the basic principles and rules of public international law 
should not be frustrated by legal concepts and rules prevailing in the relations between private 
economic and juridical players’). 
311 Plama (Jurisdiction), at para. 147. 
312 Eureko, at para. 248.  See also Pope & Talbot (Merits, Phase 2), at para. 77 (agreeing with the 
investor’s submission ‘that the legal context of Article 1102 [of the NAFTA] includes “the trade and 
investment-liberalizing objectives of the NAFTA”’).  Under a broad view of the context, it could be 
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154. In contrast to the wide use of the context criterion, a few FIATs have held that 
some provisions may be sufficiently independent to stand alone without influence 
from the context provided by the other provisions in the treaty.  As an example, the 
claimant in Salini v Jordan argued that other provisions of the BIT at issue influenced 
the meaning of the umbrella clause in dispute.  The tribunal disagreed and held that 
these provisions did not affect the meaning of the umbrella clause.313  Canada asserted 
in SD Myers that the compensation standard for expropriation set out in Article 
1110(2) applied to other non-expropriation types of breaches of Chapter 11.  The 
tribunal, however, doubted that Article 1110(2) supplied the standard for other 
Chapter 11 breaches:  
The drafters of the NAFTA did not state that the ‘fair market value of the asset’ formula 
applies to all breaches of Chapter 11.  They expressly attached it to expropriations.314  
                                                                                                                                            
 
understood as covering subsequent practice or international law rules referred to in Article 31(3) and 
even elements of the preparatory work dealt with in Article 32.  For example, in relation to the rules of 
international law mentioned in Article 31(3)(c), Sinclair, supra note 6, at 139, has pointed out ‘[e]very 
treaty provision must be read not only in its own context, but in the wider context of general 
international law, whether conventional or customary’.  Also in discussing the reference to the 
circumstances surrounding the conclusion of a treaty in (what was to become) Article 32 of the Vienna 
Convention, Sir Humphrey Waldock in his Third Report as ILC Special Rapporteur on the law of 
treaties commented ‘[t]his broad phrase is intended to cover both the contemporary circumstances and 
the historical context in which the treaty was concluded’.  YILC (1964-II), at 59, para. 22, citing 
European Commission of the Danube, PCIJ Ser. B. No. 14, p. 57 (1927).  In this regard, however, 
Professor Brownlie’s Separate Opinion in CME (Final Award), at para. 9, should be noted.  There he 
attempted to draw a distinction between the context in Article 31(1) and an interpreter’s ability to take 
into account rules of international law in Article 31(3)(c).  In his view, ‘the context is that of the 
particular treaty and not of the principles of general international law’. 
313 Salini v Jordan (Jurisdiction), at paras. 128-30. In Gruslin, the tribunal was required to interpret the 
terms of an Intergovernmental Agreement (‘IGA’) of 1979 between Malaysia and the Belgo-
Luxemburg Economic Union.  The claimant there argued that in some provisions of the IGA the noun 
‘investment’ was qualified by the phrase ‘in the territory’ whereas in other parts, no such qualification 
was made.  He asserted that Article 10(1), in which the term ‘investment’ was not so qualified and, 
consequently, for the purposes of Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, ‘investment’ in that provision 
applied without any territorial limit.  Gruslin, at para. 13.7.  In response, the tribunal concluded: 
The absence of qualifying words of limitation to the word ‘investment’ in Article 10 itself does 
not broaden the class of investments included by the IGA.  It follows that in providing for the 
resolution of disputes within the ICSID Convention, Article 10 is limited to the same subject 
matter as the rest of the IGA, namely to investments by nationals of one contracting party in 
the territory of the other.   
Gruslin, at para. 13.10. 
314 SD Myers (Partial Award), at para. 76.  See also, Article 300 of the NAFTA, which prescribes that 
Chapter 3, including its definitions, applies (unless provided otherwise) only to Part Two of the 
NAFTA. 
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155. Silence as to matters falling within the specific subject area of a treaty may 
also constitute a part of the context.  The tribunal in Salini v Jordan succinctly drew 
attention to the multifaceted problems that silence in a treaty throws up when it 
observed ‘silence may mean agreement or disagreement.  It also may mean that no 
conclusion should be drawn from silence’315 and that the consequences to be drawn 
from silence ‘may be different in each case, taking into account the circumstances of 
the case’. 316   The split personality of silence is well illustrated in the Methanex 
tribunal’s observation concerning the absence of a reference to amicus submissions in 
NAFTA Chapter 11: ‘there is no provision in Chapter 11 that expressly prohibits the 
acceptance of amicus submissions, but likewise nothing that expressly encourages 
them’.317  It can be seen that the interpretation of silence is thus a difficult task, often 
fraught with considerable uncertainty.   
156. One means used by FIATs to make sense of silence is to have regard to similar 
treaties.  Thus in Tokios, the absence of a qualification to an investment treaty 
provision, which qualification had been included in other investment treaties, was 
seen ‘as a deliberate choice of the Contracting Parties’ not to impose limits on the 
provision.318  FIATs have also looked to other treaties for insights into other language 
                                                 
315 Salini v Jordan (Award), at para. 95. 
316 Salini v Jordan (Award), at para. 96.  
317 Methanex (Amicus Decision), at para. 38. 
318 Tokios (Jurisdiction), at para. 36.  See also SGS v Philippines, at para. 132(e).  Words included in 
one treaty but not present in similar treaties concluded by the same State may be seen to create a 
presumption that the provisions were intentionally omitted and that this comparative exercise raises 
questions as to whether these words should be implied.  See, e.g., the submission made by Argentina in 
Sempra Energy (Jurisdiction): 
the relevant interpretation … is that which arises from the intention of the State expressed in 
the provisions of some treaties and omitted from the provisions of other treaties signed by the 
same State; this comparative exercise makes it possible to establish the value of silence vis-à-
vis that of words, arguing that if a treaty includes a certain provision but a subsequent or 
simultaneous treaty does not, this constitutes a presumption that the recognition of the rights 
concerned is not intended … 
Ibid., at para. 136 (tribunal’s summary of Argentina’s submission).  This point is discussed in Chapter 
V, Section C below.  If terms are to be implied that have not been explicitly included in the treaty, it is 
important to have a degree of certainty that the omission was unintentional.  In CAA-Vivendi 
(Challenge) the ad hoc Committee was faced with a challenge to one of its members.  However, the 
ICSID Convention did not contain rules governing such a situation.  The ad hoc Committee approach 
was to apply not the ICSID Convention but ICSID Rules 8-12 to the challenge.  On this point, 
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that could have been employed in the disputed treaty but was not.319  In contrast, it has 
been suggested that where a treaty is silent as to whether a FIAT can take measures to 
protect parties, such as requiring the payment of costs to be guaranteed, this silence 
cannot by itself mean that the tribunal prevented from making such measures.320  
157. The gap left by the silence may also be filled in by the treaty’s object and 
purpose, as was the case in Siemens.321  At other times, relevant rules of international 
law not mentioned in the treaty may add substance to the silence.  For example, in 
Loewen (Jurisdiction), the tribunal made the following observation:  
We accept that an important principle of international law should not be held to have 
been tacitly dispensed with by an international agreement, in the absence of words 
making clear an intention to do so (Elettronica Sicula SpA (Elsi) (United States v Italy) 
(1989) ICJ 15 at 42).  Such an intention may, however, be exhibited by express 
provisions which are at variance with the continued operation of the relevant principle of 
international law.322 
                                                                                                                                            
 
Schreuer, supra note 5, at 1042, has remarked that this decision is possible only on the assumption that 
the omission of these provisions from the ICSID Convention was unintentional and that if the omission 
was deliberate, they could not be reintroduced under the guise of the ICSID Rules.  
319 For example, the Plama tribunal noted that if the Respondent’s interpretation of the ECT were 
correct ‘it is surprising that Article 17(1) should be drafted as it is: it would have been much easier to 
draft wording to make the Respondent’s meaning plain’.  Plama (Jurisdiction), at para. 156.  The 
tribunal referred to Article VI of the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services, December 1995, as 
an example of the words that could have been drafted, but were not.  See also Plama (Jurisdiction), at 
para. 156 (‘[i]t requires little effort to imagine other similarly effective language which could have been 
used for Article 17(1) ECT—but which has not there been used. In these circumstances, it would 
clearly not be permissible for the Tribunal to re-write Article 17(1) ECT in the Respondent’s favor’) 
and also at para. 148; Tokios (Jurisdiction), at para. 36; and Olguin (Jurisdiction), at paras. 72-73.  In 
Aguas del Tunari, at para. 234, the tribunal, without reference to other treaties, suggested wording it 
considered would have been used (as opposed to the words actually used) had the parties intended a 
certain meaning.  On this point see also SGS v Pakistan, at para. 171. 
320 Casado, at paras. 85-6; and Siemens (Jurisdiction), at para. 140.  Judge Fitzmaurice was sceptical 
about such reasoning.  In the Golder case, he described as a ‘logical fallacy’ the situation under which 
B would derive from A ‘because A does not in terms exclude B.  But non-exclusion is not ipso facto 
inclusion.  The latter still remains to be demonstrated’. The Golder case, European Court of Human 
Rights, 57 ILR (1975), at 249. 
321 Siemens (Jurisdiction), at para. 140. 
322 Loewen (Jurisdiction), at para. 73.  An almost identical finding is made in Loewen (Award), at para. 
160, which finding was approved in SGS v Pakistan, at para. 171, n. 178.  See also Loewen (Award), at 
para.162 in which the tribunal was willing to imply a role of ‘judicial finality’ not expressly included in 
the NAFTA treaty and para. 226 (‘[i]t is that silence in the Treaty that requires the application of 
customary international law to resolve the question of the need for continuous national identity’).  This 
point overlaps with Article 31(3)(c) discussed at Chapter III, Section D. 
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158. FIATs also appear reluctant to use silence in a treaty to read in limitations 
neither found in the text nor evident from the negotiating history.323  
159. The award in Gruslin demonstrates that the context provided by the formatting 
or visual appearance of a treaty text was the subject of dispute.  For present purposes, 
the relevant provision was Article 1(3) of the 1979 Intergovernmental Agreement 
between Malaysia and the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union.  The text’s original 
layout was as follows324: 
 
160. The format of Article 1(3), as it was printed in the executed treaty, justifies its 
sub-paragraphs (a) through (e) to the left-hand margin.  Immediately below sub-
paragraph (e) were indented provisos (i) and (ii), which gave the appearance (resulting 
from the visual perception created by the indentation) that they were connected 
exclusively with sub-paragraph (e) and not with (a) through (d).  In the Gruslin 
tribunal’s view   
                                                 
323 See, e.g., Tokios (Jurisdiction), at para. 52. 
324 This text has been scanned from 5 ICSID Reports at 488.  It is assumed that the editors of the ICSID 
Reports have retained all formatting and indents used in the original award.  The text appears in the 
award at para. 9.2. 
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[i]t is obvious that proviso (i) should have been justified back to the margin, immediately 
under para (e), rather than aligned to its text.  It is untenable to suggest that because the 
proviso is indented in from the margin, it is to be read as attaching only to para (e).  
Proviso (i) sensibly is to be read as attaching to any asset coming from within the term of 
‘investment’, including any of the paras (a) to (e).325 
161. Gruslin thus indicates that the context provided by the formatting or visual 
appearance of a treaty’s text does not appear to exert considerable influence on an 
interpretation, particularly when the substance of the text indicates this layout is 
misleading.   
162. Another case raising issues as to the context provided by the format of treaty 
provisions is American Manufacturing.  There, the tribunal considered such a context 
as being less important than the object and purpose of the treaty.  The tribunal held 
that  
the manner in which Article IX of the [Zaire-US BIT] is formatted could mislead any 
reader and could entail an interpretation not in conformity with the object and purpose of 
the provisions in question.  Such an interpretation would lead to an absurd result and an 
unacceptable fact.326   
163. On the subject of a treaty’s context, some particularities of the NAFTA require 
comment.  This treaty is one of the most complex free trade agreements in existence.  
It covers a great deal more than foreign investment, consisting of 22 Chapters that 
include provisions regulating customs procedures, intellectual property and market 
access for goods and services.  Virtually all Chapters contain their own articles that set 
out definitions of terms; some chapters stand alone; others contain general principles 
and rules that run through much of the treaty text; several provisions provide 
exceptions; and five schedules list non-conforming measures that are not subject to the 
legal framework of the NAFTA.327  Mindful of these complexities, the tribunal in 
ADF v United States stated  
                                                 
325 Gruslin, at para. 22.1. 
326 American Manufacturing (Award), at para. 5.36. 
327 See ADF (Award), at para. 148. 
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the specific provisions of a particular Chapter need to be read, not just in relation to each  
other, but also in the context of the entire structure of NAFTA if a treaty interpreter is to 
ascertain and understand the real shape and content of the bargain actually struck by the 
three sovereign Parties.328  
164. But as will be seen shortly, this statement is not useful when a conflict 
emerges between provisions in its different Chapters.  Such a conflict surfaced in SD 
Myers.  In that case, Canada contended that while the export ban at issue may have 
contravened NAFTA Chapter 11, such bans could be permitted under Chapter 3 
(concerning goods) if driven by proper environmental concerns.  The tribunal 
considered that the Chapters of the NAFTA were part of a ‘single undertaking’ and 
that generally its provisions were ‘cumulative’ and ‘complementary’.329  It proceeded 
to adopt the position that while different Chapters of NAFTA overlap, it saw no 
reason why a measure concerning goods under Chapter 3 could not constitute a 
measure relating to investors or investments under Chapter 11.  It noted, however, 
after a discussion of relevant WTO case law, that ‘different chapters of the NAFTA 
can overlap and that the rights it provides can be cumulative except in cases of 
conflict’.330 
165. In a later phase of the proceedings, the SD Myers tribunal provided the 
following elaboration on what it termed the ‘cumulative principle’:  
The grant of a right generally does not take away other rights unless they are mutually 
exclusive, or the grant is stated expressly to abrogate another right.  
 
… The cumulative principle does not apply where there is actual conflict between 
different provisions.331 
166. It went on to note: 
General principles such as the cumulative principle must yield to specific treaty 
provisions to the contrary. An example in the context of Chapter 11 is in Article 1102, 
                                                 
328 At para. 149, citing, inter alia, Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention. 
329 At paras. 291-2, quoting with approval the WTO case of Korea - Definitive Safeguard Measure on 
Imports of Certain Dairy Products, WT/396/R, at para. 738. 
330 SD Myers (Partial Award), at para. 294. 
331 SD Myers (Compensation), at paras. 132-133. 
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which expressly excludes from the scope of the chapter measures that are covered by 
Chapter 14 (financial services). An investor in financial services generally could not 
bring a Chapter 11 claim. Chapter 11 does not contain a similar exclusion of activities 
that engage Chapter 12. 
 
… SDMI has acquired no extra rights in this case because of the existence of Chapter 12, 
but neither has it lost any. The Chapter 11 rights of SDMI are no stronger or weaker 
merely because there is another section of the NAFTA that provides some additional 
constraints on the way a state treats nationals of another NAFTA state.  
 
… In summary, the fact that SDMI as a cross-border service provider may have recourse 
to the dispute provisions of Chapter 12, does not deprive it of the right to claim as an 
investor under Chapter 11. Extending to it rights as a cross-border service provider under 
Chapter 12 does not take away from SDMI rights conferred on it by Chapter 11.332 
167. In concluding this section, it must be noted that the Fauchald empirical 
analysis found that contextual arguments are used by ICSID tribunals frequently and 
that out of the 98 decisions reviewed, contextual arguments in 38 decisions were 
‘essential’ interpretative arguments (defined as those arguments ‘that constitute an 
important factor in the subsequent analysis’).333  Despite the frequency of its use, a 
general conclusion that may be drawn from the foregoing Section is that the context 
alone is usually not determinative of an interpretation.334    
5. Object and Purpose 
a) International Law Practice 
168. The fourth and final Article 31(1) criterion is the object and purpose of the 
treaty.  This term adds a teleological element to the Vienna Convention interpretative 
process.335  On the face of its wording, this criterion is comprised of two elements: (1) 
the object and (2) the purpose.  Nonetheless, in virtually all cases, the ‘object and 
purpose’ has been employed as a unitary concept rather than as two terms having 
                                                 
332 SD Myers (Compensation), at paras. 134-5 and 138. 
333 Fauchald, supra note 11, at 321. 
334 See, e.g., Plama (Jurisdiction), at para. 192 (‘the context alone, in the light of the other elements of 
interpretation considered [in the award], does not persuade the Tribunal that the parties intended such 
an interpretation’); and Salini v Jordan (Jurisdiciton), at para. 77 (holding that ‘the context cannot 
prevail over the general wording of the text’).  See also Fauchald, supra note 11, at 321 (concluding in 
relation to essential contextual arguments that they were ‘not necessarily in support of the final 
conclusion.’).    
335 It has been described by Yasseen as the ‘ratio legis du traité’.  Yasseen, supra note 194, at 55. 
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distinct functions.336  Where treaty interpretations make reference only to the object or 
to the purpose, either tends to be used synonymously with the phrase ‘object and 
purpose’.   
169. An appreciable distinction between the terms ‘object’ and ‘purpose’ is difficult 
to find in the English language.  For example, the ninth edition of The New Shorter 
Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘object’ as ‘[t]he end to which effort is directed; a 
thing sought or aimed at; a purpose, an end, an aim’.  In the same dictionary a 
meaning ascribed to the noun ‘purpose’ is ‘[a] thing to be done; an object to be 
attained, an intention, an aim ... [t]he reason for which something is done or made, or 
for which it exists; the result or effect intended’.  The circularity inherent in these two 
definitions eliminates, to a large extent, the differences that those words may possess 
and explains the failure of English speakers to differentiate between the two terms.337     
170. The distinction, however, appears to be clearer in the French language.  In this 
regard, the French version of Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention speaks of ‘à la 
lumière de son objet et de son but’.  Yasseen has observed: 
… En droit interne, il convient de le rappeler, chacun de ces deux termes a un sens précis.  Il 
devrait en être ainsi en droit international.  L’objet du traité est ce que les parties ont fait, les 
norms qu’elles ont énoncées, les droits et les obligations qui en découlent, tandis que le but du 
traité est ce que les parties on voulu atteindre. … 
… Certains auteurs sont pourtant d’avis que la jurisprudence international envisage les deux 
termes objet et but comme synonymes.  Or il nous semble plus exact de dire que, dans le 
domaine de l’interprétation des traités, la jurisprudence a tendance plutôt à employer le terme 
objet dans le sens du terme but. … 
171. Another way of explaining the difference would be to say that ‘l’objet d’une 
acte’ is the direct and immediate consequence of the performance of an act (e.g., 
                                                 
336 For a separate treatment of the two terms see the Advisory Opinion on Minority Schools in Albania, 
PCIJ Ser. A/B, No. 64, p. 17.  
337 See also the eighth edition of Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines one sense of the noun ‘object’ 
as ‘[s]omething sought to be attained or accomplished; an end, goal or purpose’ (emphasis added); and 
the phrase ‘object of a statute’ as ‘[t]he aim or purpose of legislation; the end or design that a statute is 
meant to accomplish’ (emphasis added).  The same dictionary defines the noun ‘purpose’ as ‘[a]n 
objective, goal or end’. 
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creating a treaty with rights and obligations), whereas ‘le but d’une acte’ is the result 
achieved through ‘l’objet’.338 
172. Some commentators consider that the object and purpose criterion is 
subordinate to the ordinary meaning.339  For example, Sinclair has noted that 
[i]t may of course be that the intellectual process can be short-circuited where the object 
or purpose of the treaty is so overwhelmingly apparent that it must necessarily and from 
the very outset exercise a determining influence upon the search for the contextual 
‘ordinary meaning’; but this is likely to be a rare case, given that most treaties have no 
single, undiluted object and purpose but a variety of differing and possibly conflicting 
objects and purposes.340  
173. Gardiner’s view is that the object and purpose of a treaty is limited to ‘a means 
of shedding light on the ordinary meaning’ and that the function of this criterion ‘is 
not one allowing the general purpose of a treaty to override its text.’341 
174. In contrast, the European Court of Human Rights has sometimes applied 
expansive teleological techniques in interpreting the European Convention on Human 
Rights.  In the Tyrer case, it held as follows:  
The Court must also recall that the [European Convention on Human Rights] is a living 
instrument which, as the Commission rightly stressed, must be interpreted in the light of 
present-day conditions.  In the case now before it the Court cannot but be influenced by 
the developments and commonly accepted standards in the penal policy of the member 
States of the Council of Europe in this field.342  
175. The European Court of Justice has also taken a relatively wide teleological 
approach, which has caused Lord Diplock to observe that the Court 
                                                 
338 See Linderfalk, On the Interpretation of Treaties: Modern International Law as Expressed in the 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2007), at 207; and Buffard and Zemanek, ‘The 
“Object and Purpose” of a Treaty: An Enigma?’, 3 Austrian Review of International and European Law 
311 (1998), at 325-328.  
339 Nonetheless, the criterion finds many important roles in the Vienna Convention.  See, e.g., Article 
33(4) of the Vienna Convention requires it to be the determinative factor in the event of a difference in 
meaning of authentic treaty texts that cannot be removed by application of Articles 31 and 32.  See also, 
the reference to the criterion in Articles 18, 19, 20, 33, 41, 58 and 60 of the Vienna Convention. 
340 Sinclair, supra note 6, at 130. 
341 Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (2008), at 190. 
342 ECHR, 1978, para. 31. 
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seeks to give effect to what it conceives to be the spirit rather than the letter of the 
Treaties; sometimes, indeed, to an English judge, it may seem to the exclusion of the 
letter.  It views the Communities as living and expanding organisms and the 
interpretation of the provisions of the Treaties as changing to match their growth.343 
176. While it is not uncommon for international law cases to have referred 
specifically to the ‘object and purpose’ of a treaty in their interpretations,344 other 
terminology is frequently used to convey, more or less, the same concept.  Those other 
terms include a treaty’s: 
a) ‘aim’;345  
b) ‘aim and scope’;346  
c) ‘aim and object’;347  
d) ‘aim and purpose’;348  
e) ‘common and reasonable purpose’;349  
f) ‘known and proved purpose’;350  
g) ‘general plan’;351  
h) ‘main object’;352  
                                                 
343 Henn and Darby v Director of Public Prosecutions [1981] AC 850, at 905.  
344 See, e.g., Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 15 (1951), at 
24. 
345  Factory at Chorzów, (Merits) (1928), Judgment No. 13, PCIJ Series A, No. 17, p. 47; and 
Norwegian Loans case, ICJ Reports (1957), at 24. 
346 Competence of the ILO to Regulate Incidentally the Personal Work of the Employer, Advisory 
Opinion, PCIJ, Ser. B, No. 13 (1926), at 18.   
347 Greco-Bulgarian ‘Communities’, Advisory Opinion, PCIJ, Ser. B, No. 17 (1930), at 21. 
348 McNair, at 380. 
349 Italian Republic v Federal Republic of Germany, Arbitral Commission on Property, Rights and 
Interests in Germany, 29 ILR 442 (1959), at 460; and Kingdom of Greece (on behalf of Apostolidis) v. 
Federal Republic of Germany, Arbitral Commission on Property, Rights and Interests in Germany, 34 
ILR 219 (1960), at 241. 
350 Opinion of the US Members, Alaska Boundary case, 1903 (GB v US), 15 RIAA 485, at 528. 
351 Diversion of Water from the Meuse, PCIJ, Judgment, Ser. A/B, No. 70 (1937), at 32.    
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i) ‘paramount object’;353  
j) ‘purpose’;354  
k) ‘general purpose’;355  
l) ‘object and its end’;356  
m) ‘general scheme’;357  
n) ‘underlying idea’;358 and  
o) the ‘main preoccupation of the authors’.359   
177. Often, the object and purpose may be evident from the preamble of a treaty,360 
sometimes guidance may be provided by the title of a treaty,361 and, on occasion, it 
                                                                                                                                            
 
352 German Settlers in Poland, Advisory Opinion, PCIJ, Ser. B, No. 6 (1923), at 25.   
353 Temple of Preah Vihear, ICJ Reports 6 (1962), at 34-5.   
354 Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia, Judgment, PCIJ, Ser. A, No. 15 (1928), at 33.  
355  Greco-Bulgarian ‘Communities’, Advisory Opinion, PCIJ, Ser. B, No. 17 (1930), at 20; and 
Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of IMOC, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports (1960), at 170.  
See also, the Harvard Research on International Law, reprinted in 29 AJIL (Supplement) 657 (1935), at 
Article 19.  
356 Re Competence of Conciliation Commission, Anglo-Italian Conciliation Commission, 22 ILR 867 
(1955), at 871. 
357 Interpretation of the Statute of the Memel Territory, PCIJ, Ser. A/B, No. 49 (1932), at 317; and 
Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ Reports 127 (1959), at 142.    
358 Minority Schools in Albania, Advisory Opinion, PCIJ, Ser. A/B, No. 64 (1935), at 17.    
359 Interpretation of the Convention of 1919 Concerning Employment of Women at Night, PCIJ, Ser. 
A/B, No. 50 (1932), at 374.    
360 As Fitzmaurice put it 
[a]lthough the objects of a treaty may be gathered from its operative clauses taken as a whole, 
the preamble is the normal place in which to embody, and the natural place in which to look 
for, any express or explicit general statement of the treaty’s objects and purposes.  Where these 
are stated in the preamble, the latter will, to that extent, govern the whole treaty.  
Fitzmaurice, supra note 185, at 228.  See also the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry in Case 
concerning the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v Senegal), ICJ Reports 53 (1991), at 
67; and Yasseen, supra note 194, at 35 (‘C’est le préambule qui souvent énonce l’objet et le but du 
traité…’).  But see Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (2008), at 192 and 196-197 (while it is common to 
use the preamble as a source of guidance for understanding a treaty’s object and purpose, to keep within 
the Vienna Convention Rules, it is the whole text and not simply the preamble that needs to be taken 
into account and that while the ‘preamble may seem an obvious starting point for ascertaining the 
object and purpose of the treaty, caution is necessary because preambles are not always drafted with 
care and a preamble itself may need interpreting’). 
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may be explicitly stated in the text of the treaty.362  Subsequent practice may also 
assist in determining the object of a treaty. 363  In many but not all respects, the 
criterion has similarities with the principle of effectiveness.364 
b) FIAT Practice 
178. A number of FIATs have made explicit reference to the ‘object and purpose’ 
of a treaty or a particular provision365 but many others have referred to a variety of 
similar terminology, including a treaty’s:  
a) ‘intention’;366  
b) ‘aim and spirit’;367  
c) ‘aim’;368  
d) ‘motive’;369  
e) ‘objective[s]’;370  
                                                                                                                                            
 
361 See Case of Certain Norwegian Loans, ICJ Reports (1957), at 24.  
362 See, e.g., Section 52(c) of the Agreement regarding the Headquarters of the IAEA (Austria-IAEA) 
1957 (‘[t]his Agreement shall be construed in the light of its primary purpose of enabling the IAEA at 
its headquarters in the Republic of Austria full and efficiently to discharge its responsibilities and fulfil 
its purposes’). 
363 Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear, Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 6 (1962), at 35. 
364 See Chapter V, Section F.  See also Kingdom of Greece (on behalf of Apostolidis) v. Federal 
Republic of Germany, Arbitral Commission on Property, Rights and Interests in Germany, 34 ILR 219 
(1960), at 241.  
365  See, e.g., Plama (Jurisdiction), at paras. 147-9; Tokios (Jurisdiction), at para. 32; Maffezini 
(Jurisdiction), at 402, para. 31; SGS v Pakistan, at para. 165; CAA-Vivendi (Challenge), at para. 11; 
Noble Ventures (Award), at para. 50; Lauder, at para. 292; and Vacuum Salt, at 338, para. 29, n. 9.  In 
respect of FIAT pronouncements regarding the similarities between the object and purpose criterion 
and the principle of effectiveness, see Chapter V, Section F. 
366 Kaiser Bauxite, at para. 17. 
367 Amco (Jurisdiction), at para. 18. 
368 Pope & Talbot (Merits, Phase 2), at para. 116; Amco (Jurisdiction), at para. 23; Plama (Award), at 
para. 139. 
369 Aguas del Tunari, at 241. 
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f) objects;371  
g) ‘purpose[s]’;372  
h) ‘purpose and aim’;373 and 
i) ‘general spirit and objectives’.374 
179. According to some FIATs, the starting point of the search for a treaty’s object 
and purpose is the text of the treaty itself.375  This approach serves to reinforce the 
view that the text is the most important Article 31(1) criterion.  Further confirmation 
of the primacy of the text is found in cases where reference is made to the object and 
purpose not to determine but to confirm an interpretation.376   
180. A treaty’s preamble has also assisted FIATs to elucidate its object and 
purpose.377  The Fauchald empirical analysis found that of the 98 decisions reviewed, 
                                                                                                                                            
 
370 SD Myers (Partial Award), at para. 229; ADF (Award), at para. 147; Banro, at para. 16; LESI, at Pt. 
II, para. 13; CSOB (Jurisdiction), para. 57; Klöckner (Annulment), at para. 119; MTD (Award), at para. 
104; and Loewen (Jurisdiction), at para. 46. 
371 Gruslin, at 493, para. 13.7. 
372  Santa Elena (Award), at 170, para. 64; Siemens (Jurisdiction), at paras. 81, 92; Wena Hotels 
(Jurisdiction), at 81 and 84; Feldman (Jurisdiction), at para. 35; and Aucoven (Jurisdiction), at para. 97. 
373 Banro, at paras. 19 and 20. 
374 AAP, at 270, para. 51. 
375 See, e.g., ADF (Award), at para. 147 (‘[t]he object and purpose of the parties to a treaty in agreeing 
upon any particular paragraph of that treaty are to be found, in the first instance, in the words in fact 
used by the parties in that paragraph’).  See also Plama (Jurisdiction), at para. 161; Tokios 
(Jurisdiction), at para. 32; and SGS v Pakistan, at para. 165.  The Fauchald empirical analysis found 
that 12 out of the 48 decisions that used the object and purpose in their interpretative arguments 
referred to the provisions of the treaty to be interpreted.  Fauchald, supra note 11, 322. 
376 Feldman (Jurisdiction), at para. 35.    
377 See, e.g., Tokios (Jurisdiction), at para. 31 and the Dissenting Opinion of Prosper Weil, at para. 19; 
Gruslin, at 493, para. 13.7; Saluka (Award), at para. 299; Siemens (Jurisdiction), at para. 81; Metalclad 
(Award), at 225, para. 71; Vacuum Salt, at 345, para. 39; Plama (Jurisdiction), at para. 193; Amco 
(Jurisdiction), at paras. 23 and 249; SGS v Philippines, at para. 116; Continental Casualty 
(Jurisdiction), at para. 80; and Professor Brownlie’s Separate Opinion in CME (Final Award), para. 17.  
See also Rudolf Dolzer and Margrete Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties (1995), at 20 (observing 
that even though preambles rarely contain binding obligations, they may serve as ‘useful aids to 
interpretation of the treaty’).  For a strong critique of the use of preambles in determining the object and 
purpose of the treaty, see Zachary Douglas, The International Law of Investment Claims (2009), at 82, 
paras. 146 et seq.  He questions, for example, whether FIATs are mandated to promote policy-based 
preamble goals in resolving specific disputes between parties and whether FIATs have the capability to 
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48 used the object and purpose criterion in their interpretative arguments but in that 
smaller group only 13 decisions referred to the preamble as a source that identifies the 
treaty’s object and purpose.378  This suggests a low rate of use of the preamble for 
interpretative purposes.  Nonetheless, where it is used, FIATs have considered it a 
valuable source for casting light on the object and purpose.  In this regard, the 
tribunal’s opinion in Aguas del Tunari was that ‘[i]t is widely accepted that the 
preamble language of a treaty can be particularly helpful in ascertaining the motive, 
object and circumstances of a treaty’.379   
181. Less frequently, light has been cast on the object and purpose by the title of a 
treaty; 380  the preparatory work; 381  or, in the case of the ICSID Convention’s 
interpretation, the Executive Director’s Report.382  The ECT is more straightforward 
in the sense that it has a specific provision (Article 2) entitled “Purpose of the Treaty”.  
In addition to this provision, the ECT has an introductory note which expresses a 
‘fundamental aim’ of the treaty (‘to strengthen the rule of law on energy issues’).  The 
tribunal in Plama considered that the ECT must be interpreted consistently with this 
aim.383 
182. On a strict reading of Article 31(1), the object and purpose must be that of the 
treaty.  The provision requires that an ordinary meaning is ‘to be given to the terms of 
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose’ (emphasis 
added).384  The use of ‘its’—from a grammatical perspective—is a reference to the 
                                                                                                                                            
 
assess whether their interpretation of substantive principles (influenced by the preamble) will in fact 
achieve the wide preambular goals such as greater economic cooperation.  
378 Fauchald, supra note 11, at 322. 
379 Aguas del Tunari, at para. 241, n. 216.   
380 See, e.g., Plama (Jurisdiction), at para. 193; Continental Casualty (Jurisdiction), at para. 80 and 
Saluka (Award), at para. 299.  See, also note 298 supra.  As to the international law position on this 
specific issue, see Case of certain Norwegian Loans case, Judgment, ICJ Reports (1957), at 24 (‘[t]he 
purpose of the Convention in question is that indicated in its title’). 
381 See, e.g., Banro, at para. 16. 
382 See, e.g., Vacuum Salt, at 345, para. 39; and Tokios (Opinion), at paras. 2 and 19. 
383 Plama (Award), at para. 139. 
384 See, e.g., Plama (Jurisdiction), at paras. 117 and 160; and Aguas del Tunari, at para. 91.  Both of 
these cases speak of examining the object and purpose of the treaty.  See also Waldock III, Article 
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treaty rather than the terms.385  Nevertheless, many FIATs appear to emphasise the 
object and purpose not of the treaty as a whole but of a specific provision.386  There 
are sensible reasons for utilising the object and purpose of a provision.  For example, 
in interpreting a treaty as complex and voluminous as NAFTA, it is understandable 
that the tribunal may desire to assess solely the object and purpose of a single 
provision or one of its Chapters—other provisions may have distinct objectives that 
may not be evident if the object and purpose of the whole treaty is considered.387  
Fauchald’s empirical analysis found that of the 98 ICSID decisions examined 37, 16, 
3 and 2 decisions relied on, respectively, the object and purpose of the treaty, a 
specific provision of the treaty, a selection of the treaty’s provisions and a chapter of 
the treaty.388   
183. FIATs frequently tend to consider the object and purpose of investment 
treaties to be the protection of foreign investors and their investments. 389   Other 
tribunals have elaborated on this basic premise indicating that the purpose of such 
treaties is to promote economic cooperation and stimulate the flow of capital and 
technology through the reciprocal encouragement and protection of foreign 
investments390 usually through the creation and maintenance of a stable investment 
                                                                                                                                            
 
70(2)—a predecessor of Vienna Convention Article 30(1)—which referred specifically to the ‘objects 
and purposes of the treaty’ (emphasis added).  YILC (1964-II), at 52.  
385 It would be expected that if the reference was specifically to the terms of the treaty, the word ‘their’ 
instead of ‘its’ would have been used. 
386 See, e.g., SOABI (Jurisdiction), at para. 35; Bayindir, at para 96; Wena Hotels (Jurisdiction), at 82; 
American Manufacturing (Award), at 28, para. 5.36; Keith Highet’s Dissenting Opinion in Waste 
Management (Opinion), at para. 33; Tokios (Jurisdiction), paras 46 and 83; SGS v Pakistan, at para. 
164; and SGS v Philippines, at para. 135.  
387 See, e.g., Loewen (Award), para. 161; and Mondev, at para. 91. 
388 Fauchald, supra note 11, at 322-323. 
389 See, e.g., Santa Elena (Award), at 170, para. 64; Tokios (Jurisdiction), at para. 32; El Paso, para. 68; 
Eureko, at para. 248; Loewen (Jurisdiction), at para. 53; Sempra Energy (Jurisdiction), at para. 142; 
and SGS v Philippines, at para. 116.  Even when interpreting domestic law that consents to the 
submission of a claim by a foreign investor to ICSID, it has been said that relevant legislation should be 
interpreted in favour of the objectives of investor protection and ICSID Convention jurisdiction.  See, 
e.g., Tradex (Jurisdiction), at 68. 
390 See, e.g., Gruslin, at para. 13.8; Aguas del Tunari, at paras. 153 and 241; and CSOB (Jurisdiction), 
at para. 64; Tokios (Jurisdiction), at para. 31; Tokios (Opinion), Dissenting Opinion of Prosper Weil, at 
para. 2; and Brownlie’s Separate Opinion in CME (Final Award), at para. 17.  As to the ICSID 
Convention, the Executive Directors of the World Bank have stated that its primary purpose is to 
 
J O S E P H  R O M E S H  W E E R A M A N T R Y                                          139  P H D  T H E S I S  |  U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  L O N D O N  
environment or favourable investment conditions391 and through an independent, non-
political and neutral forum for the resolution of investment disputes.392  The Siemens 
tribunal for example observed that the intended consequence of this promotion and 
protection of investments is that they ‘may stimulate private economic initiative and 
increase the well-being of the peoples of both countries.’ 393  Similar objects and 
purposes have been identified in respect of multilateral treaties such as the NAFTA394 
and the ECT.395   
                                                                                                                                            
 
‘stimulate a larger flow of private international investment into its territories’.  Executive Directors’ 
Report, at para. 12. 
391 See, e.g., CMS (Award), at para. 274; Tokios (Jurisdiction), at para. 31; MTD (Award), at para. 104; 
and SGS v Philippines, para. 116.    
392 See, e.g., CME v Czech Republic (Partial Award), at para. 417; Aguas del Tunari, at para. 247; 
Plama (Jurisdiction), at paras. 141 and 193; Banro American Resources v Congo at paras. 16 and 19; 
Aguas del Tunari, at para. 153; Maffezini, at 402, para. 31; CAA-Vivendi (Challenge), at para. 11; 
CSOB (Jurisdiction), para. 57; AAP, at para. 51; and Enron (Jurisdiction) (Ancillary Claim), at para. 37.  
See also Prosper Weil’s Dissenting Opinion in Tokios (Opinion), at para. 21 in which he emphasises 
that the ICSID arbitration mechanism was established to resolve disputes between States and foreign 
investors, not disputes between States and their own nationals.  In relation to the views of domestic 
courts, see Republic of Guinea v Atlantic Triton Company Limited, 26 October 1984, Cour d’appel, 
Rennes (Second Chamber), 3 ICSID Reports 3, at 8 (the ICSID Convention was concluded ‘to establish 
machinery which would be widely accepted for conciliation and arbitration, to which the Contracting 
States and nationals of other Contracting States could submit their disputes relating to private 
international investments, rather than submitting such disputes to municipal courts’).  This decision, 
however, was overturned by the French Cour de cassation (First Civil Chamber). 
393 Siemens (Jurisdiction), at para. 81.  See also Phoenix, at para. 87 (the purpose of the ICSID 
Convention ‘is to encourage and protect international investment made for the purpose of contributing 
to the economy of the host State’ (original emphasis)). Whether investment treaties actually increase 
investment into countries is the subject of debate.  See, e.g., Vis-Dunbar and Nikiema, ‘Do Bilaterial 
Investment Treaties Lead to More Foreign Investment?’, Investment Treaty News, 30 April 2009; Rose-
Ackerman, ‘Do BITs Benefit Developing Countries?’, in Rodgers and Alford (eds.), The Future of 
Investment Arbitration 131 (2009); and Salacuse and Sullivan, ‘Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation 
of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain’, 46 Harvard International Law Journal 67 
(2005). 
394 See, e.g., Feldman (Jurisdiction), at para. 35 (referring to Article 102(1)(c) and (e) of the NAFTA, 
according to which ‘[t]he objectives of this Agreement, as elaborated more specifically through its 
principles and rules,’ are to ‘increase substantially investment opportunities in the territories of the 
Parties’ and to ‘create effective procedures for the implementation and application of this Agreement, 
for its joint administration and for the resolution of disputes’); Metalclad (Award), at para. 70 (holding 
that the objective of NAFTA ‘specifically include transparency and the substantial increase in 
investment opportunities in the territories of the Parties’, citing NAFTA Article 102(1)(c)); Metalclad 
(Award), at para. 71 (‘[t]he Parties to NAFTA specifically agreed to “ensure a predictable commercial 
framework for business planning and investment”’, citing NAFTA Preamble, para. 6 (emphasis 
omitted)); and at para. 75 (‘[a]n underlying objective of NAFTA is to promote and increase cross-
border investment opportunities and ensure the successful implementation of investment initiatives’, 
citing NAFTA Article 102(1)); and Loewen (Award), at para. 222 (‘NAFTA is a treaty intending to 
promote trade and investment between Canada, Mexico and the United States’).  See also ADF 
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184. The issue of the legitimacy of a pro-investment interpretative bias resulting 
from interpretations based on investment promotion objectives is discussed in Chapter 
VI, Section G below.  A treaty may, however, contain other objects and purposes that 
may be used in a way that does not favour investors in all cases, as was indicated in 
Saluka: 
The protection of foreign investments is not the sole aim of the Treaty, but rather a 
necessary element alongside the overall aim of encouraging foreign investment and 
extending and intensifying the parties’ economic relations. That in turn calls for a 
balanced approach to the interpretation of the Treaty’s substantive provisions for the 
protection of investments, since an interpretation which exaggerates the protection to be 
accorded to foreign investments may serve to dissuade host States from admitting foreign 
investments and so undermine the overall aim of extending and intensifying the parties’ 
mutual economic relations.396 
185. Additionally, the Amco tribunal stated that the ICSID Convention ‘is aimed to 
protect, to the same extent and with the same vigour the investor and the host State, 
not forgetting that to protect investments is to protect the general interest of 
development and of developing countries’. 397   A much more politically oriented 
objective of the ICSID Convention was highlighted in Banro: 
One of the main objectives of the mechanisms instituted by the Washington Convention 
was to put an end to international tension and crises, leading sometimes to the use of 
force, generated in the past by the diplomatic protection accorded to an investor by the 
State of which it was a national.398 
186. An aim of the ECT as stated in its introductory note is that of encouraging 
respect for the rule of law.  On this basis, the Plama tribunal held that substantive 
                                                                                                                                            
 
(Award), at para. 147 (discussing the problems of applying the general objectives of NAFTA to 
particular provisions).    
395 See, e.g., Plama (Jurisdiction), at paras. 141 and 161. 
396 Saluka (Award), at para. 299.  On this issue, see generally Omar E. García-Bolivar, ‘The Teleology 
of International Investment Law: The Role of Purpose in the Interpretation of International Investment 
Agreements’, 6(5) Journal of World Investment and Trade 751 (2005). 
397 Amco (Jurisdiction), at para. 23.  See also ibid, at para. 249.  
398 Banro, at para. 15. 
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protections cannot apply to investments that are made contrary to law.  This may be 
seen as an example where an aim of a treaty works to the detriment of an investor.399 
187. The difference between the object of a treaty on the one hand and its purpose 
on the other has rarely been addressed in FIAT case law.  An insight into the 
distinction between the object and the purpose is, nonetheless, provided in Prosper 
Weil’s Dissenting Opinion in Tokios.  In that opinion he indicated, quoting from the 
Executive Directors’ Report, that the object of the ICSID Convention is to ‘offer 
international methods of settlement designed to take account of the special 
characteristics of the disputes covered, as well as of the parties to whom it would 
apply’.400  He said, in contrast, that the primary purpose of the ICSID Convention is to 
‘stimulate a larger flow of private international investment into territories’. 401  
Professor Weil, as a native speaker of French, would have been aware of the 
distinction between the ‘object’ and ‘purpose’ to which Yasseen (discussed in the 
international law section above) referred. 
188. An overall conclusion that could be made in relation to the object and purpose 
criterion is that it is subsidiary to the ordinary meaning criterion.402  Nonetheless, the 
former criterion has sometimes played a dominant role in the interpretative process.  A 
prime example is found in SGS v Philippines, where the BIT in dispute was seen to 
provide investors and their investments with a broad protection.  The tribunal, rather 
controversially, gave considerable effect to this object and purpose.403  In a number of 
                                                 
399 Plama (Award), at para. 139.  
400 Tokios (Jurisdiction), at para. 3. 
401 Ibid.  Contrast this with Professor Brownlie’s Separate Opinion in CME (Final Award), para. 17, in 
which he stated that ‘[o]ne of the objects [of the BIT in dispute] was the stimulation of the economic 
development of the parties’ (emphasis added).  In this regard, it is useful to compare the Executive 
Directors’ Report, which states that ‘the broad objective of the Convention is to encourage a larger flow 
of private international investment’ (emphasis added), at para. 13.  Thus, it may be said that despite the 
close similarity in appearance between ‘object’ and ‘objective’, the latter word relates more to the 
purpose of a treaty.   
402 See also a similar conclusion in Fauchald, supra note 11, at 323. 
403  SGS v Philippines, at para. 116.  A similar position was taken by the majority in Tokios 
(Jurisdiction), at para. 31, 32, 77 and 85.  But compare this to the Dissenting Opinion of Prosper Weil 
in Tokios (Opinion), at para. 19.  See also Siemens (Jurisdiction), at para. 92 (determining that ‘[w]hile 
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other cases, FIATs have given weight to the object and purpose as justifying a broad 
or expansive rather than restrictive interpretation of its jurisdiction.404  Reliance on the 
object and purpose also arises where the FIAT has considered that the interpretation 
asserted by a party would frustrate,405 defeat,406 or be irreconcilable,407 inconsistent408 
or otherwise be incompatible 409  with the object and purpose of the treaty or its 
provisions.410  
                                                                                                                                            
 
these considerations may follow a strict logical reasoning based on the terms of the Treaty, their result 
does not seem to accord with its purpose’); Wena Hotels (Jurisdiction), at 84; and SD Myers (Partial 
Award), at para. 229.  
404 See, e.g., Tokios (Jurisdiction), at para. 46; Wena (Annulment), 41 ILM 881 (2002), at 888; and 
Aucoven (Jurisdiction), at para. 109.  See also Feldman (Jurisdiction), at para. 35. 
405 Santa Elena (Award), at 170, para. 64; and Mondev, at para. 91. 
406 Aguas del Tunari, at para. 153. 
407 Maffezini (Jurisdiction), at 402, para. 31. 
408 Tokios (Jurisdiction), at paras. 32, 46, 77 and 86; Aguas del Tunari, at para. 247; and CAA-Vivendi 
(Challenge), at para. 11. 
409 See, e.g., Pope & Talbot (Merits, Phase 2), at para. 116; and Siemens (Jurisdiction), at para. 92 
410 This line of FIAT authority is reflective of the many similarities between the object and purpose 
criterion and the principle of effectiveness.  See Chapter V, Section F. 
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C.  ARTICLE 31(2) 
The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in 
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
 
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the 
parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; 
  
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection 
with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an 
instrument related to the treaty.411 
1. Introduction 
189. Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention augments the Article 31(1) context 
criterion.  It is a composite of four separate elements, one or more of which may of 
themselves assist in determining the appropriate context of a treaty text subject to 
interpretation.  The four elements are (1) the preamble, (2) the annexes, (3) an 
agreement by all parties connected with the treaty’s conclusion, and (4) an instrument 
relating to the treaty’s conclusion made by one or more parties but accepted by all the 
others.  An important function of Article 31(2) is to ensure that the use of agreements 
and instruments connected with a treaty’s conclusion is not treated as a subordinate 
Article 32 means of interpretation.412   
190. Generally, the international case law relating to Articles 31(2)(a) and (b) is 
sparse.  Most international practice in this area relates to written instruments 
associated with the conclusion of conferences or agreements.413  Given the paucity of 
the materials in respect of Article 31(2), the discussion that follows does not contain 
                                                 
411 This provision is the progeny of the following ILC draft articles:  Article 71(1), Waldock III, YILC 
(1964-II), at 52; Article 69(2), ILC Draft Articles 1964, YILC (1964-II), at 199; and Article 27(2), ILC 
Draft Articles 1966, YILC (1966-II), at 217.  See Annex II. 
412  In respect of the international law position, see generally, Fitzmaurice, supra note 76, at 12; 
Fitzmaurice (1957), supra note 185, at 218; and Thirlway, supra note 91, at 37.  
413 See Aust, supra note 4, at 189-191.  See, e.g., the eleven resolutions adopted by the Diplomatic 
Conference of 1949 when it adopted the four Geneva Conventions on international humanitarian law.  
Pictet, Commentary: IV Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War (1958), at 651.   
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separate sections for the pertinent FIAT and international law jurisprudence (as has 
been the usual structure adopted in this thesis).  These will be discussed together.   
2. Preamble 
191. As discussed in the previous Section, numerous references have been made to 
the preamble in FIAT interpretations to cast light on the object and purpose of the 
treaty in dispute.414  This accords with the use of the preamble in treaty interpretation 
in international law.415   
192. Also to be noted in relation to preambles is the reluctance of FIATs to consider 
them as stand-alone substantive provisions.  The Bayindir tribunal, in examining the 
preamble of the BIT in question—which contained an express reference to fair and 
equitable treatment—stated as follows: 
Despite the use of the verb “agree”, it is doubtful that, in the absence of a specific 
provision in the BIT itself, the sole text of the preamble constitutes a sufficient basis for a 
self-standing fair and equitable treatment obligation under the BIT.416  
193. This finding is consonant with international law, as is demonstrated by the 
following observation in the Beagle Channel arbitration: 
Although Preambles to treaties do not usually—nor are they intended to—contain 
provisions or dispositions of substance—(in short they are not operative clauses)—it is 
nevertheless generally accepted that they may be relevant and important as guides to the 
manner in which the Treaty should be interpreted, and in order as it were, to ‘situate’ it in 
respect of its objects and purpose.417  
                                                 
414 See, e.g., Amco (Jurisdiction), at para. 23; SGS v Philippines, at para. 116; Tokios (Opinion), at para. 
6; Tecmed, at para. 156; Siemens (Jurisdiction), at para. 81; American Manufacturing (Opinions), 
Arbitrator Golsong’s Separate Opinion, at 40, para. 13; Bayindir, at para. 137; Metalclad (Award), at 
para. 71; and CSOB (Jurisdiction), at paras. 64 and 73. 
415 See supra note 360. 
416 Bayindir, at para. 230.  The relevant provision of the BIT provided:  
The Islamic Republic of Pakistan […] and the Republic of Turkey […] agre[e] that fair and 
equitable treatment of investment is desirable in order to maintain a stable framework for 
investment and maximum effective utilization of economic resources.  
417 (Argentina v Chile) (1977) 52 ILR 93, at 132, para. 19. 
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3. Annexes 
194. No FIAT award reviewed made reference to an annex as forming part of the 
context during the interpretation of a treaty.418  Similarly, there is a paucity of material 
on this subject on the international law plane.419   
195. A distinctive practice is found concerning the interpretation of annexes in the 
NAFTA and the 2004 US Model BIT.  A tribunal hearing disputes arising out of these 
agreements may be obliged to request that the interpretation of certain annexes be 
made, respectively, by the FTC or the State parties.  Interpretations issued under these 
procedures are binding on the tribunal.420   
4. Agreement or Instrument in connection with Conclusion of Treaty 
196. Of the FIAT awards reviewed, only one referred to an agreement or instrument 
in connection with the conclusion of a treaty.  This occurred in the Yaung Chi Oo 
Trading v Myanmar award, in which the Joint Press Release of the Inaugural Meeting 
of the ASEAN Investment Council was held to be ‘clearly an authoritative statement 
made by relevant ministers of ASEAN Member States, including the Myanmar 
Minister of Industry, as to their intentions at the time of the conclusion of the 
Agreement’.421  The press release appears to have had characteristics resembling an 
Article 31(2)(b) instrument more than an Article 31(2)(a) agreement.  Whether it was 
categorized as one or the other would have made no real substantive difference.422 
                                                 
418 For the sake of completeness, reference should be made to Lauder (Award), at para. 220 (noting that 
a right to make an exception to a discriminatory measure in the BIT at issue was permitted if a 
reservation were made in an annex to that treaty; but no such reservation was made). 
419 For example, Sinclair, supra note 6, at 127-130, fails to mention annexes in his discussion on the 
context criterion. 
420 See supra note 161.  
421 Yaung Chi Oo Trading v Myanmar (Award), at para. 74. 
422 Another instrument in connection with the conclusion of a treaty that is relevant to investment law is 
Chairman’s Statement made at the Adoption Session of the Energy Charter Treaty, 17 December 1994. 
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197. Similar agreements or instruments are not uncommon in the general domain of 
international law.423  For example, during the conclusion of the 2004 United Nations 
Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property 424  full 
agreement about the scope of the Convention could not be agreed.  As a result, the 
Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their 
Property (established by the General Assembly) drafted a document entitled 
“Understandings with respect to certain provisions of the Convention”, which is 
annexed to the Convention.  
 
                                                 
423 See, e.g., Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (2008), at 212-216. 
424 UN Doc. A/RES/59/38, 16 December 2004.   
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D.  ARTICLE 31(3) 
There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; 
  
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which 
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
  
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties.425 
1. Introduction 
198. The agreements, practice or rules referred to in Article 31(3) are to be ‘taken 
into account, together with the context’.  The wording suggests that the three 
categories do not form part of the context but are in addition to it.  In reality, it makes 
no difference whether or not they constitute the context.  The important consequence 
of Article 31(3) is that should any factors falling within the Article 31(3) criteria be 
relevant to an interpretation, they are to be included in the initial Article 31(1) 
interpretative process and should not be relegated to a subsidiary Article 32 
analysis.426 
199. Attention should be drawn, however, to the intention behind the adoption of 
the words ‘should be taken into account’.  Waldock explained that he preferred that an 
interpretation take into account the three criteria in Article 31(3) rather than require 
the interpretation to ‘be subject to’ those three items.  He believed that this would 
                                                 
425 This provision evolved from the following ILC draft articles: Articles 70 (1)(b) and 73, Waldock III, 
YILC (1964-II), at 52; Articles 69(1)(b) and 69(3), ILC Draft Articles 1964, YILC (1964-II), at 199; and 
Article 27(3), ILC Draft Articles 1966, YILC (1966-II), at 218.  See Annex II. 
426 See, e.g., the comment in Oppenheim that Article 31(3) words ‘together with’ indicated ‘that the 
stipulations which follow are to be taken as incorporated in the basic statement of the rule, and not as 
norms of an inferior character.’  Oppenheim, supra note 4, at 1274, n. 17.  The position taken in 
Oppenheim is reflective of the ILC’s view: 
these three elements are all of an obligatory character and by their very nature could not be 
considered to be norms of interpretation in any way inferior to those that precede them.  
YILC (1966-II), at 220, para. 9. 
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‘leave open the results of the interpretation’.427  In other words, if an interpretation 
was ‘subject to’ certain criteria, it would have imposed a stronger—almost 
mandatory—obligation on the interpreter to give effect to those criteria in comparison 
to the less rigorous duty to ‘take account’ of them. 
200. Significance has also been placed on the use of ‘agreement’ in Article 
31(3)(b).  The word recommended by the ILC was ‘understanding’.  The Vienna 
Conference expressed a preference for the use of ‘agreement’ rather than 
‘understanding’.  The former term implies a higher standard of formality than what an 
‘understanding’ may involve.428 
201. Another general point that needs to be made in respect of Article 31(3) is that 
it refers to ‘any subsequent agreement between the parties’ or subsequent practice that 
‘establishes the agreement of the parties’.  This wording is to contrasted with Article 
31(2), which speaks of ‘any agreement … made between all the parties’ and any 
instrument made between one or more parties and ‘accepted by the other parties’.  A 
grammatical argument could conclude that there is a substantive difference between 
the phrasings in Articles 31(2) and (3) but, in practice, the failure of the drafters to 
utilize ‘all’ or ‘the other parties’ in Article 31(3) is largely a semantic difference and 
has not proved to be a significant point of controversy. 
2. Subsequent Agreement or Practice 
a) International Law Practice 
202. Article 31(3)(a) acknowledges the freedom of the parties to vary the terms that 
were agreed subsequent to the conclusion of the treaty.  The consequences of a 
subsequent agreement by all the parties interpreting their treaty was described by the 
ILC as follows: 
                                                 
427 Waldock III, at 61 (para. 32) 
428 See Annex II. 
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an agreement as to the interpretation of a provision reached after the conclusion of the 
treaty represents an authentic interpretation by the parties which must be read into the 
treaty for purposes of its interpretation.429   
203. In practice, Sinclair has observed that State recourse to subsequent 
interpretative agreements is rare.  This attitude may be reflective of (1) the reluctance 
to disturb the delicate balance of compromises embedded in most treaties, (2) the 
interest of one of the parties to maintain an ambiguity in the terms or, (3) in the case 
of a multilateral treaty, the difficulties involved in obtaining the consent of all the 
parties to the interpretation and ensuring compliance with the stipulations contained in 
Part II (concerning conclusion and entry into force of treaties) and Article 40 of the 
Vienna Convention.430   
204. Under Article 31(3)(b), subsequent conduct in the application of a treaty must 
be sufficient to ‘establish’ an agreement as to the treaty’s interpretation.  Numerous 
cases before the ICJ have required the Court to refer to subsequent practice in 
determining the meaning of a treaty provision.431 
205. The reason for the importance placed on subsequent practice is to a large 
extent the high probative value of State conduct. 432   As the ILC commented, 
                                                 
429 YILC (1966-II), at 221, para. 14.  The rule has close ties to the legal maxim ad quem pertinet iuris 
constitutio, ad ipsum pertinet interpretatio (‘the one who makes the law is the one who is competent to 
interpret it’).  In the Chamizal Arbitration (US v Mexico), 5 AJIL 782 (1911), at 805, the award found 
that ‘it appears to be impossible to come to any other conclusion than that the two nations have, by their 
subsequent treaties and their consistent course of conduct in connection with all cases arising 
thereunder, put such an authoritative interpretation upon the Treaties of 1848 and 1853’ that they were 
precluded from asserting otherwise. 
430 See, e.g., Yasseen, supra note 194, at 44. 
431 See, e.g., the Kasikili/Sedudu Island case, in which the ICJ stated that ‘[i]ndeed in the past, when 
called upon to interpret the provisions of a treaty, the Court has itself frequently examined the 
subsequent practice of the parties in the application of that treaty’, ICJ Reports 1045 (1999), para. 50, 
citing several ICJ decisions.  More recently, see Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan 
(Indonesia v. Malaysia), ICJ Reports 625 (2002), para. 37. 
432 See McNair, at 424. 
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subsequent practice ‘constitutes objective evidence of the understanding of the parties 
as to the meaning of the treaty’.433   
b) FIAT Practice 
206. Rather than arranging the following section into cases that fall specifically 
within either Article 31(3)(a) or (b), it will proceed to discuss the two provisions 
together.  This approach is due largely to the difficulty in classifying the conduct of 
the treaty parties as an agreement (which, as discussed below, need not be in writing) 
under Article 31(3)(a) as opposed to an instance of Article 31(3)(b) practice 
establishing an agreement.  Instead, the cases have been grouped into the following 
categories: (1) those in which there appeared to be a concordance of views by all the 
parties to the treaty and (2) those that involved interpretations by one or more treaty 
parties but where it is unknown whether all parties were in agreement.   
207. Before proceeding to analyse the cases in this manner, it is appropriate to 
mention the discussion in Methanex (Final Award) as to the form of a subsequent 
agreement under Article 31(3)(a).  The tribunal there stated that: 
… Independent of the effect under Article 1131(2) NAFTA of the FTC’s Interpretation of 
31st July 2001, that “interpretation” also evidences, according to the USA, an agreement 
between the NAFTA Parties as to the meaning of Article 1105 NAFTA which it is 
appropriate for the Tribunal to take into account.  In this respect, the Tribunal notes that 
whilst the language of Article 31(3)(a) is clear, it is useful also to refer for the purposes of 
confirmation to the International Law Commission’s Commentary on what was then 
Article 27(3)(a).  This states that: “an agreement as to the interpretation of a provision 
reached after the conclusion of the treaty represents an authentic interpretation by the 
parties which must be read into the treaty for purposes of its interpretation”. This passage 
was cited (with apparent approval) by the International Court of Justice in the 
Kasikili/Sedudu Island case.  
 
… It follows from the wording of Article 31(3)(a) that it is not envisaged that the 
subsequent agreement need be concluded with the same formal requirements as a treaty; 
and indeed, were this to be the case, the provision would be otiose.  According to Daillier 
et al., Droit International Public, as to a subsequent agreement on interpretation: “Il est 
admis que cet accord postérieur peut être tacite et résulter des pratiques concordantes des 
Etats quand ils appliquent le traité” (“It is accepted that this subsequent agreement may 
be tacit and result from the concordant practice of States when they apply the treaty”).  
From the ICJ’s approach in the Kasikili/Sedudu Island case, it appears that no particular 
                                                 
433 YILC (1966-II), at 221, para. 15. 
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formality is required for there to be an “agreement” under Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna 
Convention.  
 
… In the light of these factors, the Tribunal has no difficulty in deciding that the FTC’s 
Interpretation of 31st July 2001 is properly characterised as a “subsequent agreement” on 
interpretation falling within the scope of Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention. 434  
208. Concordant practice of the NAFTA States as reflected in ther interpretations of 
the FTC may thus be seen as evidence of a subsequent agreement, which draws 
attention to the less than clear border between an Article 31(3)(a) agreement or an 
Article 31(3)(b) practice.435 
209. Also, it also bears noting that the ICSID Convention did not define the type of 
‘investment’ over which an ICSID tribunal has jurisdiction pursuant to Article 25 of 
the Convention.  The drafters of the Convention gave contracting States the freedom 
to define in subsequent BITs the precise type of investment in respect of which ICSID 
tribunals will have jurisdiction.  However, subsequent definitions that States may 
agree to in BITs are not the type of subsequent agreements contemplated by Article 
31(3) because these clearly are not agreements between all the parties to the ICSID 
Convention. 
(i) Subsequent Concordance of All the Parties 
210. An instance of subsequent concordance of parties in relation to the 
interpretation of a treaty is found in the practice of Argentina and Panama.  Those two 
States, in direct response to the Maffezini tribunal’s interpretation of an MFN clause, 
                                                 
434 Methanex (Final Award), at Part II, Chpt. B, paras. 19-21 (footnotes omitted).  See also Methanex 
(Final Award), at Part II, Chpt. H, para. 23, (noting that while it should look to the ordinary meaning of 
the provisions that had been interpreted by the FTC Interpretation pursuant to Article 31(1), it should 
also take into account the FTC Interpretation in accordance with Article 31(3)(a) and adding ‘[i]ndeed, 
according to Oppenheim’s, an authentic interpretation by treaty parties overrides the ordinary principles 
of interpretation’), quoting Oppenheim, supra note 4, at 630. 
435 In connection with the issue of a subsequent agreement amending a treaty, the Methanex (Final 
Award) added the following: 
… Article 39 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties says simply that “[a] treaty 
may be amended by agreement between the parties”.  No particular mode of amendment is 
required and many treaties provide for their amendment by agreement without requiring a re-
ratification.   
Methanex (Final Award), at Part IV, Chapt. C, para. 21. 
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exchanged diplomatic notes with an ‘interpretative declaration’ concerning the MFN 
clause in their 1996 BIT.  This declaration, the two States stated that it had always 
been their intention, contrary to the finding in Maffezini, that MFN clauses did not 
extend to dispute resolution clauses.436   
211. In CAA Vivendi (Challenge), the ad hoc Committee considered that ICSID 
Arbitration Rule 53    
was adopted unanimously and was treated by the Members of the [ICSID] Administrative 
Council as uncontroversial.  In the circumstances, the unanimous adoption of Arbitration 
Rule 53 can be seen, if not as an actual agreement by the States parties to the Convention 
as to its interpretation, at least as amounting to subsequent practice relevant to its 
interpretation.437 
The ICSID Administrative Council is composed of a representative of each State party 
to the ICSID Convention.438   
212. Negotiations as to the revision of a BIT by both of its State parties may in 
certain circumstances provide guidance as to the subsequent common understanding 
of both parties in regard to that BIT.  In Plama, the tribunal drew the following 
inferences from negotiations subsequent to the conclusion of the 1987 Bulgaria-
Cyprus BIT:  
Bulgaria and Cyprus negotiated a revision of their BIT in 1998. The negotiations failed 
but specifically contemplated a revision of the dispute settlement provisions … It can be 
inferred from these negotiations that the Contracting Parties to the BIT themselves did 
not consider that the MFN provision extends to dispute settlement provisions in other 
BITs.439 
213. The United States argued in Methanex that the concordant submissions made 
in those proceedings by itself, Canada and Mexico, i.e., all three parties to the 
                                                 
436 This exchange of diplomatic notes is noted in National Grid (Jurisdiction), at para. 85. 
437 CAA Vivendi (Challenge), at para. 12, citing Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention.   
438 See Article 4 of the ICSID Convention. 
439 Plama (Jurisdiction), at para. 195.  This finding was made despite the tribunal’s observation in the 
immediately preceding paragraph that it found ‘no guidance in the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 of 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, as there are no facts or circumstances that point to their 
application’. Plama (Jurisdiction), at para. 194. 
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NAFTA, as to the interpretation of that treaty constituted a subsequent agreement or 
subsequent practice of all State parties to that treaty. 440  While the tribunal was not 
required to rule on this point, it may be arguable that a coordinated or joint submission 
by all parties to a treaty expressing the same interpretation may satisfy Article 
31(3)(a) or (b).  But care must be exercised here as it might be unfair to the investor if 
the meaning of a treaty can be changed in this way after the dispute has arisen.  This 
point was touched upon in Aguas del Tunari.  The tribunal there indicated that both 
State parties to the relevant BIT could not determine what constitutes the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction once a BIT claim had been made.441  In other words, after a claimant 
institutes a treaty claim, a subsequent agreement by the State parties to that treaty, 
which purports to modify the jurisdictional mandate of the tribunal, would not be 
determinative of a FIAT’s jurisdiction over the presented claim. 
214. The CME final award provides a contrast.  The proceedings there were 
instituted in 2000 pursuant to the 1991 Netherlands-Czech and Slovak Federal 
Republic BIT.  ‘Agreed Minutes’ signed and exchanged between the Netherlands and 
the Czech Republic as to their common position in respect of the interpretation of 
Article 8.6 of that BIT were concluded in 2002.  This ‘common position’ was used by 
the CME tribunal to support its interpretation of the BIT.  No express reference to 
Article 31(3) was made by the tribunal.442   
215. Another situation in which the practice of States that could arguably be 
considered as subsequent concordance relates to the joint publication of investment 
guides or brochures by both State signatories to a BIT.443  But usually these guides are 
general in nature and are unlikely to provide sufficient specificity to aid or enrich an 
interpretation. 
                                                 
440 Methanex (Partial Award), at para. 101. 
441 Aguas del Tunari, at para. 263.  See also Bayindir, at para. 178. 
442 See CME (Final Award), paras. 89 et seq., 400 and 437.  See also the Svea Court of Appeal 
Judgment (Sweden), Czech Republic v CME Czech Republic BV of 15 May 2003, at pp. 6-7 of English 
translation. 
443 See dissenting opinion of Dr El Mahdi in SPP (Jurisdiction), at para. 29 (although his views were on 
a ‘for the sake of argument’ basis). 
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(ii) Subsequent Practice of One or More States 
216. On a number of occasions FIATs have indicated that subsequent practice of 
one or more State parties may assist in interpreting their treaty.   
217. The investment treaty practice of Venezuela was examined as part of the 
Fedax tribunal’s interpretation of the term ‘investment’ in the 1991 Netherlands-
Venezuela BIT.  This practice revealed that, in various other investment treaties, every 
time Venezuela ‘has wished to exclude investments that are not manifestly direct, it 
has done so in unequivocal terms’.  This practice was used to support the tribunal’s 
interpretation of an investment.444  However, it is relevant to note here the view of the 
Enron tribunal: ‘that a treaty may have provided expressly for certain rights of 
shareholders does not mean that a treaty not so providing has meant to exclude such 
rights if this can be reasonably inferred from the provisions of such a treaty’. 445  
Tribunals must thus be careful of attributing a meaning to one treaty from a State’s 
general practice.  A tribunal’s reference to other treaties in the process of 
interpretation is dealt with in Chapter V, Section C.  
218. The tribunal in Gruslin was required to interpret a 1979 intergovernmental 
agreement between Malaysia and the Belgio-Luxembourg Economic Union 
(“Intergovernmental Agreement’).  In 1992, Belgium, by way of a note verbale, 
sought clarification from Malaysia as to the term ‘approved project’ in the 
Intergovernmental Agreement and Malaysia clarified the matter in a responsive note 
verbale to Belgium.  The sole arbitrator considered that this exchange of note verbales 
                                                 
444 Fedax (Jurisdiction), at para. 36.  The two instruments specifically mentioned by the tribunal were 
concluded subsequent to the 1991 Netherlands - Venezuela BIT.  In Plama (Jurisdiction), at para. 195, 
reference was made to Bulgaria’s practice in concluding investment treaties subsequent to its 
conclusion of the 1987 Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT that was invoked in that case.  The tribunal held that in the 
circumstances of that case the subsequent practice was not particularly relevant. Also in Camuzzi 
(Jurisdiction), at para. 134, the tribunal referred to other investment treaties concluded by Argentina in 
when interpreting the 1990 Argentina – Belgo-Luxembourg BIT.  See also Sempra Energy 
(Jurisdiction), at para. 142; and Mihaly, at para. 58.   
445 Enron (Jurisdiction), at para. 46. 
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does not effect a direct amendment to the terms of the IGA.  However, at this peak level 
of intercourse between states it must be regarded as an enduring and authoritative 
engagement expressing to the Belgo-Luxemburg Union the manner in which the 
Respondent regards and applies the terms of the IGA with regard to investments made in 
its territory by nationals of the Belgo-Luxemburg Union.446 
219. Ultimately, the tribunal held that Malaysia’s note verbale thus was too obscure 
and of uncertain effect to be of assistance.447  Nonetheless, had this note verbale been 
sufficiently clear, the tribunal appears to have been open to giving it some weight.   
220. The most detailed FIAT analysis and application of Article 31(3) is found in 
Aguas del Tunari.  Information relevant to that case appeared to have been discussed 
in Dutch parliament.  Two rounds of questions by Dutch parliamentarians addressed 
to two government ministers asked whether the Bolivia-Netherlands BIT could be 
invoked in the dispute before the Aguas del Tunari tribunal.  The ministerial response 
on both occasions effectively declined to indicate whether that dispute fell under the 
BIT; the answer was said to be at the discretion of the tribunal.448  However, after a 
third round of questions to the same two ministers, as well as another, the ministerial 
response expressed the view that the BIT was not applicable to the Aguas del Tunari 
arbitration.  Bolivia, the respondent in Aguas del Tunari, used the Dutch governmental 
response to the third round of questions to assert that both State parties to the Bolivia-
Netherlands BIT were of the view that BIT did not apply in that case.449   
221. Referring to Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention, the Aguas del Tunari 
tribunal concluded that despite both States’ views being related to the dispute before 
it, they were 
                                                 
446 Gruslin, at para. 23.4. 
447 Gruslin, at paras. 23.12-23.16 
448 Aguas del Tunari, at paras. 253-4. 
449 Aguas del Tunari, at para. 249. 
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not a ‘subsequent agreement between the parties.’  The coincidence of several statements 
does not make them a joint statement.  And, it is clear that in the present case, there was 
no intent that these statements be regarded as an agreement.450   
222. The tribunal thereafter examined whether the Bolivian position asserted before 
the tribunal and the internal Dutch government statements could constitute 
‘subsequent practice’ in accordance with Article 31(3)(b). 
223. In the opinion of the tribunal, the third response from the Netherlands 
government was inconsistent with the first two responses and appeared to refer 
incorrectly to the latter.  It concluded that ‘[a]s a result, little can be concluded from 
the three written replies of The Netherlands government’.451  Nonetheless, because of 
the great weight placed on these replies by the respondent, the tribunal decided to 
write to Mr. Lammers, the Legal Advisor of the Foreign Ministry of the Netherlands 
and put to him several related questions.452  It was considered that it would assist the 
tribunal to have further limited information concerning the basis for the Dutch 
government statements.453   
224. The tribunal received a reply from Mr Lammers to which there was attached a 
document entitled ‘Interpretation of the Agreement on encouragement and reciprocal 
protection of investments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic 
of Bolivia, signed on 19 March 1992 and entered into force on first November 1994’.  
In relation to the content of this document, the tribunal made three observations.   
225. First, the document contained comments only of a general nature, possibly 
relevant to confirm an interpretation pursuant to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention.  
                                                 
450 Aguas del Tunari, at para. 251. 
451 Aguas del Tunari, at para. 257. 
452 The entire letter is attached to the awards as Appendix III. 
453 Aguas del Tunari, at para. 258.  A pertinent passage of the letter is set out below:  
If the Government’s statement replying to the Parliamentary questions of 19 April 2002 
reflects an interpretative position of general application held by the Government of the 
Netherlands, the Tribunal requests that the Government provide the Tribunal with information 
(of the type suggested by Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
as being possibly relevant) upon which that general interpretative position is based. 
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It did not provide information of the type covered by Article 31 that would have been 
possibly relevant and upon which a general interpretative position could have been 
based.  Accordingly, the tribunal made no use of the document to arrive at its 
decision.454     
226. Secondly, the letter of Mr. Lammers stated that the answers given to the 
parliamentary questions ‘were based on information from the press which at the time 
the answers were given “may not necessarily have been correct”’.455  On the basis of 
these first two observations, the tribunal found no ‘subsequent practice … which 
establishes an agreement of the parties’ in respect of the interpretation of the BIT.   
227. The third observation was that the tribunal was 
not presented with, and therefore need not consider, the situation where the two state 
parties to a BIT both express the position that a tribunal lacks jurisdiction over a 
particular dispute before a tribunal.  The inconsistency between the first and second 
replies of The Netherlands government, on the one hand, and its third reply, on the other 
hand, and the apparent incorrect reference in the latter to the first two replies does not, in 
the Tribunal’s view, express with any clarity the position that the BIT does not apply in 
this case.456 
228. In addition to this, and perhaps most important of all, was the tribunal’s ‘firm 
view that it is the Tribunal, and not the contracting parties, that is the arbiter of its 
jurisdiction’. 457   In other words, even if any plausible concordance of views had 
existed between Bolivia and the Netherlands in connection with the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction under the BIT, such consensus was not definitive—the tribunal still 
retained an overriding authority to make an assessment as to whether it possessed 
jurisdiction.   
                                                 
454 Aguas del Tunari, at para. 260. 
455 Aguas del Tunari, at para. 262, quoting from the letter of Mr. Lammers.   
456 Aguas del Tunari, at para. 263.  A footnote appended to this last sentence maintained as follows: 
The majority of the Tribunal accepts that the first two replies by the Dutch government 
properly reflect its view or intention which is consistent with our view that the Tribunal must 
be the arbiter of its jurisdiction.  It is for an arbitral tribunal to determine in specific factual 
circumstances whether an investor falls within the scope of a bilateral investment treaty. 
457 Aguas del Tunari, at para. 263. 
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3. Any Relevant Rules of International Law 
a) International Law Practice 
229. Reference to ‘any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties’ as provided under Article 31(3)(c) is in many respects pragmatic.  
A heavy burden would be imposed on the drafters of treaties if they were required to 
make express reference to every international law rule relevant to the treaty that will 
result from the drafting process.458  As the award in the Georges Pinson case held:  
[e]very international convention must be deemed tacitly to refer to general principles of 
international law for all questions which it does not itself resolve in express terms and in 
a different way.459  
230. The reference to ‘rules’ in Article 31(3)(c) is not defined.  The ILC’s 
commentary fails to discuss why the term ‘rules’ was adopted in preference to 
‘principles’.  There is no reason why this provision should not apply equally to 
principles.460  Limitations are nonetheless contained in the sub-paragraph: the rules or 
principles must be those that are ‘relevant’ and ‘applicable in the relations between the 
parties’.   
231. Commentators have understood this sub-paragraph as bearing wide meaning.  
Sinclair, in his explanation of the provision notes that ‘every treaty provision must be 
                                                 
458 This has long been realised in the domestic context.  For example, in the interpretation of English 
statutes, it has been observed that they ‘often go into considerable detail, but even so allowance must be 
made for the fact that they are not enacted in a vacuum.  A great deal inevitably remains unsaid.  
Legislators and drafters assume that the courts will continue to act in accordance with well-recognised 
rules …’  Bell and Engle (eds.), Cross on Statutory Interpretation (1995), at 165.   
459 Georges Pinson case, France-Mexico Claims Commission, (1927-28) Annual Digest 426, at 426-
427; and 5 RIAA 327 (1928), at 422.  
460 See Douglas, The International Law of Investment Claims (2009), at 86, para. 154 (the Article 
31(3)(c) reference to ‘rules’ is ‘best understood as any legal norms’).  For a discussion of the 
differences between principles and rules, see Chapter I, Section A(2) above. 
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read not only in its own context, but in the wider context of general international law, 
whether conventional or customary.’461  Oppenhiem states as follows: 
Account is taken of any relevant rules of international law not only as constituting the 
background against which the treaty’s provisions must be viewed, but in the presumption 
that the parties intend something not inconsistent with the generally recognised principles 
of international law, or with previous treaty obligations towards third states.462 
232. Schwarzenberger considered such recourse as serving three purposes:   
It assists in counterbalancing the tendency to overemphasise the completeness of any 
treaty system.  It helps in avoiding unlikely or absurd conclusions.  It imposes further 
restraints on interpretation by reference to other treaties.  Thus, this form of crosscheck 
with other potentially relevant rules assists greatly in a balanced use of the teleological 
method of treaty interpretation.463 
233. Until recently, however, the application of this Article 31(3)(c) has been 
infrequent.  McLachlan, for example, has described the provision as ‘the neglected 
son of treaty interpretation’.464  One reason suggested for the low frequency of its use 
is that the principle expressed is the obvious—it ‘operates, on most occasions, as an 
unarticulated major premise in the construction of treaties’. 465   Lately, however, 
increased attention has been given to Article 31(3)(c), an interest ascribed in large 
measure to the treatment of this provision in the ICJ Oil Platforms judgment and 
individual opinions. 466   The ICJ there took a wide view of Article 31(3)(c), 
                                                 
461 Sinclair, supra note 6, at 139.  See also McLachlan, at 290 (Article 31(3)(c) is ‘apt to include all of 
the sources of international law, including custom, general principles, and, where applicable, other 
treaties’). 
462 Oppenhiem, at 1275.   
463  Schwarzenberger, International Law (1957), Vol. 1, at 529.  See similarly, Lauterpacht, 
Development of International Law (1958), at 27-28; Hudson, The Permanent Court of International 
Justice, 1920-1942 (1943), at 655; Crandall at 394, §170; and C. Wilfred Jenks, ‘The Conflict of Law-
Making Treaties’, 30 British Yearbook of International Law 401-453 (1953), at 451. 
464 McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention’, 
54 ICLQ 279 (2005), at 289.  See also Sands, ‘Treaty, Custom and the Cross-fertilization of 
International Law’, 1 Yale Human Rights and Development Journal 85 (1998), at 95. 
465 McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3) (c) of the Vienna Convention’, 
54 ICLQ 279 (2005), at 280. 
466 ICJ Reports (2003); 42 ILM 1334 (2003).  See McLachlan, ibid., at 279; and French, ‘Treaty 
Interpretation and the Incorporation of Extraneous Legal Rules’, 55 ICLQ 281 (2006), at 281.  See also 
the reference to Article 31(3)(c) in the recent cases of Access to Information under Article 9 of the 
OSPAR Convention (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Permanent Court of Arbitration, 2 July 2003, paras. 
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interpreting the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights 
between the United States and Iran467 by reference to the international law rules on the 
use of force by States.  The Court’s position is to be contrasted with the one expressed 
by Judge Higgins in her Separate Opinion.  She considered that the Treaty of Amity 
was an economic and commercial treaty and that the ‘relevant rules’ criterion under 
Article 31(3)(c) was not intended to incorporate ‘the entire substance of international 
law on a topic not mentioned in the clause—at least not without more explanation than 
the Court provides’. 468   She considered that the Court had not given sufficient 
emphasis to the text of the provision to be interpreted: 
The Court has, however, not interpreted Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), by reference to the 
rules on treaty interpretation. It has rather invoked the concept of treaty interpretation to 
displace the applicable law.  It has replaced the terms of Article XX, paragraph 1 (d), 
with those of international law on the use of force and all sight of the text of Article XX, 
paragraph 1 (d), is lost.469 
234. Later in her opinion she wrote that the Court was ‘reformulating the matter as 
one of self-defence under international law rather than “necessary” action for the 
“protection of essential security interests” within the terms of the 1955 Treaty’ and as 
such, the Court narrowed  
the range of factual issues to be examined.  Through this recasting of the United States 
case the Court reduces to nil the legal interest in what was happening to oil commerce 
generally during the ‘Tanker War’.  Instead it makes the sole question that of whether an 
attack on two vessels … constituted an armed attack on the United States that warranted 
military action in self-defence.470 
235. Given the generality of Article 31(3)(c), and an absence of a settled view on its 
proper operation in the Oil Platforms case, it will be a rule likely to give rise to a 
conflict of views in future cases before the ICJ. 
                                                                                                                                            
 
93-105, 42 ILM 1118 (2003), 1144; and  Al-Adsani v United Kingdom, ECHR, 123 ILR 24 (2001), at 
40, paras. 55-6, 34 EHRR 273. 
467 Signed in Tehran on 15 August 1955 and entered into force on 16 June 1957. 
468 Ibid., Higgins, Separate Opinion, at para. 46. 
469 Ibid., Higgins, Separate Opinion, at para. 49. 
470 Ibid., Higgins, Separate Opinion, at para. 51. 
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b) FIAT Practice 
236. In dealing with relevant rules of international law within the framework of 
ICSID arbitrations, reference should be made to Article 42(1) of the ICSID 
Convention which indicates the applicable law of the dispute includes ‘the law of the 
Contracting State party to the dispute … and such rules of international law as may be 
applicable’.  The Executive Directors’ Report comments that the term ‘international 
law’ as used in Article 42(1) should be understood in the sense given by Article 38(1) 
of the ICJ.471  Despite this guidance, Schreuer comments: 
The reference to the enumeration of sources of international law as contained in Art. 
38(1) of the ICJ Statute by no means resolves the problem of establishing the rules of 
international law relevant to the particular dispute.  It is debatable whether the list 
provided there paints a complete picture of contemporary international law and whether 
the neat categories suggested there conform to the complex realities of international legal 
practice.  Nevertheless, this reference demonstrates that an ICSID tribunal is directed to 
look at the full range of sources of international law in a similar way as the International 
Court of Justice.472  
237. The first and foremost point of reference in the interpretation of a treaty, as 
will be recalled, is the text of the treaty.  The Waste Management tribunal emphasised 
the text’s importance when it stated ‘[w]here a treaty spells out in detail and with 
precision the requirements for maintaining a claim, there is no room for implying into 
the treaty additional requirements, whether based on alleged requirements of general 
international law in the field of diplomatic protection or otherwise’.473  Consistent 
with this textual emphasis, other FIATs have also held that only if the treaty is silent 
or unclear on an issue will recourse be had to general rules of international law.474   
238. The situation that arises when the chosen rules conflict with customary rules of 
international law not mentioned in the treaty was addressed in AES v Argentina.  The 
                                                 
471 Executive Directors’ Report on the ICSID Convention, at para. 40. 
472 Schreuer, supra note 5, at 610. 
473 Waste Management II (Award), at para. 85. 
474 See, e.g., SD Myers (Partial Award), at para. 310 (‘[t]here being no relevant provisions of the 
NAFTA other than those contained in Article 1110 the Tribunal turns for guidance to international 
law’); Loewen (Award), at para. 226; Methanex (Final Award), Part IV, Chpt. B, para. 37; and Feldman 
(Jurisdiction), at paras. 36.  
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tribunal there referred to the following ‘fundamental principle of international law’, 
which it considered it must respect: 
the rule according to which ‘specialia generalibus derogant’, from which it derives that 
treaty obligations prevail over rules of customary international law under the condition 
that the latter are not of a peremptory character …475 
239. As a corollary, silence has not been viewed as a method drafters consciously 
use to exclude any important international law rules.  The position taken by the 
Loewen tribunal is demonstrative: 
We accept that an important principle of international law should not be held to have 
been tacitly dispensed with by an international agreement, in the absence of words 
making clear an intention to do so (Elettronica Sicula SpA (Elsi) (United States v Italy) 
(1989) ICJ 15 at 42).  Such an intention may, however, be exhibited by express 
provisions which are at variance with the continued operation of the relevant principle of 
international law.476   
240. The FIAT case law reviewed shows that the following international law rules 
have been taken into account by FIATs in interpreting treaties, often without 
articulating that they are applying Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention Rules: 
a) the principle of good faith;477 
b) principles relating to the law of treaties;478  
                                                 
475 AES v Argentina (Jurisdiction), at para. 23.  Similarly, the Methanex tribunal took the view that if 
the chosen rules in a treaty are inconsistent with imperative principles of international law or jus 
cogens, the tribunal has an independent duty not to give effect to the parties’ choice of rules.  Methanex 
(Final Award), at Part IV, Chapt. C, paras. 24-25.  This finding is consistent with Article 53 of the 
Vienna Convention.  See also AAP, at paras. 21 and 22; LGE (Liability), at para. 97; Enron 
(Jurisdiction), at para. 46 (observing that each treaty ‘must be interpreted autonomously … in the light 
of its interconnections with international law’); and Olguín (Jurisdiction), at para. 83. 
476 Loewen (Jurisdiction), at para. 73.  An almost identical finding is made in the tribunal’s final award, 
at para. 160, which finding was approved in SGS v Pakistan, at para. 171, n. 178.  See also Maffezini 
(Jurisdiction), at 400, para. 22; and Brownlie’s Separate Opinion in CME (Final Award), at para. 108. 
477 Tecmed, at para. 154 (‘[t]he Arbitral Tribunal considers that this provision of the Agreement, in light 
of the good faith principle established by international law, requires the Contracting Parties to provide 
to international investments treatment that does not affect the basic expectations that were taken into 
account by the foreign investor to make the investment’). 
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c) State responsibility rules under which actions of a political subdivision of a 
federal State are attributable to the central government;479  
d) State responsibility rules that determine whether a particular entity is a State 
body;480  
e) rules as to the nationality of a claimant;481 
f) principles as to the assessment of compensation;482 and 
g) rules relating to the continuous national identity of claimants.483  
241. In terms of substantive provisions, Article 31(3)(c) allows FIATs to interpret 
provisions such as ‘fair and equitable treatment’ as the meaning may develop in 
international law over time. 484   For example, the Mondev tribunal made an 
‘evolutionary interpretation’ of Article 1105(1) of the NAFTA, which took into 
account ‘current international law, whose content is shaped by the conclusion of more 
                                                                                                                                            
 
478 The FIAT jurisprudence applying the Vienna Convention Rules as detailed in this thesis provides 
unshakable support for this point.  See also Metalclad (Award), at para. 100; and CSOB (Jurisdiction), 
at para. 39. 
479 CAA (Award), at para. 49. 
480 Maffezini (Jurisdiction), at 413, para. 76 (‘[s]ince neither the Convention nor the Argentine-Spanish 
BIT establish guiding principles for deciding the here relevant issues, the Tribunal may look to the 
applicable rules of international law in deciding whether a particular entity is a state body’). 
481 Tokios (Jurisdiction), at para. 70 (‘[a]s with the [ICSID] Convention, the definition of corporate 
nationality in the Ukraine-Lithuania BIT is also consistent with the predominant approach in 
international law’); Feldman (Jurisdiction), at para. 36; and Amco (Annulment), at para. 37. 
482 SD Myers (Partial Award), at para. 309 (‘the Tribunal considers that the drafters of the NAFTA 
intended to leave it open to tribunals to determine a measure of compensation appropriate to the 
specific circumstances of the case, taking into account the principles of both international law and the 
provisions of the NAFTA’); and Brownlie’s Separate Opinion in CME (Final Award), para. 108 (‘[i]n 
relation to the issue of [compensation for] speculative benefits it is relevant to note that, in case the 
treaty provisions are not in themselves clear, the Vienna Convention justifies reference to the position 
in general international law’). 
483 Loewen (Award), at para. 226 (‘it is that silence in the Treaty that requires the application of 
customary international law to resolve the question of the need for continuous national identity’).  This 
tribunal’s eventual decision on this point, however, has been subject to criticism.  See, e.g., Maurice 
Mendelson, ‘The Runaway Train: the “Continuous Nationality Rule” from the Panevezys-saldutiskis 
Railway case to Loewen’, in Weiler, Todd (ed.), International Investment Law and Arbitration: Leading 
Cases from the ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties and Customary International Law (2005), 97, at 136 
484 McLachlan, Shore and Weiniger, International Investment Law: Substantive Principles (2007), at 
222-223, at para. 7.69. 
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than two thousand bilateral investment treaties and many treaties of friendship and 
commerce.’485 
242. A unique feature of FIAT jurisprudence is that reference is made not only to 
international law but also to established principles, laws or rules in international 
arbitration to interpret treaties.  For example, references have been made to  
a) the ‘principle of the separability (autonomy) of the arbitration clause’,486  
b) ‘the laws of evidence generally and by the customs of evidentiary production 
in international arbitration generally’,487  
c) and ‘fundamental rules of procedure’.488    
243. Although the use of Article 31(3)(c) by FIATs has been relatively 
uncontroversial, it has potential to create controversy in the future if, like in the ICJ 
Oil Platforms case, it is applied to invoke a rule in a manner that may be considered as 
displacing the applicable law.   
 
                                                 
485 Mondev, at paras. 123-125.  See also Tecmed, at para. 155; and ADF (Award), at para. 179 and 183. 
486 Plama (Jurisdiction), at para. 212 (interpreting an MFN clause). 
487  Aguas del Tunari, Procedural Order No 1 concerning the Discontinuance of Proceedings with 
respect to Aguas Argentinas SA, para. 13, quoted in Aguas del Tunari, at para. 25. 
488 See MINE (Annulment), at paras. 5.05-06. (in interpreting Article 52(1) of the ICSID Convention, it 
referred to Article 18 of the UNCITRAL Model Law as an example of such a procedure).  See also 
Article 52(1)(d) of the ICSID Convention, which refers to ‘a serious departure from a fundamental rule 
of procedure’ as constituting a ground for annulment. 
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ARTICLE 31(4) 
A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so 
intended.489 
c) International Law Practice 
244. The ordinary meaning of a text may be displaced by application of Article 
31(4).  Of all the Vienna Convention Rules, this is the only provision that makes 
explicit reference to the intentions of the parties.490  The provision does not require 
that those intentions be evidenced in writing. 
245. It was debated in the ILC whether Article 31(4) served any purpose because 
some members considered the special meaning would be apparent from the context.  
Nevertheless, it was considered that there was a certain utility in including the rule, ‘if 
only to emphasise that the burden of proof lies on the party invoking the special 
meaning of the term’.491   
246. The invocation of this provision is rare in international law.  The Continental 
Shelf Arbitration between the UK and France provides an example of its application.  
In that case, the tribunal accepted the French contention that the expression ‘Bay of 
Granville’ was considered by the parties as covering the whole of the Channel Islands 
region.  The tribunal noted that, normally, the geographical expression ‘Bay of 
Granville’ would have been used in a more restricted sense but in this particular case 
documents evidenced that negotiations relating to the Channel Islands region as a 
whole took place under the rubric ‘Granville Bay’.492 
                                                 
489 This provision evolved from the following ILC draft articles:  Article 70 (3), Waldock III, YILC 
(1964-II), at 52; Article 71, ILC Draft Articles 1964, YILC (1964-II), at 199; and Article 27(4), ILC 
Draft Articles 1966, YILC (1966-II), at 218.  See Annex II. 
490 See Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, ‘International Law in the Past Third of a Century’, 159 Recueil 
des cours 1 (1978), at 44.    
491 YILC (1966-II), at 222. 
492 Delimitation of the Continental Shelf (UK v France), Award of 30 June 1977, 54 ILR 6, at 57, para. 
74.  Compare the declaration of Herbert W. Briggs, ibid., at 131. 
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d) FIAT Practice 
247. Much like the position in international law, FIAT practice is exiguous in 
relation to Article 31(4).  In the FIAT case law reviewed, specific reference to that 
provision has occurred only in Aguas del Tunari.  In that case, the tribunal’s 
comprehensive interpretative analysis of a disputed BIT phrase touched upon almost 
every element of Article 31.  In this analysis, the tribunal made express reference to 
Article 31(4) but noted only that  
[t]here is no indication in the record that any special meaning for the word ‘controlled’ 
[the term in dispute] was intended by these contracting parties.  The Tribunal observes, 
however, that the negotiators of the Netherlands – Bolivia BIT likely possessed a 
sophisticated knowledge of business and law.  For such persons, the ordinary meaning of 
a word or phrase also includes the legal meanings given to such words or phrases.493   
248. Definitional sections in treaties obviously may provide express elaborations of 
particular meanings that parties intended to give to certain terms.494  The benefit of 
definitions in the context of investment treaties was alluded to by the Aguas del 
Tunari tribunal: ‘the purpose of stimulating investment is furthered by clear 
definitions which thereby allow potential investors to ascertain whether they are, or 
are not, covered by a particular BIT’.495  
249. However, Article 31(4) of the Vienna Convention has no practical value in 
relation to explicit definitions because they may be regarded as part of the treaty text 
that must be interpreted according to Article 31(1).  Article 31(4) is likely to assume 
relevance only when the special meaning is able to be evidenced from materials or 
circumstances external to the treaty.   
                                                 
493 Aguas del Tunari, at para. 230.  The dissentient in that case, arbitrator Alberro-Semerena, concurred 
with this observation.  Aguas del Tunari, Dissenting Opinion, at para. 27. 
494  See, e.g., Loewen (Jurisdiction), at para. 40; Middle East Cement, at paras. 100-101; Enron 
(Jurisdiction) (Ancillary Claim), at paras. 29-32; Enron (Supplemental Claim), at paras. 30-32; 
Bayindir, at para. 113; and Tokios (Jurisdiction), at para. 77.   
495 Aguas del Tunari, at para. 313. 
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250. Limits exist, however, in relation to the freedom of parties to define terms or 
give them special meanings.  This limit is particularly evident in the ability of States 
to define the type of investment disputes that may be settled by ICSID arbitration.  As 
Prosper Weil stated in his Dissenting Opinion in Tokios:  
it is not for the Parties [to a BIT] to extend the jurisdiction of ICSID beyond what the 
Convention provides for.  It is the Convention which determines the jurisdiction of 
ICSID, and it is within the limits of the ICSID jurisdiction as determined by the 
Convention that the Parties may in their BIT define the disputes they agree to submit to 
an ICSID arbitration.496   
251. Similarly, the Aucoven tribunal indicated that while the ICSID Convention 
gave State parties a good deal of autonomy to define some of its terms, these 
definitions needed to be reasonable or otherwise not inconsistent with the purposes of 
the ICSID Convention.497  Nevertheless, it is accepted that States may formulate broad 
definitions of the term ‘investment’ as found in Article 25 of the ICSID Convention.   
252. In connection with definitions, it bears mention that BITs traditionally do not 
define substantive terms such as ‘expropriation’ or ‘deprivation’ of property.498  These 
are fact-sensitive terms and interpretations or applications of them are usually 
influenced not by their ‘ordinary meaning’ but by the accumulated body of relevant 
international case law and commentary on those terms.499  However, more recent 
versions of investment treaties are starting to define some of these terms.500 
                                                 
496 Tokios (Opinion), at para. 16. 
497 Aucoven (Jurisdiction), at paras. 114-116.  Likewise, the Enron tribunal held that the discretion of 
States is limited when defining the meaning of ‘investment’ in Article 25 of the ICSID Convention 
‘because they could not validly define as investment in connection with something absurd or entirely 
incompatible with its object and purpose’.  Enron (Jurisdiction), at para. 42.   
498 See, e.g, Lauder, at para. 200 (‘Bilateral Investment Treaties … generally do not define the term of 
expropriation and nationalization, or any of the other terms denoting similar measures of forced 
dispossession (“dispossession”, “taking”, “deprivation”, or “privation”)’).   
499 See Douglas, The International Law of Investment Claims (2009), at p. 82, para. 143. 
500 See, e.g., the ‘shared understanding’ of the parties as to the meaning of expropriation in Annex B of 
the 2004 US Model BIT.  
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Chapter IV 
 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY MEANS OF 
INTERPRETATION 
 
 
 
Chapter outline: Having discussed the Vienna Convention Article 31 ‘general rule’ of 
interpretation in Chapter III, this Chapter turns to examine the use of supplementary 
means to interpret treaties as provided for in Article 32.  Section A introduces that 
provision, following which Section B discusses the role of preparatory work in 
interpretation.  Sections C and D cover, respectively, the use of supplementary means to 
confirm or determine a meaning.  Also relevant to this Chapter are Annexes I and II of 
the thesis, which provide a guide to the drafting history of Article 32. 
A.  ARTICLE 32 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the 
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to 
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the 
meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: 
 
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.501 
253. The inclusion of the words ‘may’ and ‘supplementary’ in Article 32 indicates 
that provision’s subsidiarity in relation to Article 31.  In the words of the ILC, ‘[t]he 
word “supplementary” emphasizes that article [32] does not provide for alternative, 
autonomous, means of interpretation but only for means to aid an interpretation 
                                                 
501 This final text of Article 32 of the Vienna Convention evolved from the following ILC draft articles:  
Article 71(2), Waldock III, YILC (1964-II), at 52; Article 70, ILC Draft Articles 1964, YILC (1964-II), 
at 199; and Article 28, ILC Draft Articles 1966, YILC (1966-II), at 218.  See Annex II. 
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governed by the principles contained in article [31].’ 502   Despite this Article’s 
designation as subsidiary, many international courts and tribunals (including FIATs) 
refer to preparatory work during the Article 31 phase of the interpretation without 
exhausting all the possible avenues of investigation provided under that provision.503  
In relation to FIAT practice, in a few notable cases the tribunal resorted to the 
preparatory work at a very early stage.  For example, the Fedax tribunal, when 
determining the existence of a ‘legal dispute’ as required by Article 25(1) of the 
ICSID Convention, turned to the ‘drafting history’ of the Convention in the following 
manner:  
the Tribunal must first consider whether there is a legal dispute between the parties as 
required by Article 25(1) of the Convention.  Although the term ‘legal dispute’ is not 
defined in the Convention, its drafting history makes abundantly clear that such term 
refers to conflicts of rights as opposed to mere conflicts of interest …504  
254. This tendency to have recourse to preparatory work relatively early in the 
interpretation process—divergent as it is from the sequence prescribed by the Vienna 
Convention Rules—may provide a fast-track and relatively accurate method of 
interpreting a provision containing uncontroversial terms.  In the appropriate 
circumstances, this approach may be preferred to embarking upon a detailed 
application of Article 31 and 32 but caution must be exercised not to ignore 
completely the Article 31 criteria.505 
                                                 
502 YILC (1966-II), at 224, para. 19.  See also YILC (1966-II), at 223.  The secondary role allocated to 
the preparatory work in the Vienna Convention was the subject of vigorous debate during the Vienna 
Conference.  The position taken by the United States was essentially to amalgamate Article 31 and the 
Article 32 supplementary means of interpretation.  See, e.g., McDougal, Lasswell, and Miller, The 
Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order: Principles of Content and Procedure (1967), at 
365 (‘[i]n some contexts … the most reliable clue to the shared expectations of the parties comes from 
the travaux’).  Sinclair saw the US proposal as placing primary emphasis on the text of the treaty but 
opposed the proposal because ‘it gave equal weight to a series of factors of greater or lesser 
significance in treaty interpretation and was likely to open the door to a never-ending stream of inquiry 
for would-be interpreters, and to encourage unnecessary disputes.’ VCOR 1968, p. 184, paras. 67-9. 
503 See Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (2008), at 45. 
504 Fedax (Jurisdiction), at 189, para. 15.  In that same paragraph, the tribunal referred also to the 
‘discussions held on the drafts leading up to this provision’.  See also Fireman’s Fund, at para. 94; and 
Klöckner (Annulment), at para. 119.  
505 See e.g. United States v Canada, LCIA Case No. 81010, Expert Opinion by Professor W. Michael 
Riesman, ‘Opinion with respect to Selected International Legal Problems in LCIA Case No. 7941’, 1 
 
J O S E P H  R O M E S H  W E E R A M A N T R Y                                          170  P H D  T H E S I S  |  U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  L O N D O N  
255. One problem that the subsidiary nature of Article 32 helps to overcome is the 
lack of availability of preparatory work to developing States or investors.  This means 
that even if it is not available, it the chances are that it may not be critical—what is of 
primary importance is the text of the treaty and the application of Article 31. 
256. In his general course on public international law at The Hague Academy, 
Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga referred to an intriguing reason why some considered 
that preparatory work should be given only a secondary role in treaty interpretation:  
[to] place travaux préparatoires on the same level as the “context” of the treaty … would 
create the risk that the preparatory work might be utilized by a party in order to advance 
an interpretation at variance with the text and modifying its meaning.  Experience shows 
that such extrinsic materials are sometimes allowed to infiltrate a text with a view to 
evading clear obligations.506 
257. Article 32 is commonly perceived as relating to the use of the preparatory 
work in interpretation.  However, it goes further.  It permits, in appropriate situations, 
the circumstances of a treaty’s conclusion to be taken into account, and generally 
allows all other ‘supplementary means of interpretation’.  No definition is provided as 
to what should constitute these ‘supplementary means’.  Absent any precise guide as 
to the content of these secondary means of interpretation, the canvas of potentially 
applicable interpretative aids or guidelines remains large.   
B.  PREPARATORY WORK GENERALLY 
a) International Law Practice 
258. The ILC took the view that use of supplementary means of interpretation 
designated in Article 32 was an 
exception to the rule that the ordinary meaning of the terms must prevail. ... The 
Commission considered that the exception must be strictly limited, if it is not to weaken 
                                                                                                                                            
 
May 2009, at para. 7 (‘A failure to apply the rules of interpretation perforce distorts the resulting 
interpretation of the parties’ agreement and is a species of the application of the wrong law’). 
506 Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, ‘International Law in the Past Third of a Century’, 159 Recueil des 
cours 1 (1978), at 46.  Other observations on the reliability of preparatory work are discussed in 
Chapter VI. 
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unduly the authority of the ordinary meaning of the terms.  Sub-paragraph (6) is 
accordingly confined to cases where interpretation under article 27 [which eventually 
became Article 31] gives a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.507 
259. The ILC also decided against including a definition of preparatory work in the 
Vienna Convention Rules as it considered that such a definition might possibly lead to 
the exclusion of relevant evidence. 508   Given the absence of a definition, Aust’s 
elucidation of the concept is helpful.  He indicated that the preparatory work includes 
‘successive drafts of the treaty, conference records, explanatory statements of an 
expert consultant at the codification conference, uncontested interpretative statements 
by the chairman of a drafting committee and ILC Commentaries’.509  He adds that the 
value of such material  
will depend on several factors, the most important being authenticity, completeness and 
availability.  The summary record of a conference prepared by an independent and 
experienced secretariat will carry more weight than an unagreed record produced by a 
host state or a participating state.  However, even the records of a conference served by a 
skilled secretariat will generally not tell the whole story.  The most important parts of 
negotiating and drafting often take place informally, with no agreed record being kept.  
The reason why a particular compromise formula was adopted, and what it was intended 
to mean, may be difficult to establish.  This will be especially so if the form of words was 
deliberately chosen to overcome a near irreconcilable difference of substance.510 
260. There is scant jurisprudence in both in international law and FIAT awards 
concerning the limb of Article 32 that deals with the circumstances of a treaty’s 
conclusion.  One reason that may explain this situation is that the circumstances 
falling within this criterion may also overlap with or be treated as part of the Article 
31(1) object and purpose analysis, as an Article 31(2)(a) or (b) factor or generally as 
part of the preparatory work.511  Sinclair identified the essence of the criterion when 
he observed that it ‘may have some value in emphasising the need for the interpreter 
                                                 
507 YILC (1966-II), at 223, para. 19. 
508 YILC (1966-II), at 223, para. 20. 
509 Aust, Handbook of International Law (2005), at 95. Oppenheim, supra note 4, at 1277, observes that 
the preparatory work includes ‘the record of the negotiations preceding the conclusion of a treaty, the 
minutes of the plenary meetings and of committees of the Conference which adopted a treaty, the 
successive drafts of a treaty, and so on’. 
510 Aust, Handbook of International Law (2005), at 95 (footnote omitted). 
511 See Sinclair, supra note 6, at 141.  
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to bear constantly in mind the historical background against which the treaty has been 
negotiated’.512  Neither the text nor the preparatory work may provide this historical 
background, which may take into account some wide-ranging factors.  Sinclair added, 
for example, that under this element of Article 32: 
[i]t may also be necessary to take into account the individual attitudes of the parties – 
their economic, political and social conditions, their adherence to certain groupings or 
their status, for example, as importing or exporting country in the particular case of a 
commodity agreement – in seeking to determine the reality of the situation which that 
parties wished to regulate by means of the treaty.513 
261. Aust has further observed that the preparatory work may override the ordinary 
meaning in the following circumstances: 
It has been suggested that, even when the ordinary meaning appears to be clear, if it is 
evident from the travaux that the ordinary meaning does not represent the intention of the 
parties, the primary duty in Article 31(1) to interpret a treaty in good faith requires a 
court to ‘correct’ the ordinary meaning.  This is no doubt how things work in practice; for 
example, the parties to a dispute will always refer the tribunal to the travaux, and the 
tribunal will inevitably consider them along with all the other material put before it.  The 
suggestion is therefore a useful addition to the endless debate on the principles of 
interpretation.514 
262. This position is not consistent with the ILC’s intentions as to the exceptional 
and limited role of subsidiary means of interpretation extracted above.  As regards the 
pitfalls of preparatory work, Sinclair drew attention to the following: 
the obscurity of a particular text will often find its origin in the travaux préparatoires 
themselves.  The natural desire of negotiators to bring negotiations to a successful 
conclusion will often result in the adoption of vague or ambiguous formulations.  
Sometimes the parties will have deliberately wished to avoid too much precision in order 
to allow themselves in future to argue that the provision as formulated does not commit 
                                                 
512 Sinclair, supra note 6, at 141.  Oppenheim addresses this criterion in the following terms:  
the circumstances of a treaty’s conclusion may be invoked to ascertain its meaning, since a 
treaty is not concluded as an isolated act but as part of a continuing series of international acts 
which shape an limit the circumstances with which the treaty deals.  
Oppenheim, supra note 4, at 1278.  See also Yasseen, supra note 194, at 90. 
513 Sinclair, supra note 6, at 141. 
514 Aust, supra note 4, at 197 (footnotes omitted), citing Schwebel, ‘May Preparatory Work Be Used to 
Correct Rather than Confirm the ‘Clear’ Meaning of a Treaty Provision?’, in Makarczyk (ed.), Theory 
of International Law at the Threshold of the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Krzystof Skubiszewski, 
(1996), 541-547. 
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them to an inconvenient or too onerous obligation.  Finally, the travaux préparatoires are 
unlikely to reveal accurately and in detail what happened during the negotiations, since, 
more often than not, they will not disclose what may have been agreed between the heads 
of delegations during private corridor discussions.515 
263. Finally, Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga made the following notable conclusions 
in respect of preparatory work: 
preparatory work is frequently examined and often taken into account.  It may be difficult 
in practice to establish the borderline between confirming a view previously reached and 
actually forming it, since this belongs to the mental processes of the interpreter.  In any 
case, the importance of travaux préparatoires is not to be underestimated and their 
relevance is difficult to deny, since the question whether a text can be said to be clear is 
in some degree subjective.  On the other hand, the separation between Articles 31 and 32 
and the restrictions contained in the latter provision constitute a necessary safeguard 
which strengthens the textual approach and discourages any attempt to resort to 
preparatory work in order to dispute an interpretation resulting from the intrinsic material 
set out in Article 31.516  
264. It is not uncommon for international courts and tribunals to exercise caution in 
cases where their decision may turn on preparatory work.517   
b) FIAT Practice 
265. The non-mandatory character of Article 32 has led to instances where FIATs 
have chosen not to have recourse to the means of interpretation covered by that 
provision.  A case on point is Sempra Energy, in which the tribunal acknowledged that 
Article 31(1) is the ‘principal means of interpretation’ and went on to hold that the 
terms of the treaty at issue were sufficiently clear not to resort to supplementary 
means of interpretation. 518   This subsidiary nature of Article 32 was expressly 
                                                 
515 Sinclair, supra note 6, at 142.  For a more detailed and equally enlightening description of the 
drawbacks of recourse to preparatory work, see Fitzmaurice, supra note 76, at 15-17. 
516 Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, ‘International Law in the Past Third of a Century’, 159 Recueil des 
cours 1 (1978), at p. 47-48. 
517 See, e.g., Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nic. v. Hon.), ICJ Reports 69 (1988), at 85, para. 
37, where the ICJ expressed that caution must be exercised when referring to the travaux préparatoires 
where it was apparent not all the stages of the drafting of the treaty at issue were the subject of detailed 
records.  
518 Sempra Energy (Jurisdiciton), at para. 142.  See also Camuzzi (Jurisdiction), at para. 134 (holding 
that the treaty was sufficiently clear ‘making it unnecessary to resort to supplementary means’ of 
interpretation but proceeding to refer to the ‘negotiating history’ to confirm its position); Enron 
(Jurisdiction) (Ancillary Claim), at para. 31 (‘[i]n view of the explicit text of the treaty and its object 
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emphasised in Aguas del Tunari when the tribunal remarked that the ILC Commentary 
on this article noted that ‘the “supplemental” role of Article 32 serves to emphasize 
the centrality of Article 31’.519   
266. Concerning the types of materials that constitute preparatory work, FIAT 
jurisprudence is generally consistent with Aust’s description quoted above.520  While 
it would be expected that States that have participated in the drafting of a treaty are 
privy to these materials, unless they are made available to the public, it is unlikely that 
such materials will be accessible to investor claimants.  This issue is discussed in 
Section VI(F) below.   
267. FIATs have provided some practical insights as to how the preparatory work 
can be evidenced.  Obviously, detailed and comprehensive documents accepted by the 
parties relating to the drafting of the text and minutes of discussions or negotiations 
are likely to constitute evidence of the highest order.521  In this regard, the documents 
                                                                                                                                            
 
and purpose, it is not even necessary to resort to supplementary means of interpretation’) and at para. 
32 (indicating that in the circumstances at hand there existed sufficient elements of interpretation in 
connection with Article 31 of the Vienna Convention that it was not necessary to resort to 
supplementary means of interpretation); Canfor Corporation (Decision of Preliminary Question), at 
para. 324 (‘because the language of [NAFTA] Article 1902(2)(b) and Article 1902(2)(c) is so plain that, 
for interpretive purposes, there is no occasion for recourse to supplementary sources of evidence under 
the terms of the [Vienna Convention]’) and at para. 265; and Champion Trading (Jurisdiction), 19 
ICSID Review, at p. 288.  See also Methanex (Final Award), at Part II, Chpt. B, para. 22 (drawing 
attention to the limited circumstances in which recourse to Article 32 could be had). 
519 Aguas del Tunari, at para. 93, citing the ILC’s Commentary to Article 28, para. 18, YILC (1966-II), 
at 223.  See also Noble Ventures (Award), at para. 50 (‘recourse may be had to supplementary means of 
interpretation … only in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the aforementioned methods of 
interpretation’); and Klöckner (Annulment), at para. 119, in which the tribunal was reluctant to base an 
interpretation on the preparatory work.   
520  See note 509 above.  As an example of the types of materials FIATs consider to constitute 
preparatory work, see Pope & Talbot (Damages), at para. 39 (referring to a ‘record of discussions 
leading up to agreement upon the final text of Article 1105 of NAFTA, whether such record consists of 
negotiating drafts or any other matters’).  These are rather obvious embodiments of preparatory work.  
As to less clear materials, see, e.g., Mondev, in which the tribunal stated  
Whether or not explanations given by a signatory government to its own legislature in the 
course of ratification or implementation of a treaty can constitute part of the travaux 
préparatoires of the treaty for the purposes of its interpretation, they can certainly shed light 
on the purposes and approaches taken to the treaty, and thus can evidence opinio juris. 
Mondev, at para. 111 (footnote omitted). 
521 It must be noted that records of the preparatory work that are fragmentary must be used with caution.  
See, e.g., Rejoinder of the United States of 17 December 2001 to Methanex’s Reply Submission in the 
Methanex case, quoted in Pope & Talbot (Damages), at para. 35. 
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and meeting minutes relating to the ICSID Convention have most conveniently been 
published in English, French and Spanish.522  In connection with NAFTA, after some 
criticism and controversy about the non-disclosure of the negotiation texts of Chapter 
11, on 16 July 2004 the FTC announced their public release. 523  In contrast, the 
preparatory work of a BIT is relatively difficult to ascertain by the general public, 
including the investor.524   
268. Concerning the drafting of the ICSID Convention, FIATs have considered the 
recollections of Aron Broches as reliable evidence of the preparatory work of the 
ICSID Convention.  He was chairman of the consultative meetings for the negotiation 
of the ICSID Convention and undoubtedly played a major role in the Convention’s 
drafting process. 525   Statements of delegations to the negotiation of the ICSID 
Convention have also been used in support of its interpretation.526   
269. In relation to BITs, the Sempra Energy tribunal took the view that ‘the opinion 
of those who were responsible for the drafting and negotiation of a State’s bilateral 
treaties [is not] irrelevant, in that it serves, precisely, to establish the original 
intention’.527  But this type of evidence has its limits.  In Eureko, the recollections of 
an official negotiating a BIT for one of the State parties was considered to be rebutted 
by a contrary recollection by a negotiator for the other State party to that treaty.528  
Further, the tribunal in Tza Yap Shum did not consider the testimony of one of the 
                                                 
522 See supra note 40. 
523  Available at <www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/disp/trilateral_neg-en.asp>.  Whether this release 
contains all the relevant documents pertaining to the negotiation history is a subject of contention.  See 
comment in <www.naftaclaims.com>. 
524 See particularly Chapter VI, Section F below.  
525 See, e.g., Fedax (Jurisdiction), at para. 21 (noting as ‘most pertinent’ the account of the ICSID 
Convention negotiations by Broches in ‘The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes: 
Some Observations on Jurisdiction’, 5 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 261 (1966), at 268 ); 
and Aguas del Tunari, at para. 284 (referring to the Hague Lectures of Aron Broches).   
526 See, e.g., CAA Vivendi (Award), at para. 52. 
527 Sempra Energy (Jurisdiction), at para. 145. 
528 To support its interpretation of the Netherlands-Poland BIT, Poland submitted in the Eureko case the 
opinion of a Polish Foreign Ministry official involved in the negotiation of that treaty.  This was 
rebutted by a contrary opinion of a Dutch Foreign Ministry official.  Eureko, at para. 185, n. 17. 
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negotiators to the BIT at issue as convincing evidence of the contracting parties’ 
intention in regard to the scope of the MFN clause in that treaty.529 
270. In many FIAT awards, recourse to preparatory work has not been considered 
as an extremely useful aid to treaty interpretation.  First and foremost, the preparatory 
work is usually treated as subordinate to the text and is often not decisive in itself.  
The Siemens case illuminates this point in its finding that no matter how complex or 
contested the negotiation process proved to be, the fact that it was a difficult process 
still does not dilute the evidentiary strength of the words that were ultimately 
agreed.530  Then, access to the preparatory work (particularly by a private individual 
or an investor) could prove extremely difficult and, if access is available, the 
documentation might be incomplete or inadequate to draw any conclusion.  Many 
parties to treaties, particularly developing States, do not have the governmental 
resources to document the preparatory work relating to treaties they enter.  The 
tribunal in Aguas del Tunari, for instance, concluded from the evidence that 
documentation of the Boliva-Netherlands BIT negotiation history was sparse and that 
it ‘offered little additional insight into the meaning of the aspects of the BIT at issue, 
neither particularly confirming nor contradicting the Tribunal’s interpretation.’ 531  
Thomas Wälde has observed in this regard that ‘[t]here is a great temptation on 
controversial issues to delve into the travaux, but the result of such trawls for 
favourable evidence is as a rule not very trustworthy’.532  Additionally, where a body 
                                                 
529 Tza Yap Shum, at para. 212. 
530 Siemens (Jurisdiction), at para. 106 (noting that the arduousness of the negotiations process does not 
affect the legal significance of the text that was eventually agreed).  See also Tza Yap Shum, at paras. 
166-171 where witness statements were submitted by negotiators of both State parties to the BIT in 
question but were not given significant weight by the tribunal. 
531 Aguas del Tunari, at para. 274.  See also Canfor Corporation (Decision of Preliminary Question), at 
para. 265 (‘the available legislative history of NAFTA does not assist in the interpretation of Article 
1901(3), simply because there is none available that is relevant’); Dissenting Opinion of Highet in 
Waste Management (Opinion), at 475, para. 44, n. 35 (‘[t]he record before the Tribunal is unfortunately 
bare of useful evidence of travaux préparatoires of NAFTA in this regard’); and CAA-Vivendi 
(Challenge), at paras. 12 and 24. 
532 Thomas W. Wälde, ‘Investment Arbitration under the Energy Charter Treaty: An Overview of Key 
Issues’, (2004) 1(1) Transnational Dispute Management. 
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of case law has built up around the interpretation of a certain provision, it may be 
more difficult to resort to Article 32.  In this connection, the Methanex tribunal stated 
[w]here in the course of time there has been a series of decisions on a given provision by 
international tribunals seized with the task of interpretation; and there has also been an 
agreement by treaty parties on interpretation, the likelihood of supplementary means of 
interpretation contemplated by Article 32 of the Vienna Convention being relevant and 
material must inevitably decline.533  
271. Preparatory work evidencing the abandonment or rejection of a drafting 
proposal may be considered as providing a meaningful indication as to the intent of 
the drafters.534  But there may be circumstances where although the preparatory work 
indicates that a proposed provision is rejected during negotiations, it may not 
necessarily mean that the intention was to exclude such a provision.  This situation 
arose in Amco.  The tribunal there observed that a vote during the ICSID Convention 
drafting process to reject a motion (proposing a provision under which a failure to 
state reasons would be a ground for annulment) could not necessarily be regarded as a 
manifest objection to the content of the proposed provision because the delegates 
voting to reject the motion may simply have found it redundant due to the clause’s 
prior approval and adoption in a previous phase of the negotiations.535   
272. The AAP tribunal drew attention to the potential benefits that may be derived 
from well documented preparatory work in the following passage of its award: 
in the absence of travaux préparatoires in the proper sense, it would be almost 
impossible to ascertain whether Sri Lanka and the United Kingdom had contemplated 
during their negotiation the necessity of disregarding the common habitual pattern 
adopted by the previous treaties, and to establish a ‘strict liability’ in favour of the foreign 
investor as one of the objectives of their treaty protection.536   
273. Similarly, in Pope & Talbot the tribunal indicated that a complete negotiating 
history—which, despite its requests, was not provided by Canada until the damages 
                                                 
533 Methanex (Final Award), at Part II, Chpt. H, para. 24. 
534 Aguas del Tunari, at para. 284. 
535 Amco (Annulment), at para. 33.   
536 AAP, at para. 51.  As to the usefulness of preparatory work, see also Tokios (Jurisdiction), at para. 
52. 
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phase—would have assisted it to ‘reach a fully informed conclusion’ and that having 
such documentation would have made its task of interpretation ‘less difficult and more 
focused on the issues before it’.537   
274. Moreover, in Malaysian Historical Salvors (Annulment) the ad hoc Committee 
considered a reason why the tribunal manifestly exceeded his powers in the original 
award was that ‘it failed to take account of the preparatory work of the ICSID 
Convention and, in particular, reached conclusions not consonant with the travaux in 
key respects’.538 
275. Not only have FIATs resorted to preparatory work to interpret treaties, they 
have also found it useful to examine the relevant preparatory work of instruments that 
do not constitute treaties.  This technique was adopted in the Methanex case to 
interpret the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules539 and by the ad hoc Committee in CAA-
Vivendi to interpret the ICSID Rules.540  
276. A rare instance of a reference to the circumstances of a treaty’s conclusion was 
made in Plama:    
It may be mentioned here (see also Article 32 of the Vienna Convention) that the parties 
to the present arbitration have not produced preparatory work of the Bulgaria-Cyprus 
BIT.  They did provide some indication of the circumstances surrounding its conclusion.  
At that time, Bulgaria was under a communist regime that favored bilateral investment 
treaties with limited protections for foreign investors and with very limited dispute 
resolution provisions.541 
277. These circumstances formed part of the basis for the tribunal’s determination 
that ‘at the time of conclusion, Bulgaria and Cyprus limited specific investor-state 
                                                 
537 Pope & Talbot (Damages), at paras. 39 and 43 
538 Malaysian Historical Salvors (Annulment), at para. 80. 
539 Methanex (Amicus Decision), at paras. 26 and 41. 
540  CAA-Vivendi (Challenge), at para. 9.  See also Dr. El Mahdi’s Dissenting Opinion in SPP 
(Jurisdiction), at 176, para. 26 (referring to the use of preparatory work to interpret domestic Egyptian 
law). 
541 Plama (Jurisdiction), at para. 196 (emphasis added). 
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dispute settlement to the provisions set forth in the BIT and had no intention of 
extending those provisions through the MFN provision’.542 
C.  CONFIRMING A MEANING 
278. The use of Article 32 simply to confirm a meaning underlines the subsidiary 
nature of that provision.  The ICJ applied this approach in the Libya v Chad case, 
where it stated that it was not necessary to refer to the preparatory work to determine 
the meaning of a treaty in dispute but nonetheless referred to it to confirm its reading 
of the text.543  Often there appears to be an obligation on the part of the tribunal to 
examine the preparatory work in addition to its Article 31 analysis simply because it 
has been relied on in the pleadings of one or both of the parties.544   
279. FIATs have frequently displayed a willingness to refer to the respective 
drafting or negotiating history (particularly in connection with the ICSID Convention) 
to confirm the interpretation of a treaty text.545  Likewise, FIATs have found their 
                                                 
542 Plama (Jurisdiction), at para. 197.  See also the reference to the circumstances at the conclusion of a 
domestic law on foreign investment in Tradex (Jurisdiction), at 67. 
543 Territorial Dispute (Libya v Chad), Merits, ICJ Reports 6 (1994), at 27-28, para. 55.  See also 
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v Bahrain), 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ICJ Reports 6 (1995), which raised the interesting question of what must 
be done if the preparatory work did not confirm but contradicted the meaning arrived at using Article 
31.  In this regard, see Schwebel, ‘May Preparatory Work Be Used to Correct Rather than Confirm the 
‘Clear’ Meaning of a Treaty Provision?’, in Makarczyk (ed.), Theory of International Law at the 
Threshold of the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Krzystof Skubiszewski (1996), 541-547. 
544 See Aust, supra note 4, at 197 (‘the parties to a dispute will always refer the tribunal to the travaux, 
and the tribunal will inevitably consider them along with all the other material put before it’).  See also 
the comment made by Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, ‘International Law in the Past Third of a 
Century’, 159 Recueil des cours 1 (1978), at p. 47, in respect of the ICJ’s practice has relevance for 
FIAT practice: 
the State litigants before the Court often examine exhaustively the preparatory work.  
Naturally, the Court cannot leave without reply[ing to] the arguments based on such 
examination and has often declared that the travaux préparatoires when examined, confirm or 
support the view that the Court had independently arrived at on the basis of intrinsic materials.  
545 See, e.g., Amco (Annulment), at para. 22; Amco (Resubmitted Case on Jurisdiction), at 552 (referring 
to a proposal of State representatives during drafting of Article 51 of the ICSID Convention and the 
Chairman’s response); SPP (Jurisdiction), at para. 59 (referring to an ICSID Convention working paper 
in the form of a draft convention prepared by the General Counsel and transmitted to the Executive 
Directors, History of the ICSID Convention, Vol. II(1), at 23 and a preliminary draft of the ICSID 
Convention and working paper prepared by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
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interpretations have been ‘supported’ by the drafting history546 or ‘consistent’ with 
it.547   
D.  DETERMINING A MEANING 
280. The ability to utilise supplementary means of interpretation in order to 
determine the meaning of a treaty is controlled by the criteria set out in Article 32(a) 
and (b).  This process constitutes an exception to the general framework of the Vienna 
Convention Rules under which Article 31 criteria ordinarily determine the 
interpretation.  This determinative function of Article 32 may be applied only if an 
application of Article 31 results in an unsatisfactory outcome that leaves the meaning 
of the text interpreted ‘ambiguous or obscure’ (Article 32(a)) or ‘it leads to a result 
which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable’ (Article 32(b)).548  
1. Ambiguous or Obscure Meaning 
a) International Law Practice 
281. The ILC explained that Article 32(a) admits the use of supplementary means 
of interpretation ‘for the purpose of deciding the meaning in cases where there is no 
clear meaning.’549  No more guidance as to that provision was provided by the ILC.  
                                                                                                                                            
 
for the consultative meetings of legal experts, ibid., at 219-20); MINE (Annulement), at para. 5.10 
(referring to voting of the committee of legal experts); CAA (Award), at para. 52 (referring to 
statements from delegations to the negotiation of ICSID Convention); Maffezini (Jurisdiction), at 408, 
para. 57; Wena Hotels (Annulment), at para. 40; Vacuum Salt, at para. 29, n. 9 and para. 43; Sempra 
Energy (Jurisdiction), at para. 142; Camuzzi, at para. 134; Klöckner (Award), at 15; and Fedax, at para. 
24.  As to confirming the interpretation of a BIT, see Aguas del Tunari, at para. 266.   See also Tokios 
(Jurisdiction), at para. 52 (‘we do not believe that arbitrators should read in to BITs limitations not 
found in the text nor evident from negotiating history sources’).   
546 See, e.g., SGS v Philippines, at para. 146; Vivendi (Annulment), para. 69; and Amco (Annulment), at 
para. 22.   
547 See, e.g., Vacuum Salt, at para. 37. 
548 It has been suggested that even if the ordinary meaning is clear, but the preparatory work indicates 
that this ordinary meaning was not the intention of the parties, recourse to the preparatory work should 
be had to ‘correct’ the ordinary meaning.  See Schwebel, ‘May Preparatory Work Be Used to Correct 
Rather than Confirm the ‘Clear’ Meaning of a Treaty Provision?’, in Makarczyk (ed.), Theory of 
International Law at the Threshold of the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Krzystof Skubiszewski 
(1996), 541-547. 
549 YILC (1966-II), at 223, para. 19.  
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Moreover, the text of the article itself (particularly when compared with the ‘manifest’ 
requirement found in Article 32(b)) fails to indicate the requisite degree of ambiguity 
or obscurity.  Care must be exercised not to set the requisite degree too low—a 
consequence might be that minor disagreements as to the meaning of terms may 
provide sufficient reason to resort to Article 32(b).550  If this position were correct, it 
would render meaningless the hierarchical differences between Article 31and 32.    
282. An illustrative application of the rule underlying Article 32(a) was made by 
Judge Fitzmaurice in the Expenses case where he stated  
there is a sufficient element of ambiguity about the exact intention and effect of Article 
17, paragraph 2 [of the UN Charter] to make its interpretation on the basis of the rule of 
the ‘natural and ordinary meaning’ alone, unsatisfactory.  In these circumstances it is 
permissible to have recourse to the preparatory work of the San Francisco Conference.551   
283. This passage’s reference to a ‘sufficient element of ambiguity’ suggests a 
requisite degree of ambiguity that is not extraordinarily high.  Similarly, given that 
32(b) is qualified by the term ‘manifest’, the absence of such a qualifier in Article 
32(a) also suggests that the latter provision’s standard may, at the least, be lower than 
one that is ‘manifest’. 
b) FIAT  Practice 
284. The Methanex tribunal has cast some light on the standard of ambiguity or 
obscurity needed before recourse may be had to supplementary means of 
interpretation.  It held that ‘notwithstanding the existence of various possible 
interpretations’ of the provision in question, the claimant was required to show it was 
‘demonstrably ambiguous or obscure’.552  
                                                 
550 See, e.g., Sinclair, supra note 6, at 142.  
551 ICJ Reports (1962), at 209.  As to other ICJ jurisprudence on the effect of ambiguity in texts, see 
Temple case, ICJ Reports (1961), at 33-4 (‘If … there should appear to be a contradiction between 
[specified provisions]—then, according to a long-established jurisprudence, the Court becomes entitled 
to go outside the terms of the Declaration in order to resolve this contradiction’). 
552 Methanex (Final Award), at Part II, Chpt. H, para. 24 (emphasis added). 
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285. Also of interest to note in this section is the Cable Television award.  In that 
decision, the tribunal looked at the relevant antecedent drafts of Article 25(1) of the 
ICSID Convention not to ‘determine’ or ‘confirm’ the meaning of that provision but 
‘[i]n order to better understand the meaning and significance’ of the words 
‘constituent subdivision or agency’ contained in that provision.553  Its analysis of the 
preparatory work played a large role in its decision.  
2. Manifestly Absurd or Unreasonable Result 
a) International Law Practice 
286. The second type of circumstance that permits the use of the supplementary 
means of interpretation to determine a meaning is limited to cases in which Article 31 
leads to a ‘manifestly absurd or unreasonable’ interpretation.  In contrast to Article 
32(a), the requisite standard contained in Article 32(b) is explicit—it must be 
manifest.  A straightforward example of a manifestly absurd interpretation is a 
situation in which an interpretation of a dispute settlement clause finds that the clause 
compels a State to submit its claim to a defunct court.554   
287. The ILC’s intention to set a high threshold for use of supplementary means of 
interpretation in cases where the ordinary meaning led to absurd or unreasonable 
conclusions was explained in its commentary: 
The Commission considered that the exception must be strictly limited, if it is not to 
weaken unduly the authority of the ordinary meaning of the terms.  Sub-paragraph (b) is 
accordingly confined to cases where interpretation under article 27 gives a result which is 
manifestly absurd or unreasonable.555 
288. Waldock, in his Third Report, observed ‘[t]he limited nature of this exception 
is confirmed by the rarity of the cases in which the Court has applied it’.556  It may be 
                                                 
553 Cable Television, at para. 2.31. 
554 See, e.g., the Temple case, Preliminary Objections, ICJ Reports 17 (1961), at 32-33. 
555 YILC (1966-II), at 223, para. 19. 
556 Waldock III, at 57. 
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said that the rule is based on a high degree of common sense as it would be 
disconcerting for tribunals to be permitted to attribute to parties an intention that is 
exceedingly illogical or impractical to perform. 
b) FIAT Practice 
289. The instances in which Article 32(b) has been employed by FIATs to 
determine the meaning of treaty provisions—similar to the application of the 
provision in international law—is rare.  Most awards referring to absurd or 
unreasonable results do not do so as a factor justifying recourse to supplementary 
means of interpretation to determine an interpretation.  Generally, they identify what 
they consider to be an absurd or unreasonable interpretation and then—rather than use 
this as a trigger to apply Articles 32(b)—simply proceed not to follow such an 
interpretation.557  In American Manufacturing, for example, the tribunal indicated that 
the interpretation of a BIT asserted by Zaire ‘would lead to an absurd result and an 
unacceptable fact’ and held that Zaire’s interpretation was untenable.558     
290. In LANCO, the tribunal appeared to consider that an interpretation of Article 
VII (2) of the Argentina-US BIT would be absurd if it were to hold that the dispute 
settlement procedure chose  
the jurisdiction of courts whose own jurisdictions are, by law, not subject to agreement or 
waiver, whether territorially, objectively, or functionally.  As the contentious-
administrative jurisdiction cannot be selected or waived, submission to the contentious-
administrative tribunals cannot be understood as a previously agreed dispute-settlement 
procedure.559 
                                                 
557 These interpretations may be confined to interpretations in which those absurd or unreasonable 
interpretations were considered as being inconsistent with the Article 31 good faith, ordinary meaning 
and object and purpose criteria. 
558 American Manufacturing (Award), at para. 5.36.  See also Pope & Talbot (Merits), at paras. 117-
118; and Enron (Jurisdiction), at para. 42. 
559 Lanco, at para. 26. 
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291. But, again, it did not use this finding to employ supplementary means of 
interpretation as provided for in Article 32(b).  The Champion Trading Company 
tribunal referred to that provision in the following manner: 
According to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention of 23 May 1969, a treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms 
of the treaties in their context and in the light of their object and purpose. 
  
According to the ordinary meaning of the terms of the Convention (Article 25(2)(a)) dual 
nationals are excluded from invoking the protection under the Convention against the 
host country of the investment of which they are also a national.  This Tribunal does not 
rule out that situations might arise where the exclusion of dual nationals could lead to a 
result which was manifestly absurd or unreasonable (Vienna Convention, Article 
(32)(b)).  One could envisage a situation where a country continues to apply the jus 
sanguinis over many generations.  It might for instance be questionable if the third or 
fourth foreign born generation, which has no ties whatsoever with the country of its 
forefathers, could still be considered to have, for the purpose of the Convention, the 
nationality of this state.560 
292. This passage does not appear to apply Article 32(b) correctly.  The reference to 
that provision suggests that its function is to prohibit or otherwise discourage 
interpretations that are manifestly absurd or unreasonable.  As noted above, the 
function of Article 32(b) is to permit use of supplementary means of interpretation to 
determine a meaning where ambiguity or unreasonableness is present after application 
of Article 31.  
                                                 
560 Champion Trading (Jurisdiction), 19 ICSID Review, at p. 288.  See also a similar type of reference 
to Article 32(b) in Vacuum Salt, at 338, para. 29, n. 9. 
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Chapter V 
 
 
OTHER MEANS OF 
INTERPRETATION 
 
 
 
Chapter outline: This Chapter concerns techniques of treaty interpretation that are not 
specifically mentioned in the Vienna Convention Rules.  Subsequent to a general 
introduction in Section A, the Chapter examines how the treaty interpretation process 
utilises international court decisions and arbitral awards (Section B), treaties or 
international instruments (Section C), scholarly opinion (Section D), the principle of 
effectiveness (Section F) and legal maxims (Section G).  Section E deals briefly with 
inter-temporal aspects relevant to treaty interpretation.  
A.  INTRODUCTION 
293. All major criteria expressly referred to in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention have been discussed in Chapters III and IV.  Any comprehensive study of 
treaty interpretation, however, cannot end there.  A number of other techniques are 
frequently used by international courts and tribunals to interpret treaties.  As was seen 
in Chapter IV, Article 32 specifies two examples of ‘supplementary means of 
interpretation’—the preparatory work and circumstances surrounding the treaty’s 
conclusion.  But Article 32 does not provide an exhaustive list.  Moreover, as Sinclair 
has accurately remarked:  
few would seek to argue that the rules embodied in Articles 31 to 33 of the [Vienna 
Convention] are exhaustive of the techniques which may be properly adopted by the 
interpreter in giving effect to the broad guidelines laid down in those rules. … there are 
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many other principles of logic or of common sense which might have been included if the 
intention had been to draw up a comprehensive catalogue of all those aids to 
interpretation which have from time to time, and depending upon the circumstances of 
the particular case, been invoked by international tribunals.561 
294. A number of these alternate techniques of interpretation, whether or not they 
strictly fall within the scope of Article 32 and whether or not they constitute mere 
rules of logic or applications of common sense, will be discussed (in no particular 
order of importance) in this section. 
B.  COURT DECISIONS AND ARBITRAL AWARDS 
a) International Law Practice 
295. A prominent feature of international law is that it contains no system of 
binding precedent or stare decisis.562  Article 59 of the Statute of the ICJ provides that 
‘[t]he decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in 
respect of that particular case’.  Nonetheless, the Court speaks of its ‘settled 
jurisprudence’563 and Article 38(1)(d) classifies ‘judicial decisions’ as a ‘subsidiary 
means for the determination of rules of law’.   
                                                 
561 Sinclair, supra note 6, at 153.  See also Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (2008), at 6 (commenting 
that the Vienna Convention Rules are not ‘an exclusive compilation of guidance on treaty 
interpretation, other skills and principles that are used to achieve a reasoned interpretation remaining 
admissible to the extent not in conflict with the [Vienna Convention Rules]’). 
562 See, e.g., Shahabuddeen, Precedent in the World Court (1996), at 97; and Bernhardt, ‘Article 59’, in 
Zimmermann, et al., (eds.), The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary 1231 
(2006), at 1244.     
563 See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, ICJ Reports (1980), at 18, 
para. 33; and Interpretation of WHO-Egypt Agreement, ICJ Reports (1980), at 87, para. 33.  Judge 
Shahabuddeen observed in his Lauterpacht Lectures that the Court’s jurisprudence ‘has developed in 
the direction of a strong tendency to adhere closely to previous holdings.’  Shahabuddeen, Precedent in 
the World Court (1996), at 238. 
J O S E P H  R O M E S H  W E E R A M A N T R Y                                          187  P H D  T H E S I S  |  U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  L O N D O N  
296. Shabtai Rosenne has commented that the ICJ refers to its earlier decisions ‘not 
so much in the quality of binding precedent [but] as having persuasive influence’.564  
Also relevant is Rudolf Bernhardt’s summary of ICJ practice: 
The ICJ, like every court, hesitates to overrule former pronouncements; quite to the 
contrary, it often refers to previous decisions and to reasons developed in such decisions, 
whether these reasons have been essential for that decision or are only obiter dicta.  In 
many judgments of the ICJ, the Court quotes extensively its own pronouncements in 
former cases with different parties.  Even advisory opinions, which are formally not 
binding for any State or even for the international organ having requested the opinion, are 
often quoted in later advisory opinions and judgments.565   
297. In the Land and Maritime Boundary case, the ICJ made clear that Nigeria was 
not bound by decisions reached by the Court in previous cases.  In its view, 
nevertheless, the real question was whether ‘there is cause not to follow the reasoning 
and conclusions of earlier cases’.566   
298. Before proceeding to examine FIAT practice, it is worth noting a distinction 
between the practice of the ICJ and FIATs is that the former is a permanent body, 
while the latter are ad hoc arbitral tribunals.  Consequently, when the ICJ considers 
prior ICJ decisions, it is considering its own decisions.  In contrast, when FIATs 
consider past FIAT decisions, they are considering decisions made by other arbitral 
tribunals.  Furthermore, variance in the quality of FIAT awards would be expected to 
be greater than that found among ICJ decisions.  This difference may be ascribed to 
the ad hoc and permanent nature of, respectively, FIATs and the ICJ.   
                                                 
564 Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920-2005, Volume III, Procedure 
(2006), at 1553.  A similar respect for prior decisions is held by the WTO Appellate Body.  As an 
example, it stated in the Shrimp Turtle II case that ‘[a]dopted panel reports are an important part of the 
GATT acquis … They create legitimate expectations among WTO Members and, therefore, should be 
taken into account where they are relevant to any dispute.’  United States Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Appellate Body Report, 12 October 1998, WT/DS58/AB/R, at 
para. 108. 
565 Bernhardt, ‘Article 59’, in Zimmermann, et al., (eds.), The Statute of the International Court of 
Justice: A Commentary 1231 (2006), at 1244. 
566 ICJ Reports 275 (1998), at 292, para. 28. 
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b) FIAT Practice  
299. As a preliminary matter, it is of benefit to digress slightly and consider 
whether prior judicial or arbitral decisions constitute a ‘source’ of international law.  
Sempra Energy is notable for observing that  
interpretation is not the exclusive task of States.  It is also the duty of tribunals called 
upon to settle a dispute, particularly when the question is to interpret the meaning of the 
terms used in a treaty.  This is precisely the role of judicial decisions as a source of 
international law in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, to 
which the Respondent refers.567  
300. This statement calls for clarification.  Article 38(1)(d) provides that the ICJ is 
to apply ‘judicial decisions … as a subsidiary means for the determination of rules of 
law’.  Alain Pellet’s insightful view on this provision is that: 
jurisprudence and doctrine are not sources of law—or, for that matter, of rights and 
obligations for the contesting States; they are documentary ‘sources’ indicating where the 
Court can find evidence of the existence of the rules it is bound to apply by virtue of the 
three other sub-paragraphs [i.e., Article 38(1)(a), (b) and (c)] … strictly speaking, the 
Court does not ‘apply’ those ‘means’, which are only tools which it is invited to use in 
order to investigate the three sources listed above.568   
301. In the light of this (correct) reading of Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute, the 
Methanex tribunal’s approach is to be preferred to that taken in Sempra Energy 
extracted above.  The Methanex tribunal commented that while prior NAFTA awards 
were neither ‘sources of law’ nor ‘legally binding’, the claimant was ‘entitled to adopt 
their legal reasoning as part of its case’.569   
                                                 
567 Sempra Energy (Jurisdiction), at para. 147 (emphasis added). 
568 Pellet, ‘Article 38’, in Zimmermann, et al., (eds.), The Statute of the International Court of Justice: 
A Commentary 677 (2006), at 784.  However, one cannot underestimate the role of judicial or arbitral 
decisions in shaping international law.  As Professor Shaw observes, many decisions of international 
arbitral awards ‘have been extremely significant in the development of international law’.  Malcolm 
Shaw, International Law (2003), at 104.  See also Pellet, ibid., at 789-790 (citing instances of ‘the deep 
influence that the [ICJ] has exercised on the evolution of international law’). 
569 Methanex (Partial Award), at para. 141.  See also Enron (Jurisdiction), at para. 40 (‘decisions of 
ICSID or other arbitral tribunals are not a primary source of rules’). 
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302. We return now to the role prior decisions play in interpreting treaties.570  From 
an historical viewpoint, a sea change has taken place in investment treaty arbitration 
since Christoph Schreuer observed in 2001 that ICSID award references to prior 
ICSID awards were scant due to ‘their relatively small number and the difficulty in 
gaining access to them’.571  But since then, the once gentle stream of FIAT awards has 
transformed into a torrent.  By 2007, for example, Jeffrey Commission’s study of 
precedent in foreign investment arbitration examined 207 publicly accessible 
investment arbitration decisions and awards. 572  The numbers of newly published 
FIAT awards presently increase almost on a weekly basis. 
303. Similar to Article 59 of the ICJ Statute, an ICSID award by virtue of Article 
53(1) binds only the parties to an arbitration.573  This provision was characterised by 
the SGS v Philippines tribunal as one ‘which might be regarded as directed to the res 
judicata effect of awards rather than their impact as precedents in later cases’.574   
304. The El Paso tribunal said this about the significance of prior awards: 
ICSID arbitral tribunals are established ad hoc, from case to case, in the framework of the 
Washington Convention, and the present tribunal knows of no provision, either in that 
Convention or in the BIT, establishing an obligation of stare decisis.  It is, nonetheless, a 
reasonable assumption that international arbitral tribunals, notably those established 
within the ICSID system, will generally take account of the precedents established by 
other arbitration organs, especially those set by other international tribunals.  The present 
                                                 
570 For a well researched breakdown of how ICSID tribunals have used other FIAT decisions during the 
process of treaty interpretation, see Fauchald, supra note 11, at 335-341.  
571 Schreuer, supra note 5, at 617. 
572  See Commission, ‘Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration’, 24 Journal of International 
Arbitration 129 (2007), at 133. 
573 In Methanex (Amicus Decision), at para. 51, the claimant argued that by interpreting Article 15(1) of 
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules to permit the acceptance of amicus submissions, the tribunal would 
be setting a precedent for other tribunals.  The response of the tribunal was to state that it ‘can set no 
legal precedent, in general or at all.  It has no power to determine for other arbitration tribunals how to 
interpret Article 15(1)’. 
574  See SGS v Philippines, at para. 97.  See also  AES, at para. 23(d); and Enron (Jurisdiction) 
(Ancillary Claim), at paras. 25-26. 
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Tribunal will follow the same line, especially since both parties, in their written pleadings 
and oral arguments, have heavily relied on precedent.575   
305. More recently, consistency in FIAT decision–making has been emphasized by 
the Saipem v Bangladesh tribunal: 
The Tribunal considers that it is not bound by previous decisions. At the same time, it is 
of the opinion that it must pay due consideration to earlier decisions of international 
tribunals. It believes that, subject to compelling contrary grounds, it has a duty to adopt 
solutions established in a series of consistent cases. It also believes that, subject to the 
specifics of a given treaty and of the circumstances of the actual case, it has a duty to seek 
to contribute to the harmonious development of investment law and thereby to meet the 
legitimate expectations of the community of States and investors towards certainty of the 
rule of law.576 
306. The adoption of strong words such as ‘must’ and ‘duty’ in the above passage 
indicate a strong preference by this tribunal to show deference to other tribunals and 
align their decisions accordingly.  In contrast, a more circumspect view was taken in 
SGS v Philippines:  
although different tribunals constituted under the ICSID system should in general seek to 
act consistently with each other, in the end it must be for each tribunal to exercise its 
competence in accordance with the applicable law, which will by definition be different 
for each BIT and each Respondent State.
  
Moreover there is no doctrine of precedent in 
                                                 
575  El Paso, at 39.  See also Amco (Jurisdiction), at para. 14; Bayindir, at para. 76; and AES 
(Jurisdiction), at paras. 30-32.  As to NAFTA cases, see, e.g., Waste Management, Dissenting Opinion 
of Keith Highet, introductory (unnumbered) paragraph (‘[t]he precedential significance of this Award 
for future proceedings under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) cannot be 
underestimated’); and Methanex (Partial Award), at para. 141.  Correspondingly, a prior tribunal’s 
rejection of interpretations submitted by a party may also influence subsequent tribunals.  See, e.g., 
Sempra Energy (Jurisdiction), at para. 145. 
576 Saipem (Jurisdiction), at para. 67 (emphasis added).  The identical words were repeated by the 
Saipem (Award), at para. 90.  Very similar words were used in Duke v Ecuador, at para. 117.  See also 
ADC, at para. 293 (‘cautious reliance on certain principles developed in a number of those cases, as 
persuasive authority, may advance the body of law, which in turn may serve predictability in the 
interest of both investors and host States’); and Thomas W. Wälde, ‘Investment Arbitration under the 
Energy Charter Treaty: An Overview of Key Issues’, 1 Transnational Dispute Management (2004), 
Issue 1 (‘The reasoning of almost all modern arbitral awards demonstrate the great care investment 
arbitral tribunals apply to ensure they are positioned in the mainstream of emerging jurisprudence. 
While there is no formal “stare decisis” rule, there is a de facto and very strong pressure on each 
tribunal to heed what other tribunals have done with identical or very similar legal language.  This does 
not necessarily prevent contradictory awards …’); and Lowenfeld, ‘Investment Agreements and 
International Law’, 42 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 123 (2003-2004), at 128 (‘[b]ut since 
so many of the recent treaties are so much alike, it is proper in a BIT case for arbitrators who are called 
upon to construe terms such as “fair and equitable treatment,” “adequate compensation,” or “equal 
access” to draw on the awards in similar disputes under similar treaties’).  
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international law, if by precedent is meant a rule of the binding effect of a single decision.
  
There is no hierarchy of international tribunals, and even if there were, there is no good 
reason for allowing the first tribunal in time to resolve issues for all later tribunals.  It 
must be initially for the control mechanisms provided for under the BIT and the ICSID 
Convention, and in the longer term for the development of a common legal opinion or 
jurisprudence constante, to resolve the difficult legal questions discussed by the SGS v. 
Pakistan Tribunal and also in the present decision.577  
307. These words set the stage for this tribunal’s now famous decision in which it 
declined to follow the SGS v Pakistan tribunal’s interpretation of an umbrella clause 
similar to that which was at issue in SGS v Philippines.578  
308. The question whether prior decisions should be followed represents an 
important question in investment treaty arbitration because FIATs frequently interpret 
treaty provisions that are identical or similar to those already interpreted by other 
FIATs.579  Indeed, there have been times where the different claimants in parallel 
arbitrations have been seeking rights against the same host State, under the same BIT 
and in respect of the same provisions of that BIT.580  The absence of any precedential 
effect of FIAT awards thus leaves considerable room for inconsistency in decision 
making among FIATs, including in the interpretation of treaties.581   
                                                 
577 SGS v Philippines, at para. 97 (footnotes omitted).  
578 This, however, did not mean to say that the SGS v Philippines tribunal disagreed with all aspects of 
the SGS v Pakistan award.  See, e.g., SGS v Philippines, at paras. 111 and 157. 
579 See, e.g., Azurix (Jurisdiction), at para. 73 (the tribunal held it ‘concurs with the decisions of 
tribunals that have interpreted the same provision in the same BIT or similar provisions in other BITs to 
which Respondent is a party’); LG&E (Jurisdiction), at para. 74; and Lanco, at para. 43.  See also 
Kaufmann-Kohler, ‘Interpretation of Treaties: How do Arbitral Tribunals Interpret Dispute Settlement 
Provisions Embodied in Investment Treaties?’, in Mistelis, L.A. and Lew, J.D.M., Pervasive Problems 
in International Arbitration 256 (2006), at 258 (observing that ‘all investment treaties protect 
investments by granting investors rights which are materially identical or comparable’).  
580 See, e.g., AES, Azurix, LG&E, Enron, CMS, and Lanco arbitrations, which all invoked the 1991 
Argentina-US BIT.  In this regard, see particularly AES, at para. 29.  
581 For a detailed discussion on prominent FIAT cases that have not followed prior FIAT awards on the 
same or similar provisions, see Franck, ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: 
Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions’, 73 Fordham Law Review 1521 
(2004).  See also Gill, ‘Inconsistent Decisions: An Issue to be Addressed or a Fact of Life?’, in Ortino, 
Sheppard and Warner (eds.), Investment Treaty Law: Current Issues Volume I 23 (2006), at 27 
(inconsistent decisions in investment arbitration is no means unique, ‘domestic courts reach 
inconsistent decisions on a regular basis ... the thousands of domestic, consumer and industry-specific 
arbitrations undoubtedly give rise to inconsistent decisions from time to time’).  
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309. Notwithstanding this potential for inconsistent decisions, the bulk of FIAT 
practice demonstrates that prior FIAT decisions have a significant degree of influence 
on subsequent FIAT interpretations of foreign investment treaties.  For example, it is 
commonplace for ICSID tribunals to refer to other ICSID tribunal awards to confirm 
or support their interpretation or application of a treaty, particularly in relation to the 
interpretation of the ICSID Convention.582  Concerning the interpretation of the ECT, 
Thomas Wälde and Todd Weiler have commented ‘[t]he awards made by tribunals 
articulating the meaning of BITs, ICSID clauses, and NAFTA provisions can … be 
expected to have a notable influence on the interpretation of the language of the 
ECT.’583 
310. One of the most important results in the Fauchald empirical analysis was the 
finding that prior case law was used in the interpretative process in 92 of the 98 
decisions subject to that study.584  Other examinations of FIAT awards also indicate 
an evolving form of precedent (though not in the common law sense) in investment 
arbitration.585  Thomas Wälde has gone so far as to contend that  
                                                 
582 See, e.g., Amco (Annulment), at para. 22 and 44; CMS (Jurisdiction), at paras. 70-76; Vacuum Salt, 
at 337, para. 29, n. 9; Lanco, at para. 46; LG&E, at paras. 77-8; Vivendi (Jurisdiction), at para. 94; 
Bayindir, at paras. 96, 98, 102 and 128; Olguín (Jurisdiction), at para 26; Eureko, at para. 186; Gas 
Natural, at para. 39; Azurix (Jurisdiction), at para. 73; AES, at paras. 30 and 32; and Tokios 
(Jurisdiction), at para. 91.  By way of interest, a glimpse of the extent to which some tribunals cite 
other ICSID cases is provided by a perusal of the endnotes in Enron (Ancillary Claim).  See also 
Schreuer, supra note 5, at 617 (noting that the early years of the ICSID Convention, references to 
ICSID decisions was scant due to ‘their relatively small number and the difficulty in gaining access to 
them’). 
583 Wälde and Weiler, supra note 62, at 166 (footnote omitted). 
584 Fauchald, supra note 11, at 335. 
585 See, e.g., Commission, ‘Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration’, 24 Journal of International 
Arbitration 129 (2007), at 158 (‘The role that precedent has come to play in investment treaty 
arbitration today resembles the common law doctrine of stare decisis absent certain of the associated 
values advanced in a common law system of precedent.’); Cheng, ‘Precedent and Control in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration’, 30 Fordham International Law Journal 1014 (2007), at 1044 (concluding on the 
basis of examined FIAT decision trends that a credible hypothesis may be made that ‘in spite the 
absence of rules of precedent in investment treaty arbitration, there is a strong—albeit imperfect and 
informal—norm of accounting for prior relevant awards and providing reasons for following or 
departing from those awards.’); and Schreuer and Weiniger, ‘A Doctrine of Precedent?’, in Muchlinski, 
Ortino and Schreuer, The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (2008), 1188, at 1196 (‘a 
de facto practice of precedent certainly exists.  However, it is not identical to that prevailing within 
domestic common law systems’). 
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tribunals which deviate from established jurisprudence, without an extensive effort at 
reasoning, distinction and providing a full hearing to the parties on their intention to 
deviate, might be considered to commit severe procedural and material rule breaches that 
could bring them into the visor of the—limited—procedures for judicial review and 
annulment.586  
311. In the context of the ICSID system, an award would have to be rather extreme 
for it to be annulled on the basis that it has not considered established jurisprudence.  
No annulment by an ad hoc Committee has yet been made on such a basis. 
312. In many cases, FIATs consider the prior awards of other FIATs in large part 
because heavy reliance is placed on these decisions in the parties’ pleadings.587  This 
practice is evident in the following passage in the Feldman award: 
in view of the fact that both parties in this proceeding have extensively cited and relied 
upon some of the earlier decisions [of NAFTA tribunals], the Tribunal believes it 
appropriate to discuss briefly relevant aspects of earlier decisions …588 
313. A discernible practice associated with FIAT reference to prior awards is that it 
is rare for distinctions to be made between the ratio decidendi and obiter dicta.589  As 
a consequence, FIATs typically give the same weight to statements of prior FIATs 
whether or not they constitute ratio decidendi or obiter dicta.  Jeffrey Commission has 
contended that ‘[a] continued failure to distinguish between the ratio decidendi and 
obiter dicta of prior awards and decisions could threaten the integrity of the tribunals 
and legitimacy of the investment treaty system itself.’ 590   It remains to be seen 
whether the system will be jeopardised in such a fashion.   
                                                 
586 Wälde, ‘The Specific Nature of Investment Arbitration’, in Kahn and Wälde (eds.), New Aspects of 
International Investment Law 43 (2007), at 105-106. 
587 See, e.g., Renta 4, at para. 16; Plama (Jurisdiction), at para. 210; Mitchell (Enforcement Stay), at 
para. 23; El Paso, at para. 39; Enron (Jurisdiction) (Ancillary Claim), paras. 33; Bayindir, at paras. 73-
6; and Azurix (Jurisdiction), at para. 73. 
588 Feldman (Award), at para. 107. 
589 See particularly Amco (Annulment), at para. 44.  See also Fauchald, supra note 11, at 335.  But see 
Loewen (Jurisdiction), at para. 49 (reference to the ratio); and Renta 4, at paras. 23 and 95 (reference to 
obiter).   
590 Commission, ‘Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Citation Analysis of a Developing 
Jurisprudence’, 24 Journal of International Arbitration 129 (2007), at 156. 
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314. The reasons FIATs have employed to justify following or giving weight to 
prior FIAT decisions (for interpreting treaties and other decisional purposes) include 
considerations as to whether the prior decision appeared to be: 
a) convincing or persuasive;591 
b) ‘well founded’;592 
c) ‘instructive’;593 
d) ‘in harmony with applicable international jurisprudence’;594 
e) a shared view;595 
f) involving ‘similar circumstances’ or a ‘high level of similarity’;596  
g) ‘correct’;597 and 
h) ‘appropriate’.598 
315. FIATs occasionally refer to other decisions simply to confirm their own 
decision. 599  FIATs also have had regard to (1) the development of an ‘accepted 
                                                 
591 Mitchell (Enforcement Stay), at para. 23; Metalclad (Award), at para. 108; and Methanex (Partial 
Award), at Part II, Chpt. B, para. 6 (‘the Tribunal may remain open to persuasion based on legal 
reasoning developed in the GATT and WTO jurisprudence’). 
592 Amco (Annulment), at para. 44. 
593 LETCO (Award), 2 ICSID Reports 346, at 352. 
594 Amco (Annulment), at para. 44. 
595 AES (Jurisdiction), at para. 30. 
596 AES (Jurisdiction), at para. 28 (‘if the basis of jurisdiction for these other tribunals and/or the 
underlying legal dispute in analysis present either a high level of similarity or, even more, an identity 
with those met in the present case, this Tribunal does not consider that it is barred, as a matter of 
principle, from considering the position taken or the opinion expressed by these other tribunals’); and 
Mitchell (Enforcement Stay), at para. 23. 
597 Enron (Jurisdiction), at para. 40. 
598 Bayindir, at 76 (finding that ‘it is not bound by earlier decisions, but will certainly carefully consider 
such decisions whenever appropriate’); and Plama (Jurisdiction), at para. 218. 
599 Gas Natural (Jurisdiction), at paras. 36 and 52. 
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meaning’ of a term through authoritative definition in ICJ judgments600 and (2) an 
‘overwhelming weight of [ICSID] authority’ that points toward a certain interpretation 
of the ICSID Convention.601  The above justifications for reliance or finding support 
in prior decisions enhance the uniformity, predictability and authority of the FIAT 
decision making process.602    
316. Despite the numerous cases that demonstrate a good degree of respect is 
shown toward prior FIAT decisions, a number of FIATs have been reluctant to adopt 
the interpretation of other FIATs too readily.  The most prevalent reasons why other 
FIAT decisions are not followed or are not given great weight is that the antecedent 
case involved different facts, background, negotiating histories or circumstances.603  
For example, in the Enron proceedings, Argentina urged the tribunal to be consistent 
with the interpretation of Article 25 of the ICSID Convention made in Vacuum Salt.  
Among its reasons for rejecting this submission, the tribunal stressed that Vacuum Salt 
‘was an entirely different case not comparable in any way with this one’.604  In the 
AES arbitration, the tribunal agreed with the following submission by Argentina: 
Repeating decisions taken in other cases, without making the factual and legal 
distinctions, may constitute an excess of power and may affect the integrity of the 
international system for the protection of investments.605  
                                                 
600 Lucchetti (Award), at para. 48. 
601 Tokios (Jurisdiction), at para. 42.  
602 See Schreuer, ‘Diversity and Harmonization of Treaty Interpretation in Investment Arbitration’, 3(2) 
Transnational Dispute Management (2006), at 10.   
603 See, e.g., Aguas del Tunari, at para. 288; Enron (Jurisdiction) (Ancillary Claim), at paras. 35 and 43-
45; Plama (Jurisdiction), at paras. 210, 211 and 224; Sempra Energy (Jurisdiction), at paras. 145; 
Fraport, Dissenting Opinion of Cremedes, at para. 7; and 155; SGS v Philippines, at para. 110.  See 
also the CME (Final Award), at para. 432, where the tribunal stated that although that arbitration and 
the Lauder arbitration concerned the same investment and the respective BITs at issue in each case 
granted similar investment protections, the bilateral treaties were not identical.  As a consequence, res 
judicata was held to be not applicable as between the CME and Lauder tribunals. 
604 Enron (Jurisdiction) (Ancillary Claim), at para. 45.  See also Occidental Exploration (Award), at 
para. 57 (‘what ultimately matters is that every solution must respond to the specific circumstances of 
the dispute submitted and the nature of such dispute’); and Canadian Cattlemen, at para. 209. 
605 Quoted in AES (Jurisdiction), at para. 22.  See also Schreuer, ‘Diversity and Harmonization of 
Treaty Interpretation in Investment Arbitration’, 3(2) Transnational Dispute Management (2006), at 15 
(‘an application for annulment that alleges an excess of powers or a failure to state reasons because the 
 
J O S E P H  R O M E S H  W E E R A M A N T R Y                                          196  P H D  T H E S I S  |  U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  L O N D O N  
317. The risks associated with use of awards as precedents have led Thomas 
Waelde and Todd Weiler to comment: 
one should never assume an automatic precedential effect on any individual tribunal 
award.  Modern investment treaties have many commonalities and their text is mostly 
derived from previous treaties, but there are often substantial differences – particular 
[sic.] in terms of reservations and exceptions, but also in structure and the ‘fine print’ of 
the relevant text.  One needs therefore to find a balance between common and emerging 
trends in interpretation, without failing to give sufficient counterweight to the 
peculiarities of the text, context and purpose of a particular treaty such as the NAFTA, 
ECT or bilateral treaties.606   
318. FIAT discussions of antecedent awards may also not provide a sufficiently 
conclusive answer on a point.607  Likewise, the evidence submitted in the prior case 
may raise doubts about the assistance that prior case may provide, as the Aguas del 
Tunari case demonstrates.  Both parties there referred to various ICSID cases in their 
submissions as to the meaning of ‘control’ in Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID 
Convention.  The Aguas del Tunari tribunal was unsure as to what evidence had been 
filed in these prior cases and to what extent the respective tribunals considered this 
evidence.  Consequently, it took the view that ‘[w]ithout access to the full records of 
these cases, the Tribunal does not believe it possible to assess their significance for the 
present arbitration’.608   
319. The caution expressed by the Plama tribunal as to an unquestioning 
acceptance of authority created by ‘string citation’ is also pertinent:  
Actually, the Siemens decision illustrates the danger caused by the manner in which the 
Maffezini decision has approached the question: the principle is retained in the form of a 
‘string citation’ of principle and the exceptions are relegated to a brief examination, prone 
to falling soon into oblivion (Decision, at paragraphs 105, 109 and 120).609 
                                                                                                                                            
 
tribunal has simply relied on earlier decisions without making an independent decision or developing its 
own reasons is entirely possible.’).  
606 Wälde and Weiler, supra note 62, at 166, n. 19. 
607 Plama (Jurisdiction), at para. 217. 
608 Aguas del Tunari, at para. 288. 
609 Plama (Jurisdiction), at para. 226. 
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320. Furthermore, FIATs have confirmed or supported their interpretation or 
application of certain treaty provisions by reference to relevant interpretations 
rendered by a wide range of other international courts and tribunals, in particular the 
PCIJ,610 ICJ,611 European Court of Justice,612 European Court of Human Rights,613 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal,614 and ad hoc arbitrations.615  There have also 
been several references to World Trade Organisation jurisprudence. 616   In rare 
instances, references to domestic court decisions have been considered appropriate in 
a FIATs interpretation of a treaty.617  No real significance has thus been placed on the 
                                                 
610  See, e.g., Klöckner (Annulment), paras. 59-61; and Lucchetti (Award), at para. 48.  See also 
Schreuer, supra note 5, at 616, n. 233. 
611 See, e.g., Mondev, at para. 43; Klöckner (Annulment), at paras. 59-61; Amco (Annulment), at paras. 
41 and 44; Lucchetti (Award), at para. 48; Siemens (Jurisdiction), at paras. 94-103; Casado 
(Provisional Measures), at paras. 19-20; and Plama (Jurisdiction), at paras. 213-17.  See also Schreuer, 
supra note 5, at 616, n. 233. 
612 Loewen (Jurisdiction), para. 45.  See also Schreuer, supra note 5, at 616, n. 234. 
613 See, e.g., Lauder, at para. 200; and SGS v Pakistan, at para. 171, n. 178.  Contrast Mondev, at para. 
69, n. 17.  See also Schreuer, supra note 5, at 616, n. 235. 
614 CME (Partial Award), para. 608; Loewen (Jurisdiction), para. 45; Tokios (Jurisdiction), at para. 91; 
Casado (Provisional Measures), at paras. 22-23.  See also Schreuer, supra note 5, at 616, n. 236. 
615 Klöckner (Annulment), at paras. 59-61.  AAP, at para. 40 referred to a number of early international 
arbitral awards in support of its summation of treaty interpretation rules.  See also Schreuer, at supra 
note 5, at 616, n. 236. 
616 WTO references tend to be made more often by NAFTA tribunals than other FIATs.  In Methanex 
(Partial Award), at Part II, Chpt. B, para. 6, the tribunal held that when it comes to interpreting certain 
provisions of the NAFTA Chapter 11: 
the Tribunal may derive guidance from the way in which a similar phrase in the GATT has 
been interpreted in the past.  Whilst such interpretations cannot be treated by this Tribunal as 
binding precedents, the Tribunal may remain open to persuasion based on legal reasoning 
developed in GATT and WTO jurisprudence, if relevant. 
See also ADF (Award), at para. 147; Pope & Talbot (Merits, Phase 2), at para. 46-63; and SD Myers 
(Partial Award), at paras. 244 and 291.  As regards, reference to WTO case law by ICSID tribunals, see 
SGS v Pakistan, at para. 171, n. 178.  In Occidental Exploration (Award), at paras. 174-5, a non-
NAFTA investment arbitration, WTO case law was distinguished and not followed. 
617 See, e.g., SD Myers (Partial Award), at para. 249, n. 44 (referring to a line of decisions emanating 
from the Supreme Court of Canada in its interpretation of NAFTA Article 1102 and commenting that 
‘[a]lthough domestic law is not controlling in Chapter 11 disputes, it is not inappropriate to consider 
how the domestic laws of the parties to the dispute address an issue’); and Dr Asante’s Dissenting 
Opinion in AAP (Dissenting Opinion), at 306 (referring to an English court decision (Adams v Naylor 
(1946) 2 All ER 241) and commenting that the case was ‘certainly not binding in this arbitration’ but it 
‘may be instructive’).  In contrast, see Enron (Jurisdiction) (Ancillary Claim), at 39, in which the 
tribunal, in its interpretation of the Argentina-US BIT, was reluctant to rely on the view taken on direct 
and indirect share ownership in the United States Supreme Court decision in Dole Food Co. v 
Patrickson, 123 S. Ct. 1655 (2003).  In Duke v Ecuador, at para. 183, reference was made to the 
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jurisdiction from which an award has been made: the guiding factor appears to be 
relevance. 618   The tribunal in Continental Casualty said the following in its 
interpretation of Article XI of the Argentina-United States BIT: 
Since the text of Art. XI derives from the parallel model clause of the U.S. FCN treaties 
and these treaties in turn reflect the formulation of Art. XX of GATT 1947, the Tribunal 
finds it more appropriate to refer to the GATT and WTO case law which has extensively 
dealt with the concept and requirements of necessity in the context of economic measures 
derogating to the obligations contained in GATT, rather than to refer to the requirement 
of necessity under customary international law.619 
321. However, care must be exercised by FIATs not to place too much emphasis on 
interpretation or practices relating to provisions belonging to other legal regimes.  For 
example, the context of the GATT and WTO trade-related provisions could be 
significantly different to the context of investment protection provisions in BITs.    
322. Concerning the jurisprudential basis for interpretation based on reference to 
prior cases, in Canadian Cattlemen the tribunal took the view that  
Article 38 [paragraph 1.d.] of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides 
that judicial decisions are applicable for the interpretation of public international law as 
‘subsidiary means’.  Therefore, they must be understood to be also supplementary means 
of interpretation in the sense of Article 32 of the [Vienna Convention]. 620 
323. This statement fails to take into account the differences between the two 
provisions.  The ICJ Statute refers to judicial decisions as ‘subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law’.  As mentioned above, this provision enables judicial 
decisions (or arbitral awards) to be used to identify international law rules.  That is 
distinct from using prior decisions to interpret particular provisions of investment 
treaties, which are of themselves rules of international law as between the treaty 
parties.621  The logic of the Canadian Cattlemen award is therefore problematic.  This 
                                                                                                                                            
 
English Queen’s Bench judgment in Ecuador v Occidental Exploration & Production Co, [2006] 
EWHC 345 (Comm). 
618 See also Fauchald, supra note 11, at 341-342. 
619 Continental Casualty (Award), at para. 192. 
620 Canadian Cattlemen, at para. 50. 
621 See also Orakhelashvili, ‘Principles of Treaty Interpretation in the NAFTA Arbitral Award on 
Canadian Cattlemen’, 26 Journal of International Arbitration 159 (2009), at 167-168. 
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is perhaps one reason why it is relatively rare for FIATs to discuss the either the ICJ 
Statute or Article 32 of the Vienna Convention or both when they refer to past awards 
when interpreting treaties. 
324. To conclude this section, attention is drawn to the research conducted for the 
present thesis.  While not quantitative in nature, the review of awards revealed that the 
overwhelming majority of FIAT decisions referred to prior decisions in one way or 
another.  This finding is supported by the Fauchald empirical analysis, which as noted 
above, found that references to case law in interpretative arguments constituted by far 
the most frequently used mode of interpretation.622  The following observation of 
Thomas Waelde and Todd Weiler is therefore apposite: 
An investment jurisprudence is at present emerging rapidly – perhaps too easily in view 
of the sometimes significant legal differences between the various treaties underlying the 
cases.  The result of these trends may well be a burgeoning ‘common law’ of 
international trade and investment protection, where different tribunals work separately, 
but somehow symbiotically, to articulate the meaning of treaty obligations which share 
similar, if not identical, language.623 
325. This development in international investment law has parallels with decision 
trends in international law generally.  Chester Brown, for example, has concluded that 
there is an emerging ‘common law of international adjudication’ involving a practice 
where the resolution of an issue in one international court or tribunal is often aided by 
considering how that issue has been dealt with by other international bodies.624  But 
this practice is not based on a sense of obligation to follow other decisions but, inter 
alia, on similarities in (i) the procedure and remedies to be applied, (ii) the applicable 
                                                 
622 Out of the 98 ICSID decisions analysed in that study, 90 used ICSID case law in their interpretative 
arguments, and another 30 decisions referred to other tribunal decisions that used the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules.  The next most frequently used type of interpretative criterion was ‘legal doctrine’, 
e.g., the writings of scholars and other commentaries, which were referred to in 73 decisions.  See 
Fauchald, supra note 11, at 356.  
623 Wälde and Weiler, supra note 62, at 166 (footnote omitted).  See also Gaillard, ‘Investment Treaty 
Arbitration and Jurisdiction Over Contract Claims – the SGS Cases Considered’, in Weiler (ed.), 
International Investment Law and Arbitration: Leading Cases from the ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral 
Treaties and Customary International Law 325 (2005), at 328 (referring to the ‘authority resulting 
from’ a line of FIAT awards). 
624  Brown, A Common Law of International Adjudication (2007), at 226-234.  But also see his 
discussion of limitations to courts’ abilities to develop this ‘common law’, ibid., at 234-237. 
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rules or law, (iii) the lawyers that are involved and (iv) the functions to be carried out 
by those bodies. 625  These reasons for following prior decisions apply equally to 
international investment law. 
                                                 
625  Ibid., at 226-234.  See also Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and 
Tribunals (2003), at 110-112. 
J O S E P H  R O M E S H  W E E R A M A N T R Y                                          201  P H D  T H E S I S  |  U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  L O N D O N  
C.  TREATIES, INSTRUMENTS OR MATERIALS 
a) International Law Practice 
326. International law practice shows that interpreters often seek guidance from 
provisions (or interpretations thereof) in other treaties similar to the provision subject 
to interpretation.626  In the Oil Platforms case,627 the ICJ was required to interpret 
Article XX, para. 1(d) of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular 
Rights between the United States and Iran.  That provision was identical in nature to 
Article XXI, para. 1(d) of the 1956 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation 
between the United States and Nicaragua.  The 1956 treaty was interpreted by the ICJ 
in the 1986 Nicaragua case.628  Subsequently, in the Oil Platforms case, when the 
Court was required to interpret Article XX of the 1955 Treaty, it proceeded on the 
basis that it saw no reason to depart from its interpretation of the identical provision in 
the 1956 treaty in the Nicaragua case.629   
327. However, in cases where the terms of another treaty or instrument are not 
identical but similar, more caution appears to be exercised by the ICJ.  In the Anglo-
Iranian Oil case, the United Kingdom asserted that Iran’s unilateral declaration of its 
acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ should be interpreted on the basis 
that the clause at issue was copied from a unilateral declaration adopted by Belgium.  
This Belgian document had also been adopted by numerous other States. 630  
                                                 
626 See, e.g., Phillimore, Commentaries upon International Law (1882), Vol. II, at 98, who refers to 
‘[t]he rule of instituting a comparison between the Treaty in dispute and other treaties, whether prior, 
posterior, or contemporary, upon the same subject and between the same parties’; and Gardiner, Treaty 
Interpretation, at 345.  See also ‘Rule (F)’ as formulated by the AAP tribunal.  See text corresponding 
to note 636 infra. 
627 ICJ Reports 161 (2003). 
628 Nicaragua case, ICJ Reports 14 (1986), at 116, para. 222 and 136, para. 271. 
629 Oil Platforms, ICJ Reports 161 (2003), at para. 20.  A factor that should be kept in mind when this 
decision is contrasted with FIAT awards is that the prior interpretation was made by the same court.  
This is highly unlikely to happen in the case of FIATs, which comprise a different panel of arbitrators 
for each case (save for rare exceptions such as Camuzzi and Sempra Energy or where the case is 
consolidated (see, e.g., Canfor (Consolidation Order)). 
630 ICJ Reports 93 (1952), at 105. 
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Accordingly, the United Kingdom asserted that the clause in the Iranian declaration 
should be understood in the same sense as the Belgian formula.  The Court did not 
accept the United Kingdom argument because there was an interpolation of certain 
words in the Iranian declaration that altered the Belgian formula to such an extent that 
it was impossible to seek the ‘real meaning’ of the Iranian declaration in the Belgian 
formula.631 
328. A careful position was also adopted by the Law of the Sea Tribunal in the 
MOX Plant case:  
the application of international law rules on interpretation of treaties to identical or 
similar provisions of different treaties may not yield the same results, having regard to, 
inter alia, differences in the respective contexts, objects and purposes, subsequent 
practice of parties and travaux préparatoires …632  
329. Reference to other treaties or other materials may, in appropriate 
circumstances, be considered to fall within the scope of the Vienna Convention Rules 
as forming part of the Article 31(1) context or relevant international law rules under 
Article 31(3)(c).633 
b) FIAT Practice 
330. Comparative analyses of treaties are often found in FIAT awards.  The 
Fauchald empirical analysis, for example, found 28 FIAT decisions in which BITs not 
the subject of the dispute were utilised in interpretative arguments and 14 others that 
referred to other investment related instruments.634  This tendency may be attributable, 
in large measure, to the hundreds of BIT’s covering essentially the same types of 
                                                 
631 Anglo-Iranian Oil case, ICJ Reports 93 (1952), at 105. 
632 MOX Plant case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures, Order of 3 December 2001, 
ITLOS Reports 95 (2001), at 106, para. 51, 41 ILM 405 (2002), 413, quoted with approval in Access to 
Information under Article 9 of the OSPAR Convention (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Permanent Court 
of Arbitration, 2 July 2003, para. 141, 42 ILM 1118 (2003), 1144.  See also Professor O’Connell, who 
remarked that where a treaty subject to interpretation ‘forms part of a system of treaties it is permissible 
to interpret it in the light of the other treaties’.  O’Connell, International Law (1970), at 260. 
633 See Chapter III, Section B(4). 
634 Fauchald, supra note 11, at 345. 
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subject matter.  As a consequence, common threads are bound to weave through many 
of them.  In this regard, McLachlan’s articulation of the process by which BITs build 
upon antecedent BITs provides some understanding as to why prior treaty provisions 
are important: 
Each state brings to the negotiating table a lexicon which is derived from prior treaties 
(bilateral or multilateral) into which it has entered with other states.  The resulting text in 
each case may be different.  It is, after all, the product of specific negotiation.  But it will 
inevitably share common elements with what has gone before.635 
331. Consequently, the examination of prior treaty provisions may be a fruitful 
exercise in the FIAT interpretative process.  An appropriate starting point for a 
discussion on relevant FIAT practice is the exposition by the AAP tribunal concerning 
interpretation by reference to other treaties.  That tribunal neatly summed-up the 
position in its self-styled Rule F: 
‘When there is need of interpretation of a treaty it is proper to consider stipulations of 
earlier or later treaties in relation to subjects similar to those treated in the treaty under 
consideration’ … Thus, establishing the practice followed through comparative law 
survey of all relevant precedents becomes an extremely useful tool to provide an 
authoritative interpretation.636 
332. Many FIATs have followed this approach.  References have frequently been 
made to other treaties, either antecedent or subsequent to the treaty in dispute,637 
                                                 
635 McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3) (c) of the Vienna Convention’, 
54 ILCQ 279 (2005), at 283-84. 
636  APP, at para. 40, quoting the Elton case, Mexico-US General Claims Commission of 1929, 
Repertory, Vol. II, p. 35.  The AAP Rule F was quoted with approval by the NAFTA tribunal in 
Methanex (Final Award), at Part II, Chpt. B, at para. 16. 
637 See, e.g., Aguas del Tunari, at paras. 292-293 (‘[m]ost relevant to an assessment of state practice 
possibly bearing on the 1992 Bolivia-Netherlands BIT are those BITs which were negotiated 
contemporaneously in the early 1990s’); SPP (Jurisdiciton), at paras. 102-103; Fedax (Jurisdiction), at 
para. 34 (referring to ‘most contemporary bilateral treaties’ in interpreting the BIT at issue); Gruslin, at 
para. 21.4; SGS v Philippines, at para. 132(e); Fedax (Jurisdiction), at para. 27 (referring to the 
Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 1985 interpreting the ICSID 
Convention); and Enron (Jurisdiction), at para. 47 (‘[t]here is no evidence in this case that the intention 
of the parties to the Argentina-United States Bilateral Treaty might be different from that expressed in 
other investment treaties’).  See also Schreuer, supra note 5, at 289 (commenting that as long as they 
are reasonable, national legislation or treaty-based definitions should play a prominent role in the 
interpretation of Article 25(2)(b)).  
In SPP (Jurisdiction), at paras. 78-82, Egypt argued that to translate the term ‘tatimmu’ to mean ‘shall 
be’ was overstating the nature of the Arabic term.  In the tribunal’s interpretation of that term—found in 
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particularly to support or confirm an interpretation.638  In Pope & Talbot, for example, 
the tribunal noted that  
the language of Article 1105 [of NAFTA] grew out of the provisions of [antecedent] 
bilateral commercial treaties negotiated by the United States and other industrial 
countries … there are very strong reasons for interpreting the language of Article 1105 
consistently with the language in the BITs.639  
333. But this position must be qualified.  The context of each treaty’s terms must 
also be taken into account.  For example, jurisprudence as to national treatment 
provisions in the GATT has not been adopted by FIATs in interpreting similar 
provisions in investment treaties (including NAFTA Chapter 11) because of the 
different contexts in which GATT provisions operate.640  In this regard the Methanex 
tribunal quoted with approval the passage of the Law of the Sea Tribunal’s Mox Plant 
decision set out in the International Law section above.641   
334. Certain FIATs have exercised a degree of caution or altogether avoided 
reliance on other treaties as an aid to interpretation.  A few of the reasons for taking 
this position are as follows: 
                                                                                                                                            
 
Arabic legislation that was deemed to be an acceptance of ICSID jurisdiction—it was noted that those 
two terms were used interchangeably in certain treaties concluded by Egypt in both the Arabic and 
English languages.  See also its references to other treaties ibid., at para. 103. 
638 Methanex (Partial Award), at para. 140 (an interpretation of NAFTA was supported by reference to 
the 1958 New York Convention); Bayindir, at para. 113 (other BITs used to confirm interpretation of 
BIT at issue); Maffezini (Jurisdiction), at para. 68 (the relevant BIT provisions ‘complement and are 
consistent with’ the ICSID Convention); Tokios (Jurisdiction), at para. 42 (‘the definition of corporate 
nationality in the Ukraine-Lithuania BIT, on its face and as applied to the present case, is consistent 
with the [ICSID] Convention and supports our analysis under it’) and para. 79 (‘[t]he Tribunal’s finding 
under the BIT is also consistent with the ICSID Convention’); Brownlie’s Separate Opinion in CME 
(Final Award), paras. 17-8 (BIT interpretation supported by reference to 1975 Final Act of the Helsinki 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe); and LESI, at Pt. II, para. 25(ii) (other BITs and 
Energy Charter Treaty used to confirm BIT at issue). 
639 Pope & Talbot (Merits), at paras. 110-111 and 115. 
640 See, e.g., Methanex (Final Award), at Part II, Chpt. B, para. 16; and Occidental (Final Award), at 
paras. 174-176.  But see Pope and Talbot (Merits), at paras. 45-63, 68-69. 
641 Methanex (Final Award), at Part II, Chpt. B, para. 16.  See also Enron (Jurisdiction), at para. 46 
(‘Each instrument must be interpreted autonomously in the light of its own context’). 
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a) the terms of the other treaty were different;642 
b) no reason for a difference in language between two treaties is indicated;643 
c) the parties to the other treaty were different;644 
d) the tribunal was not informed by the parties of all the investment treaties 
signed by the contracting States to the BIT in dispute;645 
e) the other treaty related to a different discipline of international law;646 
f) the meaning of the treaty in dispute was clear;647 and 
g) the BIT practice of both parties to the BIT at issue was of ‘limited probative 
value’.648 
335. Obviously, if the treaty provisions subject to comparison are differently 
worded to a significant extent, then FIATs have refused to utilise them, or 
interpretations thereof.  The issue of differences in treaties is dealt with below.   
336. Comparisons between the treaty in dispute and model BITs have also become 
issues in FIAT interpretation practice.  A question raised in Siemens was whether 
special significance should be attached to a dispute settlement clause in the Argentina-
Germany BIT because it departed from Germany’s standard BIT dispute settlement 
clause.  The tribunal took the view that ‘it is not in its power to second-guess their 
intentions by attributing special meaning to phrases based on whether they were or 
                                                 
642 Aguas del Tunari, at paras. 310-314; Salini v Jordan (Jurisdiction), at paras. 116-118; and CSOB 
(Jurisdiction), at para. 57.  See also Loewen (Award), at para. 235 (the only relevance of the ICSID 
Convention to that proceeding was that the parties had elected to function under its structure and that 
election could not be used to change or supplement the substance of the NAFTA Treaty’). 
643 Aguas del Tunari, at paras. 299. 
644 Sempra Energy (Jurisdiction), at para. 144.  Contrast Plama (Jurisdiction), at para. 195 (‘treaties 
between one of the Contracting Parties and third States may be taken into account for the purpose of 
clarifying the meaning of a treaty’s text at the time it was entered into’) and para. 155. 
645 Tza Yap Shum, at para. 109. 
646 Methanex (Final Award), at Part IV, Chpt. B, paras. 29-30. 
647 Gruslin, at para. 21.6. 
648 Aguas del Tunari, at paras. 309-314.  Contrast Maffezini (Jurisdiction), at paras. 58-60. 
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were not part of a model draft.’649  As Professor Schreuer points out, model treaties 
are the starting point for negotiations.  The extent to which the concluded treaty will 
echo a certain model treaty will depend on many factors, including the negotiating 
power of the parties, whether the both countries have their own distinct model treaties 
they wish to promote and the circumstances surrounding the negotiations.650  
337. As a part of its interpretative process, FIATs have also referred to a diverse 
range of materials or information external to the treaty, including: 
a) the general practice of the signatories to the BIT at issue in respect of other 
investment treaties;651 
b) the work of the International Law Commission;652 
c) the work of the Institute of International Law;653 
d) the work of the International Law Association;654 
e) the Harvard Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for 
Injuries to Aliens;655  
                                                 
649 Siemens (Jurisdiction), at para. 106.  See also Aguas del Tunari, at para. 298 (recognizing ‘the need 
for care’ in assessing differences between a treaty and a model BIT) and paras. 310-311; Enron 
(Jurisdiction), at para. 46; Pan American (Preliminary Objections), at para. 108; El Paso, at para. 80; 
CMS (Award), at para. 368; and Plama (Jurisdiction), at para. 204.  See also Pope & Talbot (Award), at 
paras. 110-111.   
650 Schreuer, ‘Diversity and Harmonization of Treaty Interpretation in Investment Arbitration’, 3(2) 
Transnational Dispute Management (2006), at 8-9. 
651 See, e.g., Maffezini (Jurisdiction), at paras. 58-60; Lanco, at para. 32; Aguas del Tunari, at paras. 
310-314; Sempra Energy (Jurisdiction), at paras. 144-145; and Camuzzi (Jurisdiction), at para. 134.  
This type of practice may also relate to Article 31(3).  The Aguas del Tunari award, at para. 293, 
considered ‘[m]ost relevant to an assessment of state practice possibly bearing on the 1992 Bolivia-
Netherlands BIT are those BITs which were negotiated contemporaneously in the early 1990s’. 
In SPP (Jurisdiction), at para. 110, the tribunal made reference to a non-disputing State’s (Senegal) 
treaty practice.   
652  See, e.g., Eureko, at paras. 187-8 (referring to ILC work on State Responsibility); Loewen 
(Jurisdiction), at para. 47 (referring to ILC work on State Responsibility); and Methanex (Partial 
Award), at para. 99 (referring to the ILC work on the Law of Treaties).  The pronouncements of the ILC 
may also be indicative of international law rules dealt with in Vienna Convention Article 31(3)(c). 
653 American Manufacturing, Arbitrator Golsong’s Separate Opinion, at para. 13. 
654 World Duty Free Company, at para. 139. 
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f) the Statute of the ICJ;656 
g) United Nations General Assembly Resolutions;657 
h) United Nations Conference on Trade and Development reports;658 
i) Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development reports;659 
j) the American Law Institute’s 1987 Restatement of the Law Third, the Foreign 
Relations of the United States;660  
k) the submissions of a respondent State in another case relating to the same 
treaty provision;661  
l) official statements and other materials of governments of States party to the 
treaty in question;662 and 
                                                                                                                                            
 
655 See, e.g., Tokios (Jurisdiction), at para. 92.  This draft convention is published in Sohn and Baxter, 
‘Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic Interests of Aliens’, 55 AJIL 545 (1961). 
656 See, e.g., Casado (Provisional Measures), at para. 1 (noting that because Article 47 of the ICSID 
Convention was ‘directly inspired’ by Article 41 of the ICJ Statute, ‘particular importance’ could be 
accorded to the judgments of the ICJ and PCIJ); and Goetz (Award), at para. 54 (noting that because 
Article 45(1) of the ICSID Convention, and Article 42 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules were inspired by 
Article 53 of the ICJ Statute, it was ‘appropriate to refer to the principles enunciated by the 
International Court of Justice’). 
657 SPP (Opinion), at 254-5. 
658 Lauder, at para. 292; and Gruslin, at para. 21.3. 
659 Saluka (Award), at para. 284, n. 18; Pope & Talbot (Merits, Phase 2), at para. 78, n. 73.  In that 
same case, reference was made to the 1968 OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign 
Property but this was distinguished and not relied on by the tribunal.  Pope & Talbot (Merits), at para. 
112. 
660 Feldman (Award), at para. 99, 105-7. 
661 See, e.g., Bayindir, at para. 129.  This type of situation may extend beyond the contours of treaty 
interpretation and may be seen equally as an instance of the preclusive effects of a prior statement (see, 
e.g., Phillips Petroleum Company Iran v Iran, 21 Iran-US CTR 79 (1989), at para. 207) or a rule of 
evidence that contradictory statements or conduct of an interested party should be construed against that 
party (see e.g., Woodward-Clyde Consultants v Iran, 3 Iran-US CTR 239 (1983), at pp. 246-47; and 
J.R. Weeramantry, ‘Estoppel and the Preclusive Effects of Inconsistent Statements and Conduct: The 
Practice of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal’, 27 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 265 
(1996)).  See also, Sempra Energy (Jurisdiction), at paras. 132 and 143-145; Methanex (Partial 
Award), at para. 145; and Enron (Jurisdiction), at para. 47.  
662 Aguas del Tunari, at paras. 271 and 294; Mondev, at paras. 111-112; and Ethyl (Jurisdiction), at 
para. 84, n. 32.  In Gruslin, materials submitted by Malaysia to support its interpretation included a 
memorandum from the Malaysian Ministry of Trade and Industry to the Malaysian Attorney-General’s 
Chambers and records of interview of Malaysian officials involved in the negotiations of the investment 
treaty at issue.  The tribunal expressed a reluctance to allow extrinsic materials to colour the meaning of 
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m) the World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment.663 
338. In relation to the use of government materials produced during ratification or 
implementation of a treaty, the Mondev tribunal stated that  
Whether or not explanations given by a signatory government to its own legislature in the 
course of ratification or implementation of a treaty can constitute part of the travaux 
préparatoires of the treaty for the purposes of its interpretation, they can certainly shed 
light on the purposes and approaches taken to the treaty, and thus can evidence opinio 
juris.664 
339. The Mondev tribunal referred specifically to the US government transmittal 
statement for the 1995 US-Albania BIT to its legislature.  That treaty contained 
language similar to the NAFTA provision at issue in Mondev, and was considered to 
have shed light on that NAFTA provision.665 
340. However, care needs to be exercised when using extrinsic treaties and 
materials as a guide to interpretation.  In particular regard to other treaties, their texts 
may fail to reveal important nuances of the wording as understood by the signatories 
to the treaty at issue.666  In this regard, the caution expressed in Aguas del Tunari is 
apposite: 
The practice of a state as regards the conclusion of BITs other than the particular BIT 
involved in a dispute is not of direct value to the task of interpretation under Article 31 of 
the Vienna Convention.  The fact that a pattern might exist in the content of the BITs 
entered into by a particular state does not mean that a specific BIT by that state should be 
                                                                                                                                            
 
particular terms of the investment treaty.  The tribunal observed that if the meaning of the phrase ‘is 
found to be clear, the Tribunal will not reduce its reach by reference to general considerations or 
assumptions derived from extrinsic sources of the sort relied upon by the Respondent in its materials 
and arguments’.  Gruslin, at paras. 17.1 and 21.4-21.6.  In relation to government investment promotion 
materials, see SPP (Jurisdiction), at paras. 112 and 115 (noting in relation to the interpretation of a 
domestic statute providing Egypt’s consent to ICSID arbitration that ‘[i]nvestment promotion literature 
does not create rights; it informs potential investors of the rights they will enjoy by virtue of existing 
law if an investment is made’ and that ‘[w]hile there is no question of investment promotion literature 
altering the terms of a statute, in the present case the materials published by the General Authority 
merely confirm the conclusion already reached by the Tribunal’). 
663 Fedax (Jurisdiction), at para. 35.  
664 Mondev, at para. 111. 
665 Mondev, at para. 112.  See also CMS (Award), at para. 362. 
666 As Thomas Wälde and Todd Weiler have observed, dangers lurk in the practice of comparing 
seemingly similar treaties, especially the risk of overlooking the particularities of text, context and 
purpose. Wälde and Weiler, supra note 62, at 166, n. 19. 
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understood as necessarily conforming to that pattern rather than constituting an exception 
to that pattern.667 
341. In TSA Spectrum de Argentina SA v Argentina, the tribunal refused to interpret 
a treaty provision with reference to how it is understood under national law.  It held 
that because the term  
final decision” in Article 10(3) of the 1994 Argentina-Netherlands BIT “appears in an 
international treaty and not in a purely national context, it is appropriate to give it an 
autonomous meaning and thus interpret it independently of any meaning the same term 
may have in the national laws of the two Contracting States.668 
342. In connection with ICSID arbitrations, the Report of the Executive Directors669 
merits separate discussion.  Essentially, the Report is a type of explanatory note or set 
of guidelines for the ICSID Convention.  Numerous references to the Report have 
been made by ICSID tribunals in their interpretation of the ICSID Convention.670  It 
does not appear to be considered as part of the preparatory work of the ICSID 
Convention.671  Reference to the Report is sometimes made even before any other 
Article 31 analysis takes place.672  Although no FIAT has stated as such, its proper 
place in the framework of the Vienna Convention Rules is likely to be as part of the 
context, in the sense that it is an instrument connected with the conclusion of the 
treaty as provided for in Article 31(2)(a).  Characterised in this way, an interpreter’s 
                                                 
667 Aguas del Tunari, at para. 291. 
668 TSA Spectrum (Award), at para. 101. 
669 Approved on 18 March 1965 by the Directors at the same time they approved the final text of the 
Convention.  See History of the ICSID Convention, Vol. II, Part 2, p.1039.  The Report was transmitted 
to governments at the same time the text of the Convention was submitted for signature and ratification, 
acceptance or approval.  History of the ICSID Convention, Vol. II, Part 2, p.1086. 
670 See, e.g., Kaiser Bauxite, at para. 17; Bayindir, at para. 125; LESI, at Pt. 2, para. 13; CSOB 
(Jurisdiction), at para. 63; Wena Hotels (Jurisdiction), at 85; Lanco, at paras. 42-43; Tokios 
(Jurisdiction), at para. 99; and Azurix (Jurisdiction), at para. 58.  See also Fauchald, supra note 11, at 
330.  
671 See, e.g., Banro, at para. 20, which suggests that the preparatory work is distinct from the Report of 
the Executive Directors.  The tribunal there first referred to the preparatory work in making its point 
and then said this was ‘also confirmed’ by the Report. 
672 See, e.g., Goetz (Award), at para. 83, in which the tribunal immediately referred to the Report’s 
definition of ‘legal dispute’ in Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, prior to any other Article 31 
analysis.  Similarly, see Fedax (Jurisdiction), at 189, para. 15 and Joy Mining, at para. 42. 
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immediate recourse to the Report would be fully consistent with the Article 31 
process.   
343. Another issue requiring discussion in this Section is the relationship between 
the ICSID Arbitration Rules and the ICSID Convention.  Those Arbitration Rules add 
detail to the procedural provisions already contained in the ICSID Convention.673  
Although no FIAT has used the ICSID Arbitration Rules to determine an 
interpretation of the ICSID Convention,674 FIATs have used those Rules to confirm or 
support the interpretation of that Convention.675  Recourse to the ICSID Arbitration 
Rules to interpret the ICSID Convention may be found under Vienna Convention 
Article 31(3).  Under this provision, the Arbitration Rules may constitute a subsequent 
agreement between the parties regarding the application of the ICSID Convention or a 
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty establishing the agreement of the 
parties as to its interpretation.676  The ADF tribunal’s interpretation of the ICSID 
Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules is of interest in this respect.  In that case, the 
tribunal referred to the ICSID Convention and the ICSID Arbitration Rules and stated 
that ‘while these two instruments are not applicable to Additional Facility cases, like 
                                                 
673 See, e.g., Articles 36-63 of the ICSID Convention.  In this regard Article 44 provides ‘[a]ny 
arbitration proceeding shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Section and, 
except as the parties otherwise agree, in accordance with the Arbitration Rules in effect on the 
date on which the parties consented to arbitration’). 
674 Indeed, interpreters must be mindful that the ICSID Arbitration Rules are subordinate to the ICSID 
Convention and in the unlikely event of a conflict between the two instruments, the Convention should 
prevail.  See, e.g., CAA-Vivendi (Challenge), at para. 10 and Schreuer, supra note 5, at 677.  
675 See, e.g., Amco (Annulment), at para. 37; Amco (Resubmitted Case), 1 ICSID Reports 543, at 567; 
and MINE (Annulment), at para. 4.07.  Fedax (Jurisdiction), at para. 28 referred to the ICSID Rules 
Governing the Additional Facility in interpreting the ICSID Convention.  See also Aguas Provinciales, 
at para. 14 (referring to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules in interpreting the ICSID Convention); 
Vacuum Salt, at 337, para. 29, n. 9; and Guinea v Atlantic Triton Company Limited, 26 October 1984, 
Cour d’appel, Rennes (Second Chamber), 3 ICSID Reports 3, at 8 (this judgment was overturned by the 
Cour de Cassation).  
676 A reason why the Arbitration Rules may be considered to be an agreement of the parties is that they 
are adopted by ICSID’s Administrative Council, which is composed of one representative of each 
signatory to the ICSID Convention.  See Articles 4(1) and 6(1)(c) of the ICSID Convention. 
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the instant case, they often do supply, in our opinion, relevant, and even close, 
analogues for terms used in the Additional Facility Rules’.677  
344. A further issue relevant to this Section is whether the ICSID Arbitration Rules 
may supplement the ICSID Convention when there is a gap in the latter.  This was a 
very real problem for the ad hoc Committee in the CAA-Vivendi (Challenge) case, 
which was required to determine a challenge made by a party against the Committee’s 
president.  The ad hoc Committee found that the ICSID Convention contained no 
provision governing the challenge of a member of an ad hoc Committee.  In contrast, 
this issue was addressed in ICSID Arbitration Rules 9 and 53.  Before the ad hoc 
Committee could utilize the Arbitration Rules to fill the gap in the ICSID Convention, 
it was considered necessary to determine whether the drafters of the ICSID 
Convention deliberately omitted such a provision from the Convention, in which case, 
the Committee doubted whether ICSID’s Administrative Council, the drafters of the 
Arbitration Rules, had competence to achieve by those Rules what the Convention 
itself intentionally did not achieve.678  
345. As part of its decision, the ad hoc Committee examined the history of the 
ICSID Rules, which, in their opinion, showed that the intention of the Administrative 
Council was to apply all the Arbitration Rules, so far as was possible, to annulment 
proceedings.  It added  
[i]n our view the only reason why the procedure laid down in Arbitration Rule 9 could 
not be applied to members of ad hoc Committees mutatis mutandis would be if to apply 
such a procedure was inconsistent with the Convention, having regard to its object and 
purpose.  We see no reason to regard it as such.  
 
… 
 
… the travaux préparatoires of the Convention do not suggest that there was any 
particular reason for excluding the application of [the Convention’s provisions 
concerning the replacement and disqualification of arbitrators in annulment proceedings].  
It appears that no State party at the time of the adoption of Arbitration Rule 53 suggested 
any such reason.  That Rule was adopted unanimously and was treated by the Members 
                                                 
677 ADF (Award), at para. 144.  See also Methanex (Partial Award), at paras. 125-6 (referring to the ICJ 
Rules of Procedure in its interpretation of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules).   
678 CAA-Vivendi (Challenge), at para. 5.  See also Schreuer, supra note 5, at 1042. 
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of the Administrative Council as uncontroversial.  In the circumstances, the unanimous 
adoption of Arbitration Rule 53 can be seen, if not as an actual agreement by the States 
parties to the Convention as to its interpretation, at least as amounting to subsequent 
practice relevant to its interpretation.679  
346. In a footnote to this passage, the Committee made express reference to Article 
31(3) of the Vienna Convention.  The approach of the Committee (effectively to 
supplement the ICSID Convention using the ICSID Arbitration Rules) may be 
considered to be in conformity with international law.  
D.  SCHOLARLY OPINION 
a) International Law Practice 
347. Scholarly opinions or ‘teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the 
various nations’, as noted in Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the ICJ, are not a 
‘source’ of international law.  They, like judicial decisions, constitute a ‘subsidiary 
means for the determination of rules of law’.680  The case law of the ICJ reveals that 
the Court is reticent in citing authors of scholarly literature by name.681  Nonetheless, 
it has been commented that ‘the scarcely avowed use of the ‘teachings of publicists’ in 
the Court’s case law probably does not accurately reflect the influence these 
‘teachings’ still have’.682  
348. The ICJ’s reticence in indicating specific opinions of writers may be ascribed 
to (1) the diplomatic sensitivities that surround much of the ICJ’s work, (2) the ‘small 
                                                 
679 CAA-Vivendi (Challenge), at paras. 10-12 (footnotes omitted). 
680 Article 38 of the ICJ Statute (emphasis added). 
681 Pellet, ‘Article 38’, in Zimmermann, et al., (eds.), The Statute of the International Court of Justice: 
A Commentary 677 (2006), at 791; and Shabtai Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International 
Court, 1920-2005, Volume III, Procedure (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 2006), at 1558-9.  This is not the 
case in respect of individual opinions of ICJ Judges.  See Pellet, at 791-2.   
682 Pellet, ibid. 
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world’ of international law in which the Court is ‘well-advised not to distribute good 
or bad marks’ and (3)  the ‘abstract discussions’ found in scholarly works.683   
b) FIAT Practice 
349. FIAT practice is markedly different from the practice of the ICJ.  It is 
commonplace for tribunals to indicate that their views are ‘shared’ or ‘confirmed’ by 
specific scholarly literature on the subject under determination. 684   In Fauchald’s 
empirical analysis, ‘legal doctrine’ (largely including scholarly literature) was the 
second most frequently utilised criterion by ICSID tribunals in their interpretative 
arguments.685   
350. An illustration of the use of scholarly literature is found in Wena Hotels, in 
which the tribunal, after citing several relevant academic works, concluded that  
[i]n the absence of any direct evidence of the intent of the Arab Republic of Egypt and 
the United Kingdom in negotiating Article 8(1), the Tribunal was strongly convinced by 
this common academic interpretation.686   
351. Professor Schreuer has written one of the seminal works on the ICSID 
Convention.  Entitled The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, the work provides an 
extremely fastidious and systematic study of every provision in the ICSID 
Convention.  The work has been of immeasurable value to academics, practitioners 
and arbitrators in the field of international investment law.  Despite the vast body of 
jurisprudence that amassed since its publication, and despite its age, it still continues 
to be one of the leading authorities in the field.  A vast number of ICSID awards refer 
                                                 
683 Pellet, ibid., at 792. 
684 See generally, Schreuer, supra note 5, at 617. 
685 Fauchald, supra note 11, at 356. 
686 Wena Hotels (Jurisdiction), at 82.  See also Aguas del Tunari, at para. 283 (taking the view that 
among other things ‘scholarly commentary’ indicated that the drafters of the ICSID Convention 
intended a flexible definition of ‘control’ in Article 25); Amco (Annulment), at para. 22 and at para. 34; 
and Pope & Talbot (Merits), at para. 113. 
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to Schreuer’s Commentary.687  During the very late stages of completing this thesis, a 
second edition of this work was published.  It remains to be seen how this new edition 
will be treated by FIATs. 
352. In addition to Schreuer’s commentary, there are a number of other notable 
persons whose works are frequently cited in FIAT awards.  Aron Broche’s work on 
initiating, drafting and finalising the ICSID Convention has led to a high degree of 
authority being accorded to his writings on the preparatory work of the Convention.688  
In fact, in his capacity of General Counsel of the World Bank, Broches signed the 
ICSID Convention.689  He was the chair of (1) the regional consultative meetings of 
legal experts that deliberated on the preliminary draft of the Convention and (2) the 
Legal Committee on Settlement of Investment Disputes that produced a revised draft 
that formed the basis of the ICSID Convention’s final text.  
                                                 
687 See, e.g., Goetz (Award), at para. 67, n. 14, Tokios (Jurisdiction), at paras. 22, 26, 42, 88, 94, 98, 
106; Impregilo, at paras. 108, n. 57 and 133; Joy Mining, para. 53, n. 18; Aguas del Tunari, at para. 
281; Fedax (Jurisdiction), at para. 21; Tokios (Opinion), at para. 19; Wena Hotels (Jurisdiction), at 82-
3; Bayindir, at 127; Methanex (Partial Award), at para. 107, n. 8; Maffezini (Jurisdiction), at para. 31, 
n. 6,  para. 74, n. 54, at para. 94, n. 69; Mitchell (Jurisdiction), at para. 41, n. 14;  CSOB (Jurisdiction), 
at para. 38, n. 7; Duke v Peru, at para. 130; LGE (Award), at para. 85, n. 3; Vivendi (Annulment), at 
paras. 62, 64, 66 and 86; CAA (Challenge), at para. 12; LESI (Award), at para. 8(i); Aucoven 
(Jurisdiction), at para. 51; Aucoven (Award), at para. 91; Banro, at para. 19; ADF (Award), at para. 144, 
n. 151; AES, at para. 40, n. 18; Camuzzi (Jurisdiction), at para. 20, n. 7;  MTD (Stay of Execution), at 
para. 27, n. 1; Salini v Jordan (Award), at para. 102; Sempra Energy (Jurisdiction), at para. 30, n. 7; 
SGS v Pakistan, at para 48, n. 48; SGS v Philippines, at para. 29, n. 5; Siemens (Jurisdiction), at para. 
169, n. 157; and Wena (Interpretation Decision), at para. 81, n. 60.  Some of these references are to 
Professor Schreuer’s contributions to Volumes 11 to 15 of the ICSID Review-Foreign Investment Law 
Journal (1996 to 2000).  Altogether, these volumes contained eight articles by Professor Schreuer, 
which collectively represent a significant part of Schreuer’s Commentary.  See Schreuer, supra note 5, 
Preface, at xviii. 
688 In Vacuum Salt, at para. 37, he was described as ‘the acknowledged authority’ on the ICSID 
Convention.  See, also Fedax (Jurisdiction), at para. 21; Aucoven (Jurisdiction), at paras. 96-8; CSOB 
(Jurisdiction), at para. 17; Aguas del Tunari, at para. 284; Tokios (Jurisdiction), paras. 25, 46 and 69; 
Wena Hotels, Jurisdiction, at 82 and 83; and Klöckner (Award), at 15.  His most cited work is Broches, 
‘The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States’, 136 Recueil des Cours 331 (1972-II).   
689 See Schreuer, supra note 5, at 1290.  See also History of the ICSID Convention, Vol. 2, Part II, p. 
1040.  
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353. Other distinguished commentators that find prominence in FIAT awards 
include Dolzer and Stevens;690 C.F. Amerasinghe;691 and Georges Delaume.692 
354. The Mihaly tribunal, in conformity with the Statute of the ICJ, acknowledged 
that scholarly opinion was a subsidiary means of determining rules of law.693  The 
tribunal’s award also qualified the reference to teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute.  It stated without further elaboration that 
‘[o]pinions of experts on the theory and practice of multinational corporations’ were 
not to be equated with the ICJ Statute Article 38 reference to teachings of 
publicists. 694   The statement indicates, correctly, that expert opinions prepared 
especially for a specific dispute cannot be regarded as Article 38(1)(d) teachings.  
There may thus be a considerable variance in the deference paid to the publications of 
highly regarded international scholars and commentators as opposed to their expert 
opinions prepared (on instruction by a party) for a particular case.695 
                                                 
690 Eureko, at para. 251 describes their work Bilateral Investment Treaties as ‘[t]he leading work on 
bilateral investment treaties’.  See also Wena Hotels (Jurisdiction), at 83-4, Olguín (Jurisdiction), at 
para 26; Genin, at paras. 367, 368, Lauder, paras. 200 and 308; Pope & Talbot (Merits, Phase 2), at 
para. 111, n. 105; and Mondev, at para. 79, n. 19. 
691  He is often cited in relation to his studies on ICSID’s jurisdiction:  ‘The Jurisdiction of the 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes’, 19 Indian J. Int’l Law 166, 214 (1979); 
and ‘Jurisdiction Ratione Personae under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Nationals of Other States’, (1974-1975) BYBIL 227.  See, e.g., Tokios 
(Jurisdiction), para 68 (referring to what it termed ‘Dr. Amerasinghe’s corollary rule of interpretation’) 
and 97; Wena Hotels, Jurisdiction, at 82; Aucoven (Jurisdiction), at para. 62; Fedax (Jurisdiction), at 
para. 22; and Vacuum Salt, at paras. 29, n. 9, para. 37 and para. 42. 
692 See, e.g., his publications ‘ICSID Arbitration: Practical Considerations’, 1 Journal of International 
Arbitration 101 (1984); and ‘ICSID Arbitration and the Courts’, 77 AJIL 784 (1983).  See Wena Hotels 
(Jurisdiction), at 82; Salini v Morocco (Jurisdiction), at para. 27; Fedax (Jurisdiction), at paras. 22-3; 
Tokios (Jurisdiction), at para. 42, n. 27; and Vacuum Salt, at para. 29, n. 9. 
693 See, e.g., Mihaly, at para. 58.  Note, however, that this case indicated that ‘experts on the theory and 
practice of multinational corporations’ fell outside the ambit of ‘teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists’.  Ibid. 
694 Mihaly, at para. 58. 
695 See, e.g., the CME tribunal’s evaluation of the expert opinion provided by Professor Schreuer, one 
of the leading academics in the field of ICSID arbitration.  CME (Final Award), at paras. 401-413 (e.g., 
‘Prof. Schreuer’s conclusions are not adequately supported by his citations, when closely read.  Prof. 
Schreuer’s conclusions are carefully drafted with reference to assumptions which are not in accord with 
the facts of this case.’).  As to the opinions of authoritative public international lawyers on points of 
substantive law prepared specifically for one side in a case, see Loewen (Award), at para. 150. 
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355. Part of the reason for the difference in ICJ and FIAT practice could lie in the 
commercial nature of investor-State arbitration and also the autonomy and different 
composition of each tribunal.  It must be said that the FIAT practice is preferable to 
that of the ICJ because the former embodies a more transparent process, gives 
recognition to deserving academic literature and generally enhances the legitimacy of 
the adjudicative process.   
356. Another reason for the frequency of FIAT recourse to academic literature may 
also lie in the history of foreign investment arbitration.  In its early days, relatively 
few FIAT awards existed.  Given this barren environment of judicial practice, FIATs 
turned to the relatively verdant source of scholarly opinion for jurisprudential 
sustenance.  The recent growth of case law generated by FIATs has no doubt changed 
this dynamic: the accumulation of publicly available case law increases the ability of 
arbitrators to use cases in support of their decisions.  This, in turn, means there is less 
need to rely on academic literature.  The awards reviewed for this thesis have 
evidenced that over time a distinct shift has taken place: FIATs have started to refer to 
past awards more than scholarly literature.  Arguably, prior decisions have more 
practical value than scholarly opinion because they represent ‘real-life’ 
applications.696  
E.  INTER-TEMPORAL ASPECTS 
a) International Law Practice 
357. An examination of the drafting history of the Vienna Convention Rules reveals 
that Waldock’s Third Report (1964) and the ILC Draft Articles 1964 included a rule 
requiring an interpretation to be made in the light of ‘international law in force at the 
time of the conclusion of the treaty’.697  A contrary proposal was made at the Vienna 
                                                 
696 See, e.g., Pellet, supra note 681, at 791. 
697 Draft Article 70(1)(b) of Waldock III (emphasis added).  See Annex II.  See also draft Article 56 of 
Waldock III and draft Article 69(1)(b) of the ILC Draft Articles 1964.  Fitzmaurice was a staunch 
supporter of this approach.  See, e.g., Fitzmaurice (1957), supra note 185, at 212 and 226 (‘to interpret 
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Conference by Czechoslovakia’s delegation, which submitted that the interpretation 
should be made on the basis of the rules in force at the time of the application of the 
treaty.698  Neither of these approaches were finally adopted and no reference to time 
was included in the final text of the rule requiring consideration of relevant rules of 
international law (Article 31(3)(c)).  Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga explains the 
omission of any reference to a relevant time was that it  
is a question which must remain open and depends on whether the parties intended to 
incorporate in the treaty some legal concepts with a meaning that would remain 
unchanged, or intended to leave certain terms as elastic and open ended, subject to 
change and susceptible of receiving the meaning they might acquire in the subsequent 
development of the law.699   
358. The ILC’s position reflects Judge Huber’s famous dictum in the Island of 
Palmas case in which he observed that ‘a juridical fact must be appreciated in the light 
of the law contemporary with it’ but also that the existence of rights ‘shall follow the 
conditions required by the evolution of the law.’700   
359. A decision in which the subsequent development of the law was clearly 
recognised was rendered by the WTO Appellate Body in the Shrimp Products case.  
The Appellate Body there stated that ‘[f]rom the perspective embodied in the 
preamble of the WTO Agreement, we note that the generic term “natural resources” in 
Article XX(g) is not “static” in its content or reference but is rather “by definition, 
evolutionary.”’701 
                                                                                                                                            
 
such treaties according to modern concepts, would often amount to importing into them provisions they 
never really contained, and imposing on the parties obligations they never actually assumed’).  
698 Vienna Conference, First Session, Committee of the Whole, 33rd meeting, para. 54.   
699 Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, ‘International Law in the Past Third of a Century’, 159 Recueil des 
cours 1 (1978), at 49. 
700 (US v. Neth.) 2 RIAA 829 (1949), at 845. 
701 Shrimp Products case (1998), at para. 130.  See also Dissenting Opinion of Judge Alvarez in the 
Competence of the General Assembly regarding Admission to the United Nations, ICJ Reports 4 (1950), 
at 18 (‘a treaty or a text that has once been established acquires a life of its own.  Consequently, in 
interpreting it we must have regard to the exigencies of contemporary life, rather than to the intentions 
of those who framed it’); Judge Azevedo’s Dissenting Opinion in Competence of the General Assembly 
regarding Admission to the United Nations, ICJ Reports 4 (1950), at 23 (‘[t]o comply with [the UN 
Charter’s] aims one must seek the method of interpretation most likely to serve the natural evolution of 
the needs of mankind’); and Hudson, The Permanent Court of International Justice, 1920-1942 (1943), 
 
J O S E P H  R O M E S H  W E E R A M A N T R Y                                          218  P H D  T H E S I S  |  U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  L O N D O N  
b) FIAT Practice 
360. In the Mondev case, the interpretation of NAFTA Article 1105 required the 
tribunal to decide whether the NAFTA States were correct in suggesting that this 
provision’s content (particularly its reference to fair and equitable treatment and full 
protection and security) was correctly expressed by the Mexico-United States General 
Claims Commission in the Neer case.702  The standard adopted in Neer was high:  
the treatment of an alien ... should amount to an outrage, to bad faith, to wilful neglect of 
duty, or to an insufficiency of governmental action so far short of international standards 
that every reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize its insufficiency.703 
361. One of the grounds upon which the Mondev tribunal declined to apply the 
Neer standard was that it was determined in the 1920s and did not take into account 
the intervening developments in the law: 
Neer and like arbitral awards were decided in the 1920s, when the status of the individual 
in international law, and the international protection of foreign investments, were far less 
developed than they have since come to be.  In particular, both the substantive and 
procedural rights of the individual in international law have undergone considerable 
development.  In the light of these developments it is unconvincing to confine the 
meaning of “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and security” of foreign 
investments to what those terms – had they been current at the time – might have meant 
in the 1920s when applied to the physical security of an alien.  To the modern eye, what 
is unfair or inequitable need not equate with the outrageous or the egregious.  In 
particular, a State may treat foreign investment unfairly and inequitably without 
necessarily acting in bad faith.704 
362. The tribunal then referred to the sizeable number of modern investment 
treaties that, in its view, almost uniformly provided for a standard of protection that 
was higher than the standard established in Neer.  In the light of this recent 
development, the Mondev tribunal concluded ‘[i]t would be surprising if this practice 
                                                                                                                                            
 
at 658 (‘[w]ith the lapse of time, intentions entertained by the draftsmen of an instrument may lose 
some of their importance, and a course of action by those who must live with and under the provisions 
of the instrument may assume a correspondingly greater significance’). 
702 United States (LF and PE Neer) v Mexico, United States-Mexico General Claims Commission, 15 
October 1926, 21 AJIL 555 (1927) (Supplement). 
703 Mondev, at para. 114.   
704 Mondev, at para. 116. 
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and the vast number of provisions it reflects were to be interpreted as meaning no 
more than the Neer Tribunal (in a very different context) meant in 1927’.705 
363. Additionally, the tribunal commented on the need to consider evolutionary 
processes in the development of an international law concept over a long period of 
time:  
A reasonable evolutionary interpretation of Article 1105(1) is consistent both with the 
travaux, with normal principles of interpretation and with the fact that, as the Respondent 
accepted in argument, the terms “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and 
security” had their origin in bilateral treaties in the post-war period.  In these 
circumstances the content of the minimum standard today cannot be limited to the 
content of customary international law as recognised in arbitral decisions in the 1920s. 
 
… 
 
… there can be no doubt that, by interpreting Article 1105(1) to prescribe the customary 
international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of 
treatment to be afforded to investments of investors of another Party under NAFTA, the 
term “customary international law” refers to customary international law as it stood no 
earlier than the time at which NAFTA came into force.  It is not limited to the 
international law of the 19th century or even of the first half of the 20th century, although 
decisions from that period remain relevant.  In holding that Article 1105(1) refers to 
customary international law, the FTC interpretations incorporate current international 
law, whose content is shaped by the conclusion of more than two thousand bilateral 
investment treaties and many treaties of friendship and commerce. …706 
364. Similarly, in connection with the interpretation of NAFTA Article 1105, the 
Pope and Talbot tribunal held that customary international law standards of treatment 
have ‘evolved since 1926, and, were the issue necessary to the Tribunal’s decision 
                                                 
705 Mondev, at para. 117.  See also Azurix (Award), at para. 361; LG&E (Liability), at para. 125; and 
CMS (Award), at para. 284. 
706 Mondev, at paras. 123 and 125.  Similarly, Wälde and Weiler have suggested the following: 
We suggest that the right approach is not to allow oneself to become too entangled in historical 
controversies about the minimum standard, but rather to follow general principles of treaty 
interpretation in applying the relevant provisions to the facts of a given case.  This approach 
requires interpretation of treaty terms in their prevailing literal meaning, supported by the 
context and purpose of the treaty.  Notions of ‘fair and equitable’, ‘constant protection’ or 
‘avoidance of unreasonable impairment’ cannot be understood in the sense the minimum 
standard was discussed in the 19th century (relying on the prevailing standards of good 
governance), but must rather be read with today’s prevailing standard of good governance.  
This means that one must take into account the decades of international treaty practice, 
authoritative soft-law instruments and state practice which have evolved since at least the 
Second World War as indicative of such standards. 
Wälde and Weiler, supra note 62, at 187.     
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here, it would propose a formulation more in keeping with the present practice of 
states’.707  However, the tribunal did not apply its interpretation because it considered 
that even under the minimum standard of customary international law proposed by 
Canada (i.e., according to the standard pronounced in the Neer case), damages would 
be owing to the claimant. 
365. The effect of over 2500 BITs on the development of customary international 
law cannot be underestimated.  Nonetheless, it is still prudent to strike a balance 
between subsequent developments and the concerns of textualists, such as Judge 
Fitzmaurice, ever vigilant against importing terms into treaties and imposing 
obligations on parties that are not strictly evident on the face of the text.708   
366. Evolutionary considerations are found also in the Tradex case.  Although the 
issue there concerned the interpretation of a domestic Albanian law that provided 
foreign investors recourse to ICSID arbitration, the approach adopted is similar to the 
evolutionary treaty interpretation positions taken in Mondev and Pope and Talbot.  
The tribunal in Tradex said this: 
The interpretation of Art. 8 and Art. 9 of the 1993 Albanian Law adopted by the tribunal 
appears confirmed by the developments in the Albanian investment laws of 1990, 1992 
and 1993.  Clearly, there has been a continuous evolution of such investment laws to 
assure a constantly better protection of the investments; this explains why an investment 
made in 1990 does not remain submitted to the rules in force at the moment in which it 
was made, but is subsequently submitted to the new rules. … The succession in time of 
dispute settlement mechanisms is to be evaluated in such a context of progressive 
evolution.709 
367. Of the standard of compensation to be paid by host States to investors, the 
CME tribunal said this: 
                                                 
707 Pope and Talbot (Damages), at para. 65.  But see Glamis Gold, at para. 616. 
708 See, e.g., Fitzmaurice (1957), supra note 185, at 226. 
709 Tradex (Jurisdiction), at 67.  See also Eureko, at para. 258 (noting the doctrine that presumes 
sovereign rights override the rights of a foreign investor ‘has been displaced by contemporary 
customary international law, particularly as that law has been reshaped by the conclusion of more than 
2000 essentially concordant bilateral investment treaties’). 
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The possibility of payment of compensation determined by the law of the host State or by 
the circumstances of the host State has disappeared from contemporary international law 
as it is expressed in investment treaties in such extraordinary numbers, and with such 
concordant provisions, as to have reshaped the body of customary international law 
itself.710 
368. In contrast to the above FIAT cases, the LG&E tribunal considered a more 
rigid position was required when determining whether the essential security measures 
under the US-Argentina BIT were self-judging.  The tribunal took the view that 
The provisions included in the international treaty are to be interpreted in conformity 
with the interpretation given and agreed upon by both parties at the time of its signature, 
unless both parties agreed to its modification.711   
369. The tribunal concluded that only after the US-Argentina BIT was signed did 
the United States begin to consider its essential security measures treaty provisions as 
self-judging.  On this basis, Argentina’s contention that the security measures 
provisions were self-judging was rejected. 
370. The cases discussed in this Section indicate the wisdom of the drafters of the 
Vienna Convention Rules in deciding not to specify that an interpretation must be 
related to a meaning that exists at a certain period of time.  As the above cases 
illustrate, sometimes an evolutionary interpretation is required, and FIATs tend to do 
this particularly in the light of the huge number of BITs that have been signed in the 
past two decades.  At other times the tribunal may see a real need for the interpretation 
to be anchored to the meaning held at the time of the signature or conclusion of the 
treaty. 
                                                 
710 CME (Final Award), at para. 498. 
711 LG&E (Merits), at para 213. 
J O S E P H  R O M E S H  W E E R A M A N T R Y                                          222  P H D  T H E S I S  |  U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  L O N D O N  
F.  PRINCIPLE OF EFFECTIVENESS 
a) International Law Practice 
371. The interpretative principle of effectiveness does not find express reference in 
the Vienna Convention Rules.  It operates on the presumption that parties intended 
that all the terms in their agreement had a purpose and that they did not intend any 
part of it to be ineffective.712  The principle found a place in Waldock’s Third ILC 
Report but was removed in subsequent ILC drafts.713  Ultimately, the ILC considered 
the principle to be embodied in Article 31(1), particularly within the parameters of the 
good faith and object and purpose criteria.714 
372. The PCIJ and the ICJ have invoked the principle many times.715  In Libya v. 
Chad, the ICJ referred to it as ‘one of the fundamental principles of interpretation of 
treaties, consistently upheld by international jurisprudence.’ 716  The WTO Appellate 
Body placed the principle within the scope of the Vienna Convention Rules when it 
observed that ‘[a] fundamental tenet of treaty interpretation flowing from the general 
                                                 
712 See, e.g., Pollux, ‘The Interpretation of the Charter’, 23 British Yearbook of International Law 54 
(1946), at 68-9 (‘the aim of interpretation is to give effect to the instrument; to give it an interpretation 
which, on the whole, will render it most effective and useful.’) and at 70 (‘the aim [of interpretation] 
must be to endow international conventions with the maximum possible effect.’); and Lauterpacht, The 
Development of International Law by the Permanent Court of International Justice (1934), at 69-70 
and the revised 1958 version of that book, at 228. 
713 See Annex II. 
714 YICL (1966-II), at 219, para. 6. 
715 For other applications or references to this principle, see Territorial Dispute (Libya v Chad), ICJ 
Reports 6 (1994), at 23, para. 47; Corfu Channel case, ICJ Reports 4 (1949), at 24; Acquisition of 
Polish Nationality, Advisory Opinion (No. 7), PCIJ, Series B (1923), at 17; Free Zones of Upper Savoy 
and the District of Jex, Order of 19 August 1929, PCIJ, Ser. A, No. 22, p. 13; the Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge de Visscher in the South West Africa Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 128 (1950), at 187; Border 
and Transborder Armed Actions, Judgment, ICJ Reports 69 (1988), at 89, para. 46; and YILC (1966), 
Vol. II, at 219.   
716 Territorial Dispute (Libya v Chad), Judgment, ICJ Reports 6 (1994), at 25, para. 51. 
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rule of interpretation set out in Article 31 [of the Vienna Convention] is the principle 
of effectiveness (ut res magis valeat quam pereat)’.717 
373. The principle is not free from criticism or concerns that it may override the 
treaty text or its object and purpose.  ICJ, for instance, has indicated that that the 
principle of effectiveness will not be applied if it is contrary to the letter and spirit of 
the provisions subject to interpretation.718  Fitzmaurice noted that the principle had 
teleological leanings and was concerned ‘to keep it within bounds, to prevent it from 
leading to judicial legislation’. 719   Thirlway has been critical of the principle on 
another ground.  He has observed that if 
a particular set of circumstances had arisen or could be imagined in which a treaty 
provision, according to an otherwise acceptable interpretation, would be ineffective or 
lead to improbable results, this is not necessarily a ground for rejecting that 
interpretation.  The principle of effectiveness should be employed as an aid to assessment 
of likely intentions, rather than as a rigid canon of interpretation whereby the text must be 
deemed to be effective in all circumstances.720  
374. Thirlway qualifies this statement by adding that an ineffective interpretation 
should be excluded only where there is an alternative interpretation that produces an 
effective result and does not offend against other cannons of interpretation.721  
                                                 
717  Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages II, AB-1996-2, WTO Appellate Body, 
WT/DS8,10&11/AB/R (4 October 1996), at 12.  See also Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (2008), at 
159-161. 
718 See the Interpretation of Peace Treaties (Second Phase) case, ICJ Reports 221 (1950), at 229 and 
the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Read, ibid., at 238.  See also Oppenheim, supra note 4, at 1281 
(‘[e]ffectiveness is relative to the object and purpose of the treaty, a decision as to which will normally 
first have to be made’).   
719 Fitzmaurice, supra note 76, at 19.  See also Fitzmaurice, ‘Vae victis or woe to the negotiators: Your 
treaty or our ‘interpretation’ of it?’, 65 AJIL 358 (1971), at 373; the joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges 
Fitzmaurice and Spender in the South West Africa cases, Preliminary Objections, ICJ Reports 319 
(1962), at 468, 511-13; the Laguna de Desierto case, 113 ILR 1, at 44; and Thirlway, supra note 91, at 
pp. 47-8. 
720 Thirlway, supra note 91, at 46 (footnote omitted).  Similarly, Oppenheim, supra note 4, at 1281, 
takes the view that ‘the absence of a full measure of effectiveness may be the direct result of the 
inability of the parties to reach agreement on fully effective provisions; in such a case the court cannot 
invoke the need for effectiveness in order to revise the treaty to make good the parties’ omission’.  
721  Ibid., at pp. 47-8. 
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375. Some commentators consider the principle as possessing two limbs.  To them, 
the first limb—‘la règle de l’effet utile’—involves a presumption that individual 
provisions of the treaty must have been intended to have some use or effect and that an 
interpretation that reduces provisions to mere surplusage is suspect.722  The second—
‘la règle de l’efficacité’—is that the treaty as a whole (and, necessarily, each of its 
provisions) must be presumed to have a purpose, and an interpretation denying that 
end would attract doubt.723 
b) FIAT Practice 
376. The principle of effectiveness has been frequently utilized by FIATs.  The 
AAP award spoke of the principle in the following terms: 
Nothing is better settled, as a canon of interpretation in all systems of law, than that a 
clause must be so interpreted as to give it a meaning rather than so as to deprive it of a 
meaning  … This is simply an application of the more wide legal principle of 
‘effectiveness’ which requires favouring the interpretation that gives to each treaty 
provision ‘effet utile’.724 
377. The ad hoc Committee in Klöckner described the principle as a ‘customary 
principle of interpretation’. 725  According to the Eureko tribunal, the principle of 
effectiveness was a ‘cardinal rule’ of treaty interpretation that required:  
that each and every operative clause of a treaty is to be interpreted as meaningful rather 
than meaningless.  It is equally well established in the jurisprudence of international law, 
particularly that of the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International 
                                                 
722 See, e.g., Berlia, ‘Contribution à l’interprétation des traités’, 114 Recueil des cours 283 (1965), at 
306 ff.  Examples of this rule may be found in the merits phase of the Corfu Channel case, ICJ Reports 
4 (1949), at 24 and the Anglo-Iranian Oil case, ICJ Reports 93 (1952), at 105.  See also Thirlway, supra 
note 91, at 44.   
723 See, e.g., Berlia, ibid., at 308 ff.  Examples of this rule may be found in the Interpretation of Peace 
Treaties (Second Phase) case, ICJ Reports 221 (1950), at 229; and in the Ambatielos case, ICJ Reports 
(1952), at 45.  This limb appears to have a close relation to the Article 31(1) object and purpose 
criterion. 
724 AAP, at para. 40. 
725 Klöckner (Annulment), at para. 62.  
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Court of Justice, that treaties, and hence their clauses, are to be interpreted so as to render 
them effective rather than ineffective.726 
378. In applying this principle, FIATs have required ‘full effect’ to be given to a 
provision727 or to the intentions of the parties.728  A variant of this practice has been 
the tendency of FIATs to avoid interpretations that deprive a treaty or its provisions of  
a) ‘any practical value’;729  
b) ‘any meaning’;730  
c) ‘any effect’;731  
d) ‘practical content’;732  
e) ‘practical applicability’;733 or  
f) ‘any semantic content or practical utility of its own’.734   
                                                 
726 Eureko, at para. 248.  No citations were made to specific international law cases.  It could have 
referred to AAP, at para. 40 (Rule (E)), which expounds a similar rule and cites authority in support.  
See also Noble Ventures (Award), at para. 50 (commenting after a reference to the Vienna Convention 
Rules that ‘the principle of effectiveness (effet utile) … too plays an important role in interpreting 
treaties’).  FIATs have also considered the Roman maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat as having 
equivalence with the principle of effectiveness.  See infra note 757.  In relation to the use of the 
principle by domestic courts in interpreting BITs, see Czech Republic v European Media Ventures SA, 
[2007] EWHC 2851 (Comm), at para. 37.  
727  See, e.g., MINE (Annulment), at paras. 4.05-06.  See also Canfor Corporation (Decision of 
Preliminary Question), at para. 324 (‘under well-known principles of international law, every provision 
of an international agreement must have meaning, because it is presumed that the State Parties that 
negotiated and concluded that agreement intended each of its provisions to have an effect’). 
728 See, e.g., Amco (Jurisdiction), at para. 29. 
729 Kaiser Bauxite, at para. 24. 
730 Maffezini, at para. 36; Lucchetti (Award), at para. 59; and El Paso, at para. 110 (holding that treaty 
provisions ‘must be considered to carry some legal meaning’).  See also Joy Mining, at para. 50.  The 
SPP tribunal, in relation to a domestic statute, held that ‘[u]nder general principles of statutory 
interpretation, a legal text should be interpreted in such a way that a reason and a meaning can be 
attributed to every word in the text’.  SPP (Jurisdiction), at para. 89.  See also Holiday Inns, 1 ICSID 
Reports at 674; and Waste Management (Opinion), at 476, para. 47, and 478, para. 55.  
731 Camuzzi (Jurisdiction), at para. 56. 
732 Noble Ventures (Award), at para. 52.  See also infra note 938. 
733 Noble Ventures (Award), at para. 52. 
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379. Other FIATs have declined to make an interpretation that would render a 
provision  
a) invalid;735 
b) ‘useless’;736  
c) ‘pleonastic’;737  
d) ‘meaningless’;738 or 
e) ‘destroy the internal logic of [a provision] and render much of that provision 
superfluous’.739 
380. On the whole, these pronouncements have been faithful to the principle as it 
operates in international law. 
381. FIATs have been conscious of the similarities between the object and purpose 
criterion and the principle of effectiveness740 and also the limitations of the principle:  
The Tribunal is certainly aware of the general principle of interpretation whereby a text 
ought to be interpreted in the manner that gives it effect—ut magis valeat quam pereat.  
However, this principle of interpretation should not lead to confer, a posteriori, to a 
                                                                                                                                            
 
734 Tecmed, at para.156. 
735 Tza Yap Shum, at para. 188. 
736 American Manufacturing, Separate Opinion of Golsong , at 42, para. 20.  El Paso, at para. 76, spoke 
of the need to avoid rendering ‘the whole Treaty completely useless’.  See also Sempra Energy 
(Jurisdiction), at para. 94. 
737 SPP (Jurisdiction No. 2), at para. 94. 
738 Occidental Exploration (Award), at para. 68; Joy Mining, at para. 50; and SPP (Jurisdiction No. 2), 
at para. 94. 
739  SPP (Jurisdiction No. 2), at para. 94.  Note must be made that this was in relation to the 
interpretation of an Egyptian statute that, under certain conditions, consented to ICSID jurisdiction.  
See also SGS v Pakistan, at para. 168; Generation Ukraine (Award), at para. 14.3; and Eureko, at para. 
258. 
740  SGS v Philippines, at para. 116 (‘[t]he object and purpose of the BIT supports an effective 
interpretation of Article X(2)’).  See also MINE (Annulment), at paras. 4.05; Noble Ventures (Award), at 
para. 52; Mondev, at para. 91; and Schreuer, ‘Diversity and Harmonization of Treaty Interpretation in 
Investment Arbitration’, 3(2) Transnational Dispute Management (2006), at 4.  
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provision deprived of its object and purpose a result that goes against its clear and 
explicit terms.741 
382. This warning reflects the caution expressed by the ICJ in the Interpretation of 
Peace Treaties case as noted in the International Law section above. 742   More 
recently, the Renta 4 tribunal has indicated that effect need not be given to every word 
of a provision if that is not possible.  In that case  it held that ‘[t]he search to give 
meaning to the eight (or eleven) words that follow “relating to” in Article 10(1) [of the 
Spain-USSR BIT] simply cannot be allowed to deprive the remaining text of its 
essential positive meaning.’ 743   This is consonant with the observation of Hugh 
Thirlway above that the interpretation need not be effective in all circumstances.  But 
an interpretation that deprives certain words of their effect should not be made lightly. 
383. On a number of occasions FIATs have explicitly employed ‘la règle de l’effet 
utile’. 744   No instance was found where an explicit application of ‘la règle de 
l’efficacité’ was made by FIATs.  A reason for the lack of reference to this aspect of 
the interpretative process may be due to its overlap with the tribunal’s application of 
the Article 31(1) object and purpose criterion.  Nonetheless, the Sempra Energy 
tribunal appeared to be applying ‘la règle de l’efficacité’ when it stated:  
If the purpose of the Treaty and the terms of its provisions have the scope the parties 
negotiated and accepted, they could not now, as has been noted, be ignored by the 
Tribunal since that would devoid the Treaty of all useful effect.745 
384. The FIAT awards cited in this Section demonstrate the importance and 
widespread use of the principle of effectiveness in the international law of treaty 
                                                 
741 Banro (Award), at para. 6.  See also Noble Ventures (Award), at para. 52.  This passage was quoted 
with approval in the dissenting opinion of Alberro-Semerena in Aguas del Tunari, at para. 32. 
742 See supra note 718. 
743 Renta 4, at para. 32.  Article 10(1) of the Spain-USSR BIT is comprised of over 60 words. 
744 AAP, at para. 40 (Rule (E)) and para. 52; CSOB (Jurisdiction), at para. 39; Noble Ventures (Award), 
at para. 50; Salini v Jordan (Jurisdiction), at para. 95; El Paso, at para. 110; and Thunderbird, 
Dissenting Opinion, at para. 91. 
745 Sempra Energy (Jurisdiction), at para. 94. 
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interpretation.  As useful as the principle is, care still must be exercised that does not 
unduly override the text of the treaty.   
G. LEGAL MAXIMS 
a) International Law Practice 
385. Legal maxims are not anachronistic propositions of a bygone age.  They 
encapsulate reasoning or rules of logic that have survived centuries of use.  Many of 
them continue to be relevant in a large number of today’s legal systems.  An 
international tribunal’s use of maxims to interpret treaties could be justified on the 
grounds that they are relevant rules of international law under Article 31(3)(c) of the 
Vienna Convention or supplementary means of interpretation under Article 32.746  
386. The ILC’s view of maxims was that the interpretation of treaties by 
international tribunals at one time or another used almost every ‘maxim of which use 
is made in national systems of law in the interpretation of statutes’.747  It continued: 
Thus, it would be possible to find sufficient evidence of recourse to principles and 
maxims in international practice to justify their inclusion in a codification of the law of 
treaties, if the question were simply one of their relevance on the international plane.  But 
the question raised by jurists is rather as to the non-obligatory character of many of these 
principles and maxims.  They are, for the most part, principles of logic and good sense 
valuable only as guides to assist in appreciating the meaning which the parties may have 
intended to attach to the expressions that they employed in a document.  Their suitability 
for use in any given case hinges on a variety of considerations which have first to be 
appreciated by the interpreter of the document … Even when a possible occasion for their 
application may appear to exist, their application is not automatic but depends on the 
conviction of the interpreter that it is appropriate in the particular circumstances of the 
case.748   
                                                 
746 Oppenheim, supra note 4, at 1275, et seq., refers to a number of legal maxims in its section on 
supplementary means of interpretation.  
747 YILC (1966-II), at 218, para. 3. 
748 YILC (1966-II), at 218, para. 4. Oppenheim, supra note 4, at 1269-70, comments that Roman law 
maxims applied in municipal law systems:  
are expressive of common sense and of normal grammatical usage, they commend themselves 
also in the interpretation of treaties.  However, while international law permits recourse to 
many principles and maxims, it does not always require recourse to them.  The appropriateness 
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b) FIAT Practice 
387. FIATs have provided several practical applications of legal maxims, 
particularly relating to the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant (i.e., things 
general do not restrict (or detract from) things special).  Take, for instance, SGS v 
Philippines.  In that case, the BIT provision subject to interpretation prescribed that if 
consultations failed to resolve a dispute, the investor may submit the dispute either to 
the national courts of the host State or to ICSID or UNCITRAL arbitration.  In 
contrast, Article 12 of the private agreement between SGS and the Philippines 
required, in part, that ‘[a]ll actions concerning disputes in connection with the 
obligations of either party to this Agreement shall be filed at the Regional Trial Courts 
of Makati or Manila’.  The tribunal, in following the maxim generalia specialibus non 
derogant, held that it was not to be presumed that the general provision in the BIT 
‘has the effect of overriding specific provisions of particular contracts, freely 
negotiated between the parties’.749  Similarly, in SPP (Jurisdiction), the tribunal used 
the maxim to determine that  
[a] specific agreement between the parties to a dispute would naturally take precedence 
with respect to a bilateral treaty between the investor’s State and Egypt, while such a 
bilateral treaty would in turn prevail with respect to a multilateral treaty such as the 
Washington Convention.750  
388. In his Declaration in SGS v Philippines, Antonio Crivellaro contended that a 
qualification should be made to the generalia specialibus and lex posterior maxims: 
                                                                                                                                            
 
of applying many of them depends on a variety of considerations which will determine 
whether, although they are accepted in international law as potentially relevant, they are also 
suitable for application in all the circumstances of a particular case.  In such cases the principle 
is not so much a rule of international law as a discretionary aid …’ 
749 SGS v Philippines, at para. 141.  In a similar vein, Schreuer, supra note 5, at 362, has commented 
that ‘[a] document containing a dispute settlement clause which is more specific in relation to the 
parties and to the dispute should be given precedence over a document of more general application’.  
See also AAP, at para. 54 (‘in the absence of a specific rule provided for in the Treaty itself as lex 
specialis, the general international law rules have to assume their role as lex generalis’) and para. 65 
(holding that the lex generalis applies to all situations that are not covered by a specific rule).  See also 
AES (Jurisdiction), at para. 23(b); and AAP, Dissenting Opinion, at 302-3. 
750 SPP (Jurisdiction), at para. 83, citing Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis, Bk II, Chap. XVI, and the 
Readoptation of the Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions, Jurisdiction, Series A, No. 11, pp. 31-32 
(1924) and Saudi Arabia v Aramco 27 ILR 117 (1963).  However, the BIT’s cannot override the ICSID 
Convention in a way that it expands the provisions contained in that Convention.  See, e.g., Aguas del 
Tunari, at para. 278. 
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I doubt whether the Roman adagios generalia specialibus non derogant and lex posterior 
deragat legi priori (paras. 141 and 142 of the Decision) may be extended to the 
comparison between a treaty and a contract.  As the Decision admits in respect of the 
second maxim (but the same should also apply to the first maxim), for such maxims to 
apply it is required that the two instruments have the same legal character and, I would 
add, be made by or be directly binding on the same parties.751   
389. No authority is cited for this call for equivalence of legal character.  No 
comment was elicited by the majority on this issue.   
390. In SGS v Pakistan the tribunal held that the claimant’s interpretation of the 
umbrella clause at issue was exceedingly expansive.  It took the view that the clause 
required a considerably higher degree of specificity before it could accept such an 
interpretation.  The tribunal’s conclusion was that the interpretative approach to be 
adopted was summed up by the maxim in dubio mitius (i.e., the interpretation of 
treaties in deference to the sovereignty of states).752  The Eureko tribunal criticised 
this finding on the following grounds: 
This Tribunal feels bound to add that reliance by the Tribunal in SGS v Pakistan on the 
maxim in dubio mitius so as effectively to presume that sovereign rights override the 
rights of a foreign investor could be seen as a reversion to a doctrine that has been 
displaced by contemporary customary international law, particularly as that law has been 
reshaped by the conclusion of more than 2000 essentially concordant bilateral investment 
treaties.753 
391. The expressio unius est exclusio alterius rule (i.e., if something is expressed it 
must be taken to exclude something else) was applied by the Waste Management 
tribunal in the following way:  
Where a treaty spells out in detail and with precision the requirements for maintaining a 
claim, there is no room for implying into the treaty additional requirements, whether 
based on alleged requirements of general international law in the field of diplomatic 
protection or otherwise. 
392. The flaws in the above type of logic were exposed in Siemens, where the 
tribunal took the view that  
                                                 
751 SGS v Philippines, Supplementary Declaration, at para. 9.  
752 SGS v Pakistan, at para. 171.  See also Chapter VI, Section H. 
753 Eureko, at para. 258. 
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Article 4 is the only article in the [1991 Germany-Argentina BIT] that deals with 
compensation in case of expropriation and of war or civil unrest.  If the Treaty should be 
interpreted as alleged by Argentina - by excluding from its application every specific 
situation that has not been included -, we would be bound to reach the conclusion that, in 
cases of discrimination, arbitrary measures, or treatment short of the just and equitable 
standard, there would not be a right to compensation under the Treaty - an unlikely 
intended result by the Contracting Parties given the Treaty’s purpose.  If a matter is dealt 
with in a provision of the Treaty and not specifically mentioned under other provisions, it 
does not necessarily follow that the other provisions should be considered to exclude the 
matter especially covered.754  
393. This inherent problem in the expressio unius maxim calls for caution to be 
exercised if it is employed.  An injudicious application may lead to an unwarranted 
limitation on the application of a treaty.755 
394. Other maxims applied or discussed by FIATs include ejusdem generis (i.e., of 
the same genus);756 ut res magis valeat quam pereat (i.e., let the thing stand rather 
than fall);757 and lex posterior derogat legi priori (i.e., a later law repeals an earlier 
one).758  
395. The jurisprudence referred to above shows that FIATs have contributed to 
international law through the practical instances in which they have applied legal 
maxims.  Those applications have helped provide a practical context for the maxims 
and enhance the understanding of how those maxims operate. 
                                                 
754  Siemens (Jurisdiction), at para. 140.  See also Vacuum Salt, at 337, para. 29, n. 9; Tokios 
(Jurisdiction), para. 30; Tza Yap Shum, at para. 207; and Methanex (Final Award), Part IV, Chpt. C, at 
para. 14. 
755 See also Schreuer, ‘Diversity and Harmonization of Treaty Interpretation in Investment Arbitration’, 
3(2) Transnational Dispute Management (2006), at 7 (the maxim is of limited use and that ‘[w]hether 
the mention of one item or a list of items in a provision really excludes the relevance of other items 
depends very much on the particular circumstances and cannot be answered in a generalised way.’).  
756 Maffezini (Jurisdiction), at 405-6, at paras. 46-50; and Plama (Jurisdiction), at paras. 36 and 189. 
757 This maxim has been used synonymously with the principle of effectiveness.  See, e.g., Banro, at 
para. 6; El Paso, at para. 110; American Manufacturing, Separate Opinion of Arbitrator Golsong , at 42, 
para. 20; Waste Management, Dissenting Opinion, at para. 55; and Pan American (Preliminary 
Objections), at para. 132.  See also Section Chapter V, Section F.   
758 SGS v Philippines, at para. 143 and at para. 145 (‘[i]n principle a later agreement between the same 
parties could override an earlier one’). 
J O S E P H  R O M E S H  W E E R A M A N T R Y                                          232  P H D  T H E S I S  |  U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  L O N D O N  
Chapter VI 
 
 
SOME SALIENT FEATURES 
 
 
 
Chapter outline: The present Chapter highlights some unique or notable aspects of FIAT 
jurisprudence relating to the thesis subject matter.  The topics to be discussed are 
intended to assist in evaluating the contribution FIATs have made to the corpus of the 
international law on treaty interpretation.  Section A explores the pre-Vienna Convention 
rules formulated by the AAP tribunal.  Section B examines the failure of FIATs to apply 
the Vienna Convention Rules or misapplications of those Rules.  Section C studies the 
means by which FIATs interpret unilateral declarations of States consenting to ICSID 
arbitration.  Sections D and E analyse the divergent FIAT interpretations of umbrella 
clauses and most favoured nations clauses.  Section F draws attention to the problems 
resulting from investors’ lack of access to investment treaty preparatory work.  Section G 
discusses the issue of interpreting investment treaties on the basis that they have a pro-
investor bias.  Liberal and restrictive approaches to treaty interpretation are dealt with 
in Section H.  Finally, Section I appraises the interpretation of investment treaty 
provisions requiring negotiation periods prior to the commencement of an arbitration.     
A.  THE AAP  RULES  
396. The AAP award warrants separate discussion in this Chapter because it 
formulated in some detail six rules that were commonly used prior to the acceptance 
of the Vienna Convention Rules.  In international arbitral awards, or for that matter 
decisions of other international courts and tribunals, it is rare indeed to have such an 
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extensive self-styled formulation of pre-Vienna Rules treaty interpretation 
principles.759  This makes the AAP award unique. 
397. The tribunal in AAP commenced its discussion on treaty interpretation stating 
that it must construe treaties 
in conformity with the sound universally accepted rules of treaty interpretation as 
established in practice, adequately formulated by l’Institut de Droit International in its 
General Session in 1956, and as codified in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties.760   
398. Curiously, the tribunal did not proceed to discuss the text of Article 31 but 
proceeded to state that the ‘basic rule’ to be followed was contained in the Van 
Bokkelen case, which held that ‘for the interpretation of treaty language and intention, 
whenever controversy arises, reference must be made to the law of nations and to 
international jurisprudence’.761  The tribunal continued by formulating ‘[t]he other 
rules that should guide the Tribunal in adjudicating the interpretation issues raised in 
the present arbitration case’:762 
Rule (A) ‘The first general maxim of interpretation is that it is not allowed to interpret 
what has no need of interpretation.  When a deed is worded in a clear and precise terms 
[sic.], when its meaning is evident and leads to no absurd conclusion, there can be no 
reason for refusing to admit the meaning which such deed naturally presents’…[763] 
 
Rule (B) ‘In the interpretation of treaties … we ought not to deviate from the common use 
of the language unless we have very strong reasons for it (…) words are only designed to 
                                                 
759 The Georges Pinson case is one of the most prominent arbitration awards that contains a detailed 
formulation of pre-Vienna Convention treaty interpretation rules, but it was issued more than 80 years 
ago.  Georges Pinson, France-Mexico Claims Commission, (1927-8) Annual Digest 426, at 426-7; 5 
RIAA 327 (1928), at 422.  
760 AAP, at para. 38. 
761 AAP, at para. 39, citing the Van Bokkelen case, Award of 4 December 1888, in Moore’s History and 
Digest of International Arbitration 1807 (1898), Vol. II, at 1849, and Repertory of International 
Arbitral Jurisprudence, Vol I, at 13. 
762 AAP, at para. 40. 
763  Quoting Vattel.  The citation the tribunal provides is ‘Vattel’s Chapter on Interpretation of 
Treaties—Book 2, chapter 17’.  It fails to indicate the quotation is from Vattel’s The Law of Nations or 
the Principles of Natural Law Applied to the Conduct and to the Affairs of Nations and of Sovereigns, 
(1758).                
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express the thoughts; thus the true signification of an expression in common use is the 
idea which custom has affixed to that expression’ …[764] 
 
Rule (C) In cases where the linguistic interpretation of a given text seems inadequate or 
the wording thereof is ambiguous, there should be recourse to the integral context of the 
Treaty in order to provide an interpretation that takes into consideration what is normally 
called: ‘le sens général, l’esprit du Traité’, or ‘son économie general’ …  
 
Rule (D) In addition to the ‘integral context’, ‘object and intent’, ‘spirit’, ‘objectives’, 
‘comprehensive construction of the treaty as a whole’, recourse to the rules and principles 
of international law has to be considered a necessary factor providing guidance within the 
process of treaty interpretation … 
 
Rule (E) Nothing is better settled, as a canon of interpretation in all systems of law, than 
that a clause must be so interpreted as to give it a meaning rather than so as to deprive it 
of a meaning  … This is simply an application of the more wide legal principle of 
‘effectiveness’ which requires favouring the interpretation that gives to each treaty 
provision ‘effet utile’.  
 
Rule (F) ‘When there is need of interpretation of a treaty it is proper to consider 
stipulations of earlier or later treaties in relation to subjects similar to those treated in the 
treaty under consideration’[ 765 ] … Thus, establishing the practice followed through 
comparative law survey of all relevant precedents becomes an extremely useful tool to 
provide an authoritative interpretation.766 
399. After setting out the foregoing rules, the tribunal viewed its task as follows: 
In the light of the above mentioned cannons of interpretation, the relevant provisions of 
the Sri Lanka/UK Bilateral Investment Treaty have to be identified, each provision 
construed separately, examined within the global context of the Treaty, in order to 
determine the proper interpretation of each text, as well as its scope of application in 
relation to the other treaty provisions and with regard to the various general rules and 
principles of international law not specifically referred to in the Treaty itself.767  
400. Each of the AAP tribunal’s self-styled rules were supported by numerous 
references to sources, many of which were quoted directly from the Repertory of 
International Arbitral Jurisprudence and the work of the Institute of International 
Law at its Granada Session in 1956.  The rules, however, fail to make reference to 
                                                 
764 Quoting Vattel.  Here the tribunal does not provide any reference to the primary source, except to 
state that it was relied upon by the USA-Venezuela Mixed Commission in the Howland case, and then 
it refers to an excerpt in Repertory of International Arbitral Jurisprudence, Vol. I: 1794-1918, at 16.  
The opinions of all three commissioners in Howland’s case are fully reported in Moore’s History and 
Digest of International Arbitrations, Vol. IV, at 3616-64.  
765  Quoting the Elton case, Mexico-US General Claims Commission of 1929, Repertory of 
International Arbitral Jurisprudence, Vol. II, p. 35.   
766 AAP, at para. 40 (footnotes omitted). 
767 AAP, at para. 41. 
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Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, any subsequent conduct of the parties, relevant 
PCIJ or ICJ cases (it does, nonetheless, refer to pleadings before those courts), the ILC 
Commentary, Ambassador Yasseen’s 1973 Hague Academy Lectures on the Vienna 
Convention Rules or Judge Fitzmaurice’s seminal articles on the ICJ’s practice 
relating to treaty interpretation in the British Year Book of International Law.  The 
failure to mention these important materials and points in the tribunal’s detailed 
elucidation of treaty interpretation rules is somewhat perplexing. 768   All of the 
materials would have been readily available to the tribunal but perhaps not pleaded by 
the parties.  Moreover, it is difficult to understand why the tribunal set out a selective 
patchwork of treaty interpretation jurisprudence rather than simply relying on the 
Vienna Convention Rules or even the Institute’s rules.   
401. In fairness to the tribunal, it should be pointed out that the bulk of the 
pleadings in AAP appears to have been made in 1988 and the award was issued in 
1990.769  Perhaps it is only with the benefit of hindsight, particularly the subsequent 
wide-spread use and recognition of the Vienna Convention Rules, that the present 
critical observations can be made.  But nevertheless it would have been expected that 
the second edition of Sinclair’s work on the Vienna Convention (published in 1984) 
was available to the counsel involved and the members of the tribunal.  Sinclair there 
expressed the view that Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention were by then, 
without doubt, reflective of the principles of customary international law.770   
                                                 
768 One could say, in fairness to the tribunal, that it limited itself only to the rules that it considered to be 
relevant to its task.  See, e.g., the indication by the tribunal that the rules it formulated were to guide it 
in adjudicating the interpretation issues raised in that particular case and that the preparatory work was 
not before it.  AAP, at paras. 40 and 51. 
769 AAP, at para. 6 et seq. 
770 Sinclair, supra note 6, at 153.  See also Amerasinghe, ‘The Jurisdiction of the International Centre 
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes’, 19 Indian J. Int’l Law 166 (1979), at 167.  It is also relevant 
to note here that the ICJ’s first indication that Articles 31 to 33 reflected rules of customary 
international law appeared in its 1991 judgment in the Case concerning the Arbitral Award of 31 July 
1989, ICJ Reports 53 (1991), at 69-70, para. 48. 
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402. Relatively little reference has been had by other FIATs to the interpretative 
rules as formulated in the AAP case.771  One may speculate that the rules formulated in 
AAP have declined in relevance since the ascendancy of the Vienna Convention Rules 
as customary rules of treaty interpretation.  Not only are those Rules now almost 
universally accepted as first order treaty interpretation rules, they are also more 
straightforward and systematic to apply than the rules articulated by the AAP tribunal.  
Further, the AAP rules are incomplete both as to the substance of the rules (as 
mentioned above, they do not cover preparatory work or subsequent practice) and the 
jurisprudence on which they are based.  
403. The AAP rules serve to illuminate the type of dilemma faced by treaty 
interpreters prior to the Vienna Convention Rules.  There existed no real guidance as 
to the selection of the rules to be applied and no indication as to the stage of the 
interpretation at which any given rule could be deployed.  Consequently, much 
discretion rested on the tribunal as to rule selection and the hierarchy that would 
dictate the order of their application.  Undoubtedly, valuable time and energy of 
counsel and the arbitral tribunal would have been expended by this uncertain process.   
404. This is not to suggest that the Vienna Convention Rules are problem free.  
Determining how those Rules should be applied raises difficult issues, for example, 
the weight to be allocated to each of its criteria.  The Rules do, however, lay down a 
basic framework and identify the applicable rules.  As a consequence, they have 
alleviated to a significant degree the need for comprehensive pleadings by parties on 
the subject and the need for tribunals to deliberate as to the rules to be applied.  In this 
respect, there is a good deal of merit in Georg Schwarzenberger’s observation that 
‘any agreed mode of tackling questions of interpretation, however imperfect, is 
preferable to the absence of, or widespread uncertainty regarding, such rules’.772 
                                                 
771 Exceptions are Lucchetti (Award), at para. 59, n. 7 (referring to AAP Rule (E)); and Methanex (Final 
Award), at Part II, Chpt. B, at para. 16 (referring to AAP Rule (F)). 
772 Schwarzenberger, International Law and Order (1971), at pp. 110–128. 
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B.  FAILURE TO APPLY VIENNA CONVENTION RULES 
405. The Vienna Convention Rules are couched in mandatory language.  Article 
31(1) commences by stating that a ‘treaty shall be interpreted’ in accordance with the 
criteria that follow.773  Notwithstanding this instruction by the Vienna Convention and 
despite the numerous acknowledgements by FIATs that the Vienna Convention Rules 
are expressive of customary international law, a number of FIATs reviewed have 
failed to apply or rely on those Rules.774  Tribunals must be cautious of this practice.  
In this regard, it is appropriate to note Professor Reisman’s warning: ‘[a] failure to 
apply the rules of interpretation perforce distorts the resulting interpretation of the 
parties’ agreement and is a species of the application of the wrong law.’775  Indeed, the 
ad hoc Committee’s decision in Malaysian Historical Salvors suggests that a 
misapplication of general rules of interpretation in an ICSID tribunal’s award may 
have a significant influence on the annulment of an ICSID award based on the ICSID 
Convention’s Article 52(1)(b) manifest excess of powers ground.  In that case, the ad 
hoc Committee considered as extremely relevant the failure of the original tribunal to 
take into account the preparatory work of the ICSID Convention in its interpretation 
                                                 
773 Emphasis added.  Articles 31(3) and (4) in the English version also employ the word ‘shall’. 
774 See, e.g., ADF (Award), at para. 148, n. 153 (referring to Articles 31 and 32 in a footnote but 
interpreting  NAFTA mostly without reference to the Vienna Convention Rules); Metalclad (Award), at 
para. 70 (paraphrasing most of the provisions of Article 31 but not appearing to adhere, or at least refer 
back to the Vienna Convention Rules, to any great degree in its analysis); Waste Management, 5 ICSID 
Reports, at para. 8, et seq. (stating that Article 31 should guide the interpretation of a treaty but 
thereafter failing to refer to or apply it—in contrast, the interpretative analysis by Keith Highet in his 
Dissenting Opinion at 462 provides a better and clearer methodology, which is closer to the process 
prescribed by Article 31, see, e.g., at paras. 33 and 56); CME (Final Award), at para. 496 (referring to 
Article 31 but not applying it in any ostensible manner); Klöckner (Annulment), at para. 179; and SGS v 
Pakistan, at para. 161.  Examples may also be found where in the same award the Vienna Convention 
Rules are applied by a FIAT to certain interpretations of treaty provisions but not to others.  One 
example of this practice is provided in Lauder, in which the tribunal appeared to be applying those 
Rules in one instance (at para. 292) and not in two other places (paras. 200 and 219 et seq.).  See also, 
SGS v Pakistan, at paras. 161 and 164; and United States v Canada, LCIA Case No. 81010, Expert 
Opinion by Professor W. Michael Riesman, ‘Opinion with respect to Selected International Legal 
Problems in LCIA Case No. 7941’, 1 May 2009, at para. 7 (the Vienna Convention Rules ‘have become 
something of a clause de style in international arbitral awards, where they are often briefly referred to 
or ... solemnly reproduced verbatim, and then largely ignored.’), available at 
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/expert_opinions.htm. 
775 United States v Canada, LCIA Case No. 81010, Expert Opinion by Professor W. Michael Riesman, 
‘Opinion with respect to Selected International Legal Problems in LCIA Case No. 7941’, 1 May 2009, 
at para. 7, available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/expert_opinions.htm.   
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of Article 25 of that treaty. 776   Additionally, the ad hoc Committee decision in 
Lucchetti hints that a serious failure to have regard to ‘significant elements’ of the 
Vienna Convention Rules may give rise to an annulment claim under Article 52(1)(b).  
In its findings in respect of this provision, the ad hoc Committee said the following: 
Although the Tribunal’s interpretation of Article 2 of the BIT, as it appears in the Award, 
does not reflect all relevant aspects of treaty interpretation according to the Vienna 
Convention, the Committee has no basis for concluding that the Tribunal disregarded any 
significant element of the well-known and widely recognised international rules of treaty 
interpretation.  In any event, the Committee ... cannot find that the Tribunal’s reasoning 
in the Award, although summary and somewhat simplified in relation to the Vienna 
Convention, constituted an excess – and even less a manifest excess – of the Tribunal’s 
powers within the meaning of Article 52(1)(b) of the Convention.777 
406. The Dissenting Opinion of Sir Franklin Berman went further.  In his view, the 
tribunal must not only apply the proper rules of interpretation but must also 
adequately explain what it is doing in the interpretative process.  On this point, he 
considered the original award to be so defective that he was prepared to annul it.778  
407. Logic and good sense are frequently invoked as substitutes for the Vienna 
Convention Rules.  In Siemens, the tribunal was called upon to interpret, inter alia, 
Article 3(2) of the 2001 Germany-Argentina BIT, which provides: 
None of the Contracting Parties shall accord in its territory to nationals or companies of 
the other Contracting Party a less favorable treatment of activities related to investments 
than granted to its own nationals and companies or to the nationals and companies of 
third States.779 
408. The tribunal considered that it was ‘just a matter of plain common sense’ that 
this clause dealing with activities in relation to investments—without explicit 
reference to investors—still covered investors because those activities needed to be 
undertaken by a person, whether physical or legal.780  Aust’s view is relevant here: 
                                                 
776 Malaysian Historical Salvors (Annulment), at para. 80. 
777 Lucchetti (Annulment), at para. 116. 
778 Lucchetti (Annulment), Dissenting Opinion of Sir Franklin Berman, at para. 6. 
779 Translation in Siemens (Jurisdiction), at para. 82. 
780 Siemens (Jurisdiction), at para. 92; and Methanex (Partial Award), at para. 137.  See also Pope & 
Talbot (Merits, Phase 2), at para. 38; and TSA Spectrum (Award), at para 145.  With respect to the 
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‘[g]ood interpretation is often no more than the application of common sense’.781  A 
means of providing a legal basis for such summary approaches may be to assert that 
they constitute simple, unconscious applications of the Article 31(1) ordinary meaning 
criterion.782   
409. Interpretations that do not apply the Vienna Convention Rules often occur in 
situations in which the terms at issue are relatively straightforward or uncontroversial.  
For example, determinations as to the meaning conveyed by simple terms such as 
‘and’, ‘may’ or ‘shall be’ typically do not involve reference to the Vienna Convention 
Rules. 783   In such cases any detailed interpretative analysis could be considered 
inefficient or uneconomical in relation to the end to be attained.784  It may also be said 
that many of these summary interpretations are based on common sense or intuition.  
The Plama tribunal drew attention to this issue when it noted ‘as with many issues of 
disputed interpretation turning on a relatively few words, it is a short point of almost 
first impression’.785   
410. Concerning the ICSID Convention Article 52(1)(b) manifest excess of powers 
annulment ground, the tribunal in Wena Hotels took the view that this excess ‘must be 
                                                                                                                                            
 
‘rational and logical interpretation’ of commercial documents, see Tecmed, at para. 88.  See also Lord 
Hoffmann speech in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1997] 
UKHL 28; [1998] 1 All ER 98, at 114 (House of Lords), in which he remarked that the modern-day 
contract interpretation principles generally followed ‘common sense principles by which any serious 
utterance would be interpreted in ordinary life’.  
781 Aust, supra note 4, at 200.  See also Mann, ‘British Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments’, 52 BYBIL 241 (1981) (commenting that BITs ‘include many terms which involve a 
measure of evaluation and of judgment and may give rise to disputes about degree rather than 
terminology’). 
782 See, e.g., Siemens (Jurisdiction), at para. 93, where the interpretation consisted of stating that there 
was a ‘simple ordinary meaning’ of a provision and without a great deal of other reasoning.  See also 
YILC (1966-II), at 218, para. 3. 
783 In respect of the cumulative effect of ‘and’, see, e.g., Plama (Jurisdiction), at para. 143; and Lauder, 
at para. 219.  Contrast these cases with Sempra Energy (Jurisdiction), at paras. 41 and 45, which noted 
the use of ‘and’ between Article 25(2)(a) and (b) of the ICSID Convention signified that sub-paragraph 
(2)(b) was an alternative (i.e., meaning “or”) and not cumulative.  Concerning the discretion afforded to 
the interpreter by the word ‘may’, see Wena Hotels (Annulment), at para. 39.  In regard to an 
interpretation of ‘shall be’, see SPP (Jurisdiction No. 2), at para. 74.  
784 See, e.g., Lauder, at para. 159.  See also Kaiser Bauxite, at para. 16 in relation to an abridged 
interpretation of an investor-State agreement. 
785 Plama (Jurisdiction), at para. 160.   
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self-evident rather than the product of elaborate interpretations one way or the other.  
When the latter happens the excess of power is no longer manifest.’ 786   But 
interpreters must be careful; seemingly simple phrases such as ‘relate to’ may require 
many pages of analysis to understand their precise meaning.787 
411. Other criteria not strictly subsumed within the explicit criteria prescribed in 
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention but used in arriving at an interpretation 
include: 
a) justice and fairness;788 
b) policy implications;789 
c) reasonableness;790  
d) practical or legal consequences;791 
                                                 
786 Wena Hotels (Annulment), at paras. 26 and 58.  This approach may also be seen as an application of 
the ordinary meaning criterion.  See also Methanex (Partial Award), at para. 129. 
787 See the Methanex (Partial Award), in which the tribunal devotes paras. 127-147 to ascertain the 
meaning of the phrase ‘relating to’ in Article 1101(1) of the NAFTA.  See also the interpretation of 
‘and’ as signifying an alternative rather than a cumulative conjunction in Sempra Energy (Jurisdiction), 
in paras. 41 and 45. 
788 Plama (Jurisdiction), at para. 149; Metalclad (Award), at para. 67; and Corn Products (Order). 
789 Maffezini (Jurisdiction), at paras. 62-63; CME (Final Award), at para. 413; SD Myers, at paras. 261-
3.  See also the approval of the Maffezini decision in Sempra Energy (Jurisdiction), at para. 144; SD 
Myers, at paras. 261-263; Olguin, at para. 73; Loewen (Final Award), at para. 160 (implying a rule of 
‘judicial finality’ not explicitly included in the treaty); and Banro, at para. 24. 
790  Plama (Jurisdiction), at para. 157; Pope & Talbot (Interim Award), at para. 104; Amco 
(Jurisdiction), at para. 24; Dissenting Opinion in Waste Management (Opinion), at para. 44; Aucoven 
(Jurisdiction), at paras. 97, 99 and 116; SGS v Pakistan, at para. 171.  For references by ICSID ad hoc 
Committees to reasonableness in the interpretation of Article 52(1)(e) of the ICSID Convention, see 
Klöckner (Annulment), at para. 120; and Amco (Annulment), at para. 43.  See also the arguments of 
Argentina in CMS (Jurisdiction), at para. 83 (these arguments, however, were not accepted by the 
tribunal). 
791 Plama (Jurisdiction), at paras. 157 and 219; SD Myers, at paras. 259-263; SGS v Pakistan, at paras. 
167-8; SGS v Philippines, at paras. 126 and 148; Sempra Energy (Jurisdiction), at para. 77; Aguas del 
Tunari, at para. 246; Methanex (Partial Award), at paras. 137-9; Waste Management (Award), at para. 
15; Prosper Weil’s Dissenting Opinion in Tokios (Opinion), at paras. 21, 23 and 30; El Paso, at paras. 
77 and 82; Dissenting Opinion of Jerzy Rajski in Eureko, at para. 11; and CSOB (Jurisdiction), at para. 
58.  
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e) efficiency;792 and 
f) reference to the particular facts of the case.793 
412. This resort to other factors suggests a strict application of the Vienna 
Convention Rules may be less important to the tribunal in some instances than in 
others.  Some of those factors may also be an implicit invocation of one or more of the 
Article 31(1) good faith, ordinary meaning, contextual or object and purpose criteria.  
The criticism that may be levelled against taking into account the above factors is that 
it deflects the focus of the interpreter from the actual text of the treaty and imposes 
conditions or limitations that were not intended by the parties to the treaty.  Having 
said that, it must also be noted that frequently, these non-Vienna Convention factors 
are discussed in conjunction with Article 31 criteria.794 
                                                                                                                                            
 
Pope & Talbot (Merits Phase 2), at paras. 117-118 refers to a ‘practical reason’ for adopting an 
interpretation, noting that it would not render an interpretation that would lead to a ‘patently absurd 
result’ and at para. 252 provides a good example of an effects-based analysis in which it was concerned 
with whether there would be compliance with the treaty.  
For similar attitudes in international law generally, see Sinclair, supra note 6, at 121 (‘[t]he true 
meaning of a text has to be arrived at by taking into account all the consequences which normally and 
reasonably flow from that text’); and Shearer, Starke’s International Law (1994), at 436-437. 
On occasion, the consequence of an interpretation has been considered as constituting part of the good 
faith criterion found in Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention.  See, e.g., CSOB (Jurisdiction), at 
paras. 34; SOABI (Award), at para. 4.10; and CSOB (Further Decision on Jurisdiction), at para. 24.   
Professor Brownlie’s Separate Opinion in CME (Final Award), is worth special consideration here.  
There he remarked that ‘[t]he Czech Republic should have the benefit of civilized modern standards in 
the treatment of States.  Even States which have been held responsible for wars of aggression and 
crimes against humanity are not subjected to economic ruin … It would be strange indeed, if the 
outcome of acceptance of a bilateral investment treaty took the form of liabilities ‘likely to entail 
catastrophic repercussions for the livelihood and economic well-being of the population’ of the Czech 
Republic’, at para 77-78, quoting the Chamber of the ICJ in the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary 
in the Gulf of Maine Area, ICJ Reports 246 (1984), at 342, para. 237. 
792 Metalclad (Award), at para. 67 (holding that a different interpretation to the one adopted ‘would lead 
to inefficiency and inequity’).  See also Czech Republic v. European Media Ventures SA, [2007] 
EWHC 2851 (Comm) (Eng.), at para. 49. 
793 See, e.g., Mondev, at para. 118 (in interpreting what was fair and equitable treatment under NAFTA 
Article 1105 the tribunal observed ‘[a] judgment of what is fair and equitable cannot be reached in the 
abstract; it must depend on the facts of the particular case’).  See also Kaiser Bauxite, at para. 17.  This 
may be considered also an application of the treaty, as opposed to its interpretation, or an application of 
the context criterion. 
794 Methanex (Partial Award), at para. 137 (considering the context together with common sense); 
Plama (Jurisdiction), at para 149 (considering the object and purpose together with notions of justice); 
and Siemens (Jurisdiction), at para. 92 (considering the purpose together with common sense). 
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413. Tribunals that do not refer to all the Article 31 and 32 criteria generally appear 
to mention only those criteria they consider as relevant.  For example, in Lauder, the 
tribunal adopted the following approach to interpretation: ‘As with any treaty, the 
Treaty shall be interpreted by reference to its object and purpose, as well as by the 
circumstances of its conclusion (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Articles 
31 and 32).’795  Conversely, in Duke v Ecuador, the tribunal stated that Article 31(1) 
‘requires interpretation to be “in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning 
to be given to the terms of the treaty” without mentioning the context or the object and 
purpose.796  The failure to make reference to all Article 31 and 32 criteria is plainly 
visible from such examples.  This approach could run the risk of neglecting different 
meanings and nuances that could be unveiled by, for example, the context and the 
object and purpose criteria.  However, it would be inefficient to require tribunals to 
apply explicitly every criterion in the Vienna Convention Rules in each of its 
interpretations, especially if they were not highly relevant for the outcome of the 
interpretation.  Sometimes principle must give way to practicality if the system of 
dispute resolution is to function smoothly and effectively.797  If an uncontroversial 
solution can be achieved from a summary interpretation (which is not fundamentally 
at variance with the Vienna Convention Rules), this should not be discouraged.  
414. Although the practice is extremely rare in FIAT case law, domestic rules 
pertaining to statutory interpretation have on occasion been used to interpret treaties.  
In Pope & Talbot (Merits, Phase 2), for example, the tribunal referred to a domestic 
treatise on statutory interpretation—Sutherland, Statutory Construction—in support of 
a ‘general principle of interpretation’ in relation to the application of plural and 
singular form of words, which principle it applied to the interpretation of the 
                                                 
795 Lauder, at para. 292. 
796 Duke v Ecuador, at para. 318.  An approach even more concise than that adopted in Lauder is found 
in Tecmed.  The tribunal there construed a BIT provision simply by ‘interpreting its terms according to 
the ordinary meaning given to them’.  Tecmed, at para. 121.See also Phoenix, at para. 79. 
797 The observation of Judge Brower in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in McCollough & Co., 
Inc. v Iranian Ministry of Post has relevance here: ‘the struggle for perfection, as so often, must be 
tempered by competing considerations, both of right and of practicality’.  11 Iran-US CTR 3 (1986-II), 
at 42-43, paras. 24-25.  
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NAFTA.798  This recourse to domestic law where no guidance exists in international 
law should not (to the extent it is consistent with the broad parameters of the Vienna 
Convention Rules) be controversial.  As mentioned earlier in this thesis, municipal 
law rules played an important role in the early development of treaty interpretation 
principles.799 
415. In the Lucchetti annulment decision, the ad hoc Committee appeard to indicate 
that had it been provided information as to the intention of the State parties to the 
Chile-Peru BIT at the time of that BIT’s conclusion, this would have been considered 
in its decision.  It further noted that scarce information was submitted as to the views 
of Chile (the non-disputing party) as to its interpretation of the BIT.  As a 
consequence, the Committee observed that it was necessary ‘to interpret the relevant 
clause according to general principles of international law, as set out primarily in the 
Vienna Convention’.800  The reliance on statements of State parties to a treaty as to 
what they consider to be the intention of the signatories prior to the deployment of 
Article 31 does not comply with the requisite application sequence of the Vienna 
Convention Rules.  Post-dispute statements by parties to a treaty as to its meaning 
may fall within Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention but care must be exercised 
when a party to a treaty dispute (in this case the investor) was not present during the 
treaty’s negotiation.  The two State parties to the treaty may have a common self-
interest in interpreting that instrument, which interest is in conflict with the interests of 
the investor.  Allowing such interpretations would detract from the legitimacy and 
spirit of investment treaty dispute resolution.   
416. Another practice that is inconsistent with the Vienna Convention Rules is the 
application of Article 32 prior to exhausting the interpretative steps stipulated in 
Article 31.  This is discussed in Chapter IV.  
                                                 
798 Pope & Talbot (Merits, Phase 2), at para. 37. 
799 See supra note 71. 
800 Lucchetti (Annulment), at para. 79. 
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417. A thought-provoking alternative to the Vienna Convention Rules is found in 
Lemire v Ukraine.801  It involved an ‘Agreement on the Dispute Settlement’ between 
an investor and the Ukrainian Minister of Economy.  Although relating to 
international business transactions rather than treaties, its provisions on interpretation 
are of special interest to this thesis: 
22. This Agreement shall be interpreted according to the common intent of the Parties.  If 
such an intention cannot be established, the Agreement shall be interpreted according to 
the meaning that reasonable persons of the same kind as the Parties would give to it in the 
same circumstances. 
 
The Statement and other actions of a Party shall be interpreted according to that Party’s 
intention if the other Party was aware of, or should have been aware of that intention. 
 
If the preceding paragraph is not applicable, such statements and other actions of a Party 
shall be interpreted according to the meaning that a reasonable person of the same kind as 
the other Party would give to it in the same circumstances. 
 
23. For interpreting this Agreement all the circumstances shall be taken into 
consideration, including the following: 
 
(a) preliminary negotiations between the Parties; 
(b) the practices which the Parties have established in their relations; 
(c) the conduct of the parties following the conclusion of the Agreement; 
(d) the nature and purpose of the Agreement; 
(e) the meanings commonly given to the terms and expressions in the business 
concerned; 
(f) usages. 
  
Terms and conditions of the present Agreement shall be interpreted in such a way that all 
of such terms are deemed effective without making void any of them. 
418. Aside from its reference to the intentions of the parties, these terms contain 
two important concepts not present in the Vienna Convention Rules.  These are the 
reference to ‘the meaning that reasonable persons of the same kind as the Parties 
would give to it in the same circumstances’ and to the principle of effectiveness.  
These appear to be two very practical instructions to treaty interpreters, which are 
absent (at least in express terms) in the Vienna Convention Rules.  However, in 
relation to the first, it would be a concept difficult to apply to States.  Problems would 
arise as to what type of person should be used in the test, e.g., would it be a 
                                                 
801 6 ICSID Rep. 60 (2004). 
J O S E P H  R O M E S H  W E E R A M A N T R Y                                          245  P H D  T H E S I S  |  U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  L O N D O N  
government minister or an expert in the subject matter of the treaty who negotiated the 
text? 
C.  UNILATERAL DECLARATIONS CONSENTING TO ICSID 
ARBITRATION 
419. In SPP the claimants contended that Article 8 of Egyptian Law No. 43 of 1974 
(‘Law No. 43’) constituted Egypt’s consent to ICSID arbitration and that this local law 
must be considered from an international perspective rather than within a domestic 
framework.802  On this basis, they asserted that this domestic law should be construed 
by applying the Vienna Convention Rules.   
420. In addressing this contention, the tribunal held that it could not accept that the 
local law should be interpreted by application of treaty interpretation rules.  It 
observed ‘[u]nlike a treaty, Law No. 43 is not the result of negotiations between two 
or more States, but rather by the result of a unilateral act by a single State’.803  The 
tribunal added that while that State was entitled to interpret its own legislation, which 
interpretation was entitled to considerable weight,  
the jurisprudence of the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International 
Court of Justice makes clear that a sovereign State’s interpretation of its own unilateral 
consent to the jurisdiction of an international tribunal is not binding on the tribunal or 
determinative of jurisdictional issues.804  
421. The tribunal ultimately took the view that because the domestic law was 
alleged to be a unilateral declaration pertaining to the Centre’s jurisdiction, it would  
                                                 
802 SPP (Jurisdiction No. 2), at para. 56. 
803 SPP (Jurisdiction No. 2), at para. 59. 
804 SPP (Jurisdiction No. 2), at para. 60, citing Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria, Preliminary 
Objection, PCIJ Series A/B, No. 77 (1939), p. 64; and Agean Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, ICJ 
Reports 3 (1978), and also adding that to conclude otherwise would contravene Article 41(1) of the 
ICSID Convention. 
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apply general principles of statutory interpretation taking into consideration, where 
appropriate, relevant rules of treaty interpretation and principles of international law 
applicable to unilateral declarations.805  
422. The tribunal proceeded to state that ‘[t]he starting point in statutory 
interpretation, as in the interpretation of treaties and unilateral declarations, is the 
ordinary or grammatical meaning of the terms used’.806  After a detailed examination 
of the text of the law at issue, the tribunal proceeded to address Egypt’s argument that 
Article 8 of the Egyptian Law No. 43 should be interpreted in light of the historical 
reluctance of Egypt to submit to the jurisdiction of international tribunals.  The 
tribunal responded by stating that  
[i]t is clear that, in interpreting a unilateral declaration [in this case a domestic law 
containing an offer to foreign investors to submit investment disputes to ICSID] that is 
alleged to constitute consent by a sovereign State to the jurisdiction of an international 
tribunal, consideration must be given to the intention of the government at the time it 
made the declaration.807   
423. This approach is consistent with ICJ jurisprudence relating to interpretation of 
unilateral declarations.  The ICJ gives a good deal of weight to the intentions of the 
party making the declaration and does not adhere strictly to all the criteria in the 
Vienna Convention Rules.808 
424. In the SPP tribunal’s conclusion, it recognised that, historically, Egypt was 
averse to the notion of submitting its disputes to the jurisdiction of foreign or 
                                                 
805 SPP (Jurisdiction No. 2), at para. 61.  As to the legal effect of unilateral declarations in public 
international law, the tribunal cited Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v US), ICJ Reports 14 (1986).  In this regard, see also CSOB (Jurisdiction), at para. 46. 
806 SPP (Jurisdiction No. 2), at para 74. 
807 SPP (Jurisdiction No. 2), at para. 107, citing Anglo Iranian Oil Co. ICJ Reports (1951), at 104; 
Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia, PCIJ, Ser. A, No. 15 (1928), at 22; and Phosphates in Morocco, 
PCIJ Ser. A/B, No. 74 (1938), at 22-24. 
808 See, e.g., Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v Canada), Jurisdiction, ICJ Reports 432 (1998), at para. 49: 
The Court will thus interpret the relevant words of a declaration including a reservation 
contained therein in a natural and reasonable way, having due regard to the intention of the 
State concerned at the time when it accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.  The 
intention of a reserving State may be deduced not only from the text of the relevant clause, but 
also from the context in which the clause is to be read, and an examination of evidence 
regarding the circumstances of its preparation and the purposes intended to be served. 
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international tribunals but considered that this must be viewed in the light of the major 
new economic policy Egypt embarked upon in 1971—the year Egypt became a party 
to the ICSID Convention—designed to attract foreign investment; and in this context, 
the Egyptian legislation subject to interpretation had the purpose of promoting foreign 
investment.    
425. The dissenting opinion of Dr El Mahdi disagreed with what he saw as the 
tribunal’s use of treaty interpretation rules to construe domestic Egyptian law: 
The international law rules of interpretation of treaties codified in Articles 31 and 32 of 
the Vienna Convention of 1969 on the law of treaties cannot be applied mutatis mutandis 
to the interpretation of Egypt’s Law No. 43/74.  Such rules are conceived as applicable to 
treaties and other contractually binding obligations governed by the fundamental rule of 
pacta sunt servanda.  Contrarily, with regard to the interpretation of a text of law, there is 
no place for a search of a common intention.  Article 1 of the Egyptian Civil Code 
stipulates that Legislative provisions are applicable to all issues which are covered by 
these provisions, in text and content.809  
426. Dr El Mahdi proceeded to apply a ‘general rule of interpretation’, which he 
described as follows: ‘a sentence that figures in a law or statute must be construed to 
have meaning and sense’ and referred to the travaux of the domestic Egyptian law.810  
He later observed that the effet utile of a provision warrants that it must have a 
reasonable meaning.811  
427. This dissenting opinion is unconvincing for a number of reasons.  First, Dr El 
Mahdi fails to give due regard to the real function of the Egyptian law in dispute (i.e., 
effectively a unilateral declaration in relation to ICSID jurisdiction)—it focuses 
exclusively on the form in which the law exists (i.e., a domestic law).812  Secondly, 
                                                 
809 SPP (Opinion), at p. 170, para 12. 
810 SPP (Opinion), at pp. 174 and 177, paras. 20 and 27 (‘the Tribunal cannot for the interpretation of 
that Law have recourse to, or rely upon, other materials than the text of the Law itself and, if the 
necessity arises, the travaux préparatoires to elucidate what may seem ambiguous in the text.  It is not 
admissible for the interpretation of a Law to have recourse to, or rely upon, such other materials as the 
executive regulations and/or a fortiori upon the investment brochures or the like’). 
811 SPP (Opinion), at p. 187, para. 6 (in newly renumbered second part of the dissent).  
812 The law was somewhat unique because it (or at least Article 8) gave rights solely to foreign 
investors, not Egyptian citizens. 
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the interpretative rules applied by the majority were not strictly the Vienna 
Convention Rules but based more on those international rules that are applied to 
interpret unilateral declarations (particularly those accepting jurisdiction of the ICJ).  
These rules are well suited to interpreting statements such as the Egyptian law at 
issue, which did not express a common intention of two or more parties.  Thirdly, to 
apply international law or practice to the interpretation of these documents adds more 
certainty and neutrality to the dispute settlement mechanism, which avoids the 
possibility of the application of unfamiliar or idiosyncratic domestic rules of 
interpretation.  Fourthly, the host State is not given an unfair advantage from the 
application of rules for interpreting unilateral declarations because those rules give 
significant weight to the intention of the declaring State rather than emphasising the 
text of the declaration. 
428. A different approach was adopted in Tradex.  The tribunal there held that a 
1993 Albanian law represented Albania’s unilateral consent to ICSID arbitration in 
certain circumstances.  In interpreting this law, the tribunal did not explicitly state it 
was applying a specific rule of interpretation.  Rather, it appeared to make a common 
sense ‘evaluation of the wording’ of the Albanian law.813  Among the interpretative 
considerations it took into account were that the domestic law used similar terms to 
those that were frequently used in arbitration clauses,814 the context as provided by 
different provisions of the law,815 the perceived ‘legislative intent’ of the law,816 and 
the progressive evolution of Albanian investment law.817  
                                                 
813 Tradex (Jurisdiction), at 65. 
814 Tradex (Jurisdiction), at 65.  The example provided is the Model Arbitration Clause recommended 
by UNCITRAL. 
815 Tradex (Jurisdiction), at 65-6. 
816 Tradex (Jurisdiction), at 66. 
817 Tradex (Jurisdiction), at 67.  The Tradex award on the merits, revisited the issue.  In interpreting the 
1993 Albanian law, the tribunal stated that in accordance with Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention it 
would ‘make use of sources of international law insofar as that seems appropriate for the interpretation 
of the 1993 Law, such as “expropriation”’.  Tradex (Award), at paras. 69 and 135.  
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D.  UMBRELLA CLAUSES 
429. A divisive issue in investment treaty arbitration concerns whether an investor-
State contract coupled with an applicable BIT containing an umbrella clause may 
elevate an investor’s claim under the contract into a treaty claim under the BIT.818  
Umbrella clauses are broad commitments by States pursuant to which they undertake 
to observe any obligation they may have entered into with regard to foreign 
investments.819  Two inconsistent lines of FIAT awards emerged in relation to the 
interpretation of these clauses after the SGS v Philippines tribunal took a 
fundamentally different approach to the SGS v Pakistan interpretation of a similar 
umbrella clause.  The discussion now turns to examine these two cases, as well as the 
cases that followed one or the other.      
1. SGS v Pakistan 
430. The tribunal in SGS v Pakistan was required to interpret the umbrella clause 
contained in the Switzerland-Pakistan BIT.  This clause required that either of those 
States ‘constantly guarantee the observance of the commitments it has entered into 
with respect to the investments of the investors of the other Contracting Party’.820  In 
the tribunal’s opinion, the clause did not transmute all claims arising out of contracts 
between an investor and a State to the level of international law claims for breach of 
                                                 
818 See generally Gaillard, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration and Jurisdiction Over Contract Claims – the 
SGS Cases Considered’, in Weiler (ed.), International Investment Law and Arbitration: Leading Cases 
from the ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties and Customary International Law (2005), at 325, and the 
literature cited at footnotes 1 and 2 therein. 
819 In El Paso, at para. 70, for example, the tribunal noted that Article II(2)(c) of the US-Argentina BIT 
constituted the broadest type of umbrella clause: ‘Each Party shall observe any obligation it may have 
entered into with regard to investments’.  See generally, the discussion in respect of umbrella clauses in 
Noble Ventures (Award), at paras. 53-55.  See also OECD, Interpretation of the Umbrella Clause in 
Investment Agreements, Working Papers on International Investment, No. 2006/3, October 2006, at 3; 
and Schramke, ‘The Interpretation of Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties’, Transnational 
Dispute Management (May 2007).  For a detailed history of umbrella clauses, see Sinclair, ‘The Origins 
of the Umbrella Clause in the International Law of Investment Protection’, 20 Arbitration International 
411 (2004).  See also Annex III. 
820 Article 11 of the Swiss-Pakistan BIT, quoted in SGS v Pakistan, at para. 53.  The tribunal in SGS v 
Pakistan (Jurisdiction), at para. 164, claimed that it was the first tribunal to interpret an umbrella 
clause.  But see Fedax (Merits), at para. 29; and Eureko, at para. 252. 
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the BIT.  The three principal considerations that supported this conclusion.  First, the 
tribunal examined the text of the relevant BIT provision: 
As a matter of textuality therefore, the scope of Article 11 of the BIT, while consisting in 
its entirety of only one sentence, appears susceptible of almost indefinite expansion.  The 
text itself of Article 11 does not purport to state that breaches of contract alleged by an 
investor in relation to a contract it has concluded with a State (widely considered to be a 
matter of municipal rather than international law) are automatically ‘elevated’ to the level 
of breaches of international treaty law.821 
431. Next, the tribunal considered the potential consequences of a finding that a 
contractual breach could be transformed by Article 11 into an international law 
violation: 
the legal consequences that the Claimant would have us attribute to Article 11 of the BIT 
are so far-reaching in scope, and so automatic and unqualified and sweeping in their 
operation, so burdensome in their potential impact upon a Contracting Party, we believe 
that clear and convincing evidence [that such was indeed the ‘shared intent’ of the Parties 
to the BIT] must be adduced by the Claimant.822   
432. The specific consequences resulting from such a transformation were 
identified by the tribunal as follows: (1) the clause would incorporate by reference an 
unlimited number of State contracts and municipal law instruments containing 
commitments; (2) it would make the substantive rights in Articles 3 to 7 of the BIT 
superfluous;823 and (3) it would create an imbalance in contractual dispute settlement 
clauses between the investor and host State because the State could only proceed in 
the contractually stipulated forum with the consent of the investor whereas the 
investor would remain free to commence arbitration either under the contract or the 
BIT.824  In concluding, the tribunal took the view 
                                                 
821 SGS v Pakistan, at para. 166. 
822 SGS v Pakistan, at para. 167. 
823  According to the tribunal, ‘[t]here would be no real need to demonstrate a violation of those 
substantive treaty standards if a simple breach of contract, or of municipal statute or regulation, by 
itself, would suffice to constitute a treaty violation on the part of a Contracting Party and engage the 
international responsibility of the Party’.  SGS v Pakistan, at para. 168. 
824 SGS v Pakistan, at para. 168. 
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that Article 11 of the BIT would have to be considerably more specifically worded before 
it can reasonably be read in the extraordinarily expansive manner submitted by the 
Claimant.  The appropriate interpretive approach is the prudential one summed up in the 
literature as in dubio pars mitior est sequenda, or more tersely, in dubio mitius.825 
433. In arriving at its conclusion, the tribunal also interpreted Article 9 of the BIT at 
issue, which provided: 
(1) For the purpose of solving disputes with respect to investments between a Contracting 
Party and an investor of the other Contracting Party and without prejudice to Article 10 
of this Agreement (Disputes between Contracting Parties), consultations will take place 
between the parties concerned. 
 
(2) If these consultations do not result in a solution within twelve months and if the 
investor concerned gives a written consent, the dispute shall be submitted to the 
arbitration of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, instituted by 
the Convention of Washington of March 18, 1965, for the settlement of disputes 
regarding investments between States and nationals of other States.826  
434. In relation to the phrase ‘disputes with respect to investments’, the tribunal 
examined whether this referred to disputes in respect of contracts, BIT claims or both.  
In the opinion of the tribunal: 
That phrase, however, while descriptive of the factual subject matter of the disputes, does 
not relate to the legal basis of the claims, or the cause of action asserted in the claims.  In 
other words, from that description alone, without more, we believe that no implication 
necessarily arises that both BIT and purely contract claims are intended to be covered by 
the Contracting Parties in Article 9.  Neither, accordingly, does an implication arise that 
the Article 9 dispute settlement mechanism would supersede and set at naught all 
otherwise valid non-ICSID forum selection clauses in all earlier agreements between 
Swiss investors and the Respondent.  Thus, we do not see anything in Article 9 or in any 
other provision of the BIT that can be read as vesting this Tribunal with jurisdiction over 
claims resting ex hypothesi exclusively on contract.827  
435. The tribunal’s interpretations of Articles 9 and 11 did not explicitly refer to the 
Vienna Convention Rules.828  
                                                 
825 SGS v Pakistan, at para. 171 (footnote omitted).  
826 Quoted in SGS v Pakistan, at para. 80. 
827 SGS v Pakistan, at para. 161 (original emphasis). 
828 The tribunal did however indicate that ‘the object and purpose projected by [Article 11] and by the 
BIT as a whole’ constituted ‘familiar norms of customary international law on treaty interpretation’, 
which the tribunal said it applied.  SGS v Pakistan, at para. 165. 
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436. After the award was issued, the Swiss government made known its 
disagreement with the tribunal’s decision in a governmental note attached to a letter 
dated 1 October 2003 addressed to ICSID’s Deputy-Secretary General.  In the note, 
Switzerland—a non-disputing party in the case—stated that it was  
alarmed about the very narrow interpretation given to the meaning of the [umbrella 
clause] by the Tribunal, which not only runs counter to the intention of Switzerland when 
concluding the Treaty but is quite evidently neither supported by the meaning of similar 
articles in BITs concluded by other countries nor by academic comments on such 
provisions.829   
2. Other Non-Elevation Cases 
437. The El Paso tribunal cited large passages of SGS v Pakistan with approval.  It 
did not accept that an umbrella clause could assimilate a breach of contract into a 
breach of a BIT.  It stated that the consequence of holding otherwise would 
completely blur the division between the national legal order and the international 
legal order.830  The bottom line for the tribunal in El Paso appeared to be that ‘it is 
necessary to distinguish the State as merchant from the State as sovereign’.831  Its 
conclusion was that if an umbrella clause could transform any contract claim into a 
treaty claim 
any commitments of the State in respect to investments, even the most minor ones, would 
be transformed into treaty claims.  These far-reaching consequences of a broad 
interpretation of the so-called umbrella clauses [are] quite destructive of the distinction 
between national legal orders and the international legal order …832  
438. The Salini v Jordan tribunal declined to elevate a contract claim into a treaty 
claim on the basis of the specific nature of the umbrella clause at issue.  In the relevant 
                                                 
829 Letter from Ambassador Marino Baldi, Swiss Secretariat for Economic Affairs, to the ICSID Deputy 
Secretary-General dated 1 October, 2003, attaching a Swiss government note entitled ‘Interpretation of 
Article 11 of the Bilateral Investment Treaty between Switzerland and Pakistan in the light of the 
Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction of ICSID in Case No. ARB/01/13 SGS Société 
Générale de Surveillance S.A. versus Islamic Republic of Pakistan’, 19(2) Mealey’s International 
Arbitration Reports (Feb 2004), at pp. E-1 to E-2. 
830 El Paso, at paras. 73 and 77. 
831 El Paso, at para. 79. 
832 El Paso, at para. 82. 
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investment treaty, the Italy-Jordan BIT, the parties agreed to ‘create and maintain in 
its territory a legal framework apt to guarantee the investors the continuity of legal 
treatment’ in respect of ‘all undertakings’ it assumed in respect of foreign investors.  
To the tribunal, this obligation to create and maintain such a legal framework was less 
onerous than the common umbrella clause undertaking (e.g., to ‘observe’ any 
obligation a party assumed with respect to investors).833 
439. In the Dissenting Opinion in Eureko, Arbitrator Rajski stated that an approach 
to umbrella clauses that elevated all contractual disputes usually within the purview of 
international commercial arbitration tribunals and State courts to the domain of BIT 
tribunals ‘created a potentially dangerous precedent capable of producing negative 
effects on the further development of foreign capital participation in privatizations of 
State owned companies’.834   
3. SGS v Philippines 
440. The umbrella clause at issue in SGS v Philippines is expressed in Article X(2) 
of the Swiss-Philippines BIT, which reads as follows:  
Each Contracting Party shall observe any obligation it has assumed with regard to 
specific investments in its territory by investors of the other Contracting Party. 
441. Essentially, the tribunal’s interpretation of this clause placed heavy emphasis 
on the text, finding that it ‘means what it says’.835  Additionally, significant weight 
was given to the object and purpose of the Swiss-Philippines BIT: 
[t]he BIT is a treaty for the promotion and reciprocal protection of investments.  
According to the preamble it is intended ‘to create and maintain favourable conditions for 
investments by investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other’.  It is 
                                                 
833 Salini v Jordan (Jurisdiction), at para. 126.  See also the comparison of umbrella clauses in Annex 
III. 
834 Eureko, Dissenting Opinion of Arbitrator Rajski, at para. 11. 
835 SGS v Philippines, at para. 118.  See also ibid. at paras. 114-115. 
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legitimate to resolve uncertainties in its interpretation so as to favour the protection of 
covered investments.836 
442. On the basis of this twofold focus on the text and the object and purpose, the 
tribunal held that under the umbrella clause, the breach of contractual obligations 
could be elevated into BIT claims.  It was not persuaded by the Pakistan award.  Four 
core reasons underlined its position.   
443. First, on a textual analysis, it did not agree that construing Article X(2) so as to 
include contractual obligations could be interpreted as ‘susceptible of almost 
indefinite expansion’ as suggested by SGS v Pakistan.  Because Article X(2) was 
limited to ‘obligations … assumed with regard to specific investments’, the 
Philippines tribunal believed this provision fell far short of elevating to the 
international plane all ‘municipal legislative or administrative or other unilateral 
measures of a Contracting Party’.837   
444. Secondly, it considered that the Pakistan tribunal adopted a presumption 
against a broad interpretation of Article 11 on the basis of the international law 
principle that ‘a violation of a contract entered into by a State with an investor of 
another State, is not, by itself, a violation of international law’.  The Philippines 
tribunal’s criticism of this approach was that the question to be addressed was 
‘essentially one of interpretation, and does not seem to be determined by any 
presumption’.838 
445. Thirdly, it agreed with the concern as to the effect of a broad interpretation, 
inter alia, that dispute settlement clauses in contracts would be overridden.  
                                                 
836 SGS v Philippines, at para. 116. 
837 SGS v Philippines, at para. 121.  See also Joy Mining. The tribunal there indicated that not all 
contractual disputes would be transformed into investment disputes under the umbrella clause at issue.  
It took the view that only ‘a clear violation of the Treaty rights and obligations or a violation of contract 
rights of such a magnitude as to trigger the Treaty protection’ could transform the contractual claims at 
issue.  Joy Mining, at para. 81 (emphasis added).  The El Paso tribunal directed some strong criticism at 
the SGS v Philippines decision arguing that, if that award were followed, a State’s violation of any legal 
obligation (not simply contractual) would constitute a breach of the BIT.  El Paso, at para. 76.  
838 SGS v Philippines, at para. 122. 
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Nevertheless, it saw that a broad interpretation of Article X(2) would not necessarily 
create such wide-reaching consequences, i.e., ‘a full-scale internationalisation of 
domestic contracts’.839  It took the view that Article X(2) 
does not convert non-binding domestic blandishments into binding international 
obligations.  It does not convert questions of contract law into questions of treaty law.  In 
particular it does not change the proper law of the CISS Agreement from the law of the 
Philippines to international law.  Article X(2) addresses not the scope of the 
commitments entered into with regard to specific investments but the performance of 
these obligations, once they are ascertained.840  
446. Fourthly, it concluded that the Pakistan award ‘failed to give any clear 
meaning to the “umbrella clause”’.841  It considered that the Pakistan tribunal created 
jurisdictional uncertainty by concluding that the umbrella clause gave rise to ‘an 
implied affirmative commitment to enact implementing rules and regulations 
necessary or appropriate to give effect to a contractual or statutory undertaking in 
favour of investors’ and that the tribunal did not ‘preclude the possibility that under 
exceptional circumstances’ an investor-State contract violation might constitute a 
treaty violation.  As to the latter point, the Philippines tribunal considered that the 
concept of ‘exceptional circumstances’ was too fluid and vague to confer adequate 
certainty as to what cases qualified for elevation under this criterion.842 
4. Other Elevation Cases 
447. The majority in Eureko found the SGS v Philippines umbrella clause 
interpretation ‘cogent and convincing’.843  According to the majority, the plain or 
                                                 
839 SGS v Philippines, at para. 126. 
840 SGS v Philippines, at para. 126 (original emphasis).  Applying this to the facts before it, the tribunal 
considered that the basic obligation on the Philippines was the obligation to pay what was due under the 
contract in dispute ‘[b]ut this obligation does not mean that the determination of how much money the 
Philippines is obliged to pay becomes a treaty matter.  The extent of the obligation is still governed by 
the contract, and it can only be determined by reference to the terms of the contract’.  Ibid., at para. 127.  
In other words, contracts determine the scope of a host States obligations, and BITs will be triggered if 
these obligations are not performed. 
841 SGS v Philippines, at para. 125. 
842 SGS v Philippines, at para. 125.  
843 Eureko, at para. 257. 
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ordinary meaning of an umbrella clause that states that a party ‘shall observe’ 
obligations contained in it, was an ‘imperative and categorical’ prescription and that 
the reference to ‘any’ obligations was ‘capacious’.  It added that ‘any’ obligations 
meant not only obligations of a certain type, but ‘any’—that is to say, all—obligations 
entered into with regard to investments of investors of the other Contracting Party.844  
Further, it believed that the umbrella clause at issue could not be overlooked or 
equated with other substantive provisions.  The clause must be interpreted to mean 
something itself.  It by no means rendered the other BIT protections superfluous 
because those other protections were not normally covered in contracts.845 
448. The other prominent case that considered it appropriate to elevate contractual 
obligations was Noble Ventures.  There the tribunal interpreted the clause expressly 
referring to the Vienna Convention Rules and concluded that the umbrella clause in 
dispute was aimed at equating ‘contractual obligations governed by municipal law to 
international treaty obligations as established in the BIT’.846   
5. Analysis 
449. Annex III contains a tabular breakdown of various umbrella clauses referred to 
in FIAT awards.  It is intended to assist the assessment and comparison of these 
clauses by systematically dissecting each into five elementary components.  The table 
shows no fundamental difference between the umbrella clauses that were at issue in 
the Pakistan and Philippines cases.  In effect, there is no substantial difference 
between guaranteeing a commitment (as in the case of the Swiss-Pakistan BIT) and 
observing an obligation (as in the Swiss-Philippines BITs).  In contrast, the format it 
has adopted helps to demonstrate that the clause before the Salini v Jordan tribunal 
                                                 
844 Eureko, at para. 246. 
845 Eureko, at paras. 249, 250 and 258. 
846 Noble Ventures (Award), at paras. 50 and 61. 
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may be viewed as distinguishable from most other umbrella clauses that appear in the 
table.847 
450. Despite the textual similarities in the umbrella clauses at issue in the Pakistan 
and Philippine cases, the interpretations adopted by those two tribunals were patently 
different.  The SGS v Pakistan tribunal emphasised that the umbrella clause before it 
was, on the face of the text, too broad, and if interpreted on this basis, the 
consequences would be unacceptably wide.  A general conclusion could be made that 
the Pakistan determination hinged on the consequences of the interpretation rather 
than any ostensible application of the established rules of interpretation embodied in 
the Vienna Convention Rules. 848   In contrast, the SGS v Philippines tribunal 
unmistakably paid more regard to the text of the clause and the object and purpose of 
the treaty.  
451. On balance, the Philippines tribunal approach demonstrated a great deal more 
fidelity to the Vienna Convention Rules than the Pakistan tribunal.  The Philippines 
decision is in line with the ILC emphasis on the text as the most important focus of the 
interpretative process.  It also seems that the consequence of the Philippines 
interpretation was not dangerously unlimited but restricted to specific investments.  
Accordingly, the Philippines interpretation should not be taken as a precedent that 
elevates all disputed domestic measures carried out by the host State into treaty 
claims.  Moreover, the Philippines tribunal was careful to maintain a distinction 
between contract and treaty claims, as was manifest in its refusal to assume 
jurisdiction over what it considered to be the contract-related component of the claim 
before it.  That component (as to the precise amount due under the contract) was 
                                                 
847  See Salini v Jordan (Jurisdiction), at para. 126 (noting that the umbrella clause at issue was 
‘appreciably different’ from the umbrella clauses in Philippines and Pakistan). 
848 One rationale behind the Pakistan award, but not articulated by the tribunal, may have been that it 
considered an interpretation that led to such wide consequences was inconsistent with a good faith 
interpretation required under Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention.  No mention whatsoever was 
given to the concept of good faith in any part of the award.  Consequently, this theory must remain 
confined to the realms of conjecture.  
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required by the Philippines tribunal to be resolved first by the domestic court chosen 
by the parties.849 
452. It may be concluded that from the perspective of treaty interpretation that the 
SGS v Philippines umbrella clause interpretation is to be preferred to the interpretation 
in SGS v Pakistan. 850   The Pakistan tribunal’s interpretation failed to give due 
consideration to the Vienna Convention Rules and relied too heavily on perceived 
consequences of the interpretation.  By focusing on the potential consequences that 
may arise as a result of its interpretation, it appeared not to give full regard to the case 
before it—it was overly concerned with the effect of its decision on future cases rather 
than the disputed treaty text in the case it was mandated to decide.  Given that no 
precedent exists in international arbitration (which is certainly evident in the SGS v 
Philippines decision) and that a tribunal’s primary role is to determine the specific 
dispute before it, the Pakistan tribunal’s concern for the implications of its decision 
was somewhat overemphasised and played an unwarranted role in supporting an 
excessively narrow interpretation of the umbrella clause in question.  Even if the 
Pakistan tribunal made an interpretation that could be perceived as having a 
burdensome impact on a contracting party, that interpretation would not have bound 
later tribunals, which have full discretion to determine independently whether the 
specific circumstances before it fall within the meaning of the umbrella clause there at 
issue.   
                                                 
849 Sempra Energy (Jurisdiction), at para. 126.  
850 It should be added here that the concept of elevation adopted in SGS v Philippines is largely 
consonant with the opinion of F.A. Mann, who noted the following in relation to umbrella clauses in his 
study of British BITs: 
it protects the investor against any interference with his contractual rights, whether it results 
from a mere breach of contract or a legislative or administrative act, and independently of the 
question whether or no [sic] such interference amounts to expropriation.  The variation of the 
terms of a contract or licence by legislative measures, the termination of the contract or the 
failure to perform any of its terms, for instance, by non-payment, the dissolution of the local 
company with which the investor may have contracted and the transfer of assets … these and 
similar acts the treaties render unlawful.   
Mann, ‘British Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of Investments’, 52 BYBIL 241 (1981), at 246.  
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453. In relation to the unlimited consequences that concerned the SGS v Pakistan 
tribunal, Schreuer has commented that  
Problems could … arise if investors were to start using umbrella clauses for trivial 
disputes.  It cannot be the function of an umbrella clause to turn every minor 
disagreement on a detail of a contract performance into an issue for which international 
arbitration is available … For example, a small delay in a payment due to the investor 
and interest accruing from the delay would hardly justify arbitration under a BIT … 
Equally a lease dispute with the host State that is peripherical to the investment will not 
be an appropriate basis for the institution of arbitral proceedings … It is to be hoped that 
investors will invoke the umbrella clauses with appropriate restraint.851   
454. One strategy to allay the concerns of host-States that every trivial or minor 
investment dispute will be brought before an investment tribunal may be to focus on 
the part of the Joy Mining decision that referred to the following threshold: ‘a clear 
violation of the Treaty rights and obligations or a violation of contract rights of such a 
magnitude as to trigger the Treaty protection’.852  This still leaves uncertainty as to 
what circumstances would satisfy the requisite magnitude of violation but it hints at 
something that is neither minor nor trivial.  It may be an approach to be investigated to 
find a satisfactory balance between the Pakistan and Philippines approaches.  
E.  MOST FAVOURED NATIONS CLAUSES 
455. A typical MFN clause is contained in Article 3(1) of the Italy-Jordan BIT, 
which reads:  
Both Contracting Parties, within the bounds of their own territory, shall grant investments 
effected by, and the income accruing to, investors of the Contracting Party no less 
                                                 
851 Schreuer, ‘Travelling the BIT Route, Of Waiting Periods, Umbrella Clauses and Forks in the Road’, 
(2004) 5 Journal of World Investment and Trade at 255.  In quoting Professor Schreuer, the El Paso 
tribunal, at para. 82, expressed scepticism at this call for self-discipline: ‘It is the firm conviction of this 
tribunal that the investors will not use appropriate restraint – and why should they? – if ICSID tribunals 
offer them unexpected remedies.  The responsibility for showing appropriate restraint rests rather in the 
hands of the ICSID tribunals’. 
852 Joy Mining, at para. 81 (emphasis added).  In this regard, see Rubins and Kinsella, International 
Investment, Political Risk, and Dispute Resolution: A Practitioner’s Guide (2005), at p. 241. 
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favourable treatment than that accorded to investments effected by, and income accruing 
to, its own nationals or investors of Third States.853 
456. The generally accepted view is that this type of clause gives covered investors 
the benefit of more favourable substantive provisions contained in other treaties 
entered into by the host State—even if the investor’s own State is not a signatory to 
that other treaty.  The interpretation of such MFN clauses becomes a controversial 
issue, however, when an investor asserts that an MFN clause in a BIT imports into 
that BIT the dispute settlement provisions of other treaties signed by the host State.854  
The effect of such an argument is to replace the dispute resolution provisions in the 
BIT under which the claim is made by more generous dispute resolution provisions 
contained in other treaties.  
457. FIAT approaches to this problem may be classified into two basic schools.  
The first, famously manifested in the Maffezini award, has considered that MFN 
clauses may incorporate dispute settlement provisions of other treaties.  The second 
school, embodied in the decisions of Salini v Jordan, Plama, and Telenor v Hungary, 
does not consider that MFN clauses permit a BIT to incorporate dispute resolution 
provisions contained in other BITs of the host-State.   
458. In Maffezini, the basic treaty containing the MFN clause (the Argentina-Spain 
BIT) did not state explicitly that it applied to dispute settlement clauses but the 
tribunal concluded that that MFN clause in fact embraced dispute settlement 
provisions of other treaties. 855   As a consequence, the claimant was permitted to 
invoke the apparently more favourable dispute settlement mechanisms in the Chile-
                                                 
853 This clause was subject to interpretation in Salini v Jordan. 
854  See generally Kurtz, ‘The Delicate Extension of Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment to Foreign 
Investors: Maffezini v Kingdom of Spain’, in Weiler (ed.), International Investment Law and 
Arbitration: Leading Cases from the ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties and Customary International 
Law (2005), at 523; Fietta, ‘Most Favoured Nation Treatment and Dispute Resolution Under Bilateral 
Investment Treaties: A Turning Point?’, [2005] International Arbitration Law Review 131; Teitelbaum, 
‘Recent Developments in the Interpretation of Most Favoured Nations Clauses’, 22 Journal of 
International Arbitration 225 (2005); and Valentini, ‘The Most Favoured Nations Clause as a basis for 
Jurisdiction in Foreign Investor – Host State Arbitration’, 24 Arbitration International 447 (2008). 
855 Maffezini (Jurisdiction), at paras. 54-64. 
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Spain BIT.  The interpretation was made without reference to the Vienna Convention 
Rules, despite explicit reference to these rules in a previous section.856  The wide 
words of the relevant MFN clause appeared to play a crucial role in the interpretation.  
They stipulated that MFN treatment would be afforded in respect of ‘all matters 
subject to this Agreement’.857  This all-encompassing expression was used by Spain 
only in the case of its BIT with Argentina.  All other BITs entered into by Spain 
followed a narrower formulation.858  Teleological leanings are also suggested in the 
tribunal’s interpretation by its emphasis on the protection of investors.859   
459. The MFN clause in Siemens was narrower than the Maffezini-type ‘all matters 
subject to this agreement’ clause.  The Siemens MFN clause applied only to 
‘treatment’ of investments.  Nonetheless, the tribunal there considered that the MFN 
clause’s reference to ‘treatment’ and the phrase ‘activities related to the investments’ 
in the MFN clause in dispute were sufficiently wide to include settlement of 
disputes.860  As a result it followed the Maffezini approach and determined that the 
MFN clause before it applied to dispute settlement mechanisms.861  No reference was 
made to the Vienna Convention Rules or its contents in the Siemens interpretation of 
the MFN clause.   
460. The tribunal in Gas Natural also agreed with the decision in Maffezini.  In its 
approach, it appeared to give consideration to both the text and the object and purpose 
of the BIT at issue: 
                                                 
856 See Maffezini (Jurisdiction), at para. 27.  The tribunal did, however, indicate there were limits to 
MFN clauses incorporating provisions of other treaties.  See Maffezini (Jurisdiction), at paras. 63-64. 
857 See Article IV of the Argentina-Spain BIT, quoted in Maffezini (Jurisdiction), at para. 38.   
858 See Maffezini (Jurisdiction), at para. 60. 
859 See Maffezini (Jurisdiction), at paras. 54-55. 
860 Siemens (Jurisdiction), at para. 103.  Contrast Professor Brownlie’s Separate Opinion in CME.  In 
taking the view that the MFN clause before him did not extend to the other treaty dispute provisions, he 
stated ‘[t]he presumption must be that the clause promises [MFN] treatment only in matters of 
treatment of an investment, and not to the process of dispute settlement’.  CME (Final Award), Separate 
Opinion, at para. 11. 
861 Ibid. 
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We remain persuaded that assurance of independent international arbitration is an 
important – perhaps the most important – element in investor protection.  Unless it 
appears clearly that the state parties to a BIT or the parties to a particular investment 
agreement settled on a different method for resolution of disputes that may arise, most-
favored-nation provisions in BITs should be understood to be applicable to dispute 
settlement.862  
461. Some States have clearly made known their disagreement with the Maffezini 
approach.  A note appended to the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) 
draft of 21 November 2003 indicates the reaction of certain States to Maffezini: 
Note: One delegation proposes the following footnote to be included in the negotiating 
history as a reflection of the Parties’ shared understanding of the Most-Favored-Nation 
Article and the Maffezini case.  This footnote would be deleted in the final text of the 
Agreement:  
 
The Parties note the recent decision of the arbitral tribunal in the Maffezini (Arg.) v. 
Kingdom of Spain, which found an unusually broad most favored nation clause in an 
Argentina-Spain agreement to encompass international dispute resolution procedures.  
See Decision on Jurisdiction §§ 38-64 (January 25, 2000), reprinted in 16 ICSID Rev.-
F.I.L.J. 212 (2002).  By contrast, the Most-Favored-Nation Article of this Agreement is 
expressly limited in its scope to matters “with respect to the establishment, acquisition, 
expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of 
investments.”  The Parties share the understanding and intent that this clause does not 
encompass international dispute resolution mechanisms such as those contained in 
Section C.2.b (Dispute Settlement between a Party and an Investor of Another Party) of 
this Chapter, and therefore could not reasonably lead to a conclusion similar to that of the 
Maffezini case.863  
462. In Salini v Jordan, Article 31(1) of the Italy-Jordan BIT (quoted above) was 
the subject of interpretation.  The tribunal interpreted this clause to mean that the 
claimant did not possess a right to more favourable dispute settlement clauses 
contained in other treaties entered into by the host State.  The following reasons 
formed part of its interpretation: (1) Article 3 of the BIT did not explicitly extend its 
application to dispute settlement provisions of that BIT, for example, it did not include 
a phrase indicating that it included ‘all rights or matters covered by the agreement’;864 
                                                 
862 Gas Natural (Jurisdiction), at para. 49.  See also National Grid (Jurisdiction), at paras. 79-94.  
863 Quoted in Plama (Jurisdiction), at para. 202.  See also the footnote to Article 6 of the ASEAN 
Comprehensive Investment Agreement (2009), which states that its most favoured nations provision 
‘shall not apply to investor-State dispute settlement procedures that are available in other agreements to 
which Member States are party’. 
864 However, it could equally have been argued that it failed to indicate explicitly that the clause did not 
apply to the treaty’s dispute settlement clauses.  See, e.g., the Plama tribunal’s discussion as to what 
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(2) the claimants did not establish that it was the common intention of the BIT parties 
to have the MFN clause apply to dispute settlement provisions; and (3) no practice of 
Jordan or Italy supported the claimant’s contention.865  Reference was not made to the 
Vienna Convention Rules (although those provisions were referred to in a previous 
section of the award).   
463. Plama offers a striking contrast to Maffezini, Salini v Jordan and Siemens in 
that it explicitly applied the Vienna Convention Rules in its interpretation of a MFN 
clause.  The tribunal’s ultimate view on the matter, firmly anchored to the textual 
approach, was articulated as follows:  
an MFN provision in a basic treaty does not incorporate by reference dispute settlement 
provisions in whole or in part set forth in another treaty, unless the MFN provision in the 
basic treaty leaves no doubt that the Contracting Parties intended to incorporate them.866   
464. The interpretative approach adopted in that case, when compared to the 
interpretations adopted in Maffezini, Salini and Siemens, demonstrates the clarity and 
quality that can be added to an interpretation if the Vienna Convention Rules are used.  
The Plama tribunal’s analysis, which included separate, insightful discussions on the 
ordinary meaning, the context and the object and purpose and Article 32 criteria, is an 
                                                                                                                                            
 
may be considered as MFN clause’s explicit exclusion of reference to dispute settlement provisions in 
other treaties.  Plama (Jurisdiction), at paras. 201-203. 
865 Salini v Jordan (Jurisdiction), at para. 118.   
866 Plama (Jurisdiction), at para. 223.  Other relevant considerations of the tribunal in its interpretation 
were expressed as follows: 
… the intention to incorporate dispute settlement provisions must be clearly and 
unambiguously expressed. … 
… 
… Doubt may be further created by the scope of the dispute settlement provisions in the other 
BITs.  A number of them refer to disputes arising out of the particular BIT.  It appears to be 
difficult to interpret the MFN clause as importing into the particular BIT such specific 
language from other BITs.  
… Conversely, dispute resolution provisions in a specific treaty have been negotiated with a 
view to resolving disputes under that treaty.  Contracting States cannot be presumed to have 
agreed that those provisions can be enlarged by incorporating dispute resolution provisions 
from other treaties negotiated in an entirely different context.  
Plama (Jurisdiction), at paras. 204-7 (footnote omitted). 
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exemplary display of the way in which the Vienna Convention Rules may be 
employed to render a clear, concise and structured interpretation of a treaty.867 
F.  DISCLOSURE OF PREPARATORY WORK 
465. The various ways in which preparatory work can be used to interpret a treaty 
pursuant to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention have been discussed in Chapter V.  A 
practical problem, however, is that an investor may have little or no access to 
preparatory work of the relevant investment treaty because the investor played no part 
in the negotiation of that treaty.  In contrast, the respondent State is likely to possess 
relevant drafts or materials resulting from the negotiation and drafting process.868  
This situation may give the respondent State an unfair advantage over the investor.869  
The problems associated with the interpretative process in these asymmetric 
circumstances was encapsulated as follows by Sir Franklin Berman in his Dissenting 
Opinion in Lucchetti (Annulment):  
Every case of the interpretation of a BIT by an ICSID Tribunal shares this unusual feature, 
namely that the Tribunal has to find the meaning of a bilateral instrument, one of the Parties to 
which (the Respondent) will be a party before the Tribunal, while the other Treaty Party by 
definition will not. Or, to put the matter the other way round, one of the parties to the 
arbitration before the Tribunal (but not the other) will have been a stranger to the treaty 
negotiation ... That circumstance surely imposes a particular duty of caution on the Tribunal: it 
can clearly not discount assertions put forward in argument by the Respondent as to the 
intentions behind the BIT and its negotiation (since that is authentic information which may be 
of importance), but it must at the same time treat them with all due caution, in the interests of 
its overriding duty to treat the parties to the arbitration on a basis of complete equality (since it 
is also possible that assertions by the Respondent may be incomplete, misleading or even self-
serving). In other words, it must be very rarely indeed that an ICSID Tribunal, confronted with 
                                                 
867 Plama (Jurisdiction), at paras. 189-197. 
868 See, e.g., Gaillard, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration and Jurisdiction over Contract Claims – the SGS 
Cases Considered’, in Weiler (ed.), International Investment Law and Arbitration: Leading Cases from 
the ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties and Customary International Law 325 (2005), at p. 342.  See 
Schreuer, supra note 5, 618 et seq.; Toope, Mixed International Arbitration: Studies in Arbitration 
between States and Private Persons (1990), at 243; and Masood, 15 Journal of the Indian Law Institute 
311 (1973), at 321. 
869 See also Lucchetti (Annulment), at paras. 69 and 79, in which the ad hoc Committee noted that 
having only one State party to the BIT in the proceedings before it made its task of interpreting that BIT 
more difficult. 
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a disputed issue of interpretation of a BIT, will accept at its face value the assertions of the 
Respondent as to its meaning without some sufficient objective evidence to back them up.870 
466. Related issues of fairness and equality were pointed out in Canfor (Order 5): 
the Tribunal has borne in mind its duty to conduct the arbitral proceeding in a way 
consistent with the principles of fairness and equality among the disputing parties. … the 
Tribunal notes that, in the context of investment disputes, each of the NAFTA Parties has 
accorded to the nationals of the other two Parties the right to submit to arbitration a claim 
on its own behalf regarding a dispute with that NAFTA Party.  It is the Tribunal’s view 
that, had the dispute arisen between any of the NAFTA Parties rather than between one of 
the NAFTA Parties and a private party, the parties to the arbitration would have had 
equal access to the negotiating history of the Agreement as well as equal opportunity to 
resort to those documents.  In this context, the Tribunal finds it consistent with the 
principle of equality that the parties to this arbitration are given the same opportunity to 
present their case, including the opportunity for the private party to access existing 
documents of the types specified above which are freely available to the government 
party, irrespective of whether such documents are ultimately conclusive as to any issue in 
dispute.871 
467. Accordingly, the Tribunal invited the respondent to file ‘any materials such as 
communications, explication notes, position papers or memoranda which were shared 
among the three NAFTA Parties with respect to the relevant portions of the NAFTA 
as identified in the Claimant’s request for documents’.872  This view was not shared by 
the Methanex tribunal: 
The position in this arbitration may be contrasted with the parties’ position in Canfor v. 
The USA.  This Tribunal does not know the circumstances under Article 32 which may 
have moved the Canfor tribunal to decide as it did, but would in any event not subscribe 
to the international legal reasons given by the Canfor tribunal for its Order No. 5, at para. 
22.873 
468. From an investor’s perspective, it is often futile to request the investor’s home 
State to furnish the relevant preparatory work because that State is not a party to the 
arbitration and is generally reluctant to become involved in the dispute.  In this regard, 
Wälde and Weiler have perceptively observed: 
                                                 
870 Lucchetti (Annulment), Dissenting Opinion of Sir Franklin Berman, at para. 9. 
871 Canfor (Order 5), at para. 22.   
872 Canfor (Order 5), at para. 23. 
873 Methanex (Final Award), at Part II, Chpt. H, para. 20, n. 14, and, similarly, at Part II, Chpt. H, para. 
25, n. 18. 
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Rarely, the interests of the investor in solving his problem coincided with those of the 
home state.  The home state’s foreign affairs agencies were not interested in having their 
inter-state relationship affected by private companies.  Even if they took up such cases, 
their strategy and legal argument were influenced by much wider ranging considerations 
…874   
469. The inequality of access to preparatory materials may thus become a serious 
issue in the event the interpretation may depend on or be influenced to some degree by 
the preparatory work.   
470. The types of potentially relevant documents to which claimants have no access 
(without the co-operation of one of the State parties to the treaty at issue) may be 
gleaned from the document requests made by FIATs to States.  These have included 
production requests for the following:875   
a) ‘the draft texts of the Agreement as compiled and distributed by Canada [to 
Mexico and the United States] during the course of the negotiations’;876  
b) ‘any materials such as communications, explication notes, position papers or 
memoranda which, to the extent they exist, were shared among the three 
NAFTA Parties with respect to the relevant portions of the NAFTA’;877  
                                                 
874 Wälde and Weiler, supra note 62, at 160-61.  These divergent interests are also reflected in the 
general lack of support that home States provide to its investors under NAFTA Article 1128, under 
which non-disputing NAFTA States may make submissions to a NAFTA tribunal on the interpretation 
of NAFTA. 
875 For an example of a non-FIAT international law decision in which the preparatory work was 
requested see Kingdom of Greece (on behalf of Apostolidis) v. Federal Republic of Germany, Arbitral 
Commission on Property, Rights and Interests in Germany, 34 ILR 219 (1960), at 242 et seq.   
876 Canfor (Order 4), at para. 9.  The tribunal affirmed this decision in Canfor (Order 5), at para. 18, 
stating that this category of materials ‘unquestionably form part of the negotiating history of the 
NAFTA which may be considered for the purposes of treaty interpretation’. 
877 Canfor (Order 5), at para. 21.  In the previous paragraph the tribunal noted:  
To the extent they exist, negotiating records such as communications, explication notes, 
position papers or memoranda established during the negotiation of the Agreement and which 
were circulated among, discussed by or relied upon by the negotiating teams or by the drafting 
teams of the NAFTA Parties may well be pertinent to the issue of the common intention of the 
NAFTA Parties in suggesting a particular draft and in adopting, or rejecting, a particular 
provision. 
Ibid., at para. 20. 
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c) the ‘record of discussions leading up to agreement upon the final text of 
Article 1105 of NAFTA, whether such record consists of negotiating drafts or 
any other matters’;878 
d) ‘such evidence as is available as to the interpretation and practice that the 
Kingdom of The Netherlands and the Republic of Bolivia have placed on the 
relevant portions of the [BIT]’;879 and 
e) ‘any potentially relevant negotiating history, if available’.880   
471. In this context, the Pope & Talbot tribunal requested Canada, and through it, 
the other NAFTA parties, whether preparatory work existed to support a certain 
interpretation of the NAFTA or otherwise shed light on the matter, and, additionally, 
whether the FTC was presented with any material related to the interpretation, 
including any negotiation history.881  
472. A rather unique situation involving a FIAT request to a government for 
information arose in Aguas del Tunari.  There, the Tribunal acted under Rule 34 of the 
ICSID Arbitration Rules to request information from The Netherlands as to the 
interpretation of the Netherlands-Bolivia BIT.  Although The Netherlands was not a 
party to the arbitration, questions raised in the Dutch Parliament led a Dutch minister 
to indicate on 18 April 2002 that the Netherlands-Bolivia BIT was not applicable in 
the Aguas del Tunari case.882 
473. Because Bolivia placed significant weight on this statement, the tribunal 
decided that further information from The Netherlands could assist the tribunal in its 
work.  President of the tribunal therefore wrote to the Legal Adviser of the Dutch 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs stating that, inter alia, (1) The Netherlands under Article 
                                                 
878 Pope & Talbot (Damages), at para. 37. 
879  Aguas del Tunari, at para. 268, quoting Order No. 1.  While the breadth of this request is 
considerably wide, the tribunal appears to have expected it to have produced materials pertaining to that 
BIT’s negotiation history.  See Aguas del Tunari, at para. 269. 
880 Grand River (Jurisdiction), at para. 35. 
881 Pope & Talbot (Damages), at para. 28. 
882 Aguas del Tunari, at para. 255.   
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27 of the ICSID Convention was under an obligation not to provide diplomatic 
protection to its nationals in the case of investment disputes covered by the tribunal, 
(2) the tribunal did not seek the view of The Netherlands as to the jurisdiction of the 
tribunal but the specific documentary bases on which the government provided the 
responses to the parliamentary questions, (3) the information of The Netherlands 
government—although not a party to the dispute—would assist the work of the 
tribunal, (4) the tribunal ‘aimed at obtaining information supporting interpretative 
positions of general application rather than ones related to a specific case’, and (5) if 
the reply of 18 April 2002  
reflects an interpretative position of general application held by the Government of the 
Netherlands, the Tribunal requests that the Government provide the Tribunal with 
information (of a type suggested by Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties as being possibly relevant) upon which that general interpretative 
position was based.883   
474. The Dutch Legal Adviser responded to the request by submitting a document 
entitled ‘Interpretation of the Agreement on encouragement and reciprocal protection 
of investments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Bolivia’.  
This represents a rare FIAT case in which a non-disputing State to a BIT has furnished 
information to an investment tribunal regarding the interpretation of that BIT.  
475. Just as requests for the production of preparatory materials have been granted 
by tribunals, FIAT case law equally demonstrates that tribunals may also deny such 
requests.  The following grounds have been used as justifications for denying requests 
for production of preparatory work:  
a) the materials requested did not reflect the common intentions of the parties;884  
                                                 
883 Letter by the President of the Tribunal, David D. Caron, of 1 October 2004 to the Legal Adviser of 
the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, J.G. Lammers.  Appendix IV to the Decision on Jurisdiction. 
884 Canfor (Order 5), at para. 19 (noting that memoranda, notes and communications reflecting the 
internal deliberations of a NAFTA Party ‘established solely for that Party and not communicated to the 
other Parties during the negotiations of the Agreement do not reflect the common intention of the 
NAFTA Parties in drafting, adopting, or rejecting a particular provision’).  See also Methanex (Final 
Award), at Part II, Chpt. H, para. 25 (finding that the claimant did not demonstrate that the intentions of 
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b) there had been an unreasonable delay in making the request;885  
c) no satisfactory explanation had been provided as to why an Article 31 
interpretation would be confirmed by the requested materials or may have led 
to a result stipulated in Article 32(a) and (b);886 
d) the disclosure sought was not relevant or material to the issues sought to be 
proved as required by Article 3.6 and 9.2(a) of the IBA Rules on the Taking of 
Evidence;887 
e) the scope of the request was exceptionally broad;888 and 
f) the documentation had neither been seen nor discussed by all the State parties 
to the treaty.889 
476. In this regard, the Methanex tribunal also indicated that where there existed a 
series of international tribunal decisions on a given provision or there had been an 
interpretation by the treaty parties, the reasons for recourse to supplementary means 
would decline.890  
477. Even if a tribunal grants a request for the production of preparatory materials, 
this still does not guarantee these materials will be produced.  The Pope & Talbot case 
provides a controversial example of the potential difficulties that private parties and 
also tribunals may encounter in obtaining preparatory work from States.  A high point 
of dispute in that case was the interpretation of NAFTA Article 1105.  Pope & Talbot 
requested from Canada’s Coordinator for Access to Information and Privacy several 
NAFTA documents including minutes and records of negotiating meetings and agreed 
negotiating texts.  In 1997, the Coordinator wrote to the claimant stating: 
                                                                                                                                            
 
the NAFTA parties ‘could reliably be established from documents which had never been seen or 
discussed between the three NAFTA parties’).   
885 Methanex (Final Award), at Part II, Chpt. H, paras. 17-18. 
886 Methanex (Final Award), at Part II, Chpt. H, para. 19.   
887 Methanex (Final Award), at Part II, Chpt. H, para. 20. 
888 Methanex (Final Award), at Part II, Chpt. H, para. 25. 
889 Methanex (Final Award), at Part II, Chpt. H, para. 25.  The tribunal noted that in the circumstances 
at hand, even though Methanex did not have sight of the preparatory work, it did not see this to present 
a difficulty in providing such explanations. 
890 Methanex (Final Award), at Part II, Chpt. H, para. 24. 
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[T]his will confirm that, apart from the actual NAFTA Agreement which is in the public 
domain, there are no minutes or records of NAFTA negotiating minutes, nor any 
mutually agreed negotiating texts, which have been or can be released publicly.891 
478. In November 2000, at an early stage of the Pope & Talbot proceedings, the 
tribunal asked Canada whether any preparatory work existed that might shed light on 
the matter.  In response, counsel for Canada informed the tribunal: 
Let me make it easy for everybody.  I have been in three or four of these cases, so I 
happen to know if there are travaux preparatoires, and can tell you that I have not been 
able to find any.892   
479. Again, the tribunal addressed the same question to Canada in September 2001, 
which produced the same result.893  At the closing stages of the hearing on the merits 
in November 2001, counsel for Pope & Talbot produced a submission filed by 
Methanex Corporation in its NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitration against the United States.  
In that submission, it was asserted that one of the principal Chapter 11 negotiators for 
Mexico recalled that various versions of Article 1105 were circulated and discussed 
among the negotiators and later in those proceedings that Mexican negotiator provided 
a statement declaring that the drafts would be found in the ‘negotiating history’ 
maintained by the NAFTA parties or in the ‘archives’ of the United States or 
Canada. 894   In the Methanex case, the United States submitted that the Mexican 
negotiator’s recollection was  
unsupported by any of the travaux that Mexico or counsel for the United States could 
locate after a diligent search.  Moreover, … travaux such as those that do exist for the 
NAFTA ‘must be used with caution … on account of their fragmentary nature’.895   
480. In the Methanex proceedings, Mexico also challenged the negotiator’s 
recollection after it conducted a ‘search of its records of the negotiations’.896  The next 
                                                 
891 Quoted in Pope & Talbot (Damages), at para. 31. 
892 Quoted in Pope & Talbot (Damages), at para. 40.  See also, ibid., at para. 28.  
893 Pope & Talbot (Damages), at para. 28. 
894 Pope & Talbot (Damages), at paras. 34-35. 
895 Rejoinder of the United States of 17 December 2001 to Methanex’s Reply Submission in the 
Methanex case, quoted in Pope & Talbot (Damages), at para. 35.  
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pertinent event in Pope & Talbot was a February 2002 letter by the claimant’s counsel 
informing the tribunal that, contrary to Canada’s previous position taken in Pope & 
Talbot, the NAFTA parties admitted to the existence of travaux in separate 
proceedings instituted under NAFTA Chapter 20.897  Based on this knowledge, the 
Pope & Talbot tribunal requested Canada to produce a ‘record of discussions leading 
up to agreement upon the final text of Article 1105 of NAFTA, whether such record 
consists of negotiating drafts or any other matters’.898  In compliance with this request, 
Canada submitted in April 2002 approximately 1,500 pages of documents, indicating 
that over 40 different drafts of Article 1105 had been made before the final version 
had been agreed!899  The tribunal made known its displeasure with this staggering 
revelation in the following terms: 
the Tribunal knows that having the documents would have made its earlier interpretations 
of Article 1105 less difficult and more focused on the issues before it.  In this sense, the 
failure of Canada to provide the documents when requested in November 2000 was 
unfortunate.  Forcing the Tribunal to chase after the documents as it did is not acceptable. 
… 
… Canada has not told the Tribunal where the documents resided, or how a diligent 
search would have failed to find over forty iterations of Chapter 11.  The documents 
themselves show that Canada possessed them at one time.  It is not credible that 
negotiators would have forgotten their existence.  Surely the other NAFTA Parties would 
have been willing to refresh recollections and provide copies.  If Canada did not want to 
release them, it surely knew how not to do so, as the very letter transmitting the 
documents to the Tribunal included a refusal to provide other documents.  Finally, it is 
almost certain that the documents provided, which included nothing in explication of the 
various drafts, are not all that exists, yet no effort was made by Canada to let the Tribunal 
know what, if anything, has been withheld. 
 
… This incident’s injury to the Tribunal’s work can now be remedied.  But the injury to 
the Chapter 11 process will surely linger.900  
                                                                                                                                            
 
896 Mexico’s letter to the Methanex tribunal of 11 February 2004, quoted in Pope & Talbot (Damages), 
at para. 35. 
897 Pope & Talbot (Damages), at para. 36, quoting In the Matter of Tariffs Applied by Canada to 
Certain US-Origin Agricultural Products, Final Report of Chapter 20 Panel, 2 December 1996, at para. 
71 (‘Canada also relies on the text of the NAFTA more broadly, on the travaux preparatoires [sic.] of 
the NAFTA, on various other statements and documents said to indicate the intention of the Parties in 
the period of negotiations’); and In the Matter of Cross-Border Trucking Services, Final Report of 
Chapter 20 Panel, 6 February 2001, at para. 212 (‘[e]specially, given the negotiating history of NAFTA, 
which shows that the Parties agreed’).  
898 Pope & Talbot (Damages), at para. 37. 
899 Pope & Talbot (Damages), at para. 38. 
900 Pope & Talbot (Damages), at paras. 39 and 41-42. 
J O S E P H  R O M E S H  W E E R A M A N T R Y                                          272  P H D  T H E S I S  |  U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  L O N D O N  
481. The problems associated with investor access to the preparatory work of the 
NAFTA were reduced on 16 July 2004 when the FTC announced that it would release 
to the public the negotiating history of Chapter 11 of the NAFTA.  The FTC statement 
noted that  
We are committed to transparency in trade negotiations.  The negotiating texts of the 
NAFTA are documents of historical value and we recognize the level of public interest in 
them.  We asked our officials to compile the NAFTA negotiating texts, bearing in mind 
the time necessary to complete this.  We began the process with Chapter 11 and are 
pleased to announce that Chapter 11 texts will be available through our websites …901   
482. Despite this change in approach, doubts still linger as to whether all relevant 
NAFTA negotiation documentation has been released.902   
483. In lieu of negotiating texts, evidence by governmental officials involved in a 
treaty’s negotiations may be of assistance.  However, FIATs have been cautious in 
ascribing significant weight to such evidence.  In Tza Yap Shum, for example, 
evidence by negotiators for both State parties of the BIT at issue were presented by 
the respondent but the tribunal did not regard this evidence as convincing.903  In 
SwemBalt, a Swedish Foreign Ministry official having experience in investment treaty 
negotiation testified for the Swedish claimant in that case but the tribunal did not 
mention whether this assisted their decision.904  Additionally, such evidence raises the 
possibility that a contrary opinion from a negotiator of the other State party may be 
submitted by the opposing side effectively to neutralize the first opinion.905  Other 
helpful material that may be more readily available to investors may be explanations 
                                                 
901 Quoted in Methanex (Final Award), Part II, Chpt. H, para. 2, n. 2.  The negotiating history is 
available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/disp/trilateral_neg-en.asp. 
902 Numerous negotiating texts of the NAFTA are available at www.naftaclaims.com, which states 
‘[t]he following versions of the NAFTA negotiating texts were finally made public by the three 
NAFTA governments in July 2004, after years of denying that they even existed, followed by a few 
more years of simply denying access.  Two tribunals have already issued orders suggesting that more 
documents exist which could add to our understanding of the negotiations ...’ (accessed 29 January 
2009). 
903 See, e.g., Tza Yap Shum, at para. 212.  See also paras. 166-171 of that case. 
904 SwemBalt, at para. 14. 
905 See Eureko, at para. 185, n. 17.  
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given by signatory governments to its legislature in the course of the approval of a 
treaty or from a minister’s parliamentary statements.906  
484. To remedy the potential imbalance in access to preparatory work assistance 
may be drawn from the multilateral treaty context.  If a dispute arises in respect of a 
multilateral treaty between one State that participated in its negotiation and another 
(which subsequently acceded to the treaty) that did not, Sinclair has remarked 
that recourse to travaux préparatoires does not depend on the participation in the drafting 
of the text of the State against whom the travaux are invoked.  To hold otherwise would 
disrupt the unity of a multilateral treaty, since it would imply that two different methods 
of interpretation should be employed, the one for States that participated in the travaux 
préparatoires and the other for States who did not participate.  One qualification should, 
however, be made.  The travaux préparatoires should be in the public domain so that 
States which have not participated in the drafting of the text should have the possibility of 
consulting them.  Travaux préparatoires which are kept secret by the negotiating States 
should not be capable of being invoked against subsequently acceding States.907 
485. Such an approach may be useful in the foreign investment arbitration context.  
This rule could be adapted to investment treaty disputes and invoked to warn 
respondent States that they may not be able to invoke preparatory work in their favour 
unless all of it is disclosed to the claimant.  An obstacle to this approach is that it may 
be difficult to know whether all the preparatory work has indeed been disclosed, as the 
Pope & Talbot experience demonstrated.  
486. One of the protections the Vienna Convention Rules offer an investor is that 
preparatory work is not utilised in the primary Article 31 interpretative analysis.  
Preparatory work is only to be used in the circumstances stipulated in Article 32.  By 
                                                 
906 See, e.g., Mondev, at para. 111-112; and Aguas del Tunari, at para. 261 (in this latter case, however, 
it was held that the government answers given to a series of Dutch parliamentary questions may not 
have been correct).  
907 Sinclair, supra note 6, at p. 144 (emphasis added).  See also Yasseen, supra note 194, at 89-90.  In 
the domestic context, this concern was raised by Lord Fraser in Fothergill v Monarch Lines.  In that 
case, in having to interpret the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to International 
Carriage by Air (Warsaw Convention 1929), he declined to take judicial notice of minutes of the 1955 
Hague Conference that amended that Convention ‘because it has not been sufficiently published to 
persons whose rights would be affected by it’, [1981] AC 251, at 287.  He maintained this position even 
though he acknowledged that those minutes had been published and were available for purchase at Her 
Majesty’s Stationery Office on the basis that ‘they have never been reasonably accessible to private 
citizens, or even to lawyers who do not specialise in air transport law’.  Ibid., at 288. 
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regulating the use of preparatory work to the Article 32 supplementary means of 
interpretation, the Vienna Convention Rules provide some degree of protection to 
investors that do not have access to preparatory work.908     
487. In contrast to the document request episodes relating to the NAFTA and BIT 
preparatory work, there has been an absence of disputes concerning the disclosure of 
preparatory work of the ICSID Convention.  This is attributable to the detailed four 
volume collection published by ICSID on the negotiating history of the ICSID 
Convention.909  In addition to this valuable publication, there are other public sources 
that also cast some useful light on the ICSID Convention preparatory work.  These 
include the Executive Directors’ Report and the published writings of Aaron Broches, 
who was involved with most of the Convention’s preparatory work.  Consequently 
much of the preparatory work is already in the public domain and readily available to 
claimants.  
G. PRO-INVESTOR BIAS IN INTERPRETING INVESTMENT 
TREATIES? 
488. Interpretations giving significant weight to the object and purpose of 
investment treaties have been criticised as favouring investors to the detriment of host 
States.  Concerns as to this pro-investor bias arose from the SGS v Philippines tribunal 
view (referring to the Philippines-Switzerland BIT) that ‘[i]t is legitimate to resolve 
uncertainties in its interpretation so as to favour the protection of covered 
investments’.910  In this regard, Zachary Douglas has taken the following view:  
                                                 
908 This point resulted from discussions with Professor Michael Reisman during his ‘Selected Problems 
in International Investment Law’ seminars at the School of Law, City University of Hong Kong, 2009. 
909 See supra note 40. 
910 SGS v Philippines, at para. 116.  See also Renta 4, at para. 57 (‘[t]o “favour the protection of covered 
investments” is not equivalent to a presumption that the investor is right’); and MTD (Award), at para. 
104.  In relation to the interpretation of a domestic law conferring ICSID jurisdiction, the tribunal in 
Tradex (Jurisdiction), 5 ICSID Reports 43, at 68, observed that Albania had confirmed to the tribunal 
of its commitment to the full protection of foreign investment.  The tribunal added that because of this, 
it would ‘seem appropriate to at least take into account, though not as a decisive factor by itself but 
rather as a confirming factor, that in case of doubt the [1993 Albanian Investment Law] should rather 
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The promotion of foreign investment is one of the key policies underlying the conclusion 
of investment treaties by states.  So much is clear from their preambles.  But this policy 
cannot be invoked to determine the rights and obligations of the parties to a particular 
investment dispute on the merits.  If this policy is relied upon to decide the import of a 
treaty provision to the particular controversy between the parties, then the implication is 
that the investor must prevail for this policy objective of the treaty to be upheld.  An 
interpretive approach that systematically favours the interests of one of the disputing 
parties need only be articulated to be proven unsound.  Can reference to the policy of 
promoting foreign investment ever result in an interpretation favourable to the state 
party’s defence?  If the answer to that question is no, both as a matter of experience 
(based on the record of past decisions) and as a matter of logic, then something is wrong 
with the interpretative approach and the idea that it is supported by Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties is untenable. 911 
489. Adding to these concerns is Susan Franck’s suggestion that an overly 
exuberant use of the object and purpose will distance the interpretation from an 
objective analysis of a treaty’s text and promote an interpretation based on the 
subjective whims of the interpreter.912 
490. Certain FIATs have given particular thought to this pro-investor bias issue.  
The Noble Ventures tribunal, conscious of its dangers, stated that ‘it is not permissible, 
as is too often done regarding BITs, to interpret clauses exclusively in favour of 
investors’.913  In Plama, the claimant placed much reliance on the object and purpose 
of the BIT in question (the preamble of the BIT in question stated that its object and 
purpose was ‘the creation of favourable conditions for investments by investors’).  In 
response, the tribunal drew attention to the limits of a treaty’s object and purpose in 
determining what the parties intended a particular provision to mean.  Referring to the 
particular facts of that case, the tribunal took the view that broad statements in the BIT 
                                                                                                                                            
 
be interpreted in favour of investor protection and in favour of ICSID jurisdiction in particular.’  See 
also Loewen (Jurisdiction), at paras. 50-53. 
911  Douglas, ‘Nothing if Not Critical for Investment Treaty Arbitration: Occidental, Eureko and 
Methanex’, 22 Arbitration International 27 at 50 (2006).  
912  See Franck, ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public 
International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions’, 73 Fordham Law Review 1521 (2004), at 1578 (an 
interpretation focused on the object and purpose of a treaty ‘is subject to more subjective interpretation 
once analysis becomes more divorced from text’).   
913 Noble Ventures (Award), at para. 52.  See also the judgment of the English High Court in Czech 
Republic v European Media Ventures SA, [2007] EWHC 2851 (Comm), at para. 23 (‘If the suggestion 
made in Ecuador v. Occidental (No.2) at §28, that it is permissible to resolve uncertainties in the 
interpretation of a BIT in favour of an investor, who is not a party to the treaty, is said to amount to a 
rule of interpretation, the suggestion goes rather further than appears to be justified in International 
law.’). 
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as to the purpose of investment treaties were ‘undeniable in their generality’ but were 
‘legally insufficient’ to conclude that the Contracting Parties to the Bulgaria-Cyprus 
BIT intended its MFN provision to cover agreements to arbitrate in other treaties to 
which Bulgaria or Cyprus was a Contracting Party’.914  It thereafter cited Sinclair’s 
warning of the  
risk that the placing of undue emphasis on the ‘object and purpose’ of a treaty will 
encourage teleological methods of interpretation [which], in some of its more extreme 
forms, will even deny the relevance of the intentions of the parties.915   
491. Also instructional is the position adopted in ADF v United States in relation to 
the interpretation of the NAFTA: 
NAFTA’s objectives, together with the statements set out in the Preamble of NAFTA, are 
necessarily cast in terms of a high level of generality and abstraction.  In contrast, 
interpretive issues commonly arise in respect of detailed provisions embedded in the 
extraordinarily complex architecture of the treaty. … We do not suggest that the general 
objectives of NAFTA are not useful or relevant.  Far from it.  Those general objectives 
may be conceived of as partaking of the nature of lex generalis while a particular detailed 
provision set in a particular context in the rest of a Chapter or Part of NAFTA functions 
as lex specialis.  The former may frequently cast light on a specific interpretive issue; but 
it is not to be regarded as overriding and superseding the latter.916 
492. The answer to the pro-investor bias concerns may lie in a middle-ground 
approach taking account of both the host State and the investor, as was provided in El 
Paso: 
The Tribunal considers that a balanced interpretation is needed, taking into account both 
State sovereignty and the State’s responsibility to create an adapted and evolutionary 
framework for the development of economic activities, and the necessity to protect 
foreign investment and its continuing flow.917 
                                                 
914 Plama (Jurisdiction), at para. 193. 
915 Plama (Jurisdiction), at para. 193, citing Sinclair, supra note 6, at 130.   
916 ADF (Award), at para. 147. 
917 El Paso, at para. 70.  See also Klöckner (Annulment), at para. 3 (‘application of [Article 52(1) of the 
ICSID Convention] demands neither a narrow interpretation, nor a broad interpretation, but an 
appropriate interpretation, taking into account the legitimate concern to surround the exercise of the 
remedy to the maximum extent possible with guarantees in order to achieve a harmonious balance 
between the various objectives of the Convention) and para. 119 (interpreting Article 52(1)(e) of the 
ICSID Convention, the tribunal adopted ‘neither a narrow interpretation nor a broad interpretation, but 
bears in mind the customary principles of treaty interpretation and, in particular, the objective of the 
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493. Other tribunals have espoused similar views.  The Amco tribunal considered 
that the ICSID Convention ‘is aimed to protect, to the same extent and with the same 
vigour the investor and the host State, not forgetting that to protect investments is to 
protect the general interest of development and of developing countries.’918  In Saluka, 
the tribunal observed that ‘an interpretation which exaggerates the protection to be 
accorded to foreign investments may serve to dissuade host States from admitting 
foreign investments and so undermine the overall aim of extending and intensifying 
the parties’ mutual economic relations.’919  In theory, this middle-ground approach is 
sound but the delicate balancing exercise it requires will be a difficult one to 
implement to the satisfaction of both investor and host State.  
494. In a few cases, the object and purpose criterion has been invoked to assist the 
host State to the detriment of the investor.  Banro is a case on point.  One of the 
reasons the tribunal there declined to accept jurisdiction over the investor’s claim was 
due to the object and purpose of the ICSID Convention, which it considered was to 
remove disputes between the host States and investors from the realm of diplomacy 
and place them with the ICSID Convention’s dispute settlement mechanism.  It stated   
since the ICSID Convention has as its purpose and aim to protect the host State from 
diplomatic intervention on the part of the national State of the investor and to 
‘depoliticize’ investment relations, it would go against this aim and purpose to expose the 
host State to, at the same time, both diplomatic pressure and an arbitration claim.920 
495. On this basis it considered that the investor was precluded from pursuing its 
claim by way of diplomatic intervention by Canada as well as invoking the United 
                                                                                                                                            
 
Convention and of the system it establishes’); Amco (Award), at para. 249 (indicating that the ICSID 
Convention was concluded to address the need for international cooperation for economic development 
and the role of international investment therein by ‘protecting host States as well as foreign investors’ 
and that ‘[t]o deny the host State’s liability where the same infringes the obligations undertaken 
towards the investor – as well as to refuse, in other instances, the investor’s liability where he infringes 
his own obligations – would move to empty the ICSID Convention of any meaning’); Amco 
(Jurisdiction), at para. 23 (‘to protect investments is to protect the general interest of development and 
of developing countries’); and Methanex (Partial Award), at para. 105. 
918 Amco (Jurisdiction), at para. 23.  On this point, see generally García-Bolivar, ‘The Teleology of 
International Investment Law: The Role of Purpose in the Interpretation of International Investment 
Agreements’, 6(5) Journal of World Investment and Trade 751 (2005). 
919 Saluka (Award), at para. 299.  
920 Banro, at para. 19. 
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States nationality of one of its subsidiaries to file an ICSID claim.  Because both of 
these avenues had in fact been availed, this was considered contrary to the ICSID 
Convention’s object and purpose.  Accordingly, the tribunal dismissed Banro’s ICSID 
claim for lack of jurisdiction.921  
496. A further example of reliance on the object and purpose in a manner that did 
not favour investors is found in Prosper Weil’s Dissenting Opinion in Tokios.  He 
there gave a high degree of importance to the object and purpose of the ICSID 
Convention in determining that a Lithuanian corporation owned by Ukranians (99 per 
cent of its shares were held by Ukrainain nationals) could not institute an ICSID claim 
against the Ukraine.  In so concluding he observed:  
It is indisputable, and indeed undisputed, that the object and purpose of the ICSID 
Convention and, by the same token, of the procedures therein provided for are not the 
settlement of investment disputes between a State and its own nationals.  It is only the 
international investment that the Convention governs, that is to say, an investment 
implying a transborder flux of capital. ... The ICSID mechanism and remedy are not 
meant for investments made in a State by its own citizens with domestic capital through 
the channel of a foreign entity, whether preexistent or created for that purpose.922 
H. LIBERAL AND RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION 
497. Simply put, a restrictive interpretation strives to narrow the scope of a treaty 
provision and a liberal interpretation works to broaden the scope of a provision.  The 
restrictive approach is particularly relevant for investment treaty arbitration because it 
is often invoked by States to argue—on grounds of protecting State sovereignty—that 
treaty provisions granting jurisdiction to international tribunals rather than to national 
courts should be construed narrowly.923  For example, States that adopt this position 
argue that where there is any ambiguity in jurisdictional clauses, a restrictive 
                                                 
921 Banro, at paras. 19, 20 and 26. 
922 Tokios (Opinion), at para. 19.  See also ibid., at paras. 6 and 24-7; and the Loewen (Award), at paras. 
223, 225, 233 and 237, in which it could be said that the object and purpose of the NAFTA worked 
against the investor. 
923 See Oppenheim, supra note 4, at 1276, n. 7. 
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interpretation should be made to favour maintaining the jurisdiction of local courts 
over international tribunals.924   
498. A profitable synthesis of the current international law position relating to this 
argument was provided in Mondev.  There, the tribunal stated that ‘[n]either the 
International Court of Justice nor other tribunals in the modern period apply any 
principle of restrictive interpretation to issues of jurisdiction’.925  The proper method 
of interpretation, according to the Mondev tribunal, was to ask ‘what the relevant 
provisions mean, interpreted in accordance with the applicable rules of interpretation 
of treaties’, which it stated were Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention. 926  
                                                 
924 See, e.g., the argument of the US in Methanex (Partial Award), at para. 103.   
925 Mondev, at para. 43, n. 4, citing Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Spain v. Canada), ICJ Reports 1998 p. 
432 at pp. 451-2 (paras. 37-38), 452-456 (paras. 44-56).  See also Amco (Jurisdiction), (1983) 1 ICSID 
Reports 389, at 394 and 397; Ethyl (Jurisdiction), decision of 24 June 1998, (1999) 38 ILM 708, at 723 
(para. 55); SOABI (Award), at para. 4.09; Methanex (Partial Award), at paras. 103-105; Casado 
(Provisional Measures), at para. 18 (concerning provisional measures and the interpretation of Article 
47 of the ICSID Convention); Eureko, at paras. 186 and 258; Loewen (Jurisdiction), at paras. 50-51; 
Tokios (Jurisdiction), at para. 68; and Metalpar (Jurisdiction), at para. 92.  See also, Amerasinghe, ‘The 
Jurisdiction of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes’, 19 Indian J. Int’l 
Law 166 (1979), at 168 (‘where jurisdiction is clearly excluded that fact should be recognized, in other 
cases a restrictive interpretation which would result in the ouster of jurisdiction should not be adopted 
where a reasonable approach could bring about the opposite result’);  Schreuer, ‘The Interpretation of 
Treaties by Domestic Courts’, 45 BYBIL 255 (1971), at 283-301; and Lauterpacht, ‘Restrictive 
Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties’, 26 BYBIL 48 (1949), 
at 65 and 71.  For a rejection of the restrictive approach to interpreting arbitration agreements entered 
directly between investors and States, see Duke v Ecuador, at para. 128 et seq.  Concerning ICJ 
decisions, see Case concerning the Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pakistan v. India), 39 ILM 1116 
(2000) at p. 1130 (para. 42).  It should be noted that the pronouncements of the ICJ in the Fisheries 
Jurisdiction case and the Aerial Incident case concerned the interpretation of declarations, not treaties.  
In Judge Higgins’ Separate Opinion in the Oil Platforms case, Jurisdiction, ICJ Reports (1996), at 857, 
para. 35, she observed ‘[i]t is clear from the jurisprudence of the Permanent Court and of the 
International Court that there is no rule that requires a restrictive interpretation of compromissory 
clauses’.  This passage was quoted with approval in Methanex (Partial Award), at para. 105.  As to 
early cases adopting a restrictive interpretation of clauses concerning a State’s obligations, see Frontier 
between Turkey and Iraq, Advisory Opinion, (1925) Series B. No. 12, p. 25.  This does not mean to say 
that cases during that time did not also adopt liberal or broad interpretations.  See, e.g., Nielson v 
Johnson (1929), 279 US 47, 5 Annual Digest (1929-30), at 302; and generally Oppenheim, supra note 
4, at 1276, n. 7. 
926 Mondev, at para. 43.  This view is consistent with the general consensus in international law.  See, 
e.g., Judge Brower, in his Concurring Opinion in Iran v United States, Award of 13 May 1985, 8 Iran-
US CTR 189 (1989), at 207 stated that ‘[t]he Vienna Convention resolved past debates concerning the 
wisdom of pronouncements by international tribunals that limitations of sovereignty must be strictly 
construed’.  See also Siemens (Jurisdiction), at para. 81 (‘the Treaty has to be interpreted neither 
liberally nor restrictively, as neither of these adverbs is part of Article 31(1) of the Vienna 
Convention.’).  
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Likewise, the Siemens tribunal considered that ‘the Treaty has to be interpreted neither 
liberally nor restrictively, as neither of these adverbs is part of Article 31(1) of the 
Vienna Convention’. 927   A similar view was expressed by the Aguas del Tunari 
tribunal when it noted that the Vienna Convention Rules have moved away from ‘the 
canon that treaties are to be construed narrowly, a canon that presumes States can not 
have intended to restrict their range of action’.928  It added that the Vienna Convention 
failed to mention this cannon specifically.929 
499. In Mondev, the United States argued that ‘its consent to arbitration was given 
only subject to the conditions set out in NAFTA, which conditions should be strictly 
and narrowly construed’.930  The tribunal’s response was that ‘there is no principle 
either of extensive or restrictive interpretation of jurisdictional provisions in 
treaties’.931  
500. With respect to interpreting the annulment grounds stipulated in Article 52(1) 
of the ICSID Convention, the ad hoc Committee in MINE said this: 
… The fact that annulment is a limited, and in that sense extraordinary, remedy might suggest 
either that the terms of Article 52(1), i.e., the grounds for annulment, should be strictly 
construed or, on the contrary, that they should be given a liberal interpretation since they 
                                                 
927 Siemens (Jurisdiction), at para. 81. 
928 Aguas del Tunari, at para. 91.  See also Ethyl (Jurisdiction), at para. 55 (‘[t]he erstwhile notion that 
“in case of doubt a limitation of sovereignty must be construed restrictively” has long since been 
displaced by Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention’), citing Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the 
District of  Gex, PCIJ, Ser. A/B, No. 46, at 167.   
929 Aguas del Tunari, at para. 91.   
930 Mondev, at para. 42 (the quote is the tribunal’s summary of the US submission).   
931 Mondev, at para. 43.  See also Tza Yap Shum, at para. 37.  But see Mondev at para. 91, where the 
tribunal held that NAFTA should be interpreted broadly to cover investments which may not subsist 
under the identity of the claimant (there the investment—real estate—was lost through foreclosure) at 
the time the arbitration is commenced.  In assessing the law of a State that consents to ICSID 
jurisdiction, the SPP tribunal observed that ‘jurisdictional instruments are to be interpreted neither 
restrictively nor expansively, but rather objectively and in good faith, and jurisdiction will be found to 
exist if – but only if – the force of the arguments militating in favor of it is preponderant’.  SPP 
(Jurisdiction-1988), at para. 63.  Similarly, in response to a claim that an investor-State agreement to 
arbitrate existed, Amco (Jurisdiction), at para. 16 looked neither to a restrictive nor liberal interpretation 
but at ‘the normal expectations of the parties, as they may be established in view of the agreement as a 
whole, and of the aim and the spirit of the Washington Convention as well as of the Indonesian 
legislation and behaviour’.  Amco (Jurisdiction), at paras. 14(i) and 16-18. 
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represent the only remedy against unjust awards.  The Committee has no difficulty in rejecting 
either suggestion.  In its view, Article 52(1) should be interpreted in accordance with its object 
and purpose, which excludes on the one hand, as already stated, extending its application to 
the review of an award on the merits and, on the other, an unwarranted refusal to give full 
effect to it within the limited but important area for which it was intended.932   
501. Notwithstanding this now well-established line of authority rejecting the 
restrictive approach, there is still some FIAT authority that supports the restrictive 
approach, particularly in relation to the interpretation of provisions that attempt to 
carve out exceptions to generally established rules.933  A questionable position was 
taken by the Noble Ventures tribunal when it considered restrictive interpretation to be 
connected to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention.934  There is nothing in the Vienna 
Convention Rules that speaks of a requirement to apply them restrictively.     
502. The general rejection of the restrictive interpretation based on the view that the 
Vienna Convention Rules are the rules to be applied is a notable example of the effect 
that the Vienna Convention Rules has had on international law.  In this context, it 
must be asked whether the failure to adopt the restrictive approach in the Vienna 
Convention Rules has tilted the balance from an interpretation in favour of State 
sovereignty to one favouring the investor.  The Loewen tribunal, for instance, 
considered that  
[t]he text, context and purpose of Chapter Eleven [of the NAFTA] combine to support a 
liberal rather than a restricted interpretation of the words ‘measures adopted or 
                                                 
932 MINE (Annulment), at para. 4.05.  A similar emphasis was placed on the object and purpose in the 
interpretation of the same ICSID Convention provision by the tribunal in Klöckner (Annulment), at 
para. 3 (‘application of [Article 52(1) of the ICSID Convention] demands neither a narrow 
interpretation, nor a broad interpretation, but an appropriate interpretation, taking into account the 
legitimate concern to surround the exercise of the remedy to the maximum extent possible with 
guarantees in order to achieve a harmonious balance between the various objectives of the Convention) 
and para. 119 (interpreting Article 52(1)(e) of the ICSID Convention, the tribunal adopted ‘neither a 
narrow interpretation nor a broad interpretation, but bears in mind the customary principles of treaty 
interpretation and, in particular, the objective of the Convention and of the system it establishes’). 
933 See, e.g., El Paso, at para. 77.  See also SGS v Pakistan, at para. 171; and Declaration of Antonio 
Crivellaro in SGS v Philippines (Jurisdiction), at para. 10 (‘when a provision which is intended to 
confer an advantage to a certain party, here Article VIII(2), may have two meanings, one should retain 
the meaning which is less restrictive or more favourable to the beneficiary’).   
934 Noble Ventures (Award), at para. 55.  On this point see Schreuer, ‘Diversity and Harmonization of 
Treaty Interpretation in Investment Arbitration’, 3(2) Transnational Dispute Management (2006), at 5-
6. 
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maintained by a Party’, that is, an interpretation which provides protection and security 
for the foreign investor and its investment.935 
503. A number of other FIATs have taken similar approaches that favour 
investors.936  The tribunal in Noble Ventures exhibited concern regarding this pro-
investor trend when it stated that ‘it is not permissible, as is too often done regarding 
BITs, to interpret clauses exclusively in favour of investors’. 937   Nevertheless, it 
considered that in the circumstances before it, such an interpretation was justified.938  
The issue of a pro-investor bias is dealt with in Section G above. 
I. NEGOTIATION PERIODS 
504. Express provisions in investment treaties often stipulate that once a dispute 
arises, a fixed period of time for negotiation or consultation must expire before an 
arbitration claim may be instituted. 939   The interpretation of these negotiation 
provisions has been an area in which—exceptionally—FIAT practice has generally 
not been consistent with the Vienna Convention Rules.  
                                                 
935 Loewen (Jurisdiction), at paras. 50-53.   
936 In Occidental (Award), at para. 173, the tribunal held the term ‘in like situations’ as found in the 
MFN clause in the Ecuador-US BIT (Article II(1)) ‘cannot be interpreted in the narrow sense advanced 
by Ecuador as the purpose of national treatment is to protect investors as compared to local producers’.  
See also Tokios (Jurisdiction), at para. 68 (citing with approval C.F. Amerasinghe, who wrote ‘every 
effort should be made to give the Centre jurisdiction by the application of the flexible approach’, in 
Amerasinghe, ‘The Jurisdiction of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes’, 
19 Indian J. Int’l Law 166 (1979), at 214); SGS v Philippines, at para. 116; Mondev, at para. 91; and 
CSOB (Jurisdiction), at para. 64. 
937 Noble Ventures (Award), at para. 52. 
938 The justification for the pro-investor interpretation resulted from the application of the principle of 
effectiveness.  This approach should be considered as exceptional and tribunals need to be mindful of 
the words of Oppenheim in these types of circumstances: ‘[t]he doctrine of effectiveness is … not to be 
thought of as justifying a liberal interpretation going beyond what the text of a treaty justifies’.  
Oppenheim, supra note 4, at 1281.   
939 A typical example of such a provision is found in the 1999 Italy-Jordan BIT.  Article 9 of that BIT 
provided that, as far as possible, a dispute should be settled amicably.  However, if the dispute could 
not be settled amicably within six months from the date of a written application for settlement the 
investor could submit the dispute either to the host State’s courts or to ICSID arbitration.  This 
provision was subject to interpretation in Salini v Jordan (Jurisdiction), at para. 66.  See also Article 
VII of the Argentina-US BIT at issue in Azurix (Jurisdiction), at para. 55. 
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505. FIATs have justified the exceptional treatment of these provisions on the basis 
that they constitute procedural rules rather than jurisdictional provisions.  For 
example, the tribunal in SGS v Pakistan observed that FIATs ‘have generally tended 
to treat consultation periods as directory and procedural rather than as mandatory and 
jurisdictional in nature’.940  The underlying rationale emphasises that the failure to 
satisfy jurisdictional provisions necessarily results in a determination that the tribunal 
lacks jurisdiction ab initio but unfulfilled procedural provisions result only in a delay 
of proceedings.941  According to the Bayindir tribunal, preventing the commencement 
of arbitration until the expiry of the negotiation period, i.e., in contravention of the 
actual language of the provision, would amount ‘to an unnecessary, overly formalistic 
approach which would not serve to protect any legitimate interests of the Parties’.942  
The SGS v Pakistan tribunal explained: 
it does not appear consistent with the need for orderly and cost-effective procedure to halt 
this arbitration at this juncture and require the Claimant first to consult with the 
Respondent before re-submitting the Claimant’s BIT claims to this Tribunal.943 
506. In Bayindir, the six-month negotiation period under the relevant BIT 
commenced upon written notification by the investor.  The tribunal observed that the 
non-fulfilment of this notice requirement was not fatal to the investor’s case because 
‘to require a formal notice would simply mean that Bayindir would have to file a new 
request for arbitration and restart the whole proceeding, which would be to no-one’s 
advantage’.944 
                                                 
940 SGS v Pakistan, at para. 184.   
941 See, e.g., Ethyl (Jurisdiction), at paras. 59, 76-88.  See also Lauder, at para. 187; and Bayindir, at 
para. 99. 
942 Bayindir, at para. 102.  See also LESI, at Pt. II, para. 32(iv) (a six month waiting period ‘is not 
absolute, and that it should be waived when it is obvious that any conciliation attempt would be 
doomed given the clearly demonstrated attitude of the other party’); and Bayindir, at para. 99 
(procedural rules are ‘non-absolute’ in character).  See also Mondev, at para. 44, as to the absolute 
nature of certain conditions precedent to submitting a claim and the more flexible approach to other 
conditions.  See similarly, Lauder, at paras. 189-191.   
943 SGS v Pakistan, at para. 184. 
944 Bayindir, at para. 100.  In Wena Hotels (Jurisdiction), at 87, Egypt withdrew its objection that the 
procedural time periods for filing claims had not expired.  It noted during oral argument that even if the 
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507. The above approach tends to place significant weight on pragmatic 
considerations rather than apply the rules of interpretation.  In effect, these negotiation 
periods are clear and unambiguous but are not interpreted according to their ordinary 
meaning.  The Bayindir tribunal purported to apply the Vienna Convention Rules to 
the negotiation period in question in the following passage: 
Determining the real meaning of Article VII of the BIT is a matter of interpretation. 
Pursuant to the general principles of interpretation set forth in Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, and consistently with the practice of previous ICSID 
tribunals dealing with notice provisions, this Tribunal considers that the real meaning of 
Article VII of the BIT is to be determined in the light of the object and purpose of that 
provision.945  
508. For the tribunal to have restricted the interpretative analysis to solely the object 
and purpose is a rather selective application of the Vienna Convention Rules, 
particularly when it is used to reduce to naught what is a patently unambiguous text.  
Also, it may be questioned why the tribunal referred to the ‘real meaning’ rather than 
the ‘ordinary meaning’.  The implication here appears to be that the former may not 
have necessarily been the ordinary meaning of the provision in dispute. 
509. The Generation Ukraine tribunal was clearly mindful of this anomalous FIAT 
practice and invoked the principle of effectiveness to observe: 
This Tribunal would be hesitant to interpret a clear provision of the BIT in such a way so 
as to render it superfluous, as would be the case if a “procedural” characterisation of the 
requirement effectively empowered the investor to ignore it at its discretion.946 
510. A better approach than purporting to interpret a negotiation provision is 
perhaps to explain that compelling reasons exist for the consultation provisions not to 
                                                                                                                                            
 
objection were granted, it could easily have been rectified and would have had little practical effect 
other than delaying the proceedings.  See also TSA Spectrum (Award), at para. 112 (‘despite the fact 
that the ICSID proceedings were initiated prematurely, the Arbitral Tribunal considers that it would be 
highly formalistic now to reject the case on the ground of failure to observe the formalities in Article 
10(3) [of the Argentina-Netherlands BIT], since a rejection on such ground would in no way prevent 
TSA from immediately instituting new ICSID proceedings on the same matter.’). 
945 Bayindir, at para. 96 (footnote omitted).  But see Maffezini, at para. 27 (applying Article 31 and 
implicitly emphasising the ordinary meaning criterion to interpret a treaty provision requiring the 
dispute to be submitted to a competent contracting State tribunal for a fixed period before arbitration is 
instituted). 
946 Generation Ukraine (Award), at para. 14.3. 
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be applied.  One such justification may be that it was unlikely that fruitful negotiations 
would have taken place had the time-period run its course or that a substantial part of 
the negotiation period had elapsed and it was most unlikely that the matter could have 
resolved before its end. 947   Another justification for this approach is evident in 
Metalclad.  The tribunal in that case indicated that there may be no need to enforce 
procedural rules if the complaining party suffers no prejudice.948  And, as the Bayindir 
tribunal appears to indicate, a further justification may arise from the conduct of the 
host-State, precluding it from relying on those procedural provisions or signalling that 
it has waived or is not adhering strictly to those provisions.949  At least by explicitly 
invoking these other reasons, it indicates that the situation is not strictly one in which 
rules of treaty interpretation are applicable.  Strained and distorted applications of the 
Vienna Convention Rules would therefore be prevented.    
511. A negative consequence produced by the general FIAT approach to 
negotiation periods is the detriment to investors who are concerned to adhere to the 
ordinary meaning of the provisions of the relevant BIT by waiting for the stipulated 
negotiation period to elapse.  By adopting this approach they are likely to suffer extra 
costs and financial loss, which would not be incurred by other investors who do not 
comply with those procedural waiting periods.950     
                                                 
947 Lauder, at paras. 187-8; and TSA Spectrum (Award), at para. 111.  See also SGS v Pakistan, at para. 
184; and Bayindir, at para. 102.  There is no suggestion here that treaty based negotiation periods are 
per se inefficient.  If a claim can be settled by negotiation and subsequent agreement, that may be a 
highly efficient dispute settlement option. 
948 Metalclad (Award), at para. 69. 
949 Bayindir, at paras. 101-102.  On this issue, see generally Weeramantry, ‘Estoppel and the Preclusive 
Effects of Inconsistent Statements and Conduct: The Practice of the Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal’, 27 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 265 (1996)).   
950 For instance, in Tokios, the ICSID notified the parties requesting arbitration that the dispute had not 
been negotiated for six months as required by Article 8 of the applicable Ukraine-Lithuania BIT.  In 
response, those parties withdrew their request for arbitration and reinstated the request after the 
required period for negotiation had elapsed.  Tokios (Jurisdiction), at para. 7.  AAP is another case in 
which the claimant appears also to have waited for the negotiation period to expire.  See AAP, at para. 
3.  Contrast this with SGS v Pakistan or Lauder, in which the premature filing of the case did not result 
in the withdrawal of the requests.   
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512. There may also be some alternative strategies to address this problem.  In 
Ethyl, for example, the claimants ‘jumped the gun’ by filing a claim before the expiry 
of the procedural waiting period.  The tribunal, in allowing the arbitration to proceed, 
nevertheless ordered that the claimant should be made to bear the costs of the 
proceedings in so far as these issues were involved. 951   In the case of ICSID 
arbitrations, it may be helpful for a more vigilant role to be played by the ICSID 
Secretariat to ensure compliance with these negotiation periods during the registration 
phase of the claim.  This would ensure fairness and equal treatment among investor 
claimants.  Having the issue dealt with by the Secretariat (in a consistent manner for 
every case filed) before it becomes an item of contention during proceedings is an 
option that needs consideration.    
* * * 
513. This ends Chapter VI and also brings to a close the main body of the thesis.  
The remaining task is to set out in the next Chapter the conclusions that can be drawn 
from the research and analysis presented in foregoing pages. 
 
                                                 
951 Ethyl (Jurisdiction), at para. 88 
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Chapter VII 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Chapter outline: This final Chapter addresses the three core objectives of the thesis.  In 
so doing, it also serves to provide a summary of the research findings.  Section A 
discusses whether FIAT treaty interpretation practice is consistent with the practice of 
other international courts and tribunals.  Section B assesses whether the Vienna 
Convention Rules are suitable for application in investor-State treaty disputes.  Section C 
concludes the thesis with an evaluation of the contribution of FIAT treaty interpretation 
jurisprudence to international law.  Also relevant to this Chapter is Annex IV to the 
thesis, which presents a number of recommendations formulated in response to treaty 
interpretation problems revealed during the research.   
A.  CONSISTENCY IN PRACTICE OF FIATS AND OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 
514. The task of this Section is to determine whether FIAT practice is consistent 
with the treaty interpretation practice generally adopted by other public international 
law courts and tribunals.  To attain this end, a comparison has been made between the 
numerous thesis sub-sections headed ‘International Law Practice’ and ‘FIAT 
Practice’.  As stated at the outset of the thesis, the former sub-sections are not 
intended to provide a comprehensive survey of the decisions of all international courts 
and tribunals.  Rather, the purpose of these sub-sections is to facilitate a general 
comparison with FIAT practice.       
515. As Chapter I indicates, prior to the commencement of the research, two of the 
thesis findings thought to be possible were (i) that FIATs pay a high degree of lip 
service to public international law rules of treaty interpretation and fail to apply them 
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properly; and (ii) in comparison with other international courts and tribunals, FIATs 
are more open to drawing guidance from domestic law approaches to interpretation.  
These hypotheses were due to (i) the commercial nature of foreign investment and (ii) 
the commercial backgrounds of many FIAT arbitrators.  Consequently, a finding of a 
specific FIAT regime of interpretation or lex specialis (for example, a hybrid of 
international and domestic law) was contemplated as possible.  However, general 
trends in the directions of these contemplated findings were not evidenced in the 
research results.       
516. The overall conclusions to be drawn from the awards reviewed for this thesis 
are that (i) domestic interpretative concepts are very rarely applied to construe treaties 
and (ii) many FIATs expressly recognise the Vienna Convention Rules and attempt to 
apply them (although in varying degrees) when interpreting treaties.952  Only one 
instance of an application of a domestic interpretation rule was found: the Pope & 
Talbot tribunal invoked a principle contained in domestic statutory interpretation text 
to determine the applicability of treaty words in the plural form to words in the 
singular.953  Any hypothesis concerning the emergence of a FIAT treaty interpretation 
lex specialis for international investment law thus cannot be sustained.  Indeed, the 
research has drawn attention to a distinctive symmetry in the treaty interpretation 
approaches of FIATs and those of international courts and tribunals.   
517. A comparison between the practice of FIATs and other international courts 
and tribunals in applying the Vienna Convention Rules as set out mainly in Chapter III 
leads to a number of specific findings:   
a. Numerous FIATs have expressed the view that the Vienna Convention 
Rules reflect customary international law treaty interpretation rules.  
                                                 
952 It should be noted that the finding in point (ii) is confirmed in Kaufmann-Kohler, ‘Interpretation of 
Treaties: How do Arbitral Tribunals Interpret Dispute Settlement Provisions Embodied in Investment 
Treaties?’, in Mistelis and Lew, Pervasive Problems in International Arbitration 256 (2006), at 274-
275 (‘An extensive review of arbitral awards shows that arbitrators do apply treaty interpretation rules 
rather conscientiously, with variations of course, some being more text-bound and others more intent-
bound.’). 
953 Pope & Talbot (Merits, Phase 2), at para. 37.  See Chapter VI, Section C.  
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This is in harmony with the practice of other international courts and 
tribunals.954 
b. In each instance where a FIAT interprets a treaty, rarely does it apply 
all the criteria set out in the Vienna Convention Rules.  As has been 
suggested in Chapter III, Section A, it would be too inefficient and 
overly burdensome to require tribunals to apply all Article 31 
interpretative elements for every interpretation.  FIATs apply a 
particular element only where it is deemed necessary.  The manner and 
the degree to which Article 31 is applied vary considerably from 
tribunal to tribunal.  This practice of FIATs, when viewed as a whole, 
bears a marked resemblance to the treaty interpretation practice of 
international courts and tribunals.955     
c. A large proportion of FIATs and other international courts and 
tribunals have given prominence to the text of the treaty.  By 
implication, the ordinary meaning criterion has thus been considered 
more important than the other Article 31 criteria.  This practice may not 
sit easily with the absence of a hierarchy in Article 31, but it reflects the 
majority view in the jurisprudence reviewed that the treaty text is often 
the best evidence of the agreement between the State parties.956   
d. Readily evident similarities are found in the practice of FIATs and 
international courts and tribunals concerning the Article 31(1) context 
criteria.  Both groups provide examples of wide contextual 
examination, which reach into areas beyond the terms of the treaty, 
such as other relevant treaties and instruments.  This liberal practice as 
to the scope of the context is not fully consistent with the Vienna 
Convention Rules, in which the context specifically relates to the 
‘terms of the treaty’.957 
e. The use of the object and purpose criterion by FIATs is congruent with 
the practice of other international courts and tribunals.  For example, 
the general practice of both groups is to consider that a treaty preamble 
is an important means of determining its object and purpose and it is 
not uncommon in both groups to assign a subordinate role to the object 
and purpose when weighed against a treaty’s text.958   
                                                 
954 See Chapter II, Section D. 
955 See Chapter III, Section A. 
956 See Chapter III, Sections B(1) and B(3). 
957 See Chapter III, Section B(4). 
958 See Chapter III, Section B(5). 
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f. The practice of FIATs and that of other international courts and 
tribunals have strong parallels in that they both have produced 
relatively little jurisprudence in connection with the Article 31(1) good 
faith criterion,959 the context criterion in Article 31(2)960 and the Article 
31(4) special meaning criterion.961  
g. FIAT practice relating to Article 31(3)(a) and (b) is distinct from the 
practice of other international courts and tribunals in the sense that 
FIATs have dealt with some unique situations.  Two notable examples 
of this unique FIAT jurisprudence are found in (i) the subsequent 
concordance of NAFTA States’ views as expressed through the FTC 
and (ii) the consideration in Aguas del Tunari of Dutch parliamentary 
statements and the response from the Dutch Legal Advisor.962  
h. FIATs and other international courts and tribunals both acknowledge 
that Article 32 is a subsidiary means of interpretation.  However, at the 
same time many decisions emanating from both groups use Article 32 
prior to a full application of the Article 31 criteria.963  This practice is 
contrary to the Vienna Convention Rules.   
i. FIATs do not require a restrictive interpretation of treaties to protect the 
sovereignty of a State.  This practice is consistent with the 
contemporary practice of international courts and tribunals.964  
518. The following points draw conclusions from the interpretative methods 
examined in Chapter V concerning other means of interpretation.  It will be recalled 
that these methods are not expressly mentioned in the Vienna Convention Rules but 
are frequently invoked without indicating an Article 31 or 32 basis for their use. 
a. Despite the absence of a precedent system, reference to prior decisions 
or awards to interpret treaties is a prominent feature of the 
interpretative practice of both FIATs and other international courts and 
tribunals.  This finding is confirmed by the Fauchald empirical 
analysis, which concluded that the use of other decisions and awards 
                                                 
959 See Chapter III, Section B(2). 
960 See Chapter III, Section C. 
961 See Chapter III, Section E. 
962 See Chapter III, Section D(2). 
963 See Chapter IV, Section A.  
964 See Chapter VI, Section I.  
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was by far the most frequent interpretative argument employed by 
FIATs.965   
b. Both FIATs and international courts and tribunals refer to other treaties, 
instruments or materials as a guide to interpretation of the treaty in 
dispute.  The research suggests that FIATs as opposed to international 
courts and tribunals tend to make more comparisons with other 
treaties.966  The more frequent deployment of this comparative method 
by FIATs is likely a result of the large number of BITs that contain 
seemingly similar provisions.  The pool of relevant treaties that may be 
used by other international courts and tribunals for comparative 
purposes usually tends to be smaller.     
c. The reliance on scholarly opinion is an area in which FIAT practice 
diverges from the approach taken by the ICJ.  The ICJ is reticent in 
using scholarly literature to support its findings.  This contrasts sharply 
with FIAT utilisation of scholarly literature, which the Fauchald 
empirical analysis found was the second most frequent interpretative 
criterion employed by FIATs.967  The difference in ICJ practice, as 
discussed in Chapter IV, may be explained by the diplomatic context in 
which that court operates. 
d. FIAT and international court and tribunal decisions have by and large 
used the principle of effectiveness consistently. 968  Although on the 
basis of the research a general conclusion as to the frequency of use of 
the effectiveness principle by international courts and tribunals cannot 
be made, the awards reviewed show that FIATs have resorted to this 
principle regularly. 
519. One of the rare fields in which FIATs do not regularly apply the Vienna 
Convention Rules (or at least the principles that they embody) is in respect of 
investment treaty provisions concerning pre-arbitration settlement periods.  This is an 
exceptional area in which treaty interpretation practice of a number of FIATs fails to 
                                                 
965 See Chapter V, Section B.  
966 See Chapter V, Section C. 
967 See Chapter V, Section D. 
968 See Chapter V, Section F. 
J O S E P H  R O M E S H  W E E R A M A N T R Y                                          292  P H D  T H E S I S  |  U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  L O N D O N  
comport with international treaty interpretation rules.  No comparable international 
court or tribunal practice was found in this regard.969   
B.  SUITABILITY OF VIENNA CONVENTION RULES FOR 
INVESTOR-STATE TREATY DISPUTES 
520. The research and analysis set out in this thesis demonstrates that the Vienna 
Convention Rules are in considerable measure suitable for application in investor-
State treaty disputes.  However, two exceptions to this general assessment were found.  
Problems result from (i) the inability of an investor to access the preparatory material 
of investment treaties and (ii) the potential of a pro-investor bias emerging from the 
application of the object and purpose criterion to interpret investment treaties.  It must 
be added here that many interpretative problems may not result from the treaty 
interpretation rules themselves but may be attributable to the broad wording of 
investment treaties, which are easily susceptible to many divergent interpretations.   
521. This Section will commence first with an examination of some positive aspects 
of the application of the Vienna Convention Rules to investment treaty arbitration and 
the interpretation problems created by the broad language utilised to draft BITs.  It 
will then proceed to discuss the problems related to preparatory work availability and 
pro-investor bias identified above. 
1. Positive Aspects of the Vienna Convention Rules 
522. Any assessment of the suitability of the Vienna Convention Rules must be 
conducted in the light of the near-impossible task faced by treaty drafters: the 
eradication of all ambiguity from treaty texts.  This problem has a direct impact on 
interpreters because no regime of interpretation—international or otherwise—
automatically transforms ambiguous language into a precise meaning that satisfies all.  
Often, two or more equally valid interpretations exist from which one must be 
                                                 
969 See Chapter VI, Section J. 
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selected.  Treaty interpretation has thus been famously described as ‘a delicate art 
rather than a strict science’.970   
523. Given this background, the Vienna Convention Rules are an easy target for 
critics.  As we have seen, they have been criticised as (i) being too general to be of 
practical use and (ii) enabling the interpreter to arrive at any desired outcome.971  
Despite these adverse comments, they provide a logical, structured and inclusive set of 
rules that are universally considered to express customary international law.   
524. A valuable characteristic of the Vienna Convention Rules that makes them 
suitable for application in investment treaty arbitration is their ability to enhance 
decision-making objectivity.  Before discussing this quality of the Rules, attention 
must be drawn to the circumstances of investment arbitration that make objective 
decision-making especially important.  Investment arbitrations often involve 
extremely sensitive and far-reaching public issues that call for as much objectivity as 
possible to be exercised by a tribunal.  The more objective a decision is (and is seen to 
be), the greater the legitimacy of the decision-making process.  Some of the 
significant issues that arise in investment arbitration are listed below. 
a. The extraordinary monetary amounts in dispute:  Astronomic monetary 
amounts may be claimed in investment treaty arbitrations.  USD 33 
billion, for instance, has been sought in Yukos Universal Ltd. v Russian 
Federation and its associated cases.972  If an investor is successful in 
bringing such immense claims, the compensation to be paid impacts not 
just on the respondent State but every one of its citizens.  A case on 
point is CME.  Pursuant to the final award the Czech Republic was 
ordered to pay, and did pay, USD 355 million to CME.  According to 
the Czech Premier, this amount was equivalent to the Czech Ministry 
                                                 
970  Amerasinghe, ‘The Jurisdiction of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes’, 19 Indian J. Int’l Law 166 (1979), at 167.   
971 See Chapter II, Section C. 
972 A pending Energy Charter Treaty arbitration administered by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, 
registered 3 February 2005, see http://www.encharter.org/.  
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of Health’s annual budget and it is said that Czech taxes were increased 
to fund the payment.973    
b. Allegations of arbitrator self-interest:  It has been alleged that because 
investment arbitrators are not tenured, they are tempted to further their 
careers by interpreting the law or arriving at outcomes in ways that will 
please those who may appoint them in future cases.974 
c. Disparity of investor economic power vis-à-vis the host State:  Many 
transnational corporations have annual sales that are larger than the 
gross national products of more than half the world’s nations.  As an 
example, Siemens—a corporation known in the investment arbitration 
community for its claim against Argentina—has sales that are six times 
the GNP of Jamaica.975  Claims brought by these large multinationals 
against relatively small host States give rise to public perceptions that 
the economic disparities distort the process in favour of the corporation 
because, for example, the host State is unable to afford legal 
representation that will match the expert and highly-paid lawyers 
retained by the claimant corporation. 
d. Investment’s impact on host State citizens’ human rights:  The 
investments at issue in cases before FIATs may be perceived to impact 
significantly on the living standards, health and environment of citizens 
in the host State.  As a result, FIAT decisions may be subject to intense 
and highly emotional public scrutiny.  In Aguas del Tunari, for 
example, compensation was sought in respect of the termination of a 
water concession.  The termination was made after large-scale, violent 
protests erupted in Bolivia to oppose the concession and reassert 
citizens’ right to water, the delivery of which had been privatised under 
the concession.976   
                                                 
973 Desai and Moel, ‘Czech Mate: Expropriation and Investor Protection in a Converging World’, 12 
Review of Finance 221 (2008), at 238-239.  Professor Brownlie’s Separate Opinion in the case noted 
that relative to population size and gross national income, the amount claimed against the Czech 
Republic (USD 500 million) would have been the equivalent of USD 131 billion for the United States.  
CME (Final Award), Brownlie Separate Opinion, at para. 80. 
974 Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (2007), at 167-175. 
975 Joseph Nye, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s only Superpower Can’t Go it Alone 
(2002), at p. 74. 
976  Vis-Dunbar and Peterson, ‘Bolivian Water Dispute Settled, Bechtel Forgoes Compensation’, 
Investment Treaty News, 20 January 2006.  See also Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Human Rights, Trade and Investment’, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/9, 2 July 2003, at para. 51. 
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525. Decisions made in cases involving these types of issues must place a premium 
on objectivity (both actual and perceived) if confidence in the system is to be 
maintained.  In this context, the Vienna Convention Rules possess value because they 
stress the application of objective criteria: i.e., the ordinary meaning of a treaty’s 
terms in their context and in the light of the treaty’s object and purpose.  What is 
‘ordinary’ is not what is considered ordinary to the interpreter but should be evaluated 
on a more generally accepted level.  The context should be derived from the terms of 
the treaty, not from any other sources that the interpreter personally considers 
relevant. 977   The object and purpose is essentially driven by the treaty’s text, 
particularly its preamble.  All these objective criteria demand that interpreters avoid 
drawing from the well of their own subjective notions for interpretative sustenance.  In 
turn, this helps diminish (but, of course, not eliminate) accusations of arbitrariness or 
arbitrator bias.978   
526. The recognition of Articles 31 and 32 as a standard set of rules generally 
applied may also enhance the objectiveness of the interpretative process.  As such, and 
if deployed consistently, they help satisfy an expectation of disputing parties that 
justice in their case will be dispensed on the basis that the same established 
interpretative rules will be applied in their case as they have been applied to all 
similarly placed parties.979   
527. Another positive aspect of the Vienna Convention Rules that renders them 
suitable for investment treaty arbitration is predictability of interpretative technique.  
Those Rules have by and large dispensed with the need for time-consuming argument 
                                                 
977 But as the research has shown, many FIATs and other international tribunals, in contrast to the 
Vienna Convention Rules, refer to contexts that are external to the treaty.  This could potentially be 
seen as injecting subjective views into the interpretative process. 
978 In this regard, see the comment made long ago by Sir Eric Beckett during the drafting phase of the 
Institute of International Law’s resolution on treaty interpretation.  Sir Eric Beckett, ‘Comments [on the 
report by Hersch Lauterpacht]’, 43(I) AIDI 435 (1950), at 436 (‘The fundamental reason for the 
existence of rules of interpretation … is to defend the court from the charges of reaching its conclusions 
on arbitrary or subjective grounds’). 
979 See, e.g., Waldron, ‘How Judges Should Judge’, New York Review of Books, 10 August 2006, p. 54, 
at p. 59.   
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on the choice of interpretative rules to be applied.  Because of the general acceptance 
and application of Articles 31 and 32, it may be confidently said that the rules to be 
used to interpret investment treaties are now known in advance to all parties and the 
arbitral tribunal.  While this helps to reduce uncertainty associated with the 
interpretative process, difficulty remains in predicting the weight a tribunal will assign 
to the different Vienna Convention Rules criteria and also to what extent the tribunal 
will consider criteria not explicitly mentioned in the Rules.   
528. The above reasons present a strong argument for demanding that FIATs should 
place a priority on the diligent application of the Vienna Convention Rules.   
2. Generality of BIT Provisions 
529. The problems encountered in applying the Vienna Convention Rules to 
interpret investment treaties have resulted on many occasions not from any inherent 
deficiencies in those Rules but from the lack of specificity provided in BIT provisions.  
The need to draft broad treaty provisions is well understood.  Drafters are not 
omniscient.  They cannot formulate specific language to cover every future 
contingency.  Broad wording is therefore adopted.  Sufficient elasticity is thus injected 
into the text to apply to these unforeseen situations where the circumstances warrant.  
But this drafting technique has its drawbacks.  As an UNCTAD report has remarked:   
the increase in investment disputes has tested the wisdom of negotiating IIAs [i.e., 
international investment agreements] with extremely broad and imprecise provisions.  
The broader and more imprecise a particular text is, the more likely that it will lead to 
different, and even conflicting, interpretations.  This will increase not only the likelihood 
of a dispute arising between the investor and the host country, but also the possibility of 
delegating to the arbitral tribunal the task of identifying the meaning that the disputed 
provision should have.  Clearly, one of the objectives of IIAs is to foster predictability 
and certainty for investors, but also for host countries, and in this regard, having 
investment provisions that are drafted broadly and imprecisely does not serve the 
interests of either of those parties.980 
                                                 
980 Investor-State Dispute Settlement and Impact on Investment and Rulemaking, Paper by UNCTAD 
Secretariat (2007), UN Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2007/3, at p. 92.  See also ibid., at pp. 5 and 85; and 
McLachlan, Shore and Weiniger, International Investment Law: Substantive Principles (2007), at 268, 
para. 8.07 (indicating that the broad language of investment treaties is one cause of the difficulty in 
determining the meaning of expropriation).  
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530. The drafting of more comprehensive investment treaties that define rights and 
obligations with greater specificity is to be encouraged.  More elaborately formulated 
investment treaties increase their clarity for all concerned, including State parties, 
investors and arbitrators.  The possible outcomes of an interpretation are thus likely to 
be more predictable when compared to an interpretation of a broader worded treaty. 
3. Investor Access to Preparatory Material 
531. Public international law as traditionally understood has been described as ‘law 
between states, for states, by states’.981  In this connection, virtually all of the Vienna 
Convention provisions are designed for application in disputes between States.  No 
indication has been found that the application of the Vienna Convention Rules to a 
treaty dispute between a private investor and a State was fully contemplated by the 
drafters of the Vienna Convention Rules.  As seen in Chapter VI, Section G, problems 
under the Vienna Convention Rules arise when a respondent State has access to an 
investment treaty’s preparatory work but the investor does not.  This circumstance is 
not ameliorated by the general approach of home States, which have displayed a 
reluctance to furnish the relevant preparatory materials to investors and have avoided 
becoming involved in the dispute.   
532. The Vienna Convention Rules are therefore not altogether suitable in this type 
of situation, especially if the preparatory work may influence the outcome of the 
interpretation.  However, the Rules provide a limited degree of protection to investors 
without access to preparatory work because such material cannot be referred to in the 
primary interpretative analysis under Article 31 but only as a supplementary means 
under Article 32.   
533. One way of redressing the imbalance is for a practice to be established 
whereby preparatory work relied on by States will not be admissible unless the 
preparatory work in its entirety is disclosed to the investor (with exceptions for 
                                                 
981 Wälde and Weiler, supra note 62, at 160. 
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confidential material).  But as the Pope & Talbot case illustrates, it will be difficult to 
be absolutely certain that all the materials have been disclosed.   
4. Potential Pro-Investor Bias 
534. As discussed in Chapter VI, Section G, the potential for the Article 31(1) 
object and purpose criterion to result in a pro-investor interpretative bias has caused 
some concern as to the suitability of the Vienna Convention Rules for investment 
treaty arbitration.  A bias that unquestioningly requires interpretations to be made in 
favour of investors lacks the requisite degree of impartiality and undermines the 
legitimacy of the investor-State dispute resolution system.  FIATs rightly have 
displayed an increasing sensitivity to this issue.  The holding by the Noble Ventures 
tribunal that investment treaty clauses cannot interpret clauses exclusively in favour of 
investors represents a step in the right direction to address this potential imbalance.982   
C.  CONTRIBUTION OF FIAT PRACTICE TO INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 
535. Every Chapter in this thesis serves to demonstrate that FIATs have made a 
substantial contribution to the international law of treaty interpretation. 983   The 
approaches to treaty interpretation embodied in the FIAT awards display many 
encouraging signs of a precocious maturity in the short but exceedingly active life of 
investment treaty arbitration.  Interpretation-related jurisprudence contained in FIAT 
awards and commentary on them has helped to understand to a considerable degree 
the operation of the Vienna Convention Rules, as well as their limitations.   
                                                 
982 See Chapter VI, Section H. 
983 It should be added that another discipline of international law that appears to have a similarly 
voluminous and instructive body of jurisprudence is the law and practice relating to the WTO.  See, 
e.g., Van Damme, Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body (2009).  Comparisons between 
FIAT and WTO decisions on interpretation could prove to be an insightful exercise. 
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536. An insightful explanation as to why FIAT jurisprudence has proven to be such 
fertile ground for the interpretative approaches and techniques has been put forward 
by Wälde and Weiler: 
the process [of investor-State arbitration] is considerably more promising for the future of 
international norm-development.  This is because there will likely be much less need for 
claimants’ counsel to ‘pull their punches’ as can be the case when potential claims are 
raised within the context of state-to-state dispute-settlement.  Here, counsel representing 
governments are forever mindful of how ‘too broad’ (or too good) an argument made in 
one case might precipitate a future case in which he or she will be forced to defend.  This 
special prudence is very visible in WTO litigation (in particular by the US and EU, 
present in most WTO cases).  An investor plaintiff, on the other hand, should have few 
compunctions about deploying any argument or precedent that might further its cause.984  
537. The jurisprudence detailed in Chapters III and IV on FIAT applications of 
Vienna Convention Articles 31 and 32 would of itself be sufficient to conclude that 
FIATs have made a significant contribution to international law.  However, the 
evaluation should not end there.  Numerous other FIAT contributions to treaty 
interpretation law are apparent from this thesis.  Some of the more notable are the 
following: 
a. The AAP tribunal’s articulation of six interpretative rules is valuable 
because they facilitate an understanding of treaty interpretation rules 
that existed prior to the Vienna Convention Rules.  They also illustrate 
the problems faced before the Vienna Convention Rules became 
accepted as the common currency in treaty interpretation, in particular 
the need for a tribunal to formulate or determine on a case by case basis 
the specific interpretative rules to be applied.985 
b. The attention that FIATs have drawn to the problems caused by 
emphasising the object of a treaty so as to favour the investor over the 
host State and the solutions FIATs have proposed will provide useful 
comparative material for other fields of international law in which 
treaties aim to protect a certain category of private persons against State 
conduct.986    
                                                 
984 Wälde and Weiler, supra note 62, at 168 (footnote omitted). 
985 See Chapter VI, Section B. 
986 See Chapter VI, Section H. 
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c. FIATs have assisted in confirming that international law has moved 
away from the restrictive approach to treaty interpretation that calls for 
a narrow interpretation of clauses that limit a State’s sovereignty.987  
d. FIATs have shown that the principle of effectiveness, although not 
explicitly mentioned in the Vienna Convention Rules, is one of the 
most prominent principles of treaty interpretation.988   
e. FIATs have contributed to the corpus of international law by casting 
light on the how the meaning of a treaty may evolve over time, 
particularly from the changes resulting from the conclusion of 
thousands of BITs.989   
f. FIAT practice provides a substantial amount of guidance on the 
interpretation of silence in treaties.  This is an area that is not often 
discussed in other international law jurisprudence.990 
g. The application by FIATs of legal maxims to interpret treaties also 
merits mention in this list of contributions.  FIAT awards have applied 
in a number of practical situations maxims such as expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius, generalia specialibus non derogant and ejusdem 
generis.  This has increased the understanding of how these maxims 
operate in international law.991  
h. Although not strictly related to treaty interpretation, it is worth noting 
FIAT interpretations of domestic statutes that permit investor-State 
arbitration.  The investor-State dispute resolution provisions of these 
statutes have been interpreted not by using domestic law but in the 
same way that unilateral declarations by States are interpreted by the 
ICJ.  As explained in Chapter VI, Section D, this is a sensible approach, 
the uniqueness of which constitutes a valuable contribution to 
international law.  
                                                 
987 See Chapter VI, Section J. 
988 See Chapter V, Section F. 
989 See Chapter V, Section E. 
990 See Chapter III, Section B(4). 
991 See Chapter V, Section G 
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538. To conclude, one sees in FIAT jurisprudence many insightful applications of 
the Vienna Convention Rules and other interpretative techniques.992  Some of these 
represent expositions of treaty interpretation rules that will leave an indelible imprint 
on the landscape of international law.  Although a number of FIATs do not mention, 
fail to apply or misapply the Vienna Convention Rules, FIATs collectively have 
bequeathed a rich and voluminous corpus of jurisprudence on treaty interpretation.  
Any serious international law discourse on treaty interpretation practice in the future 
will be incomplete without reference to this important realm of jurisprudence.   
* * * 
                                                 
992 See in particular the detailed application and examination of treaty interpretation rules in AAP, 
Plama (Jurisdiction), Aguas del Tunari, Canadian Cattlemen and Hrvatska (including Jan Paulsson’s 
Individual Opinion).   
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ANNEX I 
 
COMPARISON BETWEEN ARTICLES 27-29 OF THE 1966 ILC DRAFT AND 
ARTICLES 31-33 OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION 993  
 
 
Article 27 31. General rule of interpretation 
 
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to 
the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
 
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in 
connexion connection with the conclusion of the treaty; 
 
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion connection 
with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument 
related to the treaty. 
 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the 
treaty or the application of its provisions; 
 
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
understanding agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
 
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties. 
 
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended. 
 
Article 28 32. Supplementary means of interpretation 
 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory 
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning 
resulting from the application of article 27 31, or to determine the meaning when the 
interpretation according to article 27 31: 
                                                 
993 Underlined sections of text did not constitute a part of the 1966 ILC Draft Articles but were included 
in the Vienna Convention.  The text appearing in strikeout format constituted part of the 1966 Draft 
Articles but was omitted from the Vienna Convention.  Alterations in capitalisation and punctuation 
have not been indicated. 
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(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
 
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 
 
 
Article 29 33. Interpretation of treaties authenticated in two or more languages 
 
1. When a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is equally 
authoritative in each language, unless the treaty provides or the parties agree that, in case of 
divergence, a particular text shall prevail. 
 
2. A version of the treaty in a language other than one of those in which the text was 
authenticated shall be considered an authentic text only if the treaty so provides or the parties 
so agree. 
 
3. The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text.[994]  
 
4. Except in the case mentioned in where a particular text prevails in accordance with 
paragraph 1, when a comparison of the authentic texts discloses a difference of meaning 
which the application of articles 27 31 and 28 32 does not remove, the meaning which as far 
as possible best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, 
shall be adopted. 
 
* * * 
 
                                                 
994 In the 1966 ILC Draft Articles, paragraphs 3 and 4 were combined, forming one paragraph, namely, 
Article 29(3).  
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ANNEX II 
COMPARATIVE TABLE OF DRAFT TREATY INTERPRETATION RULES 
 
INSTITUTE RESOLUTION 1956 
[46 AIDI (1956), at 364-5] 
WALDOCK THIRD REPORT 1964 
[YILC (1964-II), at 8-10, 52-65] 
ILC DRAFT ARTICLES 1964 
[YILC (1964-II), at 177-179, 199-208] 
ILC DRAFT ARTICLES 1966 
[YILC (1966-II), at 217-226] 
 
GENERAL RULE(S) 
 
Article 1 
 
 
1.  The agreement of the parties having 
been embodied in the text of the treaty, it 
is necessary to take the natural and 
ordinary meaning of the terms of this 
text as the basis of interpretation.  The 
terms of the provisions of the treaty 
should be interpreted in their context as a 
whole, in accordance with good faith and 
in the light of the principles of 
international law. 
 
 
Article 70.  General rules 
 
 
1. The terms of a treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the natural and ordinary meaning to 
be given to each term —  
(a) in its context in the treaty and in the 
context of the treaty as a whole; and 
(b) in the context of the rules of 
international law in force at the time of 
the conclusion of the treaty.  [See also 
Article 56 below.] 
 
2.  If the natural and ordinary meaning of 
a term leads to an interpretation which is 
manifestly absurd or unreasonable in the 
context of the treaty as a whole, or if the 
meaning of a term is not clear owing to 
its ambiguity or obscurity, the term shall 
be interpreted by reference to —  
(a) its context and the objects and 
purposes of the treaty; and  
(b) the other means of interpretation 
mentioned in article 71, paragraph 2. 
Article 69.  General rule of 
interpretation 
 
1.  A treaty shall be interpreted in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to each term: 
(a)  In the context of the treaty and in the 
light of its objects and purposes; and  
(b) In the light of the rules of general 
international law in force at the time of 
its conclusion.  
 
[Article 69(1)(b) was partially included 
in the 1966 ILC Draft Articles as Article 
27(3)(c)] 
 
Article 27.  General rule of 
interpretation 
 
1.  A treaty shall be interpreted in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in the light of 
its object and purpose. 
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INSTITUTE RESOLUTION 1956 
[46 AIDI (1956), at 364-5] 
WALDOCK THIRD REPORT 1964 
[YILC (1964-II), at 8-10, 52-65] 
ILC DRAFT ARTICLES 1964 
[YILC (1964-II), at 177-179, 199-208] 
ILC DRAFT ARTICLES 1966 
[YILC (1966-II), at 217-226] 
 
[see below for Article 70(3)] 
 
CONTEXT 
 
 
 
 
No specific provision. 
 
Article 71.  Application of the general 
rules 
 
1.  In the application of article 70 the 
context of the treaty as a whole shall be 
understood as comprising in addition to 
the treaty (including its preamble) — 
(a) any agreement arrived at between the 
parties as a condition of the conclusion 
of the treaty or as a basis for its 
interpretation; 
(b) any instrument or document annexed 
to the treaty; 
(c) any other instrument related to, and 
drawn up in connexion with the 
conclusion of, the treaty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Article 69(2). 
 
 
The context of the treaty, for the 
purposes of its interpretation, shall be 
understood as comprising in addition to 
the treaty, including its preamble and 
annexes, any agreement or instrument 
related to the treaty and reached or 
drawn up in connexion with its 
conclusion.  
 
 
 
 
Article 27(2). 
 
 
The context for the purpose of the 
interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, 
in addition to the text, including its 
preamble and annexes:  
(a) Any agreement relating to the treaty 
which was made between all the parties 
in connexion with the conclusion of the 
treaty; 
(b) Any instrument which was made by 
one or more parties in connexion with 
the conclusion of the treaty and accepted 
by the other parties as an instrument 
related to the treaty. 
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INSTITUTE RESOLUTION 1956 
[46 AIDI (1956), at 364-5] 
WALDOCK THIRD REPORT 1964 
[YILC (1964-II), at 8-10, 52-65] 
ILC DRAFT ARTICLES 1964 
[YILC (1964-II), at 177-179, 199-208] 
ILC DRAFT ARTICLES 1966 
[YILC (1966-II), at 217-226] 
 
SUBSEQUENT AGREEMENT OR CONDUCT 
 
 
 
 
 
No specific provision. 
 
Article 73. Effect of a later customary 
rule or a later agreement on 
interpretation of a treaty 
 
The interpretation at any time of the 
terms of a treaty under articles 70 and 71 
shall take account of —  
(a) the emergence of any later rule of 
customary international law affecting the 
subject-matter of the treaty and binding 
upon all the parties; 
(b) any later agreement between all the 
parties to the treaty and relating to its 
subject-matter; 
(c) any subsequent practice in relation to 
the treaty evidencing the consent of all 
the parties to an extension or 
modification of the treaty. 
Article 69(3). 
 
 
 
There shall also be taken into account, 
together with the context: 
(a) Any agreement between the parties 
regarding the interpretation of the treaty; 
(b) Any subsequent practice in the 
application of the treaty which clearly 
establishes the understanding of all the 
parties regarding its interpretation. 
 
Article 27(3). 
 
 
 
There shall be taken into account, 
together with the context: 
(a) Any subsequent agreement between 
the parties regarding the interpretation of 
the treaty; 
(b) Any subsequent practice in the 
application of the treaty which 
establishes the understanding of the 
parties regarding its interpretation; 
(c) Any relevant rules of international 
law applicable in the relations between 
the parties. 
 
 
SPECIAL MEANING 
 
Article 1(2). 
 
 
If, however, it is established that the 
terms used should be understood in 
another sense, the natural and ordinary 
meaning of these terms will be displaced. 
 
Article 70(3) 
 
 
Notwithstanding paragraph 1, a meaning 
other than its natural and ordinary 
meaning may be given to a term if it is 
established conclusively that the parties 
employed the term in the treaty with that 
special meaning. 
Article 71.  Terms having a special 
meaning 
 
Notwithstanding the provisions of 
paragraph 1 of article 69, a meaning 
other than its ordinary meaning may be 
given to a term if it is established 
conclusively that the parties intended the 
term to have that special meaning. 
Article 27(4). 
 
 
A special meaning shall be given to a 
term if it is established that the parties so 
intended. 
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INSTITUTE RESOLUTION 1956 
[46 AIDI (1956), at 364-5] 
WALDOCK THIRD REPORT 1964 
[YILC (1964-II), at 8-10, 52-65] 
ILC DRAFT ARTICLES 1964 
[YILC (1964-II), at 177-179, 199-208] 
ILC DRAFT ARTICLES 1966 
[YILC (1966-II), at 217-226] 
 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY MEANS OF INTERPRETATION 
 
Article 2 
 
 
1. In case of a dispute brought before an 
international tribunal it will be for the 
tribunal, while bearing in mind the 
provisions of the first article, to consider 
whether and to what extent there are 
grounds for making use of other means 
of interpretation. 
2. Amongst the legitimate means of 
interpretation are the following: 
(a) Recourse to preparatory work; 
(b) The practice followed in the actual 
application of the treaty; 
(c) The consideration of the objects of 
the treaty. 
 
Article 71(2) 
 
 
Reference may be made to other 
evidence or indications of the intentions 
of the parties and, in particular, to the 
preparatory work of the treaty, the 
circumstances surrounding its conclusion 
and the subsequent practice of parties in 
relation to the treaty, for purposes of — 
(a) confirming the meaning of a term 
resulting from the application of 
paragraph 1 of article 70; 
(b) determining the meaning of a term in 
the application of paragraph 2 of that 
article; 
(c) establishing the special meaning of a 
term in the application of paragraph 3 of 
that article. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Article 70.  Further means of 
interpretation 
 
Recourse may be had to further means of 
interpretation, including the preparatory 
work of the treaty and the circumstances 
of its conclusion, in order to verify or 
confirm the meaning resulting from the 
application of article 69, or to determine 
the meaning when the interpretation 
according to article 69: 
(a) Leaves the meaning of ambiguous or 
obscure; or 
(b) Leads to a result which is manifestly 
absurd or unreasonable in the light of the 
objects and purposes of the treaty. 
 
Article 28.  Supplementary means of 
interpretation 
 
Recourse may be had to supplementary 
means of interpretation, including the 
preparatory work of the treaty and the 
circumstances of its conclusion, in order 
to confirm the meaning resulting from 
the application of article 27, or to 
determine the meaning when the 
interpretation according to article 27: 
(a) Leaves the meaning ambiguous or 
obscure; or 
(b) Leads to a result which is manifestly 
absurd or unreasonable. 
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INSTITUTE RESOLUTION 1956 
[46 AIDI (1956), at 364-5] 
WALDOCK THIRD REPORT 1964 
[YILC (1964-II), at 8-10, 52-65] 
ILC DRAFT ARTICLES 1964 
[YILC (1964-II), at 177-179, 199-208] 
ILC DRAFT ARTICLES 1966 
[YILC (1966-II), at 217-226] 
 
 
TREATIES IN TWO OR MORE LANGUAGES 
 
 
 
 
 
Not included. 
Article 74.  Treaties drawn up in two 
or more languages 
 
 
1.  When the text of a treaty has been 
authenticated in accordance with the 
provisions of article 7 in two or more 
languages, the texts of the treaty are 
authoritative in each language except in 
so far as a different rule may be laid 
down in the treaty. 
 
2.  A version drawn up in a language 
other than one in which the text of the 
treaty was authenticated shall also be 
considered an authentic text and be 
authoritative if — 
(a) the treaty so provides or the parties so 
agree; or  
(b) an organ of an international 
organization so prescribes with respect to 
a treaty drawn up within the 
organization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Article 72.  Treaties drawn up in two 
or more languages 
 
 
1.  When the text of a treaty has been 
authenticated in accordance with the 
provisions of article 7 in two or more 
languages, the text is authoritative in 
each language, except in so far as a 
different rule may be agreed upon by the 
parties.  
 
2.  A version drawn up in a language 
other than one of those in which the text 
of the treaty was authenticated shall also 
be authoritative and be considered as an 
authentic text if: 
(a) The parties so agree; or  
(b) The established rules of an 
international organization so provide. 
 
 
Article 29.  Interpretation of treaties 
in two or more languages 
 
1.  When a treaty has been authenticated 
in two or more languages, the text is 
equally authoritative in each language, 
unless the treaty provides or the parties 
agree that, in case of divergence, a 
particular text shall prevail. 
 
2.  A version of the treaty in a language 
other than one of those in which the text 
was authenticated shall be considered an 
authentic text only if the treaty so 
provides or the parties so agree. 
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INSTITUTE RESOLUTION 1956 
[46 AIDI (1956), at 364-5] 
WALDOCK THIRD REPORT 1964 
[YILC (1964-II), at 8-10, 52-65] 
ILC DRAFT ARTICLES 1964 
[YILC (1964-II), at 177-179, 199-208] 
ILC DRAFT ARTICLES 1966 
[YILC (1966-II), at 217-226] 
 
 
 
 
Not included. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Article 75.  Interpretation of treaties 
having two or more texts or versions 
 
1.  The expression of the terms of a treaty is of 
equal authority in each authentic text, subject to the 
provisions of the present article.  The terms are to 
be presumed to be intended to have the same 
meaning in each text and their interpretation is 
governed by articles 70-73. 
 
2.  When a comparison between two or more 
authentic texts discloses a difference in the 
expression of a term and any resulting ambiguity or 
obscurity as to the meaning of the term is not 
removed by the application of articles 70-73, the 
rules contained in paragraphs 3-5 apply, unless the 
treaty itself provides that, in the event of 
divergence, a particular text or method of 
interpretation is to prevail. 
 
3.  If in each of two or more authentic texts a term 
is capable of being given more than one meaning 
compatible with the objects and purposes of the 
treaty, a meaning which is common to both or all 
the texts is to be adopted. 
 
4.  If in one authentic text the natural and ordinary 
meaning of a term is clear and compatible with the 
objects and purposes of the treaty, whereas in 
another it is uncertain owing to the obscurity of the 
term, the meaning of the term in the former text is 
to be adopted. 
 
5.  If the application of the foregoing rules leaves 
the meaning of a term, as expressed in the authentic 
text or texts, ambiguous or obscure, reference may 
be made to a text or version which is not authentic 
in so far as it may throw light on the intentions of 
the parties with respect to the term in question. 
 
Article 73.  Interpretation of treaties 
having two or more texts 
 
1.  The different authentic texts of a 
treaty are equally authoritative in each 
language, unless the treaty itself provides 
that, in the event of divergence, a 
particular text shall prevail. 
 
2.  The terms of a treaty are presumed to 
have the same meaning in each text.  
Except in the case referred to in 
paragraph 1, when a comparison between 
two or more authentic texts discloses a 
difference in the expression of a term 
and any resulting ambiguity or obscurity 
is not removed by the application of 
articles 69-72, a meaning which so far as 
possible reconciles the different texts 
shall be adopted. 
 
 
 
Article 29. 
 
 
3. The terms of the treaty are presumed 
to have the same meaning in each 
authentic text.  Except in the case 
mentioned in paragraph 1, when a 
comparison of the texts discloses a 
difference of meaning which the 
application of articles 27 and 28 does not 
remove, a meaning which as far as 
possible reconciles the texts shall be 
adopted. 
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INSTITUTE RESOLUTION 1956 
[46 AIDI (1956), at 364-5] 
WALDOCK THIRD REPORT 1964 
[YILC (1964-II), at 8-10, 52-65] 
ILC DRAFT ARTICLES 1964 
[YILC (1964-II), at 177-179, 199-208] 
ILC DRAFT ARTICLES 1966 
[YILC (1966-II), at 217-226] 
 
 
PRINCIPLE OF EFFECTIVENESS 
 
 
 
 
 
Not included. 
Article 72. Effective interpretation of 
the terms (ut res magis valeat quam 
pereat) 
 
In the application of articles 70 and 71 a 
term of a treaty shall be so interpreted as 
to give it the fullest weight and effect 
consistent — 
(a) with its natural and ordinary meaning 
and that of the other terms of the treaty; 
and 
(b) with the objects and purposes of the 
treaty. 
 
 
 
 
Not included. 
 
 
 
 
Not included. 
 
INTER-TEMPORAL LAW 
 
 
 
 
Not included. 
Article 56. The inter-temporal law 
 
 
1. A treaty is to be interpreted in the light 
of the law in force at the time when the 
treaty was drawn up. 
 
2. Subject to paragraph 1, the application 
of a treaty shall be governed by the rules 
of international law in force at the time 
when the treaty is applied. 
 
[See also Article 70(1)(b) above] 
Article 56. Application of a treaty in 
point of time 
 
1. The provisions of a treaty do not apply 
to a party in relation to any fact or act 
which took place or any situation which 
ceased to exist before the date of entry 
into force of the treaty with respect to 
that party, unless the contrary appears 
from the treaty. 
 
2. Subject to Article 53, the provisions of 
a treaty do not apply to a party in relation 
 
 
 
Not included. 
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INSTITUTE RESOLUTION 1956 
[46 AIDI (1956), at 364-5] 
WALDOCK THIRD REPORT 1964 
[YILC (1964-II), at 8-10, 52-65] 
ILC DRAFT ARTICLES 1964 
[YILC (1964-II), at 177-179, 199-208] 
ILC DRAFT ARTICLES 1966 
[YILC (1966-II), at 217-226] 
  
to any fact or act which takes place or 
any situation which exists after the traty 
has ceased to be in force with respect to 
that party, unless the treaty otherwise 
provides. 
 
[See also Article 69(1)(b) above] 
 
 
* * * 
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ANNEX III  
UMBRELLA CLAUSE COMPARATIVE TABLE  
Award A B C D E 
SGS v Pakistan 
Art. 11 Swiss-Pakistan BIT Either Contracting Party shall 
constantly guarantee the 
observance of the commitments it has entered into 
with respect to the 
investments 
 
of the investors of the other 
Contracting Party. 
 
SGS v Philippines 
Art. X(2) Swiss-Philippines BIT Each Contracting Party shall  observe any obligation it has assumed 
with regard to specific 
investments 
in its territory by investors of 
the other Contracting Party. 
El Paso v Argentina 
LGE v Argentina 
Art. II(2)(c) Argentina-US BIT 
Each Party shall  observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard to investments. -- 
Salini v Jordan 
Art. 2(4) Italy-Jordan BIT Each Contracting Party shall 
create and maintain in its 
territory 
a legal framework apt to guarantee the 
investors the continuity of legal 
treatment, including the compliance, in 
good faith, of all undertakings assumed 
with regard to each specific 
investor. 
[reference to territory in 
column B] 
Eureko v Poland see para. 244 
Art. 3(5) Netherlands-Poland BIT Each Contracting Party shall  observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard to investors 
of the other Contracting 
Party. 
Fedax v Venezuela 
Art. 3(4) Netherlands-Venezuela 
BIT 
Each Contracting Party shall  observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard to the treatment of investments 
of nationals of the other 
Contracting Party. 
Noble Ventures 
Art. II (2)(c) Romania-US BIT Each Party shall observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard to investments. -- 
Joy Mining v Egypt 
Art. 2(2) UK-Egypt BIT Each Contracting Party shall observe  any obligation it may have entered into with regard to investments 
of nationals or companies of 
the other Contracting Party. 
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ANNEX IV 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND MATTERS REQUIRING FURTHER RESEARCH 
1. Promotion of ‘respectful co-existence’ between FIATs: FIATs should be 
urged by the international investment law community, as far as possible, to 
avoid inconsistency.  While it is recognised that FIATs have no obligation to 
follow treaty interpretations made by prior FIATs, at the least, a need for 
‘respectful co-existence’ between FIATs is required, similar to what has been 
recommended to maintain a co-operative relationship between international 
judicial bodies whose competences may overlap.995  In a similar vein, domestic 
courts are increasingly showing respect for decisions foreign courts and are 
displaying concern for harmony in the interpretation of treaties by different 
courts.  In Rocklea Spinning Mills Pty Ltd v Anti-Dumping Authority, for 
example, the Australian Federal Court made the following pertinent 
observation: ‘as a broad principle, it is obviously desirable that expressions 
used in international agreements should be construed, as far as possible, in a 
uniform and consistent manner by both municipal courts and international 
courts and panels to avoid a multitude of divergent approaches in the territories 
of the contracting parties on the same matter’.996  This type of mutual respect 
and comity should be an example that FIATs should strive to follow.  If 
national courts, which generally are in no way bound by foreign court 
decisions, can take this approach, there is no reason why FIATs cannot follow 
suit.  More research to explore ways for promoting consistency in treaty 
interpretations is needed.       
2. Submission rights for non-disputing States: States should consider 
incorporating provisions into future BITs that grant the non-disputing State 
party to a BIT the opportunity, should it wish, to make submissions in an 
investment arbitration instituted under that BIT.  Such a provision may follow 
                                                 
995 See, e.g., Carl-August Fleischhauer, ‘The Relationship Between the International Court of Justice 
and the Newly Created International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea’, 1 Max Planck Yearbook of 
United Nations Law (1997) p. 333; and the speech by Judge Rosalyn Higgins, in her capacity as 
President of the International Court of Justice, at the tenth anniversary of the International Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea, 29 September 2006, available at <http://www.icj-
cij.org/court/index.php?pr=1880&pt=3&p1=1&p2=3&p3=1>. 
996 (1995) 129 ALR 401, at 415 per Spender, Einfeld and Tamberlin JJ.  The Court in this case accorded 
substantial weight to relevant decisions of the European Court of Justice.  See also Savvin (2000) at 
511; Kotsambasis at 500 per Meagher J.A..  D’Agostino and Jones have adeptly articulated this very 
point in relation to the interpretation of the Energy Charter Treaty.  See D’Agostino and Jones, ‘Energy 
Charter Treaty: a Step Towards Consistency in International Investment Arbitration?’, 25 Journal of 
Energy and Natural Resources Law 225 (2007), at 242.  Those authors also suggest that to achieve 
consistency in cases where similar proceedings brought under the ECT are heard (1) by different 
tribunals and (2) at the same time, the temporary suspension of one set of proceedings may be required 
pending the conclusion of the other in order that the tribunals are given sufficient opportunity to work 
toward consistency with each other’s awards.  Ibid., at 243.  
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Article 1128 of the NAFTA997 or perhaps even require the arbitral tribunal to 
notify the non-disputing State of any required interpretation of the relevant 
BIT.  A filing of submissions by a non-disputing party should not be 
mandatory because it is understood that non-disputing State parties to BITs 
may not wish to be drawn into the dispute or may have other reasons why it 
wishes not to file such submissions.  Although States may not feel a need for 
this type of provision in every BIT, the utility of such a clause in certain 
circumstances is evident in the letter by the Swiss government to the ICSID 
Secretariat expressing its concern that it was not consulted in the SGS v 
Pakistan proceedings in relation to the interpretation of the Switzerland-
Pakistan BIT.  The comments of the home State on the interpretation of the 
BIT may partially redress the imbalance in terms of access to the preparatory 
materials of that treaty vis-à-vis the investor and the host State. 
3. Requirement of reasons for non-use of Vienna Convention Rules: Tribunals 
that do not refer to or apply the Vienna Convention Rules should be 
encouraged to explain why they have not done so.998  After all, a decision not 
to apply rules of customary international law ought not to be made lightly.  
The failure of international decisions to divulge the reasons why they did not 
apply the Vienna Convention Rules does not assist the development of those 
Rules.  If a practice emerged in which reasons are stated as to why the rules 
were not applied, it would draw attention to areas or aspects of the Vienna 
Convention Rules in which extra care should be exercised or where alternative 
approaches or improvements to the Rules need to be considered.   
4. Introduction of uniformity clauses in treaties: It is not recommended that 
provisions specifically requiring the application of the Vienna Convention 
Rules be incorporated into investment treaties.  Such a requirement would 
impose a suffocating grip on arbitrators who may be able to apply or consider 
more economical and acceptable approaches outside of those Rules. 999  
However, a strategy to reduce divergent interpretations of future investment 
treaties may take the form of incorporating provisions to the effect that ‘in the 
interpretation of this treaty, regard should be had to the need to promote 
uniformity in its application and interpretation’.1000  On a practical level, by 
                                                 
997 That Article provides that any NAFTA party may make submissions to a NAFTA Tribunal on a 
question of an interpretation of NAFTA.  See, e.g., Metalclad v Mexico, in which the Article was relied 
on by Canada, whose submission rejected Metalclad’s interpretation of NAFTA Article 1110.  
Metalclad, at 218, para. 24.  See also Friedman in 2(2) Transnational Dispute Management 45 (2005).   
998 See, e.g., this author’s remark in his case report on the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, 101 
American Journal of International Law 616 (2007). 
999 In principle, however, the rules contained in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention should 
always be applicable, irrespective of whether there is express reference to their use in a treaty, because 
they reflect rules of customary international law. 
1000 See, e.g., similar provisions contained in Article 7 of the Vienna Convention on the International 
Sale of Goods and Article 18 of the Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contract Obligations 
1980. 
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itself, such instruction will not assure harmony in interpretation.  It would seek 
simply to give added emphasis to the need to be mindful of other decisions and 
the expectations that the parties have as to predictability and consistency in 
decisions relating to the same or similar treaties.  Also, the clause should make 
clear that it is not intended to establish any system of precedent.  
5. Modifications to the Vienna Convention Rules: If ever an attempt is made to 
modify the Vienna Convention (a highly unlikely prospect in the near future), 
consideration should be given to amending Article 31(1) in order to clarify that 
the object and purpose to be taken into account may either be that of the treaty 
as a whole or a particular provision.  Also, it would be advisable to incorporate 
a provision that explicitly refers to the principle of effectiveness in the Vienna 
Convention Rules given its constant and useful deployment in international 
and FIAT case law, and if only to draw attention to it as a fundamental 
principle of treaty interpretation that is of equivalent stature to most of the 
Article 31 criteria. 
6. Better investor access to preparatory work: More consideration should be 
given to procedures that may improve the position of the investor vis-à-vis 
access to the preparatory work of the BIT under which it bases its treaty claim.  
Some possible options may be (1) to give the tribunal an express power to 
request the relevant preparatory work from any State parties to the relevant 
treaty; 1001  (2) to give the tribunal an express power to request the non-
disputing State, should it wish, the opportunity to provide the claimant access 
to relevant preparatory work or for their comments; (3) to encourage and 
promote the preparation and maintenance of more detailed and transparent 
public records in respect of investment treaty negotiations; and (4) to give 
tribunals the power to limit the disputing State’s reliance to its advantage on 
the preparatory work if that State does not disclose to the claimant all relevant 
materials (within the limits of its legal obligations restricting such disclosure).  
More research in this field is required with a view to developing suitable 
solutions for the imbalance in access to the preparatory material.  
7. Use of different language versions: The comparison of different language 
versions of investment treaties has not been used as a common tool by FIATs 
for the interpretation of ambiguous terms.  This area is in need of more 
exploration.  It may provide in some cases an important means with which to 
confirm or even arrive at an interpretation. 
* * * 
                                                 
1001 See, e.g., Article 13 of the WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement 
of Disputes pursuant to which WTO panels have the right to seek information and technical advice 
from any individual or body which it deems appropriate. 
